A Long Way to Go by McAuliffe, Marie & Koser, Khalid
A LONG WAY TO GO
IRREGULAR MIGRATION PATTERNS, PROCESSES,  
DRIVERS AND DECISION-MAKING

A LONG WAY TO GO
IRREGULAR MIGRATION PATTERNS, PROCESSES,  
DRIVERS AND DECISION-MAKING
EDITED BY MARIE MCAULIFFE  
AND KHALID KOSER
Published by ANU Press
The Australian National University
Acton ACT 2601, Australia
Email: anupress@anu.edu.au
This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au
A catalogue record for this 
book is available from the 
National Library of Australia
ISBN(s): 9781760461775 (print)
 9781760461782 (eBook)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying 
or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design and layout by ANU Press. Cover photograph adapted from: Sydney, Australia 
by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, flic.kr/p/cE8dwS.
This edition © 2017 ANU Press
Contents
List of Figures  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . vii
List of Tables   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . xiii
List of Acronyms  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . xvii
Contributors  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .xix
Foreword  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . xxv
Mark Matthews
Preface  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .xxix
Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser
1 . Introduction   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1
Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser 
2 . Irregular maritime migration as a global phenomenon  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .11
Marie McAuliffe and Victoria Mence
3 . Placing Sri Lankan maritime arrivals in a broader  
migration context  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .49
Dinuk Jayasuriya and Marie McAuliffe
4 . The root causes of movement: Exploring the determinants  
of irregular migration from Afghanistan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .77
Craig Loschmann, Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel
5 . Seeking the views of irregular migrants: Decision-making,  
drivers and migration journeys  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .103
Marie McAuliffe
6 . Leaving family behind: Understanding the irregular migration  
of unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .141
Ignacio Correa-Velez, Mariana Nardone and Katharine Knoetze
7 . Indonesia as a transit country in irregular migration  
to Australia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .167
Graeme Hugo, George Tan and Caven Jonathan Napitupulu
8 . The process of Sri Lankan migration to Australia focusing  
on irregular migrants seeking asylum  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .197
Graeme Hugo and Lakshman Dissanayake
9 . Applications for asylum in the developed world: Modelling  
asylum claims by origin and destination  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .227
Tim Hatton and Joseph Moloney
10 . Assisted voluntary return and reintegration of migrants: 
A comparative approach   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .255
Khalid Koser and Katie Kuschminder
11 . Media and migration: Comparative analysis of print  
and online media reporting on migrants and migration  
in selected countries  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .277
Marie McAuliffe, Warren Weeks and Khalid Koser
12 . Environmentally related international migration:  
Policy challenges  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .317
Victoria Mence and Alex Parrinder
13 . Conclusions  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .343
Khalid Koser and Marie McAuliffe
vii
List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Number of irregular maritime arrivals to Australia,  
1976–2014  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2.1: Global internet and mobile telephone access . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 2.2: Maritime migrant interdictions since 1982 by fiscal year . . . 25
Figure 2.3: Number of IMAs to Australia, 1976–2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 2.4: Proportion of detected irregular arrivals by region  
and mode of travel around 2012  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Figure 3.1: Departures for foreign employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 3.2: Remittances globally and from the Middle East . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 3.3: Sri Lankan diaspora in all OECD countries, 2000,  
2006 and 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 3.4: Remittances from OECD countries, 2010, 2011  
and 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 3.5: Asylum applications submitted in Sri Lanka, 2005–12 . . . 58
Figure 3.6: Sri Lankan asylum seekers and refugees, 2001–12  . . . . . . 60
Figure 3.7: Australian visas granted to Sri Lankans,  
2009–10 to 2012–13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 3.8: Sri Lankan irregular maritime arrivals,  
January 2011 – June 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 3.9: Sri Lankan asylum seekers: Key destination countries, 
2007–12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Figure 3.10: Asylum applications in 43 industrialised countries  
and IMAs, 2001–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A LoNG WAy To Go
viii
Figure 3.11: Reasons why ‘intenders’ want to leave Sri Lanka  
and enter Australia via boat  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 3.12: Reasons why ‘intenders’ wanted to leave Sri Lanka  
and why they wanted to enter Australia via boat—sample  
restricted to ‘economic intenders’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Figure 3.13: Intenders’ preferred destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Figure 3.14: Reasons why ‘intenders’ are attracted to destination 
countries (all countries) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Figure 4.1: Migration and return flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Figure 4.2: Educational attainment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 4.3: Employment status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Figure 4.4: Main reason for migration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Figure 4.5: Main reason for choosing destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Figure 5.1: Respondents’ links to Australia prior to departing  
origin country  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Figure 5.2: Sources of information relied upon when making the  
final decision that Australia would be the destination . . . . . . . . 124
Figure 5.3: Individual and collective decision-making: Decision  
to leave and decision to travel to Australia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 5.4: Respondents’ travelling companions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 5.5: Assistance respondents received to travel to Australia  . . . 126
Figure 5.6: Number of transit countries by citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Figure 5.7: Aspects of feeling safe during journey to Australia  . . . . . 128
Figure 5.8: Experiences of the journey to, and life in, Australia. . . . . 130
Figure 5.9: Respondents’ perceptions of living in Australia . . . . . . . . 130
Figure 5.10: Respondents’ perceptions of living in Australia  
by primary language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Figure 7.1: Intending asylum seekers in Indonesia: Arrival location 
and place of interview of respondents to survey . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Figure 7.2: Trajectories of movement of 40 Iraqi asylum  
seekers, 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
ix
LIST oF FIGUrES
Figure 7.3: Encountering border control/immigration authorities  
when illegally entering Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Figure 7.4: Mode of transport used to enter Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Figure 7.5: Socialising with local Indonesians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Figure 7.6: Have you applied for asylum in Indonesia? . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Figure 7.7: Importance of sending remittances to family back  
in home country  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Figure 7.8: Preferred countries of resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Figure 7.9: Number of attempts to Australia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Figure 7.10: Intending IMAs to Australia: Use of an Indonesian  
local to arrange passage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Figure 7.11: Intention to return to home country after resettlement . . 192
Figure 7.12: Would they still have migrated if they had known  
of the difficulties of irregular migration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Figure 8.1: Countries of residence of the Sri Lankan  
diaspora, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Figure 8.2: Sri Lanka: Departures for foreign employment,  
1986–2011  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Figure 8.3: Settler arrivals from Sri Lanka to Australia,  
1959–60 to 2012–13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Figure 8.4: Australia: Sri Lankan–born by visa category,  
2003–04 to 2012–13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Figure 8.5: Long-term arrivals from Sri Lanka to Australia,  
1959–60 to 2012–13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Figure 8.6: Level of post-school qualification of total Australian  
and Sri Lankan–born population, 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Figure 8.7: Refugees and asylum applicants from Sri Lanka,  
1985–2012  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Figure 8.8: Asylum claims, Sri Lankan nationals, six most  
important countries, 2006–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Figure 8.9: Number of licensed agencies, 1985–2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A LoNG WAy To Go
x
Figure 8.10: Departure for foreign employment by district,  
2006 and 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
Figure 8.11: Unauthorised arrivals to Australia,  
1989–90 to 2012–13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Figure 8.12: Number of voluntary and nonvoluntary returnees  
from Australia, 2012–13  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Figure 8.13: District of origin of irregular maritime migrants,  
2012 and 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Figure 8.14: Number of people captured while departing to  
Australia by ethnicity, January 2012 to October 2013 . . . . . . . 218
Figure 9.1: Asylum applications to 38 countries by region  
of asylum, 1989–2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Figure 9.2: Asylum applications to Australia and 37 industrialised 
countries (1997 = 100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Figure 9.3: Composite policy index, Australia and 18-country  
average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Figure 10.1: Factors determining the decision to return . . . . . . . . . . 258
Figure 11.1: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online  
media in selected very high HD countries by volume—key 
migration themes: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Figure 11.2: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online  
media in selected very high HD countries by proportion—key 
migration themes: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Figure 11.3: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration 
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries 
combined—all migration themes: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Figure 11.4: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration  
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries  
by country—all migration themes: Phase I and II  . . . . . . . . . . 290
Figure 11.5: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration 
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries—
immigration and immigrants theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . 292
xi
LIST oF FIGUrES
Figure 11.6: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration 
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries—
irregular migration theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Figure 11.7: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration  
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries—
asylum seekers and refugees theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . 294
Figure 11.8: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected very high HD countries—all migration  
themes, October 2013 to March 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Figure 11.9: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected very high HD countries—immigration  
and immigrants theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Figure 11.10: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected very high HD countries—irregular migration 
theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Figure 11.11: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected very high HD countries—asylum seekers  
and refugees theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Figure 11.12: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online  
media in selected other HD countries by volume—key  
migration themes: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Figure 11.13: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online  
media in selected other HD countries by proportion—key 
migration themes: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Figure 11.14: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of  
migration in print and online media in selected other HD 
countries combined—all migration themes: Phase I and II  . . . 305
Figure 11.15: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of  
migration in print and online media in selected other HD 
countries—key migration themes: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Figure 11.16: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of  
migration in print and online media in selected other HD 
countries—overseas workers theme: Phase I and II . . . . . . . . . . 307
A LoNG WAy To Go
xii
Figure 11.17: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of  
migration in print and online media in selected other HD 
countries—irregular migration theme: Phases I and II . . . . . . . 308
Figure 11.18: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected other HD countries—all migration themes: 
Phases I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Figure 11.19: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected other HD countries—overseas workers  
theme: Phases I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Figure 11.20: Framing of migration messages in print and online  
media in selected other HD countries—irregular migration  
theme: Phases I and II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
xiii
List of Tables
Table 2.1: Difficulties in measuring irregular migration . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 2.2: Definition of irregular migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Table 2.3: Estimated size of irregular migrant populations  
by region/country  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 3.1: International students from Sri Lanka in OECD countries . . 53
Table 3.2: Top 10 industrialised countries for the Sri Lankan  
diaspora, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table 3.3: Top 10 sources of remittances to Sri Lanka,  
2012 (industrialised countries only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 3.4: Sri Lankan global asylum applications, 2012 
(selected countries) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Table 4.1: Overview by regularity status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Table 4.2: Probit model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Table 4.3: Probit model, post-2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Table A1: Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Table A2: Summary statistics, post-2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Table 5.1: Social proximity to migration and travel for work  . . . . . . 113
Table 5.2: Problems faced by respondents in country of origin  
prior to travel: Protection and non-protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Table 5.3: Reasons for leaving country of origin: Protection  
and non-protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Table 5.4: Problems faced in origin country and/or reasons  
for leaving country of origin: Protection and non-protection  
factors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A LoNG WAy To Go
xiv
Table 5.5: Respondents’ consideration of Australia as a destination 
country and reasons for travelling to Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Table 5.6: People involved in decision-making processes  . . . . . . . . . 124
Table 7.1: Birthplace of survey respondents compared with IMAs 
in Australia, 2011–13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Table 7.2: Reasons for entering Indonesia illegally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Table 7.3: Negative experiences/abuses experienced by respondents  . . 180
Table 7.4: Reasons for irregularly migrating to Australia . . . . . . . . . . 182
Table 7.5: Source of financial support in Indonesia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Table 7.6: Reasons encouraging settlement in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . 185
Table 7.7: Stakeholders assisting with migration to Australia by 
nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Table 7.8: Contract or agreement with smuggler for failed  
migration to Australia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Table 7.9: Duration spent in Indonesia before departing  
for Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Table 7.10: Location from which respondents departed  
for Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Table 8.1: Major historical trends in Sri Lankan migration  
to Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Table 8.2: Growth of the Sri Lankan–born population in Australia, 
1901–2011  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Table 8.3: Australia: Humanitarian settlers from Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . 205
Table 8.4: Persons in Australia indicating their ancestry was Tamil  
by birthplace, 2006 and 2011  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Table 8.5: Number of Sri Lankan–born individual persons  
travelling in and out of Australia temporarily by resident  
status, 1998–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Table 8.6: Sri Lankan global asylum applications, 2012 and 2014 . . 212
Table 8.7: Sri Lankan irregular migrants detected by the Sri Lankan 
authorities, 2009–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
xv
LIST oF TAbLES
Table 9.1: Asylum applications to Australia and 18 other  
destination countries (total), 2004–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Table 9.2: Asylum applications, origin and destination effects,  
1997–2012 (Dependent variable: log asylum applications  
from origin to destination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Table 9.3: Asylum applications and policy effects, 1997–2012 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from origin  
to destination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Table 9.4: Asylum applications and policy effects, 1997–2012 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from origin  
to destination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Table 9.5: Predicted change in asylum applications due to political  
terror and civil liberties (percentage)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Table 9.6: Predicted change in asylum applications due to policy 
on access and processing (percentage) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Table 11.1: Human Development Index rankings and groupings 
of selected countries in scope, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Table 11.2: World press freedom index ratings and rankings, 2014 . . . 282
Table 12.1: Overview: National-level policies relevant to 




ANAO Australian National Audit Office
BFE Bureau of Foreign Employment (Sri Lanka)
CEAS Common European Asylum System
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DIAC Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Australia)
DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
(Australia)




Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Coordination at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union
GCIM Global Commission on International Migration
GDP gross domestic product
GFC global financial crisis
GN Grama Niladhari
GSM General Skilled Migration
HD human development
HDI Human Development Index
ICG International Crisis Group
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP internally displaced person
ILO International Labor Organization
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IMA irregular maritime arrival
IOM International Organization for Migration
IZA Institute for the Study of Labor
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MV motor vessel
NGO non-governmental organisation
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development
PAC Pacific Access Category
PV protection visa holder
QUT Queensland University of Technology
RSF Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontiéres)
SHP Special Humanitarian Program
SIEV suspected illegal entry vessels
SP service provider
SVP Swiss People’s Party
SWP Seasonal Worker Program
TPS Temporary Protected Status
TPV temporary protection visas
UAM unaccompanied asylum-seeking minor
UASC unaccompanied or separated children
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VOA visa on arrival
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In this information age, characterised by near-instant communication 
at a global level, public policy has become a matter of understanding, 
using and, in turn, being affected by these global information flows—
potentially in unexpected ways. The objectives that national governments, 
and international governance arrangements, seek to achieve can be both 
aided and thwarted by the rapid and comprehensive dissemination of 
information. This information helps the people on whom behaviour-
influencing policies focus to grasp what may happen to them soon and 
to react quickly. Potentially, this easy access to information helps those 
on whom policy focuses to anticipate what may come next by observing 
patterns and analysing what is driving these patterns. Anthony Giddens 
(1987) has framed this issue thus: the understanding of what governments 
are trying to do that is achieved by the people whose behaviours 
governments seek to influence, reciprocally, allows these people to act in 
ways that make a previously valid theory about why they act as they do 
become untrue. He calls this the ‘double hermeneutic’. Governments try 
to learn-by-doing, but those people whose behaviours governments seek 
to shape can ‘learn-by-undoing’.
This double hermeneutic driving learning-by-undoing constrains public 
policy effectiveness—imposing limits to the return on investment on what 
is currently referred to as ‘evidence-based policymaking’. Accumulating 
more evidence on the causes and effects that governments seek to modify 
will only be fruitful if learning-by-undoing is weak. If learning-by-
undoing is strong, and assisted by the transparency and accountability that 
is another feature of modern governance, then collecting and analysing 
more data and placing these results in the public domain will, in itself, 
most likely disappoint policymakers as unintended consequences generate 
nasty surprises (what was expected to work did not work). Consequently, 
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we need enough evidence to make sufficient sense of things to make well-
judged decisions on difficult and risky matters, but we should beware of 
extrapolating this productive relationship in a manner that assumes that 
even more evidence will result in even better policy decisions. Learning-
by-undoing means that this accumulating evidence can, above a threshold, 
start to increase rather than reduce unintended consequences in public 
policy. The result is decreasing marginal returns to investment in more 
evidence as a basis for policy decisions.
Irregular migration is a contemporary manifestation of this challenge. 
Modern communications at a global level makes it easier to grasp 
the gradients of safety, wellbeing and future prospects that crisscross the 
world. People are more aware of why they don’t want to be where they are, 
where they would like to go and how they might get there. As the chapters 
in this book demonstrate, people’s expectations and decisions are shaped 
by the ever-increasing volume of information from many sources, in what 
is becoming a key feature of the information age. Rapidly updated and 
pervasive electronic information is now an integral component of both 
licit and illicit (e.g. people smuggling business) transnational value chains 
that link individual nations’ jurisdictions.
For governments seeking to grapple with these challenges, robust 
evidence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for acting. However, 
for governments, this pervasive and near-instant communication at 
a global level is also a tool for policy delivery. Clearly communicating 
policy intentions changes the expectations of the people and groups 
governments seek to influence—whilst the clients of people smugglers 
may be understandably desperate, the people smuggling businesses are 
able to factor this information on new policy stances into their tactics and 
strategies—potentially leading to faster changes in behaviours than occurs 
when those behaviours simply react to what is happening rather than 
what is expected to happen in the future. Illicit market processes factor 
these risks into the values of assets and investments just as effectively as 
licit market processes.
This book reflects an innovative effort to strengthen government–academic 
collaboration against this complex, important and often very saddening 
background. Conscious of the usefulness of improving the evidence-base on 
irregular migration, we jointly set about putting in place a program, known 
as the Collaborative Research Program on the International Movement 
of People. Developed in Australia as a pilot initiative, this innovative 
government–academic partnership has attracted attention in other countries 
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(and amongst international organisations) as a viable model for investigating 
issues of collective international concern. If implemented on a larger scale 
as a multilateral initiative, this approach could reduce duplication amongst 
nationally commissioned studies and help to exploit the synergies between 
each nation’s own work on irregular migration.
The Research Program was intended to make progress in helping to enrich 
the evidence-base via building an effective partnership between government 
and academia. The program was co-managed by the Crawford School of 
Public Policy at The Australian National University and the Australian 
Government’s Department of Immigration and Border Protection. 
From the university side of things, it was refreshing to work closely, 
and in a trusted manner, with practitioners in government—to balance 
academic research interests and incentives against the differing interests 
and incentives in government. Above all, this collaboration highlighted to 
me the ‘bell curved’ nature of the return on investment in creating more 
evidence: we set about increasing the availability of evidence on irregular 
migration and, in so doing and by virtue of the close collaboration with 
practitioners, learned a little more about the diminishing marginal returns 
to investment that can set in as a result of learning-by-undoing.
The collected papers in this book stand as a record of both the substantive 
achievements in research on irregular migration and as a testimonial to the 
potential that exists for strengthened government–academic collaboration 
to have the ‘dual-use’ impact of seeking to directly inform policy whilst 
also strengthening academic research capability. 
Looking to the future, there may be new ways of approaching the policy 
utility of evidence. 
First, enhanced information flows can create a ‘tug of war’ between 
factors that limit policy effectiveness (via learning-by-undoing) and those 
that increase it (via the ways in which expectations revalue assets and 
investments in the illicit domain). This may open up new perspectives 
on evidence and analysis. Rather than treating evidence too narrowly, 
as information on what has happened so far (and may be happening 
at the moment), we may be able to offset the diminishing marginal 
returns to investment in evidence and analysis by paying more attention 
to the forward-looking expectational dimension: focusing on a better 
understanding how information flows on emerging policy stances are 
likely to shape irregular migration in the future. This perspective is better 
positioned to inform ‘strategic insights’ in public policy.
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Second, the intertwined licit and illicit activities that comprise the 
transnational value chains shaping irregular migration suggest that adopting 
such a perspective may strengthen our understanding of how irregular 
migration is evolving. As a key focus for analysis, these value chains that 
span different national jurisdictions, and that can be rerouted in response 
to nationally based policy initiatives, provide a useful complement to 
nation-state perspectives. This systemic approach would be particularly 
valuable if it were also framed in a forward-looking manner—focused on 
anticipating what may happen based upon the analysis of accumulated 
experience to date. We need a better balance between intelligence and 
strategic insights on what may happen in the future and robust evidence 
on what has happened so far. The experience reflected in this book 
highlights the utility of government–academic collaborations that develop 
a better balance between evidence and strategic insights. This re-balancing 
requires academics to be more willing to move out of the comfort zone of 
analysing evidence of what has happened so far and into the challenging 
domain of insights into what may happen next—some are comfortable 
in this domain, but others less so. This process can be assisted by doing 
far more to frame strategic insight in a scientific manner—as testable 
hypotheses rather than simply as opinion and speculation. Of course, the 
challenge of learning-by-undoing means that some of these hypotheses 
may need to be kept confidential to government for a defined period …
This pragmatic collaborative approach could be particularly useful to 
policymakers by helping to future-proof their interventions—reducing 
the risk of designing policy on the basis of what used to work rather than 
what may work better in the future.
Dr Mark Matthews
SDG-Economic Development, UK
Former Executive Director of the HC Coombs Policy Forum
The Australian National University
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Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser
In its August 2012 report, the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers noted that 
‘the evidence on the drivers and impacts of forced migration is incomplete, 
and more intuitive than factual. As a result, the policymaking process is 
forced to rely on partial and largely qualitative information, rather than 
a solid base of measurement and analysis. Addressing this gap in evidence 
and knowledge is a priority’. The expert panel went on to recommend that 
a research program on irregular migration be established in support of the 
development of a stronger evidence-base to inform policy deliberations. 
The expert panel envisaged that, among other things, the program would 
‘focus on the drivers and determinants of irregular migration, including 
why people decide to leave their home countries, how they travel between 
source, transit and destination countries, and the irregular and regular 
migration pathways used by asylum seekers’ (Expert Panel on Asylum 
Seekers, 2012, p. 46). 
The Australian Government agreed to all 22 of the panel’s 
recommendations, including the establishment of an irregular migration 
research program. As part of the research program, an occasional paper 
series was established, with the initial paper, Establishing an evidence-base 
for future policy development on irregular migration to Australia, being the 
overarching ‘lead’ paper for the series (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013). This 
paper was designed to help identify gaps in knowledge and research in the 
Australian context by comparing it to international research, and to make 
recommendations about how to fill these gaps, drawing on international 
experience. The paper was the template for the research program, helping 
guide the program managers and advisers as they commissioned empirical 
research on irregular migration to Australia.
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Just over five years later, this book compiles occasional papers commissioned 
under the irregular migration research program established in response 
to the expert panel’s recommendation. The papers selected for inclusion 
provide empirical research and analysis on aspects of irregular migration, 
and have been ordered according to the migration cycle, with contextual 
chapters provided initially, followed by chapters on migrant decision-
making, migration processes, return migration and finally future-focused 
migration thematic chapters.
The idea for this book came out of a November 2014 research workshop on 
irregular migration hosted by The Australian National University’s Crawford 
School of Public Policy in partnership with the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection. The ANU-DIBP research workshop was the second 
under this unique joint collaboration and it brought together researchers 
and policymakers as well as international and Australian members of the 
department’s research advisory groups (listed below).
After two stimulating and intense days of discussions on research proposals 
under development, updates from researchers who were then in the field, 
analysis of administrative data as well as final presentations of research 
findings, there was a sense that the collaboration was bearing fruit, but that 
the research gains needed to be shared more widely. It seemed fitting that 
a book proposal be submitted to ANU Press, in the hope that by bringing 
selected papers commissioned under the research program together in one 
book, a wider audience would be reached. The editors and contributors as 
well as the research advisory group members are hopeful that this objective 
will be achieved as we seek to make a contribution to an under-researched 
and often misunderstood aspect of international migration.
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Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser 
In modern Western history, for the most part, the prevailing governance 
of international migration has generally served many nations reasonably 
well, including Australia. Orderly movement has been largely the norm and 
has contributed to growth in economies, increased human development, 
the capacity to protect large numbers of people facing persecution, and 
the ability of hundreds of millions of people to forge meaningful lives 
abroad. Concomitantly, there is a perception that other countries and 
regions, particularly some non-industrialised nations and peoples, have 
perhaps not fared as well and the benefits of international migration could 
perhaps be described as uneven. 
Against this backdrop, there is growing concern that the less desirable 
aspects  of international migration are increasing in significance and 
magnitude: the growth in irregular migration (including people 
smuggling  and human trafficking); the increasing restrictiveness of 
migration-receiving countries’ entry policies; a sense that national 
identities are being threatened (not just that they are changing); rising 
exploitation of migrants all the way along the migration pathway; and 
increasing harm to migrants, including substantial numbers of deaths 
during journeys (Brian & Laczko, 2014), all threaten the overall dividends 
of international migration.
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Of particular importance to states is the need is to manage irregular 
migration. Irregular migration has in recent decades become a significant 
public policy issue and the focus of considerable human, financial, 
diplomatic, physical/capital, technological, intelligence, operational 
and other resources. In part, many of the negative issues associated with 
irregular migration, and the pressing need to respond to it, perhaps revolve 
around its scale as well as its potential scale. From the little we know 
about actual international irregular migration flows, the combination 
of increasing international movements and a perception that there is 
growing desire for international migration has the capacity to influence 
policy responses. There has at times been a focus within some destination 
countries on deterring irregular migrants, perhaps without appreciating 
fully why or how migration occurs. In this sense, there is good reason to 
develop a better understanding of irregular migration flows—their scale, 
pace, diversity, demography and extent, as well as the mixed motivations 
and multiple factors underpinning them. 
To do so effectively, it is important to analyse irregular migration flows 
within a broader context of other transnational phenomena and global 
forces that are acting to shape, fundamentally alter and even enhance flows 
in dynamic ways. By better understanding irregular migration processes 
and the factors underpinning them we are better able to anticipate the 
consequences of policy, and to formulate effective multidimensional 
responses that can enhance migrant wellbeing, manage borders, assist 
states hosting large numbers of people in need of protection and provide 
opportunities to increase human development in key locations. This book 
is about people, often far from Australia, making difficult migration 
decisions, embarking on dangerous and sometimes high-risk journeys 
to Australia, and about how we might better understand the constraints 
they face, the factors that influence them and the migration journeys 
they undertake. 
Irregular migration as an enduring 
and complex public policy issue
The multiple complex forces of globalisation interact with migration 
dynamics to influence international migration patterns and trends. 
Increasing urbanisation, fluctuating economic circumstances, geopolitical 
insecurity and conflict, development disparities, environmental 
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impacts, population growth and demographic change all influence 
the movement of people, along with factors such as increasing access 
to transportation, telecommunications, social networks and proximity to 
viable migration pathways and agents. Within this context, irregular 
migration is a  contested topic with significant national, regional and 
global implications, particularly in Europe but also in other parts of the 
world. This form of migration presents ongoing challenges and continues 
to raise compelling humanitarian, political, social, economic and security 
concerns. It can be daunting for policymakers to try to balance these 
concerns while developing effective and sustainable strategies to manage 
irregular migration and borders.
The need for policy-relevant research on irregular migration cannot be 
overstated. Examination of the many factors underpinning irregular 
movement is important to the development of a better understanding 
of multicausality and its interconnected dimensions. Scholars have 
recognised that research that is not explicitly policy oriented is also 
crucial, particularly forced migration research that looks beyond the 
policy frames of reference to explore less visible aspects of this form of 
migration (Bakewell, 2008).
As an immigration nation surrounded by sea, Australia’s border-related 
operational capacities, both offshore and onshore, have evolved over 
decades to become among the more advanced in the world. Regular 
migration is planned and regulated in an orderly and predictable manner. 
Further, the dimensions, characteristics and history of international 
managed migration in the Australian context are comprehensively 
researched, and a strong evidence-base exists to inform policy. In contrast, 
irregular migration tends to be disorderly, unpredictable and unregulated. 
Irregular migration thus raises central concerns for governments that want 
to maintain public confidence in the state’s capacity to protect sovereignty 
and manage borders. 
Defining irregular migration
There is a wide range of definitions of ‘irregular’ migrants, including 
those who have purposefully crossed a border without authorisation, 
those who have inadvertently or unknowingly crossed a border without 
authorisation, those who have become irregular sometime after entering 
a country regularly, those who have been trafficked, and those who 
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have been born into irregularity. For the purpose of this book, the term 
‘irregular migration’ is mainly limited to the migration processes involved 
in travelling to and entering a country irregularly. We are, therefore, 
interested in intentional migration embarked upon to gain irregular 
entry into a country, regardless of whether this has been unassisted, 
with the help of a smuggler or has been as a result of human trafficking. 
The management and support of irregular migrants within a destination 
country is beyond this book’s scope.
We have chosen this focus for three main reasons. First, the increasing 
number of people crossing borders irregularly poses significant and 
increasingly complex policy and operational challenges for many 
states throughout the world, and some of the responses that have been 
implemented are clearly not working as intended. Second, the irregular 
migration journey is widely recognised as dangerous, often costly and 
sometimes deadly for migrants. While there is widespread support for 
reducing irregular migration in principle, the nature of policy responses is 
often hotly contested. Policy responses that balance the rights and needs of 
migrants with those of nation states and their need to protect sovereignty, 
and that uphold international legal obligations can be difficult to achieve. 
Third, policy responses addressing other aspects of irregular migration 
(e.g. those who become irregular after entering legally) are necessarily 
different to those aimed at influencing migration patterns and processes. 
Estimating irregular migration 
Determining flows of irregular migrants is inherently difficult. Kraler 
and Reichel (2011) argued that ‘wild assumptions, estimates and number 
games are made in regard to irregular migration flows’ (p. 97). Nevertheless, 
sound attempts to quantify irregular movements can provide clear benefits 
to national governments, regional and local governments, international 
organisations, service providers, employers and others. If such actors can 
better understand the number of people engaging in irregular migration, 
they will be better able to develop responses and mitigation strategies 
able to manage the many potentially conflicting interests. These different 
interests may range from those of  governments focused on border 
management, civil society actors focused on safeguarding migrants as far 
as possible from exploitation and other forms of vulnerability, and service 




Australia seems to hold a fairly atypical place among industrialised 
destination countries, in that in Australia it is possible to record and/or 
estimate irregular migration flows reasonably well. Australia’s geography, 
sea borders and relative isolation from regions that have traditionally 
experienced large-scale human displacement and acute refugee flows has 
meant that Australia has developed over recent decades a perhaps unique 
ability among industrialised countries to manage international people 
movement. As a corollary, Australia has, out of necessity, developed 
border management practices that have extended its virtual border well 
beyond its physical border as a means of facilitating travel to what is—
from much of the world’s perspective—an isolated location. Almost all 
international travel to Australia is by air. Multilayered processes have been 
developed focusing on the management of cross-border movements with 
virtually no regulations or processes in place to manage internal migration 
through, for  example, national identity cards, registration processes, 
internal ‘passports’, and other forms of regulation and restriction 
(Koser & McAuliffe, 2013).
With the regulation of international air travel, and considerable 
investment in technology and international cooperation in this regard, 
there has been a fairly constant low number of irregular air arrivals of 
between one and two thousand per year. This contrasts with the peak–
lull dynamic of irregular maritime arrivals (Figure 1.1). In addition, 
the number of irregular migrants living in Australia is very low (around 
62,700 or 0.26 per cent of the population) compared to other countries, 
including the US (around 12 million or 3.85 per cent), and South Africa 
(between 3–5 million or around 7.5 per cent) (McAuliffe & Mence, 2014; 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection [DIBP], 2014).
Further, irregular air arrivals (i.e. those refused immigration clearance at 
airports) represented a very small proportion of all air arrivals (around 
0.013 per cent in 2011–12, or 2,048 of around 15.920 million air arrivals), 
whereas irregular maritime arrivals are a much greater proportion of all 
maritime arrivals (8,371 or 3.1 per cent of 478,000 maritime arrivals in 
2011–12).1 Very few irregular air arrivals lodge asylum claims, and so do 
not pose the same policy challenges as those who arrive irregularly by 
sea. In 2011–12, of the 2,048 irregular air arrivals, just 26 people made 
1  Maritime arrivals are derived from DIBP’s Annual report of 2011–12 (pp. 151 and 219).
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protection claims at the border (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013). In contrast, 
almost all of those who have arrived irregularly by sea in recent years have 
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Figure 1.1: Number of irregular maritime arrivals to Australia, 1976–2014
Source: McAuliffe and Mence (2014), updated.
In terms of asylum seekers who arrived in an authorised manner on 
a visitor or other type of visa, there would appear to be some underlying 
differences between these asylum seekers and those who arrive 
unauthorised. In addition to demographic differences (most notably 
citizenship), behaviours and/or motivations appear to be somewhat 
divergent. For example, in many cases they apply for asylum years after 
they have arrived in Australia. Analysis of 2011–12 program data shows 
that the median time between arrival and application for a protection 
visa for those who arrived by air in an authorised manner was 321 days. 
In  relation to some student visa citizenship groups, median times were 
over 1,000 days (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013, p. 6).
Irregular maritime arrivals in the Australian context have become 
a lightning rod for political, public and academic debate. Australia is not 
alone in this regard: in receiving countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain 
and Malta, the phenomenon is high on the immigration agenda where it 
remains contested and contentious. The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) estimated that in 2015 over one million people arrived 





Part of the problem with the debates about irregular migration is a lack 
of information and data on aspects of its manifestation, as well as of its 
consequences. This is particularly so in the Asia–Pacific region where 
information and data has tended to be fragmented, anecdotal and 
sometimes based on assumptions. Research on the topic can sometimes 
reflect polarised positions. In addition, research is commonly undertaken 
within discrete theoretical disciplines or analytical frameworks, such as 
economics, sociology, demography, anthropology, national sovereignty 
and security, international (refugee) law and human rights (Brettell & 
Hollifield, 2015), which all contribute valuable insights but do not always 
adequately capture the multifaceted and dynamic nature of migration 
processes, including from migrants’ perspectives, that multidisciplinary 
research and analysis is often able to illuminate. 
There has also been an emphasis on the interests and concerns of receiving 
countries, with less attention given to origin, transit and refugee host 
countries, let alone the migrants themselves or their families. This can 
inhibit a more nuanced understanding of the characteristics of populations 
on the move and the reasons for changing migration patterns. Further, 
given the largely invisible, often clandestine nature of irregular migration, 
the difficulty of systematically measuring, researching and understanding 
movements is considerable. Data on irregular movements within the 
Asia–Pacific region are generally not available; research is challenging, 
expensive and sensitive. In other regions, such as the Horn of Africa, 
efforts to overcome such difficulties are bearing fruit and the scale of 
irregular movement, smuggling, trafficking and exploitation of migrants 
is being reported.
Irregular maritime migration flows to Australia have been a contentious 
academic and public policy issue for several decades. Much of the focus 
of the discourse on, and research into, this discrete type of irregular 
migration has been on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees who 
make up these irregular flows. There is a considerable body of literature 
and commentary on these aspects, including on the critical areas of human 
rights, normative frameworks, mental health, settlement and integration, 
international relations and domestic politics. These areas of research and 
scholarly enquiry are extremely important; they are also fairly mature. 
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There is a substantial body of work that exists on these aspects of irregular 
maritime migration to Australia, but much less enquiry into the migration 
patterns, processes, drivers and decision-making underpinning movement.
The contributions in this volume aim to rectify some of the imbalance in 
migration research by presenting empirical research findings on irregular 
migration undertaken in origin, transit and destination countries 
using a range of methods and employing interdisciplinary approaches. 
The chapters in this book originate from the Irregular Migration Research 
Program’s occasional paper series (see background discussion in the 
Preface), and are rooted in a particular period of time, namely 2012 to 
2014. References to recent developments are made in relevant chapters, 
such as the reduction in irregular maritime arrivals to Australia in 2014 
and the increase in arrivals to Europe in 2015; however, the main emphasis 
remains on the period from which this volume emerged.
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Irregular maritime migration 
as a global phenomenon
Marie McAuliffe and Victoria Mence1
The estimated number of international migrants has increased 
dramatically over the past 55 years, from estimates of around 77 million 
in 1960 to around 244 million in 2015 (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA], 2016). During that time, the 
pace of movement has increased as more and more international travel 
links have emerged. There has been an expansion in migration pathways 
as access to air travel has increased, resulting in much greater diversity 
among international travellers (International Migration Institute [IMI], 
2006, p. 2). 
The volume of cross-border movements that many countries around the 
world are facing is increasing, and shows no signs of abating. In the US, 
it is estimated that up to 360 million cross-border movements occurred 
in 2013 (US Customs and Border Protection, 2014). In Australia, 
14.5  million cross-border movements were recorded in program year 
1996–97 compared to 31.6 million in 2011–12. The current estimate 
is that by 2020 Australia will experience 50 million movements per year 
across its border. Countries in Asia are also experiencing increases in 
movement, including labour migration to the economies of Singapore, 
1  The authors are grateful for research assistance from Simone Gangell and Paul Hayes in the 
preparation of this chapter.
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Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand (Hugo, 2014). As access to 
international movement has increased, states have sought to implement 
a range of strategies to manage this increase in scale, pace and diversity. 
Immigration and border management policies and practices have rapidly 
evolved to meet changes in global circumstances and perceptions of risk 
associated with the movement of large numbers of people. 
Alongside increased global mobility more generally, there has been, over 
recent years, an increase in refugees and asylum seekers globally. For 
example, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
data indicate that in 2000 there were around 19 million displaced persons2 
worldwide, compared to 59.5 million in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015).3 There 
has also been a substantial increase in the number of displaced persons4 
since the recent global low of 2003. The overall global population of 
displaced persons more than doubled between 2003 and 2014, from 
14.8 to 59.5 million people.
Against this backdrop of increasing movement and human displacement, 
irregular migration poses enduring challenges, and irregular maritime 
migration most markedly. The humanitarian crisis in the summer of 2015 
involving the maritime (and subsequently land) movements of hundreds 
of thousands of people from Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere via North 
Africa and Turkey highlighted the considerable and highly visible policy 
challenges raised by irregular maritime migration. 
While it is acknowledged that there are limitations in seeking to 
distinguish global irregular maritime migration from other forms of 
irregular migration as well as from broader asylum-related migration flows, 
it is also important to note that it is a phenomenon with attributes that 
are distinguishable from irregular migration by land and air. This paper 
attempts to articulate the key aspects of this phenomenon.
In preparing this chapter, one of the key issues it raised was the relatively 
minor focus irregular maritime migration has received in the academic 
literature compared to other related topics. Perhaps one of the reasons for 
2  This figure comprises refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons and 
various other populations of concern to UNHCR.
3  This figure includes 10.5 million refugees, 925,000 asylum seekers and 17.6 million internally 
displaced persons.
4  For the present purpose, ‘displaced persons’ comprise refugees, asylum seekers, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), stateless persons and ‘others’ of concern. Other aggregate figures used by 
UNHCR may also include populations of returned refugees and returned IDPs.
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a more subdued level of academic enquiry is feasibility. While there can 
be no doubt that irregular maritime migration is a high profile, visually 
powerful form of irregular migration, the ability to conduct research on 
its various aspects is undoubtedly challenging. First, access to potential or 
actual irregular migrants who are willing to engage with researchers can 
be very difficult. The sensitive and profound nature of their experiences 
poses particular challenges. Second, the criminal aspects of irregular 
maritime migration have meant that aspects of counter people smuggling, 
transnational criminal networks and disruption are often unable to be 
examined fully due to the inability of accessing classified information, 
which is not readily available outside government (Koser, 2010). Third, the 
polarised nature of the public discourse surrounding irregular migration 
(and maritime migration in particular) makes examination of the topic 
in a balanced way difficult.
The somewhat more limited level of academic enquiry on the specific topic 
of global irregular maritime migration perhaps also needs to be viewed in 
relation to the seemingly, at times, frantic pace and significant focus it has 
been afforded in terms of policy deliberations of governments around the 
world, including those characterised as ‘source’, ‘transit’ and ‘destination’ 
countries. Attempts to study correlation and causality in complex and 
turbulent policy environments are likely to be compromised.
In terms of the structure of the chapter, the second section below discusses 
irregular migration, including definitions and data issues. The third 
section provides an overview of irregular maritime migration flows in 
key hotspots globally. The fourth section briefly outlines the multifaceted 
nature of irregular maritime migration. The fifth and final section 
concludes by highlighting some of the policy challenges in responding to 
irregular maritime migration.
The broader irregular migration context
Irregular maritime migration is commonly examined in academic 
literature as one element of the much broader occurrence of irregular 
migration, which in turn is a feature of modern migration patterns in an 
era of increased globalisation. The origins of irregular migration, and its 
links to forces driving the dramatic increase in international migration 
in the latter part of the twentieth century, are important themes in the 
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literature. The increase in regular migration and the correspondingly rise of 
irregular migration has, in the view of many commentators, an irresistible 
momentum that is likely to continue (Koser, 2005, p. 7). 
The increase in irregular migration is regarded by many commentators as 
an inevitable consequence of a globalised economy founded on integrated 
markets that fuel high labour demands and high levels of immigration 
(Castles, 2004; Hollifield, 2004). Hollifield looked at what he called the 
‘liberal’ paradox whereby rich developed countries promote and embrace 
open channels of trade, money and labour (particularly by highly skilled 
migrants) whereas the mass movement of unskilled workers willing 
to work for low wages, also necessary to a globalised economy, face 
highly regulated migration controls. This tension between immigration 
restrictions and the demand for labour has, in Hollifield’s view, driven the 
increase in irregular migration (Hollifield, 2004, p. 905). 
For people facing very difficult (and possibly life-threatening) 
circumstances—including persecution, poverty, endemic corruption as 
well as lack of health care, education, employment and/or housing —and 
who have the ability to migrate, industrialised countries with good human 
rights records, sound economies and functioning civil societies will remain 
desirable destinations as they offer, in comparison to other countries, 
a higher standard of living and security as well as the ability to remit funds 
to people remaining in the country of origin. As noted by Terrazas (2011, 
p. 3), ‘[t]he notion that international migration is somehow related to the 
well-being of countries of origin is deeply intuitive’. 
The substantial literature on the relationship between development and 
movement indicates that the ability to migrate is a significant issue. 
The ability to migrate is not related to the ‘strength’ of needs or the depth 
of direness faced, and some groups most in need do not have the resources 
or ability to migrate. Carling, for example, argued that those affected by 
extreme conditions such as warfare can have the strongest migration 
aspirations but a lack of ability to do so: a group he calls the ‘involuntarily 
immobile’ (Carling, 2002). Other significant research has found that as 
human development increases, and access to education, income, housing, 
transport and technology improves, the ability of people to migrate 
increases and populations become more mobile—the so-called ‘hump 
migration’ theory (Martin & Taylor, 1996; Skeldon, 1997; Zelinsky, 
1971). De Haas has argued that the relationship between development, 
economic growth and migration is fundamentally nonlinear so that, for 
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example, while ‘a lack of freedoms is likely to fuel migration aspirations, the 
same lack of freedoms may simultaneously decrease people’s capabilities 
to migrate’ (de Haas, 2011, p. 14).
The securitisation of migration
In the academic literature, international migration has been characterised 
as a non-traditional security issue in the post–Cold War period, along 
with other phenomena such as food and energy access, international 
terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational crime. A school of academic 
thought—the Copenhagen School—conceptualised ‘securitisation’ as the 
characterisation of danger and threat of a particular kind via a speech 
act that moved ‘security’ from the military realm to other realms, such 
as migration (Weaver, 1995).
The end of the Cold War, and the related demise of a powerful external 
threat to the security of the West, enabled the emergence of threats, or 
perceived threats, that involved non-state actors. This had implications 
for a range of global and international issues, particularly those that were 
not (adequately) regulated between states, or those that operated outside 
of states’ control, such as international terrorism. Migrant smuggling and 
human trafficking are other examples of threats involving non-state actors 
that would appear to be largely beyond regulation.
Faist argued that one of the effects of the events of 11 September, 2001 
was that it reinforced the trend towards securitising migration, which 
directly resulted in increased migration control, significant investment 
in border management systems and substantial institutional responses 
(such  as the formation of the US Department of Homeland Security, 
which incorporated the former Immigration and Nationalisation Service), 
most notably in the US but more generally throughout the Western world 
(Faist, 2004). In Miggiano’s view, the intensification of border controls 
is an overt demonstration of the securitisation of migration processes 
that is especially apparent with the deployment of military resources to 
manage sea borders (Miggiano, 2009, pp. 1–8). 
Relatedly, public administration of migration has changed over time, with 
greater focus being afforded to security aspects, as reflected in the changed 
roles and responsibilities of government departments and agencies. 
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Migration has increasingly become a focus of security-related agencies, 
although the implications resulting from the changing focus for migration 
as a public policy issue remain unclear (Koser, 2012).
Some of the other consequences of securitising migration discussed 
in the literature include aspects related to migrant integration 
(Ceyhan  &  Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans, 2000; Mulvey, 2010) as well 
as the heightened expectations of the public that governments should, 
and are able to, control transnational movements across their borders 
(Faist, 2004, p. 4). Issues of human security are also addressed, as well 
as the tensions between national security concerns and human security, 
which ‘broadens the scope of security analysis and policy from terri torial 
security to the security of people’ (Gomez & Gasper, 2013), especially 
in relation to migration policies and the negative impacts on migrants 
(Doneys, 2011).
The implications for the management of irregular migration are potentially 
profound. There is no doubt that the phenomenon is currently portrayed 
as a security issue in destination countries, and some argue that the impact 
of the securitisation of migration in the twenty-first century is on course 
to intensify (Humphrey, 2013).
The role of telecommunications and the media
The role of telecommunications and the media’s portrayals of migration 
should not be underestimated, particularly in the context of increasing 
migration flows and the technological advances in communications 
contributing to globalisation (Hopkins, 2009). Coverage of migration 
in various media, such as newspapers and television, has been noted 
for its polarisation, particularly in Europe. Key findings by academics 
indicate that references to migration in the media are generally episodic 
rather than consistent, increasingly focused on irregular migration, 
and are often associated with topics of criminality or border protection 
(Kim, Carvalho, Davis, & Mullins, 2011; Pickering, 2001; Threadgold, 
2009). The securitisation of migration in recent times is prevalent in media 
coverage on migration (Global Commission on International Migration 
[GCIM], 2005; Koser, 2012).
A more recent issue concerning irregular migration and media coverage 
is the possibility that public information could be exploited by people 
smugglers. With the launch of Operation Sovereign Borders in September 
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2013, the Australian Government restricted the dissemination of 
information on operational matters, citing public interest immunity. 
The  decision to not release operational information was based on the 
grounds that such information would place people involved in operations 
at risk and unnecessarily cause damage to Australia’s national security, 
defence and international relations (Morrison, 2014). Part of the rationale 
was also that such information would provide migrant smugglers with 
the opportunity to avoid detection or to precipitate a search and rescue 
response (Campbell, 2014).
Improved telecommunications provide migrants greater access to 
information, and act to strengthen social bonds between diaspora and 
countries of origin. Access to remittances via enhanced technology is 
also likely to be relevant to particular groups. As highlighted by Vertovec 
(as cited in Nedelcu, 2012, p. 1341):
[Information communications technologies] enable new forms of 
migrant transnationalism characterised not only by the growing intensity 
of transnational exchanges and activities, but also by a ubiquitous system 
of communication that allows migrants to connect with multiple, 
geographically distant and culturally distinct worlds to which they 
identify and participate on a daily basis.
Family, friends and community members who have migrated 
internationally inspire potential migrants to achieve the same outcome 
and can provide tangible assistance to migrate, including information, 
funds and advice. Together with enhanced ‘real time’ communications 
technology, these networks provide potential migrants with an improved 
ability to assess their migration options. It is important, however, not 
to overestimate the impact of newer communications technologies. 
Despite the internet being considered a global communications medium, 
for example, access to the internet is still limited in many locations. 
This makes accurate measurement of its level of influence difficult 
(Rabogoshvili, 2012). Further, access alone does not ensure adoption of 
new technologies. Differential access by race, class, sex and ethnicity are 
factors in technological engagement (Panagakos & Horst, 2006). Access 
to mobile telephones, however, appears to have increased dramatically, as 
can be seen in Figure 2.1.


































Figure 2.1: Global internet and mobile telephone access
Source: Data extracted from World bank (2015). A similar version of this graph was 
published by The brookings Institution on 25 February, 2014, www .brookings .edu/
research/interactives/2014/snapshot-6-rorschach-tests-international-order .
Interconnectedness, diaspora and mobility
The influence of diaspora has long been considered a factor in migration, 
including irregular migration. Diaspora provide social networks for 
potential irregular migrants, which can serve as ‘feedback mechanisms’ 
(Banerjee, 1983; Crisp, 1999; Meyer, 2001). These networks consist 
mostly of family, friends, community or religious organisations, as well as 
people smugglers and others who assist in the migration journey (Koser & 
Pinkerton, 2002). Once established, social networks may facilitate further 
migration, including affecting destination choice, providing information 
and material assistance, and offering a source of emotional support. 
While empirical evidence about the role of social networks in irregular 
migration is more limited (Crisp, 1999; de Haas, 2011; Staring, 2004), 
it is probable that transnational networks play a vital role in helping 
people circumnavigate the challenges involved in irregular migration 
(Crisp, 1999). It has been noted that such networks are especially important 
in providing the organisational infrastructure required for people to 
migrate clandestinely or irregularly, i.e. through people smuggling, the 
trafficking of persons or the irregular movement of asylum seekers.
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In addition to facilitating the migration process itself, transnational social 
networks provide irregular migrants with subsistence and support upon 
arrival (Crisp, 1999). Important for any migrant, the provision of support 
in the form of possible sources of income and assistance is particularly 
vital for illegal migrants (Blaschke, 1998), who are more restricted from 
accessing employment opportunities or possibly even their own financial 
holdings in their country of origin.
Interconnections between diaspora and communities in their country of 
origin are perhaps stronger than ever before as a result of increased access 
and technological improvements in telecommunications and travel. 
The use of the internet in particular has been viewed to have strengthened 
transnational networks, putting those who have migrated in contact not 
only with their immediate family and friends, but with ‘virtual ethnic 
communities’ on the basis of common descent (Conversi, 2012). 
For all that is known about the influence of diaspora on migration, there 
is much that is assumed, particularly relating to irregular migration. 
The difficulties with conducting research on irregular migration discussed 
in the introduction of this paper have resulted in a knowledge gap 
regarding irregular migrants’ decision-making processes that, if filled, 
would reveal more about the role of diaspora in irregular migration.
Data and definitions
According to the latest UNDESA Population Division report on 
international migration, in 2015 an estimated 244 million people, or 
3.3  per cent of the world’s population, were international migrants, 
compared with 175 million in 2000 and 154 million in 1990. Between 
1990 and 2013, the estimated number of international migrants 
worldwide rose by over 77 million or by 50 per cent. Much of this growth 
occurred between 2000 and 2010 (UNDESA, 2016).
In terms of the proportion of migrants that are thought to travel irregularly, 
broad estimates are available to provide indications of irregular migration 
globally. The United Nations, for example, has estimated that globally 
there are approximately 30 to 40 million irregular or undocumented 
migrants, a number that equates to between 15 and 20 per cent of all 
international migrants (UNDESA, 2003). 
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Some commentators question the utility of attempting to quantify 
irregular migration, citing the practical difficulties as well as the underlying 
rationale for collecting and citing such statistics, which can amount to 
alarmism (Castles, 2002; Clarke, 2000). There are, however, clear benefits 
in attempting to quantify irregular movements, including from the 
perspectives of national governments, regional and local governments, 
international organisations, service providers, employers and others. 
A better understanding of irregular migration, including in relation to 
quantity, allows for the development of responses and mitigation strategies 
as a means of managing the multitude of potentially conflicting interests.
Challenges in defining and quantifying 
irregular migration
Understanding the scale and nature of irregular migration is important, 
not only in national and regional contexts but also in a global context, as 
a means of identifying trends and patterns for a range of policy, economic 
and geopolitical reasons. There are, however, significant challenges in 
establishing reliable estimates upon which meaningful analysis and useful 
comparisons can be made (Koser, 2010). A summary of these challenges 
is included in Table 2.1, which highlights the inherent difficulties in 
accurately placing the quantum of irregular migration in a broader context.
Table 2.1: Difficulties in measuring irregular migration
Aggregating data Tends to disguise the complexity of irregular migration, e .g . ‘mixed 
flows’ consists of economic migrants and those fleeing persecution
Lack of comparable data both over time and between locations 
Media Media tendency to focus on the highest available estimate
Statistics may be used more to alarm than inform
Confusion in 
definitions
Irregular migration covers a range of people who can be in an 
irregular situation for different reasons, and people can switch from 
a regular to irregular status, or vice versa
Stocks and flows Can be difficult to differentiate between the two and discern what 
is actually being counted
Flows usually only focus on entries, not exits or return flows
Stocks assume permanence, when migrants may leave, change 
their status or die
Impossible to combine both stocks and flows to gain a total estimate
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Part of the difficulty is related to definitional issues, which may differ by 
jurisdiction, as well as the wide-ranging nature of ‘irregular’ status, which 
can result, for example, from people entering countries undetected through 
sophisticated smuggling operations as well as from minor administrative 
issues that have the effect of rendering a person irregular. A useful summary 
of the main categories of irregular migrants is summarised in Table 2.2, 
highlighting the complexity of ‘irregularity’, which clearly has its more 
benign forms, particularly when viewed in the border management and/
or security context.
Table 2.2: Definition of irregular migration
In principle, irregular migration populations can be divided into five categories:
1 Migrants who have illegally entered the country by either physically evading formal 
immigration control or presenting false papers .
2 Migrants who legally entered the country for a fixed period which has expired; they 
did not renew their permission to stay and are therefore unlawful overstayers .
3 Migrants who are lawfully entitled to reside in the country, but are in breach of some 
visa condition, notably by working more than their immigration status permits .
4 Asylum seekers who legally entered the country to pursue a case for refugee 
status, but who remain despite a final decision refusing them a continuing right 
to remain .
5 Children born in the country to such ‘irregular migrants’, who also lack a right 
to remain although they are not themselves migrants .
Source: Gordon, Scanlon, Travers, and Whitehead (2009).
Difficulties in quantifying irregular migration notwithstanding, it can be 
an important exercise, not least because it highlights the very substantial 
differences in estimates. In this regard, the imprecise nature of the task of 
quantification becomes apparent, and the need to treat data on irregular 
migration with caution is underscored. For example, estimates on the 
number of irregular migrants in Europe has varied widely from two to 
eight million (Koser, 2005). Recent reports estimate that there are around 
12 million in the US (Hoefer, Rytina, & Baker, 2011). Some  reports 
estimate that there are ‘several’ million irregular migrants in South and 
South East Asia, and between three and five million in South Africa 
(Koser, 2005). Further information on the estimated number of irregular 
migrants in selected locations is in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Estimated size of irregular migrant populations by region/
country
Region/country Time period Estimated population 
(stock)
Source
European Union 2007 4 .5 million (a)
2008 1 .9–3 .8 million (b)
2008 8 million (c)
united Kingdom 2007 417,000–863,000 (d)
2009 750,000 (e)
Italy 2008 651,000 (f)
2010 544,000 (g)
2011 <500,000 (g)
Greece 2011 172,000–390,000 (f)
Spain 2009 300,000–390,000 (f)
United States 2007 12 .2 million (g)
2010 10 .8–11 .2 million (h)
2012 11 .7 million (g)
South Africa 2005 3–5 million (i)
Saudi Arabia 2013 1 million+ (j)
yemen 2013 25,000+ (k)
Australia 2010 53,900 (l)
2011 58,400 (m)
Source: (a) Council of europe (2007), p. 8. (b) Clandestino Project (2009b), p. 4. (c) Frontex 
(2010), p. 9. (d) Gordon et al. (2009), p. 7. (e) Koser (2010), p. 186. (f) Clandestino Project 
(2009a), p. 1. (g) european Migration Network, (2012), p. 213. (g) Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-
barrera (2013). (h) rosenblum (2012). (i) Koser (2005). (j) Walker (2013). (k) regional Mixed 
Migration Secretariat (2013). (l) Department of Immigration and border Protection (DIbP) 
(2010). (m) Australian National Audit office (ANAo) (2013), p. 39.
In a global context, irregular migration to Australia constitutes a very 
small proportion of all irregular migration, especially when compared to 
the US and Europe. More than five million temporary entrants visited 
Australia in 2012–13, with 16,460 persons recorded who did not leave 
when their visas expired. In the same period, some 25,100 people arrived 
irregularly by boat. 
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Irregular maritime migration flows
Unlike other forms of irregular migration, the numbers of irregular 
maritime migrants moving from poor, less developed and/or conflict 
ridden countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East 
to developed countries, such as the flows heading for the US, Europe 
and Australia, are relatively well documented. One of the reasons that 
this movement is monitored so closely is that it is highly visible. It also 
tends to be a focus of intense public interest. As a consequence, there has 
been in more recent times the development of highly regulated border 
management processes that have increased the capacity to count and 
report on the scope of irregular maritime flows.
The US Coast Guard, for example, reports precise figures going back 
to 1995. The EU’s Frontex has increased its capacity, especially since 
2008, to report on the number of persons detected while undertaking 
maritime migration in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic. In the 
Indian Ocean, the number of irregular migrants heading to Australia is 
recorded in some detail, although public reporting has tended to be at 
the aggregate level. These flows are typical of the focus on ‘South–North’ 
movement, and highlight the interest in monitoring irregular maritime 
migration the North. 
The appetite for monitoring and reporting on such flows would appear to 
be considerable. There is also an issue of capability. Highly industrialised, 
richer destination countries, as opposed to poorer, less developed 
destination countries, have greater capacity to monitor and report on 
irregular maritime migration. Perhaps the largest, most significant flows 
of irregular maritime migrants occur well outside the three ‘South–North’ 
hotspots of the US, Europe and Australia, as the examples of Indonesia–
Malaysia maritime migration and Africa–Middle East maritime 
migration discussed below appear to indicate, notwithstanding the lack 
of reliable statistics.
The scale of irregular maritime migration is difficult to quantify outside 
of the main South–North migration corridors. That said, even as recently 
as 10 years ago, such movement into Europe was not monitored and 
reported on in the highly systematised way it is today through Frontex. 
Overall, irregular maritime migration is able to be quantified in specific 
locations, namely the Caribbean Sea to the US, the Mediterranean Sea to 
Europe and the Indian Ocean to Australia. In recent years, Canada has 
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experienced incidents of large noncommercial vessels of several hundred 
passengers arranged by smugglers, although this has been limited (e.g. the 
MVs [motor vessels] Sun Sea and Ocean Lady in 2009).
Data tends to capture interdictions/detections, and so clearly does not 
capture all attempts (successful or otherwise). It is likely that there are 
successful undetected maritime ventures in all contexts, but arguably this 
is less likely in some circumstances. For example, it is possible that failing 
to be intercepted off the northwest coast of Australia by authorities may 
result in irregular migrants perishing in the very harsh and isolated coastal 
regions; the need to be detected by authorities is a genuine one.
South–North irregular maritime migration: 
US, Europe and Australia
The Caribbean is the major region for undocumented maritime migrants 
attempting to enter the US, predominantly from Haiti, Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic. Since 1982, almost 50 per cent of migrants 
interdicted at sea were Haitians (118,700), followed by Cubans 
(29  per  cent or 70,700 migrants) and migrants from the Dominican 
Republic (15 per  cent or 36,600 migrants). Trend data, as shown 
in Figure  2.2, illustrates the very substantial increases in the early to 
mid-1990s, and the subsequent tapering off of interdictions.
Information gathering on irregular migration into the EU, either by land, 
air or sea, has been coordinated by Frontex since it began operations 
in 2005. Prior to this, each member state was responsible for its own 
marine surveillance along the EU’s southern borders. As a result, historical 
statistics on the number of detections of illegal entry by sea are difficult 
to aggregate. Frontex data indicate that there were peaks and troughs 
in maritime migration since 2009, until the dramatic increase in 2015. 
Between 2009 and 2014, the number of maritime irregular detections 
had been low (mainly under 40,000 per quarter). Then, in 2015, more 
than 850,000 travelled through the Eastern Mediterranean route from 
Turkey to Greece (Frontex, 2015). 
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Figure 2.2: Maritime migrant interdictions since 1982 by fiscal year
Source: Adapted from united States Coast Guard (2014). 
Since the mid-1970s, Australia has received over 69,000 irregular maritime 
arrivals (IMAs). The vast majority of these (71 per cent, almost 49,000) 
arrived in the last four calendar years. The year 2013 experienced the largest 
volume of IMAs to Australia ever recorded, with over 20,700 arrivals. A total 
of 41 citizenship groups have arrived in Australia since 2008. Figure 2.3 
shows the trend of IMAs to Australia since the 1970s. The significant 
decline at the end of 2013 reflects the measures taken by the Australian 
Government that resulted in only 157 IMAs arriving in 2014.
Analysis of official data published by Australia, the US and the EU suggests 
a differentiation in the way irregular migrants enter key destination 
countries, predominantly reflecting geography. Figure 2.4 shows that 
the vast majority of irregular migrants detected in 2012 were attempting 
to enter Australia by sea (92 per cent). By comparison, the majority of 
detected irregular migrants to the US were by land. In the EU, land travel 
comprised a higher proportion of irregular migration than sea travel, 
noting that air detection statistics were not available. Ideally, trend analysis 
would be able to provide a fuller picture of the relativities within regions, 
and more accurately highlight differences between regions, particularly 
given the fluctuations in Europe between land and sea detections.








Figure 2.3: Number of IMAs to Australia, 1976–2014
Source: Adapted from Phillips & Spinks (2013); updated using unpublished 
departmental data .
Based on most accounts, the scale of detected and undetected irregular 
migration (South to North) and number of unauthorised persons at any 
given time in the US and Europe is substantial and indicates that irregular 
maritime migration at the borders constitutes a small part of irregular 
migration. In contrast, the situation in Australia is different—as an island 
continent, geography, sea borders and relative isolation provide Australia 
with a unique ability among industrialised countries to manage its border. 
Australia does not have the vast and porous land borders that characterise 
the border management problems faced by the US and Europe, and 
maritime migration is the main manifestation of irregular migration in 
the Australian context.
Placing irregular maritime movements in the context of irregular 
migration more broadly is an important step in assessing the significance 
of irregular maritime migration, particularly in relation to calibrating 
policy responses. While this is not a straightforward exercise, and 
should be treated with some caution, Figure 2.4 does highlight the 
different dynamics occurring in different national and regional settings. 
This perhaps may go some way to explain the levels of focus afforded to 
the different forms of irregular migration.
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By	sea By	air By	land
Figure 2.4: Proportion of detected irregular arrivals by region and mode 
of travel around 2012
Source: Data for Australia was sourced from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
(DIAC) (2012–13). Data for the uS was sourced Simanski and Sapp (2012). Data for the eu 
was sourced from Frontex (2013).
Note: Sea arrivals for Australia were based on 25,000 irregular maritime arrivals 
(excluding vessel crew members) and excluded a small number of illegal foreign fishers 
and people who arrived on a scheduled cargo or cruise vessel and were refused entry 
at a seaport. Air arrivals were based on those who arrived on a scheduled flight and 
were subsequently refused entry at an airport. Data for the uS relates to approximately 
193,000 aliens determined inadmissible at a US border . It excluded some 360,000 persons 
apprehended at border control points, as a breakdown of these persons by mode of travel 
was unavailable . Data for the EU relates to over 72,000 illegal border crossings between 
border control points for 27 countries in the EU and 3 Schengen associated countries 
(Norway, Iceland and Switzerland). Data for unauthorised air arrivals for the entire eu was 
unavailable . The proportions are for illustrative purposes only, and are based on the number 
of detected irregular arrivals by mode of travel . The data does not include estimates for 
undetected border crossings, and does not take into account variations in proportions over 
time. Note that the graph refers to proportions, not absolute volumes. The reference period 
for Australia is Australian Financial year 2012–13;5 the uS is Fiscal year 2012;6 the EU is 
calendar year 2012 .
Further examples of irregular maritime migration: 
Horn of Africa and South East Asia
Another region of substantial irregular maritime activity, involving 
migrants mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia, is the Gulf of Aden and 
the Red Sea between the Horn of Africa to Yemen. The organisation 
responsible for recording this movement is the Regional Mixed Migration 
Secretariat. The capture of data has improved steadily since 2010. While 
the reporting may not capture every movement the numbers reported give 
5  Australian Financial Year 2012–13 is 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013.
6  United States Fiscal Year 2012 is 1 October 2011 to 30 September 2012.
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a clear indication that the scope of irregular maritime movement involved 
is substantial. Around 500,000 people are estimated to have crossed the 
Gulf of Aden between 2007 and 2013. 
Other flows tend to be more clandestine. Based on the migration 
characteristics of various citizenship groups and their inability to access 
regular travel pathways, there are thought to be significant numbers of 
people moving by boat in the South East Asian region. Many of these 
people appear to be undocumented migrant workers seeking work in 
neighbouring countries. Others travel to Indonesia from where they 
join boats to Australia. The true scale of this movement is thought to be 
substantial and used mainly by those who lack the capacity to travel via 
regular pathways, although the numbers are difficult to track and there 
is limited data to report. There are estimated, however, to be around two 
million irregular migrants in Malaysia alone (International Organization 
for Migration [IOM], 2010).
Media reporting on sudden flashpoints or hot spots is triggered, more 
often than not, by tragic incidents such as boats sinking, loss of life at 
sea or a sudden and unexpected upsurge in movement. Extensive media 
reports, for example, indicate that since the dramatic increase in interethnic 
violence in Rakhine province in Myanmar from mid-2012, there has 
been a substantial increase in the maritime migration of Rohingya from 
Myanmar and neighbouring Bangladesh to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and beyond. This flow became a humanitarian crisis in May 2015 when 
thousands of Rohingya and Bengali migrants were stranded at sea, having 
been pushed back by Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian authorities.
The multifaceted nature of irregular 
maritime migration
In seeking to understand the complexity of irregular maritime migration 
as a dynamic global phenomenon occurring within broader global forces, 
it is important to critically examine some of its key aspects. While it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the multitude of issues that 
may relate to the phenomenon, an attempt to draw out the key aspects has 
been made. These are discussed in this section and include: geography and 
mode of transport; non-state actors and migrant smuggling; international 
obligations and state sovereignty; and migrants’ motivations.
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Geography and mode of transport
Geography plays a fundamental role in irregular migration flows. 
The  physical proximity of source and destination countries as well 
as the nature of their geographic positioning—land borders, sea/
ocean channels—is a significant factor in people movement. The ease 
(or otherwise) by which people are able to travel irregularly using different 
modes of transport is an important factor. For example, around 266,000 
Mexicans are estimated to have been apprehended trying to enter the US 
overland in 2012 (Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013), whereas 79 
Mexicans were intercepted by US Coastguards in 2012 (United States 
Coast Guard, 2014).
While not wishing to overgeneralise, and noting that all forms of irregular 
movement would involve considerable challenges and difficulties for 
migrants, the ability to undertake land border crossings (however 
perilous) is likely to involve a reduced level of organisation and logistical 
support compared to maritime migration. First, maritime migration 
usually involves groups of people rather than individuals and so requires 
at least a basic level of organisation. Second, infrastructure in the form 
of a seaworthy vessel is required to make the journey, involving logistics 
and cost. Land border crossings, on the other hand, can be undertaken 
by individuals and do not require the same level of infrastructure and 
organisational support.
This has implications for direct movements between source and 
destination  countries—the huge volume across the US–Mexican 
land border being a case in point—as well as for the relative ease in which 
transit countries can be entered. Transit countries with long porous land 
borders (e.g. Libya, Egypt, Morocco) may perhaps pose fewer constraints 
than transit countries with different geography (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia). 
Many irregular maritime migrants to Spain, for example, travel from 
different locations in sub-Saharan Africa through land borders of Morocco 
before travelling by sea to Spain or entering via the Spanish enclaves 
Ceuta and Melilla (de Haas, 2005). Movement to Australia, on the other 
hand, presents a unique dynamic in that not only is Australia without 
a land border, but as well its main transit country (Indonesia) has limited 
land borders given its island composition. 
The fundamental role of physical geography, while able to be overcome via 
air travel, is arguably a more important aspect now compared to 15 to 20 
years ago, and prior to the significant increase in screening of air travellers 
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(Faist, 2004). It is likely with the recent advances in border control and 
identity verification technology, air travel offers fewer opportunities for 
irregular migrants seeking to enter destination countries, although people 
using genuine travel documentation based on a fraudulent identity remain 
a considerable challenge, one that is being increasingly addressed through 
the use of biometric technology. 
It is possible that, overall, the tightening of air travel has had an impact on 
irregular migration via other modes (land and sea). There is no doubt that 
irregular migration by land border crossing and maritime venture continue 
to be viewed as viable options by migrants, agents and smugglers where 
these options are available, and particularly given that citizens of many 
countries who travel irregularly are unable to access regular migration 
pathways (see Table 2.1). In addition, and as discussed above, a certain 
level of organisational capability needs to be in place to support irregular 
maritime migration, and while this may act as a constraint, it may also 
enable/encourage the expansion of unregulated actors (e.g. organisers, 
smugglers and corrupt officials). 
Non-state actors and migrant smuggling
There has been substantial research and enquiry into migrant smuggling 
processes and dynamics, predominantly in relation to migrant smuggling 
into Europe, and in the context of the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. In a 2011 report by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), a global review of migrant 
smuggling revealed a number of dynamics and characteristics that highlight 
the considerable challenges in tackling and reducing smuggling—see the 
summary of the UNODC report below. More recently, the UNODC has 
highlighted the significant role corruption plays in migrant smuggling, 
noting that (UNODC, 2011, p. 3):
Migrant smuggling could not occur on the large scale that it so often does 
without collusion between corrupt officials and criminals. Corruption 
seriously undermines national and international efforts to prevent and 
control the smuggling of migrants … [it] may occur in countries of origin, 
transit, or destination. It may be systemic, institutional or individual.
The organisational capabilities of non-state actors involved in irregular 
migration, including corrupt officials, agents, organisers and smugglers, 
has undoubtedly been assisted by changes in telecommunications, which 
offer greater opportunities for people to participate successfully in the 
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movement of people irregularly. In this sense, smuggling networks 
are able to occur largely outside of effective state regulation, allowing 
perhaps a greater degree of ‘opportunism’ by a wider range of actors 
than has occurred in the past. The notion of organised, ‘apex’ smuggling 
systems that are controlled by mafia-type bosses has largely given way to 
recognition that smuggling involves less organised, highly agile networks 
of relationships (Pastore, Monzini, & Sciortino, 2006, p. 109):
the evolutions of the smuggling industry does [sic] not seem to produce 
highly structured and hierarchically governed organisations, but rather 
flexible coalitions managed through contractual agreements and repeated 
interactions.
Targeting of operational and policy responses to reduce the viability of 
migrant smuggling for the range of actors involved has been a key focus 
of governments, including in relation to irregular maritime migration 
(Koser, 2011). Such responses will undoubtedly continue to be central 
components in strategic and tactical efforts to reduce irregular maritime 
migration.
Other commentators have drawn attention to the need for more 
systematic change to underlying markets as a key component to reducing 
irregular migration, and have characterised some employers as ‘bad actors’ 
and suggested that ‘markets—not criminal masterminds, syndicates or 
networks—drive illegality’ (Papademetriou, 2014, p. 2). In the context 
of the somewhat limited data on stocks and flows of irregular migrants, 
as described above, it could be hypothesised that structural labour market 
issues are more of an issue for some markets that have a greater reliance on 
irregular migration (e.g. the US and parts of Europe) compared to other 
markets (e.g. Australia). 
International obligations and state sovereignty
The tensions between state action and international legal obligations and 
responsibilities are a recurring theme throughout the literature. While 
detailed legal and technical analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
there are some aspects worth highlighting that demonstrate that the 
problems are complex and not easily reconciled. 
Irregular maritime migration, in many respects, encapsulates one of the 
most contentious fault lines between state sovereignty and international 
legal obligations and responsibilities. Strong links tend to be made by 
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governments between migration control, border protection and state 
sovereignty. Governments are often very concerned to demonstrate 
that they have a firm grip on the movement of people across 
borders—a (legitimate) sovereign right that tends to be jealously guarded 
(Brouwer & Kumin, 2003; van Selm & Cooper, 2005). ‘Control over 
migration is interpreted … as being somehow intrinsic to what is it to 
be a nation, to “stateness” and to the core of membership and national 
identity’ (Dauvergne, 2003, p. 2). 
Irregular maritime migration invokes a range of international norms and 
conventions in relation to human rights, law of the sea, including rescue at 
sea, and criminality associated with migrant smuggling and trafficking—
all of which makes for a complex mix (de Bruycker, di Bartolomeo, 
& Fargues, 2013; Miltner, 2006). Given its visibility, and the attention 
irregular migration by sea attracts, the imperative to demonstrate state 
control of maritime borders is particularly sensitive. However, reconciling 
state practices to stem the flow of irregular maritime migration with 
international legal responsibilities and obligations is complicated by 
conflicting interests, blurred lines of responsibility and overlapping issues 
(Mallia, 2003). For example, in Europe, confusion and disagreements over 
territorial boundaries at sea and state responsibility for search and rescue 
are proving difficult to resolve. There are concerns that the confusion over 
who has responsibility among states undermines international cooperation 
to protect life at sea, seen by many as a fundamental humanitarian 
consideration (Annan, 2014; Mallia, 2003). 
State measures to control irregular maritime migration can, and do, often 
clash with humanitarian considerations inherent in multiple international 
legal instruments that are activated in relation to irregular maritime 
migration, including in relation to nonrefoulement. Reconciling these 
conflicting interests is a fundamental challenge for all stakeholders 
involved. Critics of restrictive measures that are increasingly focused 
on preventing migrant flows from reaching their destination or from 
departing source and transit countries suggest that this fails to address the 
protection concerns of refugees caught up in irregular maritime migration 
flows (Dauvergne, 2003; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008). 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (2008) suggested that this extraterritorial shift to 
focus on measures that attempt to deflect or prevent movement is regarded 
by some commentators as a geographical relocation of the border, with 
the potential to relocate the limits of sovereignty in relation to border 
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control. Striking a balance between state sovereignty and international 
legal frameworks in the context of the increasing trend towards 
extraterritorialism in relation to irregular maritime migration, and the 
complex set of issues involved, is thought to be a key global challenge 
of the future.
Irregular maritime migration presents an undeniably visual manifestation 
of irregular migration and as such triggers some fundamental political and 
policy concerns relating to states’ international protection obligations, 
sovereignty, border control and security, and as such demands the 
attention of governments (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013; Koser, 2010; 
Watson, 2009). The potential and actual impacts on bilateral relationships 
as well as regional and broader international relationships and reputations 
are also key considerations for governments, including as they relate to 
sovereignty issues.
There is a strong sense that, notwithstanding different interests, values and 
priorities, as Newland pointed out, ‘international migration has surpassed 
the ability of any one country to manage unilaterally’ (Newland, 2010, 
p. 336). The transnational nature of irregular maritime migration demands 
government-to-government cooperation, including in a multilayered or 
tiered fashion. Engagement via multilateral forums as well as regional 
consultative processes are important means of understanding and working 
through points of convergence and divergence; these forms of engagement 
can also act to support or enhance bilateral cooperation.
Migrants’ motivations
A number of complex, interrelated factors impact on the movement of 
irregular asylum and non-asylum migration flows, and in relation to why 
people migrate (Castles, 2013; de Haas, 2011; Havinga & Böcker, 1999; 
Koser, 2011; Middleton 2005; Neumayer, 2004). Historically, academic 
and nonacademic writing has been dominated by the ‘push–pull’ model, 
with its roots in Ravenstein’s laws of migration from the 1880s.
Today, among policymakers, the ‘push–pull’ theory continues to dominate, 
possibly because of the attractiveness it offers as a conceptually linear 
model. The model also downplays migrant agency, with migrants being 
‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ from and to locations. Perhaps a century ago it was 
highly relevant in social, economic, technological and geopolitical terms, 
and it offered a way of explaining and understanding migration. It is less 
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relevant today, including because of the substantial social, economic, 
technological and geopolitical changes that have ensued in most parts of 
the world and that are enabling much greater transnational interaction.
Hein de Haas has argued that ‘people will only migrate if they perceive 
better opportunities elsewhere and have the capabilities to move’ 
(de  Haas, 2011, p. 14). Through a range of dynamics (or ‘enabling’ 
factors), including diaspora and other migrant networks, de Haas argued 
that migrants’ agency and counterstrategies can effectively undermine 
states’ attempts to control migration. It is important to note that de Haas’ 
theoretical discussion was not specific to irregular migration; however, 
he argued that refugee and asylum flows also involve agency and that 
‘the  “voluntary”–“forced” migration dichotomy is simplistic because it 
assumes that one category of migrants enjoys total freedom and the other 
category has no choice or agency at all’ (de Haas, 2011, p. 14).
Adhikari’s research on the relative impact of a range of factors on 
migrants’ decision-making in Nepal highlights that migrant agency, even 
in extreme conflict situations, is present, and that decisions on movement 
were based on more than just the threat to one’s life and included factors 
related to economic livelihoods and social networks (Adhikari, 2013). 
He highlighted the need for further research into the survival strategies 
people adopt once they decide to stay in war zones.
Much of the irregular maritime migration flows, including to Europe, 
Yemen, Australia and the US, are not sudden onset (although there are 
exceptions from time to time, such as the 2011 Libya crisis), and do 
involve migrant agency, and possibly considered, long-term decision-
making processes. The number of factors impacting on movement and 
decision-making highlights the complex nature of irregular maritime 
migration. It is also important to acknowledge that none of the factors 
are likely to be static, and some of them can change decisively and rapidly, 
undoubtedly adding to the complexity of irregular migration. 
The ‘mixed’ composition of irregular migrant populations, as opposed to 
past assumptions that irregular migration flows were composed primarily 
of asylum seekers, is a significant and important characteristic of modern 
manifestations of irregular migration (Miltner, 2006; Papastavridis, 
2007). One of the more significant conundrums highlighted by irregular 
maritime migration is the ‘migration–asylum nexus’. In the midst of the 
irregular migration flows of migrant workers are people who have moved 
because of war, ethnic or political persecution and meet the criteria as 
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refugees. To add to the complexity, the boundaries between each group 
can be blurred or even change over time with migrant workers becoming 
refugees or vice versa (Koser, 2013).
On the one hand, the humanitarian crisis in Syria provides a very stark 
illustration of the fundamental need for the protection of people in fear 
for their lives, and of the ongoing and perhaps growing need for an 
effective international system that provides refugee protection. There is 
a clear imperative for states and international organisations to respond 
quickly and decisively in such situations.
When examining irregular maritime movement involving asylum seekers, 
onwards movement is an important consideration, as are the reasons 
underpinning movement. It is, in this context, useful to acknowledge 
Johansson’s distinction between anticipatory refugee movement and acute 
or spontaneous movements (Johansson, 1990). As highlighted by Koser 
and McAuliffe, ‘[for] IMAs in Australia, who have undertaken long and 
relatively expensive journeys from their origin countries, and transited 
other countries where they might have remained in an irregular situation 
… the choice of Australia for most … appears to be deliberate’ (2013, 
p. 13). Much of the movement to Australia in recent years has been 
anticipatory rather than acute. This, in turn, and given the substantial 
distances travelled from source through (multiple) transit countries 
to Australia, means that both the decision to leave and the choice of 
destination are highly relevant topics of research in the Australian context.
A further line of enquiry relevant to the examination of global irregular 
maritime migration is the extent to which communities actively use 
migration as a strategy for survival and/or to improve individual and 
collective outcomes. This conceptualisation of migration as a social strategy 
acknowledges that there are often many reasons underpinning migration 
that are not static but dynamic in nature, depending on prevailing 
circumstances. Monsutti, for example, has argued that in relation to 
Hazaras, no hard and fast distinction can be made between refugees and 
economic migrants, and that a ‘migration continuum’ exists that has 
developed as part of a broader strategy of survival (2005, pp. 168–69):
Afghans give different and usually plural reasons for their decision to 
migrate: perhaps an outbreak of fighting, a threat from a personal enemy, 
the danger of bombing or compulsory conscription; perhaps the search 
for work or opportunities to trade, the need for medical treatment, or the 
undertaking of a pilgrimage.
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When viewed as a social strategy, the existence of migration pathways 
and networks, including to and within destination countries, is almost 
certainly likely to have an impact on the tendency and ability of groups 
of people to migrate successfully. Migration as part of historical and 
cultural norms is an aspect that is prevalent in some academic discussion 
(Monsutti, 2005). 
Some evidence of the many reasons underpinning asylum flows and the 
search for a better life are evident in empirical research conducted under 
the Irregular Migration Research Program (as described in the Preface and 
Introduction), and as discussed in Chapter 3 (Sri Lankan survey results) 
and Chapter 11 (survey of IMAs granted protection). 
Conclusions
Irregular maritime migration is intrinsically linked to a range of other 
phenomena—regular migration, other forms of irregular migration, 
human development, improvements in telecommunications and the 
securitisation of migration. The complex, multifaceted nature of irregular 
maritime migration renders it a particularly challenging issue for many 
states around the world. The geopolitical implications now and into the 
future are potentially profound as origin, transit and destination states 
work to better manage movements and seek to avoid deaths at sea and 
reduce migrant vulnerability. 
When examined as a global phenomenon, it is evident that South–North 
irregular maritime migration flows are highly visible and well documented, 
especially compared to other (larger) flows, including in South East Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East. A better understanding of the scale and nature 
of flows in other parts of the world, including in relation to the issues that 
migrants face, may raise additional challenges with broader implications 
for global migration movements.
There is a sense that the willingness of states to engage in forms of 
cooperation and collaboration on irregular maritime migration that do not 
involve the formulation of restrictive responses has diminished over time 
(Castles, 2004; de Haas, 2011). This diminution is reflective of current 
global and geopolitical dynamics, and in particular a growing sense of 
the potential for significantly increased ‘unmanaged’ migration in light 
of increased international movement (GCIM, 2005). The collaboration 
involved in managing earlier displacement—the Comprehensive Plan 
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of Action in South East Asia to deal with flows from Vietnam and Laos 
being one example—appears, in a general sense, to have increasingly given 
way to state-centric hardening of positions. 
Where there are ‘pockets’ or discrete groups that are able to be managed, 
it would appear that there is a greater degree of willingness to engage 
collaboratively in a positive sense in attempts to manage displacement. One 
such example of this can be seen in relation to states’ handling of stateless 
groups, where the size of the stateless groups appears to be a factor (among 
others) in states’ willingness to collaborate to find solutions with the 
assistance of the UNHCR. A second factor related to cooperation would 
appear to be related to whether the displacement issue is entrenched and/
or enduring, or more akin to an acute, sudden-onset displacement. This 
is perhaps best highlighted by large-scale displacement in Libya and Syria, 
which resulted in significant humanitarian support being provided from 
a range of actors, particularly at the outset. It remains to be seen how this 
will eventually unfold in Europe if the recent significant increases from 
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere continue into the coming years. 
In global and international discussions, it would appear that the appetite 
for a greater degree of convergence of approaches to restrictive migration 
policies, recognising migrant rights and increasing human development 
may well be increasing, notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in 
navigating a path that is able to achieve aspects of all three objectives. This 
will continue to be a challenge for individual nation states and regions as 
the global discourse evolves and expectations change. It may well be that 
in the future not only will migrants’ aspirations increase, but significant 
populations may find that their capability to migrate may also increase. 
For some of these people, irregular maritime migration may well prove 
the only viable migration option.
Notwithstanding considerable challenges, it is worth reflecting on 
the policy and operational response capacities of some nation states to 
effectively harness resources (including financial, human, intellectual, 
technological and social, etc.) to deal with complex and difficult issues. 
There would appear to be a strong appetite for agile responses based 
on a  good understanding of evidence, options, implications and risk, 
including in global and regional forums. One of the challenges for 
policymakers is to be able to deliver on all of these aspects in dynamic 
environments, and in an era of greater contestability.
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Placing Sri Lankan 
maritime arrivals in a broader 
migration context
Dinuk Jayasuriya and Marie McAuliffe1
Our examination of irregular maritime arrival (IMA) flows to Australia 
from Sri Lanka places emphasis on both origin country and global 
migration dynamics. This approach recognises broader migration and 
mobility that a more asylum-/refugee-specific focused approach has the 
potential to either underemphasise or miss entirely. Taking a broader view 
also has the potential to allow for a greater appreciation of Australia’s 
comparative position in a global context, which is perhaps useful given 
the, at times, ‘Australia-centric’ view of IMA flows.
This chapter places the unusual 2012 ‘spike’ of Sri Lankan IMAs to 
Australia in a broader migration context as a means to better understand 
the Sri Lankan migration dynamics at both the macro level and at the 
micro (i.e. individual) level. It does not delve into all aspects of Sri Lankan 
migration—such as the irregular migration of migrant workers, for 
example—which, while potentially interesting, are beyond the scope 
of this chapter.
1  The authors are grateful for research assistance from Simone Gangell, Paul Hayes and Victoria 
Mence in the preparation of this chapter.
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We draw on two surveys undertaken in January and May of 2013, of 8,800 
people in Sri Lanka, to show that while potential irregular migrants 
indicated that they would like to travel for reasons such as wanting a better 
future and economic prosperity, which are conceivably similar to those of 
regular migrants, these are not the only reasons. Rather, consistent with 
recent literature, our chapter paints a multidimensional picture showing 
that some potential irregular migrants from Sri Lanka wanted to travel for 
economic reasons and/or due to allegations of torture and persecution.2
The provision of information and evidence of Sri Lanka’s place in 
a global migration context (including historically), as well as how some 
Sri Lankans view irregular migration, hopefully provides some illustration 
of why a  strong appreciation of time and place in migration dynamics 
is important in improving our understanding of migration patterns and 
processes. This chapter does not attempt to cover all aspects related to 
Sri Lankan IMA flows in more recent times. It does, however, draw on 
a range of data and information relevant to the development of a deeper 
understanding of the events of 2012, when thousands of Sri Lankan IMAs 
travelled to Australia. 
Sri Lanka and migration
Migration flows of Sri Lankan citizens to other countries can be broadly 
grouped into the following categories: temporary work (skilled, semi-
skilled and unskilled workers); settlement (mostly skilled migrants); 
education (mainly for tertiary studies); political reasons (asylum seekers); 
and tourism, including pilgrimages to India and Nepal (International 
Organization for Migration [IOM] & Institute of Policy Studies of 
Sri Lanka [IPS], 2008).
Sri Lankan nationals who exit Sri Lanka are required to complete 
an embarkation card, and foreigners an arrival card for surrender to 
immigration officials. There are only a small number of entry/exit points 
for managing passenger movements in Sri Lanka, including one major 
and one minor international airport located in Colombo and a recently 
constructed international airport in the country’s south. There are seven 
major sea ports around the country (Department of Immigration and 
Emigration [DIE], 2013).
2  These allegations are not necessarily of state-sponsored torture and persecution.
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In 2011, Sri Lanka recorded 1,206,135 arrivals of Sri Lankan citizens 
and 1,235,228 departures (DIE, 2011a; 2011b). Of those Sri Lankans 
departing, 262,960 (21 per cent) were for foreign employment (Bureau 
of Foreign Employment [BFE], 2012). 
Sri Lankan temporary and permanent emigration 
for employment
In 2011, 262,960 Sri Lankans departed for work abroad with an almost 
linear increase between 1990 and 2011 (refer Figure 3.1). This growth 
exceeds population growth; departures for employment increased 
305 per cent between 1991 and 2011, compared with a 20 per cent growth 
in Sri Lanka’s population over the same period (BFE, 2011; World Bank, 
2013a). In 1991, 0.38 per cent of the population travelled overseas for 
work, increasing to 1.26 per cent of the population in 2011. Sri Lankans 
departing for employment outside Sri Lanka are required to register with 
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Figure 3.1: Departures for foreign employment
Source: Adapted from bFe (2012).
In 2010, almost 90 per cent of Sri Lankan men and almost 94 per cent 
of Sri Lankan women who sought temporary or permanent emigration 
for employment did so in the Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab 
Emirates (DIE, 2010). 
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The importance of these destination countries as sources of income is 
reflected in the increase in remittances from the Middle East since 1990. 
In 2011, remittances from the Middle East accounted for 60 per cent 
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Figure 3.2: Remittances globally and from the Middle East
Source: Adapted from bFe (2012) and World bank (2013a).
The increase in remittances has had a flow-on effect to the national 
economy, accounting for almost 50 per cent of export earnings in 2011 
(BFE, 2012), and being approximately five times greater than the value 
of Foreign Direct Investments into Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2013a; 
World Bank, 2012). 
Sri Lankan emigration for study
Education is very important for Sri Lankans, as demonstrated by the 
numerous newspaper, radio and billboard advertisements in Sri Lanka 
promoting potential places of study, both in Sri Lanka and overseas. 
A degree from a university outside of Sri Lanka is highly valued, with 
over 60 organisations, or ‘education agents’, providing advice on overseas 
study options (Australian Council for Private Education and Training, 
n.d.). Yet the absolute number of students travelling overseas for study to 
countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is relatively low. Table 3.1 shows a steady increase 
from 2004 until 2009, with Australia being the number one destination. 
Sri Lankans travelling overseas for study are not required to register with 
any government authority.
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Table 3.1: International students from Sri Lanka in OECD countries
Destination 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Australia 2,117 2,082 2,499 3,550 4,073 4,296
uK 2,267 2,419 2,765 3,005 3,141 3,553
US 1,964 2,081 2,234 2,425 2,594 2,927
Japan 615 765 867 1,155 1,197 1,098
Canada 161 - 252 186 271 309
Total 7,603 7,855 9,125 10,915 12,049 13,065
Source: Adapted from oeCD (2012).
Sri Lankan diaspora communities
In 2010, there were nearly two million people in the Sri Lankan diaspora, 
with approximately 54 per cent of them living in the Middle East and 
approximately 34 per cent living in industrialised countries (World Bank, 
2010).3 There are two distinct groups within this population. Sri Lankan 
Tamils constitute the overwhelming majority of diaspora communities 
found in industrialised countries, while migrant workers (such as those 
to the Middle East) are largely Sinhalese (International Crisis Group 
[ICG], 2010). 
The Sri Lankan diaspora has been increasing steadily over the last decade. 
To illustrate, in OECD countries alone the diaspora has increased from 
an estimated 300,000 people in 2000 to almost 700,000 in 2010 (refer 
Figure 3.3).
The countries with the largest diaspora in 2010 were Canada, the UK, 
Italy and Australia (refer Table 3.2).
In 2010, Australia was ranked number four on the list with an estimated 
78,098 people in the Sri Lankan diaspora.3 By mid-2013, the diaspora was 
estimated to be 130,000 by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) (DFAT, n.d.). In 2011, the Sri Lankan community 
was the 13th largest migrant group in Australia, equivalent to 1.6 per cent 
of Australia’s overseas-born population and 0.4 per cent of Australia’s total 
population (Department of Immigration and Citizenship [DIAC], 2012). 
According to census data, around 50,151 Australians were Tamil speaking 
(Special Broadcasting Service [SBS], 2013).
3  World Bank and UN data only refer to Sri Lankan–born people and not people of Sri Lankan 
ancestry.











Figure 3.3: Sri Lankan diaspora in all OECD countries, 2000, 2006 
and 2010
Source: oeCD (2012) and adapted from World bank (2010).
Table 3.2: Top 10 industrialised countries for the Sri Lankan diaspora, 2010











Source: World bank (2010).
Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora
Prior to Sri Lankan independence in 1948, there were some Sri Lankan 
Tamils living in Malaysia and Singapore, primarily as migrant workers 
in British Malaya (ICG, 2010). It was only after the 1983 riots that 
Tamils migrated en masse, largely as refugees to industrialised countries. 
Currently, there are estimated to be approximately one million Sri Lankan 
Tamils residing outside Sri Lanka, which is substantial when considering 
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the Sri Lankan Tamil population in Sri Lanka is 2.3 million people (ICG, 
2010; Department of Census and Statistics, 2012). Countries with 
significant (estimated) Sri Lankan Tamil populations include: Canada 
(200,000–300,000); UK (180,000); Germany (60,000); Switzerland 
(47,000); Australia (40,000); France (40,000–50,000); US (25,000); the 
Netherlands (20,000); and Malaysia (20,000) (ICG, 2010). A smaller 
number of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora live in the Middle East, South 
Africa and the Gulf States.
Diaspora and remittances
Remittances from industrialised countries with a large Sri Lankan diaspora 
have increased rapidly in the recent past, from USD1,429 million in 
2010 to USD1,776 million in 2011 and USD2,161 million in 2012 
(refer Figure 3.4). In 2012, remittances from the Sri Lankan diaspora in 








Figure 3.4: Remittances from OECD countries, 2010, 2011 and 2012
Source: Adapted from World bank (2011, 2012, 2013b).
As might be expected, the top 10 industrialised countries for the 
Sri  Lankan  diaspora (for 2010) feature in the top 10 sources of 
remittances from industrialised countries (for 2012), almost in the same 
order (refer Tables 3.2 and 3.3). What is surprising is that the average 
remittance per person from OECD countries in 2010 was USD2,281, 
which was only slightly lower than the average remittance per person 
of USD2,329 from Middle Eastern countries.
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Table 3.3: Top 10 sources of remittances to Sri Lanka, 2012 
(industrialised countries only)











Source: World bank (2013b).
Prior to the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the 
diaspora contributed an estimated USD200 million a year to the LTTE 
(ICG, 2010). For the past 25 years, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora has 
contributed to shaping the Sri Lankan political landscape through its 
financial and ideological support of the armed struggle for an independent 
Tamil state. Many in the diaspora were thought to have supported the 
LTTE; however, others were allegedly subject to extortion, intimidation 
and physical violence in order to silence criticism and secure financing 
(Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2006).
Sri Lanka and asylum seekers and refugees: 
Source, transit and destination
Given its recent past, Sri Lanka has primarily been a ‘source’ country of 
asylum seekers and refugees. That said, the labelling of ‘source’, ‘host’, 
‘transit’ and ‘destination’ countries can be multidimensional, with 
countries fulfilling several of these broad categories at the one time. 
In addition, countries can quickly move from one category to another 
depending on prevailing security and political circumstances. Syria, for 
example, was until relatively recently a major ‘host’ country, primarily 
of Iraqi refugees; whereas it is now a major ‘source’ country due to the 
severity of its civil conflict. 
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Asylum seekers and refugees in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 
Protocol, nor does it have specific legislation or administrative mechanisms 
governing asylum and refugee affairs. The Sri Lankan Government relies 
on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
register and assess asylum seekers. The UNHCR has been involved in 
Sri Lanka since 1987 when the organisation was invited by the Sri Lankan 
Government to facilitate large-scale repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees 
from India. The UNHCR, under an agreement with the government, 
undertakes refugee status determination processes in Sri Lanka. 
According to UNHCR data, there are (at any one time) only a small 
number of asylum seekers and refugees in Sri Lanka. At the end of 2012, 
there were 110 refugees and 263 asylum seekers registered in Sri Lanka 
(UNHCR, 2013). UNHCR data on asylum applications submitted 
in Sri Lanka between 2005 and 2012 shows that the vast majority of 
asylum seekers were Pakistani. Data also reveals that there has been 
a slight increase in asylum applications over the last two years (as shown 
in Figure 3.5) from non-Pakistani applicants. 
Refugees are not permitted to reside or work in Sri Lanka, and very 
few refugees choose to repatriate back to their country of origin. 
Resettlement, therefore, remains the main durable solution for them. 
In 2012, 178 refugees in Sri Lanka were resettled to the US and Canada 
(UNHCR, 2013).
According to some in the Sri Lankan Government, Sri Lanka is 
increasingly becoming a transit and destination country for irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers, as reflected in recent public comments by 
Sri Lankan ministers on the ‘deportation’ of asylum seekers in Sri Lanka 
(Powell, 2013). According to the Sri Lankan Department of Immigration 
and Emigration, Sri Lanka has become a transit country for asylum seekers 
from Pakistan and Afghanistan trying to reach Australia (Integrated 
Regional Information Networks [IRIN], 2012b).
































Figure 3.5: Asylum applications submitted in Sri Lanka, 2005–12
Source: uNHCr (n.d.).
Internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka
The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka has 
gradually reduced since the end of the civil conflict in 2009. UNHCR 
has estimated that by the end of September 2012, some 468,000 people 
had returned to their places of origin (UNHCR, 2013). The closure in 
September 2012 of the government’s 700-hectare IDP site ‘Menik Farm’ 
in northern Vavuniya district (the largest operational camp) highlighted 
the post-conflict transition that has occurred over time as people have 
gradually been resettled. At its peak, ‘Menik Farm’ housed 225,000 
people (UNHCR, 2012). As of December 2012, 9,800 remained in IDP 
camps throughout Sri Lanka (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
[IDMC], 2013).
Estimates of the number of IDPs in Sri Lanka have varied. The main 
sources of internal displacement statistics are government and the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
As of January 2011, the OCHA estimated that around 273,772 Sri Lankans 
continued to be displaced (Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA, 
2012). Some months on, IDMC (2013) estimated that (at 31 December, 
2011), around 95,000 people were still displaced in Sri Lanka. IDMC 
noted that the Sri Lankan Government has kept some IDPs’ areas of origin 
closed because of national security and/or danger to the public, including 
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because of incomplete landmine clearance activity. As of the end of 2012, 
there were 93,447 IDPs, including people living inside and outside of 
camps (UNHCR, 2012). Given the substantial numbers of people that 
have been internally resettled, the UNHCR has indicated in its South 
Asia operations profile that during 2013 it will continue to promote the 
reintegration of refugee and IDP returnees, while winding down its direct 
engagement in the IDP situation (UNHCR, 2013).
Sri Lankan asylum seekers and refugees around 
the world
Sri Lanka’s history of civil conflict is reflected in its status as a significant 
source country of asylum seekers and refugees. Given the nature of the 
civil conflict, Sri Lankan asylum flows have mainly comprised Tamils. 
According to UNHCR, as of December 2012, there were 132,749 
Sri  Lankan refugees and 13,975 asylum seekers worldwide (UNHCR, 
2013). This placed Sri Lanka in the top 18 origin countries of the world’s 
asylum seekers and refugees. 
India has historically been, and continues to be, the main host 
country of  Sri  Lankan refugees. At the end of 2012, it hosted some 
67,165 Sri  Lankan (predominantly Tamil) refugees (UNHCR, 2013). 
The majority of India’s UNHCR-registered Sri Lankan refugees lived in 
around 100 camps in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. However, 
estimates of the number of Sri Lankans with pending asylum claims 
in Tamil Nadu vary considerably between organisations, from around 
100,000 to 200,000 (ICG, 2010; IRIN, 2012a).
Outside of the thousands of Sri Lankan refugees hosted in India, 
Sri Lankan asylum seekers historically have travelled to specific destination 
countries. As shown in Table 3.4, the main asylum destination countries 
in 2012 were Australia, Malaysia, UK, France, Switzerland and Canada. 
These countries all have significant Sri Lankan diaspora.
Sri Lankan asylum claims in industrialised countries dropped from a high 
of about 14,500 applications in 2001 to around 5,500 per year between 
2003 and 2006 (when there was a ceasefire between Sri Lanka and the 
LTTE). The UK, Canada and France collectively received 71  per cent 
of Sri Lankan asylum claims in 2001 (more than 10,000 of the 14,500 
applications). In the lead-up to the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lankan 
asylum claims grew, as shown in Figure 3.6.
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Table 3.4: Sri Lankan global asylum applications, 2012 (selected countries)
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Figure 3.6: Sri Lankan asylum seekers and refugees, 2001–12
Source: uNHCr (2013); uNHCr (2002–13); uNHCr (n.d.).
Regular and irregular migration of 
Sri Lankans to Australia
As is the case with most other citizenship groups, the vast majority of 
Sri Lankan arrivals enter Australia on temporary visas, as can be seen 
in Figure 3.7. In 2012–13, 22,503 temporary entry visas were granted 
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to Sri Lankan nationals, with visitors accounting for 73 per cent of visas 
granted. Other categories included student visas (2,899 or 13 per cent) 






























Figure 3.7: Australian visas granted to Sri Lankans, 2009–10 to 2012–13
Source: DIAC (2013).
Sri Lankan permanent migration to Australia
Sri Lankans first started emigrating to Australia in large numbers in the 
mid-1980s as a response to protracted conflict between the LTTE and 
government forces. Even though hostilities have formally ceased, the 
number of Sri Lankans choosing to live in Australia has continued to grow, 
with almost 5,000 Sri Lankans in 2012–13 migrating under Australia’s 
Migration Program (comprising the Family and Skill Streams), compared 
with 2,000 a decade ago. Since 2007–08, Sri Lanka has consistently been 
one of Australia’s top 10 source migrant countries. 
Skilled migration remains the main route for Sri Lankan nationals 
seeking permanent residency in Australia, accounting for 80 per cent of 
permanent visas granted to Sri Lankan nationals under the Migration 
Program in the decade to 2012–13. Sri Lankans were ranked eighth out 
of 175 citizenship groups granted visas under the Migration Program’s 
Skill Stream in 2012–13, with 4,078 skilled visas granted to Sri Lankans. 
The majority of Sri Lankan skilled migrants arrive under the General 
Skilled Migration (GSM) component of the Skill Stream, which 
provides permanent residence to skilled migrants who do not have an 
employer sponsoring them. In 2012–13, 3,228 GSM visas were issued 
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to Sri Lankans, representing 79 per cent of all permanent skilled visas for 
Sri Lankans in that year. The main occupations of those granted a GSM 
visa included information and communications technology professionals, 
accountants, and engineering professionals.
Family migration to Australia facilitates the entry of close family members of 
Australian citizens, permanent residents and eligible New Zealand citizens. 
In 2012–13, 883 Sri Lankan nationals were granted permanent residency 
under the Migration Program’s Family Stream, ranking 13th among 176 
citizenship groups represented in the Family Stream in that year. 
Australia’s Humanitarian Program is designed to ensure Australia can 
respond effectively to global humanitarian situations and that support 
services are available to meet the specific needs of these entrants. Sri Lankans 
have not been a major source group for Australia’s Humanitarian Program, 
with just over a thousand Sri Lankans resettled under this program over 
the last 10 years. The majority (around 75 per cent) of visas granted to 
Sri Lankans under the offshore Humanitarian Program over the last five 
years were to the immediate (‘split’) family of Sri Lankan IMAs under the 
Special Humanitarian Program (SHP). 
In 2012–13, 363 Sri Lankans were granted onshore protection visas 
(including both IMAs and non-IMAs), and 40 were granted offshore 
protection visas. The number of offshore resettlement grants to Sri Lankan 
citizens has decreased by 55 per cent from 88 in 2011–12. This accorded 
with previous years: 288 granted in 2010–11; 184 in 2009–10 and 215 
in 2008–09, which is a reflection of the settling of hostilities since 2009. 
It is also a reflection of broader changes to the SHP. In addition, the 
number of onshore protection visas granted to Sri Lankans in 2012–13 
has decreased by 14 per cent from the previous program year.
Sri Lankan asylum seekers to Australia
The significant decrease in Sri Lankan asylum claims globally, from 2002 
onwards, coincided with the 2002 signing of the permanent ceasefire 
agreement between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. Global 
asylum claims began to rise again in 2008 as the conflict escalated in the 
lead-up to the LTTE defeat in 2009. 
This was reflected in asylum applications made in Australia. 
In  2008–09, Sri  Lankans who arrived regularly by air (non-IMAs) 
made 478 applications for asylum. Subsequently, Sri Lankan non-IMA 
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applications have generally declined over time: 328 in 2009–10; 160 in 
2010–11; 138 in 2011–12 and 169 in 2012–13, while overall non-IMA 
application numbers have increased. Sri Lanka was ranked 14th among 
non-IMA asylum nationalities in 2012–13.
In 2009, Sri Lankan IMAs to Australia also increased but subsequently 
decreased and remained at low levels. The very dramatic increase in 
Sri Lankan IMA flows to Australia in 2012, however, signalled a departure 
from previous trends and was out of step with Sri Lankan asylum claims 
globally. To place the increase in context, in 2011 there were just over 
200 IMAs from Sri Lanka, whereas in 2012 more than 6,400 Sri Lankan 
IMAs arrived in Australia, most of whom arrived in the second half of the 






























































Figure 3.8: Sri Lankan irregular maritime arrivals, January 2011 – June 2013
Source: Department of Immigration and border Protection (DIbP) (n.d.).
Note: by the end of 2012, many IMAs had not at that stage lodged applications for asylum, 
hence they were not captured in uNHCr asylum applications data in Table 3.4.
The large majority of IMAs from Sri Lanka were Tamils. However, in 
2012, approximately 13 per cent of IMAs were Sinhalese, increasing from 
0 per cent in 2011. Partly reflecting the changes in IMA dynamics and 
volume, returns to Sri Lanka following enhanced screening increased in 
volume. Between July 2012 and the end of May 2013, 162 voluntary 
and 965 involuntary returns to Sri Lanka occurred (Parliament 
of Australia, 2013).
In contrast to the Australian experience, other key Sri Lankan destination 
countries experienced decreases, plateaus or minor increases in 2012 
(see Figures 3.9 and 3.10). Further to this, and unlike earlier IMA flows, 
in addition to protection issues, economic conditions and prospects were 
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thought to be drivers for irregular maritime movement to Australia, 
especially for ethnic Sinhalese, who began arriving in significant numbers 
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Figure 3.9: Sri Lankan asylum seekers: Key destination countries, 
2007–12
Source: uNHCr (2002–13).
Figure 3.9 reveals the significant increase in Sri Lankan asylum seekers 
that occurred in Australia did not occur in other key destination 
countries. When Sri Lankan asylum applications submitted in all 44 
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Figure 3.10: Asylum applications in 43 industrialised countries and IMAs, 
2001–12
Source: uNHCr (2002–13); DIbP (n.d.).
Note: The 43 industrialised countries are all 44 industrialised countries listed in the uNHCr 
report except Australia .
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Reasons potential irregular migrants from 
Sri Lanka choose to travel to destination 
countries
In 2012, some people believed Sri Lankan IMAs entered Australia 
for economic reasons (March, 2012). This is hardly surprising, since 
literature suggests economic factors are an important reason people 
seek asylum (Neumayer, 2005), and Australia has been one of the few 
OECD countries where the economy has remained resilient throughout 
the global financial crisis (GFC). Others claimed Sri Lankans entered 
due to humanitarian reasons, citing political persecution and torture 
(Doherty, 2012). Yet, according to literature, the reasons were likely to 
be multidimensional (Monsutti, 2005), with neither economic prospects 
nor humanitarian issues representing the only reason for an IMA to enter 
Australia.
Surveys conducted in Sri Lanka during January and May 2013 under 
the Irregular Migration Research Program sought the views of potential 
irregular migrants themselves. Both surveys involved a pilot of over 400 
people and a final survey of over 4,000 people using iPad technology (hence 
a total of 8,800 people were surveyed over two waves). Districts, the largest 
administrative unit in Sri Lanka, were selected based on source locations 
of irregular migrants. Simple random sampling was then employed to 
select Divisional Secretariats (DSs), the second largest administrative unit 
and Grama Niladhari (GNs), the lowest administrative unit. Households 
within GNs were selected randomly when possible. Data was weighted 
to consider nonresponse, ethnicity, IMA source location and gender.4
The surveys asked respondents about their intentions as they related to 
migration to Australia by boat. Based on responses to survey questions, 
respondents were then categorised according to degree of intention. 
In essence, ‘non-intenders’ indicated no intention to travel, ‘intenders’ 
expressed a desire to travel overseas by boat, ‘active intenders’ demonstrated 
4  Male responses were given greater weighting than female responses (by a ratio of 89:11), as males 
overwhelmingly represent IMA. Greater weightings were also provided for districts that were source 
areas for IMAs. Ethnicity was weighted such that it was reflective of the populations in the districts 
surveyed (these were predominately Tamil, with all but one of the five districts surveyed having Tamil 
populations greater than 80 per cent). Areas with higher nonresponse were given greater weighting 
(although levels of nonresponse were largely consistent across districts). 
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action by having made plans to travel and ‘paid intenders’ had made 
a payment towards such travel.5 The focus of the results presented in this 
chapter is on ‘intenders’, given the low sample sizes and hence relatively 
larger margins of error involved in analysing the subsamples ‘active 
intenders’ and ‘paid intenders’. 
Intention to travel to Australia via irregular maritime 
migration
Figure 3.11 illustrates reasons captured during the surveys as to why 
‘intenders’ want to leave Sri Lanka and enter Australia. Note that the 
sample size is too small to allow categorisation according to ethnicity.6
A very high proportion of respondents (89 per cent) who were categorised 
as ‘intenders’ indicated that they desired to travel to Australia by boat for 
asylum to ‘give their families a better future’. While acknowledging that 
this was a very broad response option that is multidimensional in nature, 
it is worth highlighting that the response reflects two key aspects in the 
decision-making of potential irregular migrants: a wish for a better future; 
and a desire to create that future for their families.
When this result is examined in conjunction with the next two highest 
ranking results—‘Australia’s job opportunities’ (86 per cent) and ‘lack of 
job opportunities in Sri Lanka’ (84 per cent)—it is possible that many 
respondents view the attainment of a better future as being linked, in 
part, to employment and the ability to earn an income. The importance 
of remittances to the Sri Lankan economy and, therefore, Sri Lankan 
families, means that it is possible that ‘giving their families a better future’ 
includes family members that would remain in Sri Lanka.
5  In January 2013, ‘intenders’, ‘active intenders’ and ‘paid intenders’ represented an estimated 
7.92 per cent, 1.46 per cent and 0.22 cent of the population in the districts surveyed respectively. 
This reduced to 4.53 per cent, 0.54 per cent and 0.16 per cent across ‘intenders’, ‘active intenders’ and 
‘paid intenders’ respectively during the May 2013 survey.
6  ‘Intenders’ represent a small percentage of the total sample and hence a further breakdown across 
ethnicity would increase the margins of error.
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Figure 3.11: Reasons why ‘intenders’ want to leave Sri Lanka and enter 
Australia via boat
Source: 2013 Sri Lanka survey .
Economic factors, however, are unlikely to be the only reasons for wanting 
a better life. People who referred to persecution or torture amounted 
to almost 40 per cent of respondents. Notwithstanding the English 
definitions of ‘torture’ and ‘persecution’, these are ambiguous terms in 
Tamil and Sinhala. For example, ‘torture’ may refer to torture or violence 
from domestic partners rather than from state agents as might be assumed, 
while persecution may refer to Northern Tamils ‘persecuting’ Southern 
Tamils or vice versa with no consideration of whether or not the state 
could provide effective protection in such circumstances (Jayasuriya & 
Gibson, 2013). Further research is required to gain a better understanding 
of potential irregular migrants’ views on more precise meanings of ‘torture’ 
and ‘persecution’.
The difficulties involved with entering Australia using legal channels 
(63 per cent) could be due to the requirements necessary for skilled and 
other migration, and the challenges of being accepted via Australia’s 
Humanitarian Program. Further, while people smugglers are criminals 
and may lie to increase the number of clients, they may also have 
successfully facilitated previous transfers of irregular migrants to Australia 
via boat. This could point to the reason why ‘people smugglers’ are known 
as ‘agents’ by some Sri Lankans and why 56 per cent of ‘intenders’ believe 
people smugglers tell the truth.
It seems significant that over 50 per cent of people stated ‘Australia’s 
accepting immigration program’ as a reason why they chose Australia as 
a destination. However, the most attractive features of the immigration 
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policy have not been identified. Moreover, an ‘accepting immigration 
program’ could conceivably refer to the Skilled Migration Program, the 
numerous advertisements encouraging students to travel to Australia or 
possibly the way asylum seekers are treated in Australia. Further research 
is clearly required to determine which aspects of Australia’s immigration 
program are most attractive.
The fact that 49 per cent of ‘intenders’ believe it is easier to travel to 
Australia than to other countries may be surprising, given the documented 
deaths of asylum seekers at sea and the close proximity to other potential 
countries such as India. However, many Sri Lankans living in coastal 
towns are fisherman, and hence spending two weeks to a month at 
sea, which is approximately how long it takes to travel from Sri Lanka 
to Australia by boat, is unlikely to be an issue. Note that while India 
is certainly easier to travel to than Australia, survey results indicate that 
India is not a ‘preferred’ destination (refer Figure 3.14).
That 48 per cent of ‘intenders’ say previous friends and family being 
accepted in Australia is a reason for wanting to travel to Australia is 
reasonable and consistent with similar studies highlighting the importance 
for asylum seekers of relatives who live in destination countries (Robinson 
& Segrott, 2002). Moreover, future asylum seekers may believe that they 
have similar chances of resettlement, that they will have an inside track 
on the process and that they potentially have a strong support network 
if they are granted protection.
While 29 per cent of ‘intenders’ state not knowing any other way to travel 
to Australia is a reason for travelling by boat, it is conceivable that more 
than 29 per cent actually do not know about other forms of travel—
even if it’s not a stated reason. Indeed, the chances of potential irregular 
migrants entering through regular programs are likely to be minimal.
Examination of ‘economic intenders’
Economic factors were clearly one reason the large majority of people 
(approximately 85 per cent) intended leaving Sri Lanka to travel to 
Australia. Yet many of these people also had other reasons for travel, and 
it would be unwise to not recognise the multidimensional factors involved 
in migrant decision-making. 
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To highlight this point, Figure 3.12 replicates Figure 3.11 but restricts the 
analysis to ‘economic intenders’ (those who stated they intended to leave 
Sri Lanka because of lack of job opportunities or intended to travel to 
Australia for job opportunities). Figure 3.13 shows ‘economic intenders’ 
also had other reasons for seeking asylum; i.e. these people are not only 
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Figure 3.12: Reasons why ‘intenders’ wanted to leave Sri Lanka and why 
they wanted to enter Australia via boat—sample restricted to ‘economic 
intenders’7
Source: 2013 Sri Lanka survey .
The reasons why ‘economic intenders’ desire to travel to Australia by boat 
(Figure 3.12) were similar to all ‘intenders’ (Figure 3.11). Of interest 
is that among ‘economic intenders’, those who referred to persecution 
or torture amounted to approximately 42 per cent, suggesting at least 
58 per  cent of the ‘economic intenders’ potentially wanted to travel to 
Australia for non-protection reasons. 
A key limitation of this survey data is that analysis focuses on people with 
an ‘intention’ (i.e. ‘intenders’) to travel overseas for asylum and not people 
with a demonstrated ‘action’ (i.e. ‘active intenders’) or people who have 
‘committed’ to travelling overseas for asylum (i.e. ‘paid intenders’). Results 
relating to ‘intenders’, ‘active intenders’ and ‘paid intenders’ are likely 
to vary significantly. To illustrate, among ‘active intenders’ considering 
travelling to Australia for economic reasons, the number who referred 
to persecution or torture increased to 66 per cent, suggesting that the 
7  Data was pooled from the January and May surveys to increase the sample size of ‘intenders’ 
to Australia; however, this still produces a margin of error of approximately 5.4 per cent.
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remaining 34 per cent may have intended travelling for reasons that did 
not overtly include protection-related concerns. Future research should 
consider a larger sample size that is likely to capture a larger absolute 
number of ‘active intenders’ and ‘paid intenders’.
Additionally, Figures 3.11 and 3.12 list reasons why ‘intenders’ desire 
to travel to Australia by boat without demonstrating their relative 
importance. To illustrate, while economic reasons and persecution may 
be important drivers, the presence of family and friends in Australia 
may be a key determinant. Future research is required to analyse the 
relative importance of drivers and determinants. Finally, future research 
should consider presenting a more comprehensive list of possible factors 
influencing irregular migration.





























Figure 3.13: Intenders’ preferred destinations
Source: 2013 Sri Lanka survey .
Note: Individuals could indicate a ‘preference’ to travel to more than one country while they 
have an ‘intention’ to travel to just one country. results are subject to a margin of error of 
approximately 4 .2 per cent .
The May 2013 survey data found that 41 per cent of ‘intenders’ wanted 
to travel to Canada for asylum, followed by the UK (32 per cent) and 
France (28 per cent). Australia ranked 4th out of 13 countries listed, at 
20 per cent (refer Figure 3.14). This suggests that while Australia is still 
a preferred destination for asylum seekers from Sri Lanka, its importance 
may be diminishing. Australia’s position relative to other countries could 
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be due to a host of reasons including but not limited to geography, diaspora 
links, immigration policies and practices, and economic performance. 
Additional research is required to distil the relative importance of the 
multiple factors influencing decisions about potential migrants’ preferred 
destinations.
Some reasons why ‘intenders’ wanted to travel to destination countries 





















Figure 3.14: Reasons why ‘intenders’ are attracted to destination 
countries (all countries)
Source: 2013 Sri Lanka survey .
Note: results are subject to a margin of error of approximately 4.2 per cent.
The results show that economic factors are the main reason ‘intenders’ are 
attracted to a destination country. Note that these options were not shown 
to respondents during the survey, suggesting results may be different if 
multiple-choice options were provided. For example, intuitively, ease of 
travel is an important reason why one might choose a certain country, 
yet only 16 per cent of people suggested this as an answer. Perhaps if 
respondents had been presented with pre-determined options, more 
people would have selected ease of travel. Further, unlike in Figures 3.9 
and 3.10, the results also do not highlight why a person may want to leave 
Sri Lanka. 
Conclusions
Many Sri Lankans travel overseas for regular and irregular migration 
purposes. In 2011, approximately 260,000 migrants travelled overseas for 
temporary or permanent employment opportunities. Most of the foreign 
workers were Sinhalese, and the large majority of Sinhalese workers 
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migrated to Middle Eastern countries. In contrast, Tamils comprised the 
bulk of Sri Lanka’s diaspora in industrialised countries, and made up 
the majority of asylum seekers and refugees. 
In 2012, just over 15,000 Sri Lankans were asylum seekers globally, with 
Australia ranked as the number one destination. When focusing on IMAs, 
Australia experienced a highly unusual jump from under 100 arrivals from 
the first quarter of 2012 to around 2,600 in the third quarter of 2012. 
This number was also unusual when compared to asylum applications 
globally, with other countries experiencing decreases, plateaus or minor 
increases in 2012.
Surveys undertaken in high IMA source areas of Sri Lanka during January 
and May of 2013 revealed that the reasons people intended to travel 
by boat to Australia involved multiple, interrelated factors, including 
factors related to protection, visa access, employment, people smuggling, 
geography and family/community links. The most prominent factors 
related primarily to economic prosperity. This is unsurprising, given 
economic factors were also the primary reason for people desiring to 
travel to other countries. Of more interest is that, among people travelling 
for economic reasons, results show at least 58 per cent of people with 
a desire (‘intenders’), and at least 36 per cent of people with plans in place 
(‘active intenders’), to travel by boat to Australia, appeared to do so for 
non-protection reasons. That said, further research is required for a more 
precise analysis of the drivers and determinants of ‘active intenders’ and 
‘paid intenders’.
The survey findings are consistent with Koser’s discussion of a paradigm 
shift involving the convergence of ‘political refugees and economic 
migrants into a single migration route’, as asylum seeking (Koser, 2001). 
Seeking asylum via irregular migration channels can be an effective 
strategy whereby people, including genuine asylum seekers, can gain 
a legitimate migration status relatively swiftly that would be virtually 
impossible to obtain by staying where they are or attempting to move via 
regular pathways. 
The survey results in this chapter highlight the multidimensional factors 
potential irregular migrants take into account when assessing and 
reassessing whether to, and where to, migrate. Further examination of both 
potential and actual migrants’ views (including IMAs) would allow for 
a deeper understanding of the drivers and motivations of those Sri Lankans 
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who migrate irregularly by maritime means. Another useful research focus 
would be the possible decision-making factors involved in the decisions 
of potential irregular migrants not to migrate, including those who may 
be facing protection issues. Adhikari’s research on the impact of a range 
of factors on potential refugee decision-making in Nepal highlights that 
individual decision-making, even in extreme conflict situations, is based 
on more than just the threat to one’s life, and includes factors related to 
economic livelihoods and social networks (Adhikari, 2012).
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The root causes of 
movement: Exploring the 
determinants of irregular 
migration from Afghanistan
Craig Loschmann, Katie Kuschminder and Melissa Siegel
Introduction
The occurrence of migration outside of an official system is prevalent 
throughout the world. Although the precise number of irregular migrants 
is not known, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
estimated that 10 to 15 per cent of the world’s 214 million international 
migrants in 2010 could be categorised as irregular (IOM, 2010, p. 29). 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) puts that figure 
closer to a third, within developing countries alone (UNDP, 2009, 
p. 23). As a matter of concern for the individual, those embarking on 
such a  journey expose themselves to great risk outside the authority 
of any formal institution. From the states’ perspective, the extent of 
irregular migration and its political sensitivity can pose great dilemmas 
for policymakers trying to respond to such flows. Considering the scope 
and relevance of the issue, the lack of analysis on irregular migration 
is surprising.
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This chapter explores irregular migration from the (post-)conflict 
environment of Afghanistan. Our analytical methods are two-fold: first, 
we sketch a descriptive profile of irregular migrants in order to gain 
insight into the features of the particular context in question; and second, 
we empirically model the determinants of irregular migration through 
standard regression analysis. Regarding the latter, irregular migration is 
often considered to be simply driven by a lack of ability to migrate through 
regular channels. While there may be some truth to such a notion, certain 
characteristics of migrants may also influence decision-making processes. 
We therefore investigate the role premigration circumstances play, but 
also look at other relevant migration-related factors, including the period 
in which migration occurred, destination and principal reasons for 
migrating, among others.
For both the descriptive and empirical analyses, we rely on a dataset 
originating from a household survey conducted in Afghanistan in April 
and May 2011. The survey captured information on 2,005 households 
across 100 communities. For our purposes, some 16 per cent of all adults 
observed in the sample are identified as ‘irregular’, meaning they are 
either current irregular migrants or former irregular migrants who have 
since returned.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We next provide 
a brief conceptual overview of irregular migration, including definitions 
and a discussion on determinants. We then outline recent migration 
trends in Afghanistan in order to better understand the context within 
which our study is embedded. Following that, we describe our sample 
and present a descriptive profile of irregular migrants, before moving on 
to the empirical analysis of the determinants of irregular migration from 
Afghanistan. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of the study’s 
main findings.
Irregular migration: Definitions and caveats
Critical to defining ‘irregular migration’ is the recognition of multiple 
routes into irregularity (Uehling, 2004). The three main routes include 
individuals entering a country without proper authority, either through 
clandestine entry or with fraudulent documents; individuals entering with 
authority, but overstaying their authority; and individuals deliberately 
utilising the asylum system. The primary distinction of significance for 
most receiving states is that between irregular entry and irregular stay 
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(de  Haas, 2008). This chapter focuses on irregular entry, and so an 
‘irregular migrant’ is defined as someone ‘crossing borders without proper 
authority, or violating conditions for entering another country’ (Jordan & 
Düvell, 2002, p. 15).
In the case at hand, our perspective is that of the country of origin, 
meaning we look at individuals leaving Afghanistan without proper 
documentation. Therefore, in practice, we define an irregular migrant 
within our dataset as an individual who has migrated abroad without 
official documentation (e.g. tourist visa, work visa, student visa, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] refugee status). 
As  such, we do not capture other forms of irregularity like overstaying 
a visa or abuse of the asylum system, or irregular migrants who become 
regular through a regularisation scheme. Furthermore, we are unable to 
identify irregular movement involving smugglers or traffickers.
Beyond terminology, when reflecting on what may influence an individual 
to migrate irregularly, one must recognise that in most cases migration in 
general is not driven by a single motivating factor but rather an array 
of factors which traverse social, economic, environmental and political 
considerations (de Haas, 2011; Koser & McAulliffe, 2013). For instance, 
an individual may seek asylum abroad from political persecution, even 
though the underlying trigger to migrate may relate to another factor, such 
as a lack of work opportunities, resulting in a mixed migration motivation. 
Regardless of the myriad motivations that may drive migration, it seems 
likely that economic interests are a fundamental factor in decision-making 
processes (Battistella, 2008).
Moreover, when looking specifically at irregular migration, one must 
appreciate the parallels with regular migration in that we can expect both to 
be very much related to the interconnected social, political and economic 
forces operating in both host and sending countries (van Hear, Bakewell, 
& Long, 2012). For example, when the demand for foreign labour is 
not met by the supply of labour migration through formal channels, 
people routinely find their own informal, and often creative, ways to meet 
that demand. Indeed, Portes (1978) found that one of the key defining 
characteristics of irregular immigration to the US was that such migrants 
were ‘individuals who move with the sole purpose of selling their work 
capacity’ (p. 472). This consequently leads to the conclusion that the pull 
of a favourable labour market causes both regular and irregular migration, 
making distinct identification of the determinants of irregular migration 
in exclusion a challenge. 
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Still, even though it may not be difficult to imagine many of the same 
factors influencing both irregular and regular migration, there is also 
indication that the drivers of irregular migration in particular may be 
specific to the context. Orennius (2001), for example, found that there 
were five primary factors driving irregular migration from Mexico to 
the US, a context noticeably different to that of Afghanistan yet still 
informative: first, the history of migration between the two countries; 
second, the importance of established networks; third, the availability of 
smugglers to assist crossing the border; fourth, the large wage gap between 
the two countries; and fifth, the immigration policies of both countries. 
Although there are several similarities between the determinants of regular 
and irregular flows, irregular migration episodes may have certain defining 
characteristics, and individuals choosing to migrate through irregular 
channels may embody particular features which influence their decision-
making process.
Migration trends in Afghanistan
Often, migration in the Afghan context is viewed solely in relation to 
the most recent period of conflict, overlooking the fact that cross-border 
movement in the region has a deep-rooted historical precedence. Prior to 
the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghans enjoyed an almost unrestricted ability 
to move back and forth between both Pakistan and Iran, much of the time 
for temporary or seasonal employment opportunities (Stitger, 2006). The 
pull from stronger neighbouring labour markets along with close social 
and cultural ties helped establish robust social networks across locations 
(Monsutti, 2006). These networks were utilised and strengthened in the 
subsequent years of conflict, when many were forced to flee Afghanistan 
because of extreme insecurity and general hardship.
The conflict in Afghanistan over the last four decades has resulted in one 
of the worst episodes of protracted forced displacement, both externally 
and internally, in recent memory. During the Soviet presence over much 
of the 1980s an estimated 5.8 million people fled to Pakistan and Iran, 
while another 2 million are believed to have been internally displaced 
(Strand et al., 2008; Kuschminder & Dora, 2009). Even though the Soviet 
withdrawal by the end of the decade offered a brief period of respite, 
in terms of those seeking refuge abroad, the optimism for calm quickly 
subsided with heavy infighting between rival mujahedeen factions and the 
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Soviet-backed Najibullah regime. In the years up until the government’s 
eventual fall in 1992, the official number of refugees peaked at just over 
6.3 million (UNHCR, 2013a).
When the government finally did succumb, Afghanistan experienced 
a  massive return, with more than half of those abroad at the time 
repatriating within two years. As the Taliban came to power in 1996, 
however, this considerable inflow came to a halt, only to be reignited 
following the removal of their regime by international forces in 2001. 
The promise of change that came along with the international community’s 
presence in the country post-2001 led to large-scale repatriation, with 
around 2  million Afghans estimated to have returned in 2002 alone 
and another 3.7 million since then (UNHCR, 2015). Nonetheless, the 
Afghan refugee population still remains among the largest in the world, 
with nearly 2.5 million located in Pakistan and Iran (ibid.). Moreover, the 
heightened insecurity in recent years has led to a noticeable reduction in 
the number of people voluntarily repatriating.
Besides official refugees, the number of undocumented Afghans within 
the immediate region is sizeable. Movement to and from both Pakistan 
and Iran is fairly fluid, with many lured by job opportunities (Koser, 
2014). In  Iran alone, an estimated 1.4 million Afghans live without 
documentation, while another one million are believed to reside in 
Pakistan (UNHCR, 2013b). Migration outside the region, on the other 
hand, is relatively small, yet still significant, and in large part is made 
up of the better educated and highly skilled with the resources and 
wherewithal to embark on such a journey (Koser, 2014). Nevertheless, 
the total number of asylum claims by Afghans in mostly industrialised 
nations has risen in recent years, in response to intensifying violence and 
possibly in anticipation of the political and security transition that took 
place in 2014. Estimates show around 85,000 individuals applied for 
asylum in that year, up from around 75,000 in 2013 and 62,000 in 2012 
(UNHCR, 2015).
Overall, migration trends in Afghanistan need to be considered in relation 
to the context of the moment. Over the last 35 years, mobility has been 
a fundamental survival strategy for many Afghan families (Monsutti, 
2006). Migratory flows have fluctuated greatly, depending on the level 
of insecurity and the livelihood opportunities available. In light of the 
most recent transition, whether this modest slowdown in return and 
rise in requests for asylum turns into a greater trend, and whether such 
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movement takes place outside of regular channels, depends on any number 
of structural factors both within and outside of Afghanistan, as well as the 
characteristics of the potential migrant.
The survey sample
This analysis draws on data from a household survey collected for the 
IS Academy: Migration and Development ‘A World in Motion’ project.1 
The objective of the questionnaire was to explore a diverse set of 
themes related to the relationship between migration and development 
processes. A range of separate modules provide in-depth information 
on both individuals and households including general socioeconomic 
characteristics, migration histories, future migration plans, return 
migration, remittances, transnational ties and more.
The data collection took place in April and May 2011. While a purely 
random sample was not possible due to the limitations of conducting 
fieldwork in high-risk areas of Afghanistan, particular attention was 
paid to capturing the diversity of the Afghan population in order to 
increase the representativeness of the sample. In this regard, the five 
provinces of Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar and Kandahar were chosen 
because of their highly populated urban centres, and the fact that they 
represent around one third of the entire population. Moreover, they are 
geographically spread across the five main regions of the country, which 
allows for a greater representativeness of differing sociodemographic 
profiles and contextual factors that may influence migration behaviour. 
Within each province, stratification between urban, semi-rural and 
rural districts was applied as a way to capture different socioeconomic 
groups.2 Specific communities within these districts were then identified 
as the primary sampling unit to be eligible for enumeration at random, 
following official administrative records provided by the Central Statistics 
1  Unless otherwose noted, this dataset is the source for all figures and tables in this chapter. 
For more information about the dataset, see the project homepage: migration.unu.edu/research/
migration-and-development/is-academy-on-migration-and-development-migration-a-world-in-
motion.html#outline.
2  Urban refers to those communities which are the district capital; semi-rural refers to those 
communities which share a common border with the district capital; and rural refers to those communities 
with no common border with the district capital.
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Organization of Afghanistan. Additionally, the surveying of households 
followed a random starting point and fixed interval sampling methodology 
to increase representativeness within the primary sampling unit. 
The sample captures information on individuals within 2,005 households 
from 100 communities. Table 4.1 provides an overview by regularity 
status. The vast majority of those individuals with a migration experience 
migrated without official documentation and therefore irregularly. This is 
consistent with what we already know of migration in Afghanistan, where 
movement to and from neighbouring countries outside of any regulated 
system is common. Whether such individuals were current migrants, 
meaning they resided abroad for three months or more at the time of the 
survey, or were once migrants but had since returned is inconsequential 
to our analysis given the information provided from our questionnaire 
allows us to group them together based on relevant characteristics. Still, 
the imbalance between regular and irregular migrants makes comparison 
between these two groups problematic. Accordingly, the following 
descriptive profile focuses exclusively on irregular migrants.
Table 4.1: Overview by regularity status
Regularity status Frequency Per cent
Nonmigrant 6,195 82 .57
regular migrant* 86 1 .15
Irregular migrant* 1,222 16 .29
Total 7,503 100 .00
Note: *Current and return migrants, aggregated. Per cent figures rounded to two decimals.
Descriptive profile
This section highlights premigration features of irregular migrants, 
including socioeconomic status prior to movement as well as 
migration-related factors pertaining to the irregular migration episode. 
We additionally look at the potential for irregular migration in the future, 
based on migration intentions. Before that, however, we provide an 
overview of migration and return flows of our sample based on time of 
departure and return. 
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Figure 4.1 depicts a narrative consistent with what we know about the ebb 
and flow of migration both from and back to Afghanistan. Migration in 
the pre-1992 period was prevalent due to conflict with the Soviet Union, 
slightly less so between 1992 and 1996 following the removal of the 
Najibullah regime, and higher once again in the Taliban years leading up 
to 2001. The expulsion of the Taliban, however, led to a dip in departures 
as the number of those leaving in the sample reached its lowest point 
between 2002 and 2006, yet this decline reversed in the final 5-year time 
period ending in 2011. Return migration, on the other hand, neatly 
mirrors these outflows. Return flows in our sample were trivial in the pre-
1992 period, and increased between 1992 and 1996 before cooling off in 
the Taliban years up until 2001. The initial post-2001 period, however, 
witnessed substantial return, with the number repatriating reaching its 
peak, only to subside again in the final period between 2007 and 2011.
Figure 4.1: Migration and return flows
In terms of the premigration characteristics of irregular migrants, we find 
that 65 per cent of those with an irregular migration experience were 
heads of households, more than 80 per cent were male and the average 
age at departure was 23 years. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 highlight educational 
attainment and employment status, respectively, of irregular migrants 
prior to migrating. Figure 4.2 shows that nearly three quarters of our 
sample had no formal education prior to moving, whereas 14 per cent 
report primary, 15 per cent secondary and 1 per cent had tertiary level 
education. The proportion of irregular migrants in our sample with 
no formal education nearly matches the official measure of the adult 
Afghan population without any formal schooling at around 75 per cent 
(Central Statistics Organization, 2014, p. 68). 
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Figure 4.3 indicates that a fifth of respondents were employed prior to 
migrating, while 27 per cent were unemployed and 11 per cent were 
subsistence farmers. On the other hand, around 40 per cent of the 
responses were not applicable to employment status, meaning these 
respondents were either in education, retired, permanently sick or 
disabled, in community or military service or doing housework. If we 
take these two indicators to characterise socioeconomic status prior to 
migration, the results suggest those moving irregularly are generally in 
a disadvantaged position in society. Indeed, the vast majority of migration 
without documentation is undertaken by those in the sample with no 
formal education, and with little to no work experience.
Figure 4.2: Educational attainment Figure 4.3: Employment status
Information on the irregular migration episode helps shed light on 
migration decision-making processes. Figure 4.4 illustrates the main 
reasons for migrating by period of migration. Unsurprisingly, we see 
that prior to the 2001 NATO-led intervention, the vast majority of 
respondents moved because of security or political considerations. 
This is in stark contrast to those leaving just after the international 
community’s arrival and up until 2006, where absolute numbers were far 
lower and where the predominant reason for moving relates to employment. 
This trend only intensifies in the last period between 2007 and 2011, 
with 87 per cent of respondents during this time citing employment as 
the main reason for migration. Of those responses considered within the 
‘other’ category, reasons for migrating included family reunification or 
formation (marriage), education, environmental disaster, moving with 
family and health.
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Figure 4.4: Main reason for migration
When it comes to where irregular migrants moved, as expected, nearly 
all indicated Pakistan or Iran, with 55 per cent going to the former 
and 43 per cent going to the latter. Of the two per cent who responded 
‘elsewhere’, most specified European countries, including the UK, 
Belgium and Greece, and there were only a few cases of movement to 
Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan. 
Figure 4.5 provides the main reason for choosing destination by irregular 
migrants, broken down by each location. Those moving to Pakistan did so 
mainly because of easy access and entry into the country, though around 
a quarter cited better working or living conditions. For Iran, however, the 
main reason is split between easy access or entry and better working or 
living conditions, suggesting greater job opportunities in comparison to 
the Pakistani labour market. Lastly, when considering the few moving 
to locations outside of Iran or Pakistan, better work or living conditions is 
the predominant reason. Of those who indicated ‘other’ reasons, responses 
included ‘family or friends already there’ and ‘to study’.
Besides the individual irregular migrants’ motivations for migrating, we 
are also able to investigate other people involved in both the decision 
to migrate and act of migration itself. Three quarters of irregular 
migrants report family members involved in the migration decision, 
while 19 per  cent made the decision alone and 6 per cent counted on 
friends or others. Furthermore, 63 per cent of respondents migrated with 
family, while just over a quarter made the journey alone and 11 per cent 
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with friends or others. However, when disaggregating by the period of 
migration, the share of respondents migrating with family is far lower 
in the post-2001 period compared to the pre-2001 period, 21 per cent 
compared with 77 per cent respectively, suggesting again that movement 
since the Taliban’s removal is less about entire families fleeing for safety 
and more about a search for livelihood.
Figure 4.5: Main reason for choosing destination
Turning our attention to social networks, we look at both the contact 
respondents had with family or friends living abroad prior to migration 
as well as the financial support they received prior to migration. Only 
13 per cent of all irregular migrants had contact with anyone abroad prior 
to embarking on the journey, suggesting the influence of cross-border 
networks in this particular case is not as crucial in the decision-making 
process as is often speculated. A third of respondents relied on either gifts 
or loans from friends and family to finance their journey in comparison 
with using savings or selling assets, indicating support at origin was 
significant for some. However, disaggregating by the period of migration 
again shows that financial support was much more likely in the post-2001 
period in comparison to the pre-2001 period—56 per cent compared 
with 26 per cent respectively—potentially illustrating that migration 
motivated by a livelihood strategy is associated with a more robust social 
network of support.
Finally, we are also able to examine potential future flows of irregular 
migrants by considering migration aspirations at the time of survey. 
While 845 individuals in our sample reported having concrete plans 
to live in another country at some point in the future, only 8 per cent 
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of that group were in possession of a valid passport at that time. Of those 
individuals with migration intentions, 63 per cent intended to move to 
the ‘West’, including, in order of priority, the Netherlands, Canada, the 
UK, Germany, the US and Australia. Conversely, nearly a quarter planned 
on moving to a ‘non-Western’ country like Saudi Arabia or the United 
Arab Emirates, while the remaining 14 per cent cited Iran or Pakistan. 
When differentiating by whether the respondent had a passport, no 
clear distinction arises in terms of destination choice. Moreover, when 
distinguishing by the reason for choosing that particular destination, 
nearly all respondents indicate better working or living conditions.
Empirical analysis
This section provides a more detailed empirical analysis using standard 
regression techniques to identify the determinants of irregular migration 
from Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, the extreme imbalance between 
irregular and regular migrants in our sample complicates our ability to 
appropriately model determinants for both groups. We therefore provide 
two separate comparisons: the first, more robust, comparing irregular 
migrants and nonmigrants; and the second, more tentative comparing 
irregular migrants and regular migrants. In addition, we also provide the 
same two comparisons but restrict our sample to those who departed 
post-2001.
Our empirical approach is to use two separate probit models to estimate 
the predicted probability of an individual being an irregular migrant 
in general when comparing to nonmigrants, and in particular when 
comparing to regular migrants. The formal expression of the probit 
model is:
P(Mi=1 | Xi)= ΦβiXi
where Mi indicates the binary dependent variable of individual i taking the 
value of 1 if s/he is an irregular migrant, or 0 whether s/he is a nonmigrant 
and regular migrant respectively. Xi is a series of independent variables 
comprised of basic individual and migration-related characteristics 
included strictly in the second model. Moreover,  βi represents the 
regression parameter to be estimated and Φ indicates the cumulative normal 
distribution function. All models are estimated using robust standard 
errors clustered at the household level, and we report the marginal effects 
along with their standard errors for easier interpretation.
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Table 4.2 presents the results of the two separate probit models using the 
whole sample, estimating the predicted probability of an individual being 
an irregular migrant both generally and in particular.3 Beginning with 
the general model comparing irregular migrants to nonmigrants, a few 
statistically significant findings stand out. First, a household head and 
male respondent is on the margin 24 and 2 percentage points more likely 
to be an irregular migrant, respectively, while older individuals are slightly 
less likely. Compared to those with no formal education, respondents 
with some form of educational attainment are less likely to be irregular 
migrants and the scale of the marginal effect increases with each level. 
An individual with tertiary education, for example, is 5 percentage points 
less likely to be an irregular migrant. In terms of employment status, the 
unemployed are 11 percentage points more likely to be irregular migrants 
compared to their employed counterparts, whereas the same relationship 
albeit to a  smaller scale exists for subsistence farmers and those with 
a nonapplicable employment status.
Table 4.2: Probit model
General Particular
Dependent variable Irregular migrants Irregular migrants
Base Nonmigrants Regular migrants
Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
Household head 0 .2442*** (0.0098) 0 .0030 (0.0138)
Male 0 .0203** (0.0084) 0 .0250* (0.0151)
Age^ –0 .0078*** (0.0003) –0 .0001 (0.0004)
Educational attainment^
 No formal reference (.) reference (.)
 Primary –0 .0247*** (0.0084) –0 .0115 (0.0149)
 Secondary –0 .0451*** (0.0066) –0 .0047 (0.0133)
 Tertiary –0 .0547*** (0.0127) –0 .1070 (0.1060)
Employment status^
 Employed reference (.) reference (.)
 Unemployed 0 .1121*** (0.0191) 0 .0281* (0.0160)
 Subsistence farmer 0 .0520*** (0.0155) –0 .0176 (0.0262)
 Not applicable 0 .0235*** (0.0075) 0 .0202 (0.0133)
Household size 0 .0029*** (0.0011) –0 .0006 (0.0018)
3  Summary statistics for all covariates used in the model can be found in Table A1 of the appendix.
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General Particular
Dependent variable Irregular migrants Irregular migrants
Base Nonmigrants Regular migrants
Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
Ethnicity
 Pashtun reference (.) reference (.)
 Tajik 0 .0105 (0.0072) 0 .0067 (0.0133)
 Hazara 0 .0595*** (0.0195) –0 .0119 (0.0288)
 other –0 .0109 (0.0128) 0 .0172 (0.0217)
District type
 Urban reference (.) reference (.)
 Semi-rural –0 .0037 (0.0070) 0 .0096 (0.0100)
 rural 0 .0099 (0.0075) –0 .0108 (0.0139)
Province
 Nangarhar reference (.) reference (.)
 Kabul 0 .0201** (0.0096) –0 .0494*** (0.0187)
 Herat 0 .0086 (0.0100) –0 .0327 (0.0208)
 balkh 0 .0028 (0.0118) –0 .0146 (0.0126)
 Kandahar –0 .0358*** (0.0072) –0 .0168 (0.0150)
Migration post-2001 –0 .0592*** (0.0166)
Destination
 Pakistan reference (.)
 Iran –0 .0163 (0.0158)
 other –0 .3619*** (0.1240)
Migration reason
 Security/political reference (.)
 Employment –0 .0026 (0.0161)
 other –0 .0073 (0.0216)
Destination reason
 Easy access/entry reference (.)
 better conditions –0 .0156 (0.0116)
 other –0 .0007 (0.0178)
Migration decision
 Family reference (.)
 Alone 0 .0107 (0.0114)
 Friends/other –0 .0037 (0.0293)
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General Particular
Dependent variable Irregular migrants Irregular migrants
Base Nonmigrants Regular migrants
Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
Migrated with
 Family reference (.)
 Alone 0 .0377** (0.0164)
 Friend/other 0 .0559*** (0.0120)
Social networks abroad –0 .0179 (0.0124)
Method to finance trip
 Savings/sold assets reference (.)
 Gifts/loans 0 .0245** (0.0107)
 other 0 .0147 (0.0179)
r2 adjusted 0 .3625 0 .2300
N 7294 1187
Note: ^ indicates information for regular and irregular migrants is prior to migration.
* p<0 .10, ** p<0 .05, *** p<0 .01
Looking at some of the standard control variables, those respondents 
originating from a larger household are slightly more probable to 
be  irregular migrants. Hazaras are 6 percentage points more likely 
to  be  irregular in comparison to the Pashtun reference group. As for 
location, there is no statistically significant difference regarding the type of 
district one originates from, yet an individual from Kabul is 2 percentage 
points more likely to be an irregular migrant while those from Kandahar 
are 4 percentage points less likely in comparison to respondents from 
Nangarhar.
In the next model, comparing irregular migrants to regular migrants, 
we observe many of those statistically significant variables from 
the general model lose significance. Of the basic and premigration 
individual characteristics, only being male and unemployed leads to 
a respondent being marginally more likely to be an irregular migrant, 
both by 3  percentage points. Additionally, an individual from Kabul 
is now less likely to be an irregular migrant in contrast to that which 
is seen in the general model. Focusing specifically on those migration-
related characteristics, we find respondents who moved after 2001 were 
6 percentage points less likely to be irregular migrants in comparison to 
those who moved before international intervention. 
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There is no statistically significant difference between Iran and Pakistan; 
however, those migrating further abroad are much less likely, by 
36 percentage points, to be irregular compared to the reference group. 
Moreover, we see no statistical significance when it comes to the reason 
one decides to migrate or why one chooses a specific destination, nor 
depending on who was involved in the migration decision. On the other 
hand, migrating alone as well as with a friend or other acquaintance is 
positively correlated with being an irregular migrant in comparison to 
those who made the journey with family, by 4 and 6 percentage points 
respectively. Likewise, being supported by family or friends through either 
a gift or loan in order to finance the migratory trip is associated with being 
slightly more likely to be an irregular migrant, by 2 percentage points, 
in relation to those who relied on savings or sold assets.
Despite irregular migration post-2001 being less prevalent than in the 
period prior, as indicated in the previous model there is reason to believe 
the nature of flows during this interval is fundamentally distinct in 
comparison to migration pre-2001. With this in mind, Table 4.3 presents 
the results of the same two models but with a restricted sample for those 
who departed post-2001.4 Beginning once again with the general model, 
we find similarly that a household head and male respondent is more 
likely to be an irregular migrant. Still, the marginal scale of the variable 
indicating head of household is much lower than before, suggesting a slight 
change regarding which member migrates within the household. Age at 
departure still shows a negative sign despite being negligible. Concerning 
educational attainment, here only those respondents with secondary 
and tertiary qualifications are less likely to be irregular migrants, with 
the marginal scale again lower than that found earlier. With regard to 
employment status, now only a subsistence farmer is less likely to be an 
irregular migrant in comparison to an employed individual, again with 
marginal effects dampened.
4  Summary statistics for all covariates used in the model can be found in Table A2 of the appendix.
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Table 4.3: Probit model, post-2001
General, post-2001 Particular, post-2001
Dependent variable Irregular migrants Irregular migrants
Base Nonmigrants Regular migrants
 Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
Household head 0 .0084*** (0.0026) –0 .0005 (0.0440)
Male 0 .0274*** (0.0041) 0 .1313** (0.0562)
Age^ –0 .0009*** (0.0001) –0 .0015 (0.0015)
Educational attainment^
 No formal reference (.) reference (.)
 Primary –0 .0034 (0.0024) –0 .0588 (0.0538)
 Secondary –0 .0068*** (0.0021) 0 .0122 (0.0289)
 Tertiary –0 .0108*** (0.0027) –0 .0857 (0.1966)
Employment status^
 Employed reference (.) reference (.)
 Unemployed 0 .0057 (0.0063) 0 .0971*** (0.0364)
 Subsistence farmer –0 .0104*** (0.0029) 0 .0520 (0.0811)
 Not applicable –0 .0040 (0.0028) 0 .0583 (0.0416)
Household size 0 .0006* (0.0004) –0 .0008 (0.0056)
Ethnicity
 Pashtun reference (.) reference (.)
 Tajik 0 .0024 (0.0025) 0 .0160 (0.0387)
 Hazara 0 .0150* (0.0084) –0 .1458 (0.1296)
 other –0 .0060** (0.0025) 0 .0000 (.)
District type
 Urban reference (.) reference (.)
 Semi-rural 0 .0001 (0.0020) 0 .0062 (0.0324)
 rural 0 .0126*** (0.0034) –0 .0305 (0.0457)
Province
 Nangarhar reference (.) reference (.)
 Kabul 0 .0048* (0.0028) –0 .0987 (0.0627)
 Herat 0 .0293*** (0.0059) –0 .0805 (0.0521)
 balkh 0 .0204*** (0.0058) –0 .0351 (0.0254)
 Kandahar –0 .0043** (0.0018) –0 .0274 (0.0602)
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General, post-2001 Particular, post-2001
Dependent variable Irregular migrants Irregular migrants
Base Nonmigrants Regular migrants
 Marginal effect SE Marginal effect SE
Destination
 Pakistan reference (.)
 Iran –0 .0232 (0.0309)
 other –0 .6232*** (0.1813)
Migration reason
 Security/political reference (.)
 Employment 0 .0209 (0.0663)
 other 0 .0767 (0.0626)
Destination reason
 Easy access/entry reference (.)
 better conditions –0 .0101 (0.0278)
 other –0 .0829 (0.0862)
Migration decision
 Family reference (.)
 Alone –0 .0080 (0.0329)
 Friends/other 0 .0000 (.)
Migrated with
 Family reference (.)
 Alone 0 .1294 (0.1014)
 Friend/other 0 .2171** (0.0884)
Social networks abroad –0 .0320 (0.0355)
Method to finance trip
 Savings/sold assets reference (.)
 Gifts/loans 0 .1045** (0.0471)
 other 0 .0958 (0.0603)
r2 adjusted 0 .2463 0 .3847
N 6421 272
Note: ^ indicates information for regular and irregular migrants is prior to migration.
* p<0 .10, ** p<0 .05, *** p<0 .01
Regarding control variables, most results are similar, yet with a lower 
marginal effect despite a few variables gaining statistical significance. 
In reference to those variables specifying location, it seems an individual 
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from a rural district as well as from Herat and Balkh provinces is now 
slightly more likely to be an irregular migrant. Considering that migration 
post-2001 is motivated more by employment opportunities abroad, it is 
unsurprising that rural households now are more likely to be the origin of 
irregular migrants than their urban counterparts. Moreover, the statistical 
significance of provinces like Herat and Balkh post-2001 may indicate 
a more recent dispersion from where irregular migrants originate.
Finally, looking at the particular model again we see once more that 
most of those statistically significant variables in the general model 
lose significance. Still, being male and unemployed remain statistically 
significant and positive, and actually gain in scale in comparison to the 
situation when the whole sample is in the analysis. Additionally, considering 
migration flows are more likely driven by employment since 2001, the 
10 per cent marginal effect for the unemployed variable is telling. Beyond 
this result, however, all other statistically significant results are similar to 
what was seen before, including destination other than Pakistan or Iran, 
migrating with a friend or other acquaintance and relying on gifts or loans 
in order to finance the trip. Nevertheless, the marginal effect for each is 
amplified compared to the model using the whole sample, with the latter 
two again potentially indicating a greater social element to the migration 
event when motivated by the search for livelihood opportunities.
Conclusions
Despite the widespread occurrence of irregular migration in both 
the developed and developing world, there is a gap in understanding 
the specific determinants of irregular migration. This study has aimed to 
contribute to filling this research gap by exploring the determinants of 
irregular migration within the (post-)conflict environment of Afghanistan, 
taking both a descriptive and empirical approach. Relying on a unique 
dataset, we first profile irregular migrants in our sample and second model 
the determinants of being an irregular migrant for both the whole sample 
and those who migrated post-2001.
The descriptive profile paints a consistent picture regarding what we know 
about the history of migration in Afghanistan. Over the last 35 years, 
migration has ebbed and flowed in response to both insecurity and the 
lack of livelihood opportunities. Despite the rise and fall in migration 
flows, irregular cross-border movement has been common throughout 
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this time period, especially to and from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. 
The results highlight that the vast majority of migration from Afghanistan 
has been, and will continue to be, irregular. 
The descriptive analysis indicates that those who move irregularly are 
predominately of a lower socioeconomic status, with little to no schooling 
and limited work experience. Moreover, the main reason for migrating 
has shifted over time. Unsurprisingly, migration was primarily motivated 
by security or political considerations prior to 2001, whereas since then 
it has been primarily driven by the search for employment. This emphasis 
on migration for livelihood is greater for those moving to Iran for those 
moving to Pakistan, which may indicate the greater demand for low-
skilled labour in Iran due to the nature of its economy. Likewise, the fact 
that migrating alone is more prevalent post-2001, and that the trip is also 
more likely financed through gifts or loans from family and friends, gives 
credence to the notion of migration for livelihood potentially being based 
on a strategy at the household level. Finally, taking into consideration 
the intentions to migrate of those individuals without an official passport 
suggests irregular migration is likely to continue into the near future. 
As for the empirical analysis focusing on the determinants of migration, we 
notice a number of premigration characteristics of statistical significance. 
In the general model, individuals with a lower educational background are 
consistently more likely to be irregular migrants compared to nonmigrants. 
There is also evidence in both the general and particular models that 
those with less employment experience are more likely to migrate, yet 
the statistical significance varies across specification. Regarding location, 
it seems the origin of irregular migrants has dispersed more recently to 
include mostly rural areas and more provinces. 
When it comes to migration-related factors, we find irregular migration 
to be less likely in the post-2001 period than in the previous period, 
even though it still dominates overall flows. Moreover, our analysis finds 
evidence that those individuals migrating beyond neighbouring Pakistan 
and Iran, which in this case was primarily to various European countries 
and Saudi Arabia, are less likely to have made the journey through 
irregular channels. It is important to note, however, that most research on 
irregular Afghan migration to other countries, such as Australia and those 
in Europe, does find that the majority of these flows are irregular (Boland, 
2010; Koser & McAuliffe, 2013; Vervliet, Vanobbergen, Broekaert, 
& Derluyn, 2015). Even though the number of individuals in our sample 
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that did move outside of Pakistan and Iran is limited, this finding may 
still indicate the difficulties in doing so given the associated costs and 
distance. Additionally, those respondents migrating with a friend or other 
acquaintance are more likely to be irregular migrants in comparison to 
those individuals migrating with family, while the same goes for those 
relying on financial support from family or friends to finance the journey. 
This last finding again potentially indicates the importance of social 
networks when migration is motivated by the search for employment, 
possibly as part of an implicit household strategy to diversify the overall 
sources of livelihood.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics
Nonmigrant Regular migrant Irregular migrant
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Household head 0 .19 (0.39) 0 .37 (0.49) 0 .65 (0.48)
Male 0 .48 (0.50) 0 .72 (0.45) 0 .82 (0.39)
Age^ 34 .16 (15.99) 25 .53 (12.09) 23 .37 (13.13)
Educational attainment^
 No formal 0 .67 (0.47) 0 .59 (0.49) 0 .70 (0.46)
 Primary 0 .11 (0.31) 0 .16 (0.37) 0 .13 (0.34)
 Secondary 0 .19 (0.39) 0 .21 (0.41) 0 .15 (0.36)
 Tertiary 0 .03 (0.16) 0 .03 (0.18) 0 .01 (0.11)
Employment status^
 Employed 0 .23 (0.42) 0 .42 (0.50) 0 .27 (0.45)
 Unemployed 0 .04 (0.20) 0 .05 (0.21) 0 .12 (0.33)
 Subsistence farmer 0 .04 (0.19) 0 .09 (0.29) 0 .11 (0.31)
 Not applicable 0 .69 (0.46) 0 .44 (0.50) 0 .50 (0.50)
Household size 8 .29 (2.81) 8 .20 (2.58) 7 .72 (2.75)
Ethnicity
 Pashtun 0 .47 (0.50) 0 .37 (0.49) 0 .45 (0.50)
 Tajik 0 .41 (0.49) 0 .44 (0.50) 0 .42 (0.49)
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Nonmigrant Regular migrant Irregular migrant
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
 Hazara 0 .05 (0.22) 0 .17 (0.38) 0 .08 (0.27)
 other 0 .06 (0.24) 0 .01 (0.11) 0 .05 (0.21)
District type
 Urban 0 .51 (0.50) 0 .50 (0.50) 0 .49 (0.50)
 Semi-rural 0 .24 (0.42) 0 .20 (0.40) 0 .26 (0.44)
 rural 0 .26 (0.44) 0 .30 (0.46) 0 .25 (0.44)
Province
 Nangarhar 0 .22 (0.42) 0 .14 (0.35) 0 .24 (0.42)
 Kabul 0 .21 (0.40) 0 .31 (0.47) 0 .22 (0.41)
 Herat 0 .17 (0.37) 0 .19 (0.39) 0 .20 (0.40)
 balkh 0 .20 (0.40) 0 .29 (0.46) 0 .19 (0.39)
 Kandahar 0 .21 (0.40) 0 .07 (0.26) 0 .15 (0.36)
Migration post-2001 0 .57 (0.50) 0 .22 (0.41)
Destination
 Pakistan 0 .25 (0.44) 0 .55 (0.50)
 Iran 0 .60 (0.49) 0 .43 (0.50)
 other 0 .15 (0.36) 0 .02 (0.14)
Migration reason
 Security/political 0 .40 (0.49) 0 .63 (0.48)
 Employment 0 .47 (0.50) 0 .28 (0.45)
 other 0 .14 (0.35) 0 .10 (0.29)
Destination reason
 Easy access/entry 0 .33 (0.47) 0 .60 (0.49)
 better conditions 0 .58 (0.50) 0 .35 (0.48)
 other 0 .09 (0.29) 0 .05 (0.22)
Migration decision
 Family 0 .77 (0.42) 0 .75 (0.43)
 Alone 0 .20 (0.40) 0 .19 (0.39)
 Friends/other 0 .02 (0.15) 0 .07 (0.25)
Migration with
 Family 0 .62 (0.49) 0 .63 (0.48)
 Alone 0 .35 (0.48) 0 .25 (0.43)
 Friend/other 0 .03 (0.18) 0 .12 (0.32)
Social networks abroad 0 .19 (0.39) 0 .13 (0.34)
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Nonmigrant Regular migrant Irregular migrant
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Method to finance trip
 Savings/sold assets 0 .58 (0.50) 0 .60 (0.49)
 Gifts/loans 0 .31 (0.47) 0 .33 (0.47)
 other 0 .10 (0.31) 0 .07 (0.25)
Note: ^ indicates information for regular and irregular migrants is prior to migration.
Table A2: Summary statistics, post-2001
Nonmigrant Regular migrant Irregular migrant
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Household head 0 .19 (0.39) 0 .22 (0.42) 0 .30 (0.46)
Male 0 .48 (0.50) 0 .70 (0.47) 0 .93 (0.26)
Age^ 34 .17 (15.99) 27 .42 (10.72) 24 .85 (9.61)
Educational attainment^
 No formal 0 .67 (0.47) 0 .52 (0.51) 0 .58 (0.50)
 Primary 0 .11 (0.31) 0 .24 (0.43) 0 .18 (0.39)
 Secondary 0 .19 (0.39) 0 .22 (0.42) 0 .23 (0.42)
 Tertiary 0 .03 (0.16) 0 .02 (0.15) 0 .01 (0.09)
Employment status^
 Employed 0 .23 (0.42) 0 .47 (0.50) 0 .42 (0.49)
 Unemployed 0 .04 (0.19) 0 .02 (0.15) 0 .04 (0.19)
 Subsistence farmer 0 .04 (0.20) 0 .04 (0.21) 0 .09 (0.29)
 Not applicable 0 .69 (0.46) 0 .47 (0.50) 0 .45 (0.50)
Household size 8 .29 (2.81) 8 .17 (2.54) 8 .02 (2.73)
Ethnicity
 Pashtun 0 .47 (0.50) 0 .28 (0.46) 0 .26 (0.44)
 Tajik 0 .41 (0.49) 0 .50 (0.51) 0 .59 (0.49)
 Hazara 0 .05 (0.22) 0 .22 (0.42) 0 .10 (0.30)
 other 0 .06 (0.24) 0 .00 (0.00) 0 .04 (0.20)
District type
 Urban 0 .51 (0.50) 0 .54 (0.50) 0 .40 (0.49)
 Semi-rural 0 .24 (0.42) 0 .20 (0.40) 0 .20 (0.40)
 rural 0 .26 (0.44) 0 .26 (0.44) 0 .41 (0.49)
Province
 Nangarhar 0 .22 (0.42) 0 .17 (0.38) 0 .11 (0.32)
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Nonmigrant Regular migrant Irregular migrant
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
 Kabul 0 .21 (0.40) 0 .15 (0.36) 0 .18 (0.38)
 Herat 0 .17 (0.37) 0 .24 (0.43) 0 .34 (0.47)
 balkh 0 .20 (0.40) 0 .41 (0.50) 0 .33 (0.47)
 Kandahar 0 .21 (0.40) 0 .02 (0.15) 0 .04 (0.20)
Destination
 Pakistan 1 .00 (0.00) 1 .00 (0.00)
 Iran 0 .07 (0.25) 0 .13 (0.34)
 other 0 .66 (0.48) 0 .81 (0.39)
Migration reason
 Security/political 0 .27 (0.45) 0 .05 (0.23)
 Employment 0 .13 (0.34) 0 .04 (0.20)
 other 0 .72 (0.46) 0 .84 (0.36)
Destination reason
 Easy access/entry 0 .15 (0.36) 0 .11 (0.32)
 better conditions 0 .24 (0.43) 0 .41 (0.49)
 other 0 .59 (0.50) 0 .55 (0.50)
Migration decision
 Family 0 .17 (0.38) 0 .04 (0.20)
 Alone 0 .69 (0.47) 0 .63 (0.48)
 Friends/other 0 .00 (0.00) 0 .04 (0.19)
Migration with
 Family 0 .31 (0.47) 0 .33 (0.47)
 Alone 0 .48 (0.51) 0 .16 (0.37)
 Friend/other 0 .04 (0.21) 0 .29 (0.45)
Social networks abroad 0 .22 (0.42) 0 .14 (0.35)
Method to finance trip 0 .48 (0.51) 0 .55 (0.50)
 Savings/sold assets 0 .57 (0.50) 0 .25 (0.44)
 Gifts/loans 0 .35 (0.48) 0 .60 (0.49)
 other 0 .09 (0.28) 0 .15 (0.36)
Note: ^ indicates information for regular and irregular migrants is prior to migration.
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Seeking the views of irregular 
migrants: Decision-making, drivers 
and migration journeys
Marie McAuliffe1
A substantial body of research indicates that a number of complex, 
interrelated factors impact on the movement of irregular asylum and 
non-asylum migration flows (Castles, 2013; de Haas, 2011; Havinga & 
Böcker, 1999; Koser, 2011; Middleton, 2005; Neumayer, 2004). In some 
of the literature, the factors related to asylum seeker migration have been 
characterised as either ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors, both in terms of the decision 
to migrate as well as choice of destination country (Havinga & Böcker, 
1999; Neumayer, 2004; Zimmermann, 1996). Generally, push factors 
from the country of origin include: the political and security situation in-
country (home and/or host country); the state of the economy, and access 
to income; the outlook for the future, and in particular the prevailing 
pessimism (Adhikari, 2013; Hatton, 2011; Theilemann, 2006). Pull 
factors, on the other hand, include: asylum seeker policies in destination 
countries; how welcoming destination countries are perceived to be; 
perceptions of destination countries’ acceptance of refugees; the state of 
1  The author is grateful for research assistance from Simone Gangell and Paul Hayes in the 
preparation of this chapter.
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the economies of destination countries; and the existence of diaspora and 
communities in destination countries (Koser, 1997; Koser & Pinkerton, 
2002; Neumayer, 2004; Theilemann, 2006; Toshkov, 2012).
There is also a range of ‘enabling’ factors that act to facilitate flows, and 
that are less prevalent in the literature.2 These enabling factors cannot be 
characterised by the linear push–pull construct, but act to facilitate or 
underpin movement. Enabling factors include:
• geography and the ease of travelling to specific destination countries 
(Havinger & Böcker, 1999; Monsutti, 2010); 
• the ability to travel through transit countries (e.g. facilitative visa 
arrangements) and proximity to established migration networks 
(and,  in some cases, a related lack of ability to gain visas for lawful 
entry to destination countries);
• diaspora populations with the ability and resources to assist others in 
their communities around the world to migrate (Doraï, 2011; Koser 
& Pinkerton, 2002); 
• an increased ability to self-fund travel, as human development and 
greater access to resources increases (de Haas, 2010); 
• enhanced ‘real time’ communications technology to provide 
better information for decision-making both of potential irregular 
immigrants and people smugglers (e.g. blogs, social media, news 
reporting of events); and
• a global asylum system that was established decades ago to address 
a particular set of circumstances, and may not have evolved sufficiently 
to reflect significant changes in the environment (e.g. refusal of 
countries to accept the return of their nationals, and the lack of any 
ability to make countries accept the return of their citizens) (Hamlin, 
2012; Hatton, 2011; Jones, 2009).
The number of factors impacting on decision-making highlights the 
complex nature of irregular migration. It is also important to acknowledge 
that none of the factors are likely to be static, and some of them can 
change decisively and rapidly, undoubtedly adding to the complexity of 
migrant decision-making. 
2  One exception being de Haas (2010).
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There is a body of literature on decision-making by asylum seekers and 
potential asylum seekers; however, there are two important points to note 
about the research that has been conducted so far on this topic (Koser & 
McAuliffe, 2013). First, the focus of this research has been largely limited 
to ‘choice of destination’, with very little examination of the decision-
making processes associated with the decision to leave a country of origin. 
On the one hand, this is partly due to a view that, in relation to asylum 
seekers, forced migration is occurring. The associated assumption is that 
asylum seekers have a lack of agency, thereby effectively rendering research 
on this aspect of decision-making largely irrelevant (Koser & Pinkerton, 
2002; Robinson & Segrott, 2002; Spinks, 2013). Forced migration is 
characterised as being driven by ‘push’ factors, so that when situations 
in  countries become intolerable asylum seekers are compelled to move 
across borders.
In addition to the forced migration perspective, the primary focus on 
choice of destination as opposed to the decision to leave origin countries 
is likely to be related to the broader policy and political environment of 
the time. This is especially so in the European context, where much of the 
research on asylum seeker decision-making has been situated (Brekke & 
Aarset, 2009; Neumayer, 2004; Robinson & Segrott, 2002; van Liempt 
& Doomernik, 2006). Neumayer, for example, summarises:
Asylum seekers coming to Western Europe have preferred some destination 
countries over others. Austria, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland were 
the main destination countries relative to their population size in the 
1980s and 1990s, whereas Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain took on very 
few asylum seekers. … [T]he objective is to explain the choice amongst 
the various countries on offer as their destination for those asylum seekers 
coming to Western Europe. I want to explore to what extent one can 
explain the relative attractiveness of destination countries. 
Second, given that much of the research on decision-making is European, 
it is not able to adequately account for the particularities of the Australian 
situation, especially Australia’s geography and lack of proximity to similar 
destination countries. That is not to say that the European research is 
not relevant, for many aspects undoubtedly are. It is, however, prudent 
to be cautious about aspects of its applicability to the Australia context. 
In an absence of Australian empirical research, there has been a tendency 
for researchers and commentators to apply European research findings 
to the Australian context. In a recent paper published by the Australian 
Parliamentary Library, for example, Spinks (2013) states that ’decisions 
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about where to go are not always made by refugees themselves but rather are 
often determined, or at least heavily influenced, by others. In some cases, 
the decision is made by a family member, but for many the destination is 
chosen by the ‘agent’ or people smuggler engaged to get them to a place 
(any place) of safety’ (p. 9). The evidence provided by the survey results to 
be discussed in this chapter calls this into question. Table 5.6, for example, 
shows that 79 per cent of respondents reported being involved in the 
final decision to travel to Australia, and that 16 per cent of respondents 
reported that people who helped with travel (e.g. people smugglers) were 
involved in the final decision to travel to Australia.
The significant influence of agents is highlighted in European research 
on asylum seekers’ decision-making (Koser, 2008; Robinson & 
Segrott, 2002; van Liempt & Doomernik, 2006). It is possible that the 
entrenched smuggling networks that have supported irregular migration 
flows into Europe for decades may render potential migrants less able 
to exercise agency in terms of where to travel, particularly given the 
many countries smugglers can ultimately send migrants. This would 
appear to be less relevant in the Australian context, however, given that 
Australia is effectively at the ‘end of the line’. As highlighted by Koser and 
McAuliffe (2013), for irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs) ‘in Australia, 
who have undertaken long and relatively expensive journeys from their 
origin countries, and transited other countries where they might have 
remained in an irregular situation … the choice of Australia for most … 
appears to be deliberate’ (p. 13). In this sense, it is useful to acknowledge 
Johansson’s distinction between anticipatory refugee movement and acute 
or spontaneous movements (Johansson, 1990). When examining asylum 
seeker movement to Australia, much of the movement in recent years has 
been anticipatory rather than acute. This, in turn, and given the substantial 
distances travelled from source through (multiple) transit countries 
to Australia, means that both the decision to leave and the choice of 
destination are highly relevant topics of research in the Australian context.
Within this context, this chapter provides unique insights into how 
maritime asylum seekers to Australia contemplated and undertook 
migration journeys. As the first quantitative empirical research in Australia 
that has sought the views of IMAs, the study upon which this chapter 
is based has drawn on the existing European research, but also reflects 
the different dynamics that the Australian context presents. Seeking 
irregular migrants’ views on the decision-making processes related to 
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both the decision to leave and the choice of destination are key aspects of 
the survey, as are the roles of people other than the migrant in decision-
making (including agents).
Methods
The scope of the survey was all adult IMAs who had been granted 
a protection visa between 6 July, 2011 and 31 December, 2012 (inclusive), 
and were based in Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane. This population 
totalled 4,725 IMAs. The population was defined in order to minimise, as 
far as possible, problems of recall by limiting the scope to people who had 
recently travelled as IMAs. That said, issues of recall necessarily remain for 
this type of research.
IMAs who had not been granted a permanent visa during this period 
were out of scope. This approach ensured that all people in the survey had 
certainty about their status in Australia. The scope did not include people 
found not to be in need of protection, noting that merits and judicial 
review processes may take considerable periods of time, and a negative 
primary decision may not reflect a person’s final status. In addition, the 
survey population did not include any persons under the age of 18 due to 
particular sensitivities concerning interviewing minors. People who were 
under the age of 18 at the time of travel but had since turned 18 were 
in scope. 
The survey sample was drawn from two of the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection’s databases: the settlement database and the adult 
migrant English program database. The survey sample was drawn in 
two stages. The first group was drawn on 16 April 2013, and this was 
supplemented by a further group drawn in mid-June 2013. 
A stratified sample was selected from the databases. The sample was 
stratified by citizenship (Afghan, Iranian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan and other3) 
and location (New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria). The sampling 
rates varied between the strata, including because of variability in contact 
detail accuracy. To gain the same accuracy for estimates for a small 
population (e.g. Sri Lankans) a much higher sampling rate was required 
3  A sufficient subsample of Iraqis was not able to be obtained. Iraqis were included in the ‘other’ 
category.
A LoNG WAy To Go
108
than for a larger population. The stratification process has not introduced 
a bias in the population estimates because the responses are appropriately 
weighted to take these differing sample rates into account. Further details 
of the survey methodology are outlined in McAuliffe (2013).
Utilising technology to support self-completion
Due to the challenges inherent in seeking honest, candid information 
about experiences that may have involved trauma, vulnerability and high-
risk behaviour, specific measures were employed as a means of reducing 
response bias and non-sampling error. 
First, the survey was designed as a self-completion survey. The self-
completion of sensitive questions has been found to increase the level of 
reporting in a survey by reducing the social desirability effects relative to 
the administration of the same questions by an interviewer (Tourangeau 
& Smith, 1996). Given the sensitive nature of some of the questions, the 
potential for interviewer bias to affect the results was a significant issue. 
Interviewer bias can be due to the actual characteristics of the interviewer 
(e.g. sex, age, perceived social status) or because respondents may be 
reluctant to reveal beliefs unlikely to be endorsed by an interviewer 
(Bowling, 2005). 
In the IMA survey context, a traditional interviewer survey approach 
involving bilingual interviewers would be likely to have an impact on bias. 
This is, in part, due to the specific languages groups required to support an 
interviewer mode of delivery. Given the history of some IMAs groups, the 
bilingual interviewers required to conduct the interviews would (for some 
key citizenship groups) be likely to have their own experiences and views 
of irregular maritime migration, either due their own personal experiences 
(they may have themselves been IMAs) or those of their family, friends or 
other community members. Self-completion allowed for much-reduced 
interaction by removing the need for an interviewer to conduct the survey 
and ask questions.
The use of computer-based technology involving self-completion was 
chosen as it has been found to be effective in eliciting honest, open 
answers from participants in other surveys involving highly sensitive 
issues (Tourangeau & Smith, 1996; Seebregtsa et al., 2009). For example, 
in a survey on rape in South Africa, participants were asked questions via 
a tablet computer-based survey on their experiences as both a perpetrator, 
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and a victim, of rape (Jewkes, Sikweyiya, Morrell, & Dunkle, 2009). 
The results showed that a substantial proportion of men indicated that 
they themselves had raped, and this finding was in contrast to studies 
based on other research methodologies.
The survey was conducted using a tablet computer preloaded with the 
questionnaire translated in the primary language of the participant. 
The  survey was self-completed, rather than interview based, with the 
questions available in English, Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Hazaragi, Tamil and 
Urdu. The technology allowed respondents to switch between languages 
in ‘real time’. A ‘skip’ option allowed participants to skip questions they 
did not want to answer. The respondent was in control of the pace of the 
survey and was able to pause, reread a question, or think about an answer, 
a factor which has been seen to improve the quality of answers in self-
administered questionnaires (Hox, Kef, & de Leeuw, 2003). 
In recognition of potential literacy and technological access issues, bilingual 
assistants were engaged to provide initial guidance to the participant on 
how to complete the questionnaire on the tablet computer. The assistants 
remained available to provide assistance for completion of a question if 
requested, but did not interview the respondent. This allowed participants 
to complete the survey anonymously. 
The approach involving the provision of bilingual assistants recognised 
that an unsupported web-based administration would be likely to fail 
because of the particular characteristics of the population. While this 
approach may have had an impact on response bias due to the presence 
of an assistant, the much-reduced interaction (compared to a traditional 
interviewer) will have undoubtedly had a positive impact on the reporting 
of sensitive responses. Computer-based self-completion also assists 
in reducing non-sampling errors, such as missing values and incorrect 
coding,  compared to other survey delivery methods (Bernabe-Ortiz 
et al., 2008).
There are a number of methodological limitations entailed in the 
approach that was adopted. Issues of recall, for example, are likely to have 
an impact on survey results. However, this would equally be the case for 
other methodologies, such as structured interviews and focus groups.
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Much effort was expended on being able to elicit sensitive information 
through the use of computer-based self-completion surveying. 
The  approach does not allow, however, for exploration of detailed 
questioning of aspects of respondents’ experiences, such as would be the 
case through structured interviewing.
Survey results
A quantitative survey of IMAs, with a specific focus on pre-arrival 
experiences, was considered an important means to build an aspect of 
the evidence-base. Surveys of this nature are able to identify patterns, 
including by determining how widely certain processes are undertaken or 
what characteristics feature in a particular process (Sayer, 1992, p. 243). 
This section provides a summary of the key results of the survey. The results 
in this chapter are primarily reported at the aggregate level; that is all 
respondents, rather than subsamples with particular characteristics. 
Selected results by some citizenship groups (Afghans, Iranians, Pakistanis 
and Sri Lankans) as well as age have been included to highlight specific 
demographic differences.
The survey comprised 44 multipart questions on respondents’:
• host country experiences;
• circumstances in home and/or host country;
• decisions to leave;
• choice of destination;
• travel to Australia; 
• Australian experiences; and
• demographic characteristics.
Host country experiences
To better understand the experiences of survey participants, it was 
important to identify their migration histories. People who commenced 
their journey to Australia from their country of birth would be likely to 
have a different set of experiences to those who had spent time in host or 
transit countries, noting that the distinction between ‘host’ and transit’ 
can be blurry, and is largely based on a time dimension. Respondents who 
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indicated they had spent at least 12 months in a country other than their 
country of birth were asked to respond to a series of questions relating to 
their experiences in that country.
This subsample comprised 327 respondents, or almost one third of the 
sample. Discussion of survey results in this section is limited to the 
subsample, not the entire sample, and has been referred to as ‘host’ 
country experiences.
The main host countries identified by respondents were Pakistan 
(60  per  cent) and Iran (24 per cent). Other less prominent countries 
included Indonesia (4 per cent), India (3 per cent), and Iraq (3 per cent). 
These results appear to be directly related to the citizenship composition 
of the ‘hosted’ subsample: the majority of Afghans (57 per cent) indicated 
they had lived in a country other than their birth country prior to 
travelling to Australia. Iranian respondents reported very low levels of 
having lived in a host country (5 per cent). These results accord with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data on 
hosted refugee populations (UNHCR, 2013). 
These results show that of the four main citizenship groups (Afghans, 
Iranians, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans), all groups reported 90 per cent 
or more having been born in their stated country of citizenship. Small 
proportions of Afghan respondents reported that they were born in 
Pakistan (3 per cent) and Iran (2 per cent). Seven per cent of Pakistani 
citizens reported having been born in Afghanistan. The results indicate, 
for example, that most Afghan respondents were born in Afghanistan and 
had been living in a host country prior to travelling to Australia.
The average time spent in a host country was 20.5 years. Eleven per cent 
had spent 5 years or less in a host country, with almost half (44 per cent) 
having spent more than 20 years in a host country. The vast majority 
(82 per cent) indicated that they had had no contact with UNHCR while 
living in a host country, with just 3 per cent having indicated that they 
had been recognised as a refugee. 
The majority of the host country subsample (60 per cent) reported that 
they had worked illegally while residing in a host country, with 19 per cent 
having indicated that they worked legally. While not necessarily related, this 
more or less aligned with the response to questions about their legal status 
in a host country, with 19 per cent indicating that they had some form 
of legal status (e.g. registration with UNHCR), while the overwhelming 
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majority (79 per cent) advised that they had no legal status. In addition, 
just over one in 10 indicated they had been deported by their host country 
at least once. Around 30 per cent of hosted respondents indicated they 
had travelled back to their country of birth at least once. This was most 
common among Afghans (31 per cent), and is likely to have involved 
both voluntary and involuntary movement in light of the deportation 
results. This is consistent with recognised circulatory migration patterns 
of Hazaras in the region (Monsutti, 2005, pp. 168–69). 
Circumstances in country of origin
The survey sought respondents’ views on three specific aspects of their 
lives in their country of origin: their ‘social proximity’ (Fussell & Massey, 
2004) to migration (including direct migration experiences, as well as 
those of family, friends and others in their communities); the extent 
of their links to diaspora in Australia; and the problems they faced prior 
to leaving. For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘origin country’ has 
been used to encompass both ‘home’ countries (i.e. relevant to people 
residing in their country of citizenship prior to travel) and ‘host’ countries 
(i.e. relevant to people residing in countries other than their country of 
citizenship). In the survey, ‘residence’ was defined as being 12 months 
or more (not including time spent in detention).
Social proximity to migration
The survey results showed that respondents had, on average, a reasonable 
social proximity to migration prior to leaving their home or host country 
to travel to Australia. In other words, social proximity related to the extent 
to which respondents knew of people who had migrated (or attempted 
to), or had previously migrated themselves (or attempted to).
Social proximity to migration tended to diminish the closer the 
respondent was in social terms to the actual migrant group. For example, 
around a third of respondents indicated that it was common for people 
to travel to another country for work (32 per cent), and that their ethnic 
group travelled to other countries for work (34 per cent), compared to 
friends (17 per cent) and family members (13 per cent) who had migrated 
for work. 
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As shown in Table 5.1, respondents were less sure about being able to 
answer the more general questions (28–31 per cent chose the ‘not sure’ 
option), compared to more specific questions on friends (10 per cent 
not sure) and family (5 per cent not sure) who had travelled to another 
country for work.











In [origin country], was it common for people 
to travel to another country to find work?
32 36 31 1 100
Did the majority of [your ethnic] community 
travel to another country to find work?
34 38 29 1 100
Did you have any friends who travelled to 
another country to find work?
17 73 10 1 100
Did you have any family members who 
travelled to another country to find work?
13 83 5 1 100
Prior to leaving [origin country], had you 
ever applied for a visa to travel to any other 
country?
9 87 3 0 100
Prior to leaving [origin country], did you 
know of people who had travelled to another 
country without a visa?
18 68 14 1 100
Source: IMA survey .
When results were examined by the four citizenship groups, there was 
not much variation in relation to family members who had travelled 
to another country to find work, nor in relation to applying for visas 
themselves. There was, however, variation in response to the more general 
questions about ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘people’, with Sri Lankans having 
reported much higher responses against these two groups (65 per cent 
and 73 per cent, respectively). Sri Lankans were also less likely to report 
having had friends who had travelled (2 per cent).
With regard to knowing people who had travelled to other countries 
without a visa, Afghans were more likely to report this (23 per cent), and 
Sri Lankans and Pakistanis much less likely (2 per cent and 3 per cent, 
respectively). Afghans reported that the countries people travelled to 
in these circumstances included Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey 
and Australia.
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Links to diaspora in Australia
Another factor with the potential to affect decision-making is the extent 
to which potential migrants had personal links to family members, 
friends and  others in destination countries. Results showed that 
around 22 per  cent of respondents indicated that they had relatives in 
Australia before they left their origin country. When other social links to 
Australia were examined, the results showed that 37 per cent had relatives, 
friends, friends of relatives/friends or fellow ethnic community members 
in Australia prior to their departure. When examined by citizenship, 
Afghans (43 per cent) and Pakistanis (38 per cent) were more likely than 
Iranians (24 per cent) to have links to Australia. Further breakdowns by 




































Figure 5.1: Respondents’ links to Australia prior to departing origin 
country
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Note: ‘Social links—all’ includes relatives, friends, friends of relatives/friends or fellow 
ethnic community members in Australia .
Prevailing conditions
When asked about the problems faced in their country of origin, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents indicated there were many 
problems facing them, and that these problems were varied in nature and 
involved protection and non-protection problems. The most prominent 
problems included ethnic-based discrimination (62 per cent), general 
insecurity (60 per cent), religious discrimination (59 per cent), serious 
harassment (53 per cent), persecution (51 per cent), political oppression 
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(40 per cent), corruption (34 per cent), poor education facilities 
(30  per  cent), lack of job opportunities (27 per cent), unemployment 
(27 per cent), and poverty (23 per cent). 
Respondents’ reporting of the top three problems facing them provided 
further clarity of the severity of the multitude of problems facing them, with 
protection-based reasons featuring heavily (see Table 5.2). Non-protection 
reasons also featured, and included general insecurity (32  per  cent), 
widespread violence (10 per cent), unemployment (8 per cent), lack of 
job opportunities (7 per cent), and loss of home (6 per cent).
When examined by citizenship, for example, Pakistanis and Afghans were 
more likely to report religious discrimination than others (85 per  cent 
and 74 per cent respectively), and Sri Lankans and Afghans were more 
likely to report persecution on the basis of ethnicity (89 per cent and 
80 per cent, respectively). Sri Lankans were also much more likely than 
others to report ‘eviction/loss of home/nowhere to live’ as a problem 
(69 per cent). Further analysis of these results is likely to reveal a complex 
picture that will vary by citizenship and ethnicity. This would be further 
enhanced through the completion of future surveys so that changes over 
time could be analysed.
Table 5.2: Problems faced by respondents in country of origin prior 














62 80 22 66 89
religious discrimination 59 74 42 85 60
Serious harassment 53 59 52 24 72
Persecution 51 55 41 42 71
Political oppression 40 32 57 41 73
Torture 39 39 41 28 81
Non-protection1
General insecurity 60 63 54 54 83
Widespread violence 39 38 36 38 68
Unemployment 27 20 27 3* 16*
Poor education facilities 30 29 20 13* 30
Lack of job opportunities 27 18 29 2* 26














20 18 8 <1* 69
Corruption 34 31 38 17* 42
Poverty 23 18 16 2* 25
Poor health facilities 22 22 10 3* 38
Other
other 2 1* 2* 1* <1*
Threat to life3 <1* <1* <1* 0 0
Prefer not to say <1* 0 <1* 0 0
Source: IMA survey. (n=1,008). Multiple response question.
Note: (1) It is possible that some ‘non-protection’ factors (e.g. ‘eviction/loss of home/
nowhere to live’) could be protection-related, depending on the exact nature of claims 
made . For the purposes of this chapter, these factors have been interpreted as being 
non-protection factors. (2) These citizenship groups have low sample sizes and results 
for these groups should be treated with caution. (3) ‘Threat to life’ was coded based on 
open responses from the ‘other’ field. For the purposes of this analysis, it is considered 
as a protection factor . Estimates based on less than 20 unweighted responses have been 
asterisked .
Decision-making
To better understand the range of factors involved in irregular migration 
decision-making processes, the survey asked questions about both the 
decision to leave and the choice of destination. It asked respondents about 
their involvement, the involvement of other people, and the sources of 
information used in these decisions. The survey also asked respondents 
about the reasons they left their country of origin to travel to Australia, 
and about any specific events that triggered their departure. Noting 
that all respondents had been granted protection in Australia, responses 
related to different forms of persecution ranked highly. The range of 
reasons for leaving selected by respondents, however, appears to indicate 
the complexity involved in the decision to leave, particularly in light of 
the prevalence of both protection and non-protection reasons for leaving 
origin countries.
Overall, responses showed that both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors were taken 
into account in decision-making, and that both ‘protection’ and ‘non-
protection’ reasons for movement applied. Responses to questions about 
people involved the decision to leave and choice of destination indicate 
that there are some differences in these decision-making processes, 
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including in relation to the involvement of specific groups of people such 
as friends and family in origin countries, and people who help with travel 
(e.g. people smugglers). The differences in results are discussed below.
Reasons for leaving country of origin
The most common reasons respondents selected for leaving their country 
of origin were religious persecution (51 per cent), persecution against 
people of the respondent’s ethnicity (52 per cent) and general insecurity/
conflict (42 per cent). General persecution (32 per cent), political 
persecution (25 per cent), an issue with the origin country’s authorities 
(16 per cent) and persecution against women (14 per cent) also featured 
(see Table 5.3).
Many respondents also reported ‘pull’ factors among their reasons 
for leaving to travel to Australia, particularly perceptions of Australia’s 
attitude towards asylum seekers and refugees, with 30 per cent selecting 
‘Australia treats asylum seekers well’ and 23 per cent selecting ‘Australia 
accepts refugees’. 
Twenty-four per cent responded that they left to travel to Australia for 
‘a better life’. This response option was imprecise in that it is likely to 
refer to a range of protection and/or non-protection reasons, and may also 
encompass both ‘push’ and/or ‘pull’ factors. However, it was included in 
the survey because it is a phrase that is often used by migrants themselves. 
Further analysis of this variable against other variables is likely to be 
of interest. 
Of the non-protection reasons, the most common reason for leaving 
was general insecurity/conflict (42 per cent). Other non-protection 
reasons included ‘better education services’ (15 per cent), ‘better health 
services’ (9 per cent), ‘lack of economic opportunity’ (9 per cent), ‘to get 
Australian citizenship’ (9 per cent), ‘better housing’ (8 per cent) and ‘to 
work’ (7 per cent).
Consistent with results concerning the problems faced in origin countries, 
when the reasons for leaving were examined by citizenship, Pakistanis 
and Afghans were more likely to report religious persecution than others 
(82 per cent and 68 per cent, respectively), and Sri Lankans and Afghans 
were more likely to report persecution on the basis of ethnicity (84 per cent 
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and 69 per cent, respectively). Sri Lankans and Iranians were also more 
likely than other groups to report political persecution (70 per cent and 
49 per cent, respectively) as a reason for leaving. 
Respondents’ reporting of the top three reasons for leaving provided 
further clarity, with protection-based reasons featuring heavily. Non-
protection reasons also featured, and included general insecurity 
(30 per cent), ‘Australia treats asylum seekers well’ (15 per cent), ‘for a 
better life’ (13 per cent), issue with the country’s authorities (10 per cent), 
and better education services (7 per cent).













Persecution against [Ethnicity] 
people
52 69 18 63 84
religious persecution 51 68 33 82 45
General persecution 32 28 35 24* 64
Political persecution 25 11 49 23* 70
Australia accepts refugees 23 24 12 25* 19*
Persecution based against 
women
14 7 21 6* 59
Non-protection1
General insecurity/conflict 42 41 40 43 69
Australia treats asylum 
seekers well
30 30 21 32 20
For a better life 24 18 24 13* 12*
Issue with the country’s 
authorities
16 7 32 1* 40
For better education services 15 12 14 4* 8*
To get Australian citizenship 9 5* 3* 0 4*
To work 7 4* 4* 1* 2*
For better health services 9 5 5* 1* 2*
Lack of economic opportunity 9 5 11 2* 14*
For better housing 8 6 2* 2* <1*
To join family/community 3 2* <1* 0 3*
Australia is safe <1* <1* 0 0 <1*
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I don’t know, I was a child <1* <1* <1* 0 0
other 3 3* 2* 1* 0
Threat to life3 3 4* 0 3* 0
None of these 3 3* 5* 0 3*
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008). Multiple response question.
Note: (1) It is possible that some ‘non-protection’ factors (e.g. ‘issue with country’s 
authorities’) could be protection-related, depending on the exact nature of claims made. For 
the purposes of this chapter, these factors have been interpreted as being non-protection 
factors. (2) These citizenship groups have low sample sizes and results for these groups 
should be treated with caution. (3) ‘Threat to life’ was coded based on open responses 
from the ‘other’ field. For the purposes of this analysis, it is considered as a protection 
factor . Estimates based on less than 20 unweighted responses have been asterisked .
The vast majority of respondents (85 per cent) indicated that they faced 
both protection and non-protection-related problems in their country 
of origin and/or left their origin country for both protection and non-
protection reasons (see Table 5.4). 
When examined by citizenship, the results show that there was not a 
great deal of variation between citizenship groups, the exception being 
Sri Lankan respondents, who were more likely to have reported both 
protection and non-protection factors (96 per cent). 
Table 5.4: Problems faced in origin country and/or reasons for leaving 











both protection and non-
protection 
85 86 81 85 96
Protection only 9 11 8 15* 0
Non-protection only2 3 1* 4* 0 2*
other/none/no answer 3 2* 7* 0 2*
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Notes: (1) Protection problems and reasons included: all forms of persecution, religious 
discrimination, ethnic discrimination, serious harassment, political oppression, torture, 
‘Australia accepts refugees’, ‘threat to life’. Non-protection problems and reasons included: 
lack of economic/job opportunity; unemployment; general insecurity/conflict; widespread 
violence, corruption, poverty, for better housing; eviction/loss of home; to work; to join 
family/community; poor/better health services; poor/better education services; for a better 
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life; issue with country’s authorities; to get Australian citizenship; ‘Australia treats asylum 
seekers well’. (2) It is possible that some ‘non-protection’ reasons could be protection-
related, depending on the exact nature of claims made . For the purposes of the survey, 
the problems/reasons in note 2 have been interpreted as being non-protection. (3) These 
citizenship groups have low sample sizes and results for these groups should be treated 
with caution . Estimates based on less than 20 unweighted responses have been asterisked .
Departure triggers
Acknowledging that decision-making factors are not static and can 
change decisively and rapidly, the survey asked respondents whether 
any particular events triggered their departure. The results suggest that 
while the underlying reasons respondents decided to leave may have been 
present for a period of time, in most instances a specific incident triggered 
their departure.
Sixty-eight per cent responded that a significant security threat or incident 
triggered their departure. Events affecting respondents’ family and friends, 
namely a threat against family/children (31 per cent) and the loss of a close 
family member/friend (18 per cent) ranked second and third respectively.
The next most common responses were the imminent threat of deportation 
(18 per cent), loss, or threat of losing home or shelter (14 per cent) and 
loss, or threat of losing job or income (11 per cent). In relation to the role 
of people smugglers, three per cent of respondents answered that being 
approached by an agent (e.g. people smuggler) was a trigger. 
People involved in the decision to leave 
The responses to questions about the people involved in the final decision 
to leave indicated that friends and/or family in the country of origin 
played an important role and that, to a lesser extent, people smugglers 
were involved. A not insubstantial proportion of respondents indicated 
that they themselves were not involved in the final decision to leave 
(12 per cent). Eighty-two per cent responded that they were themselves 
involved in the final decision. When examined by citizenship, Iranians 
were more likely to not have been involved (19 per cent), along with 
Afghans (11 per cent) compared to Sri Lankans (4 per cent). In light of 
the survey results on who respondents travelled with—which show that 
Iranian respondents were more likely to have travelled in family groups—
the higher Iranian results may be related to the age and/or sex of the 
respondents. 
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Responses to questions on the involvement of friends and family in 
the decision to leave varied with respect to location. Forty per cent 
indicated that friends/family in their country of origin were involved in 
the decision, with only 6 per cent having indicated that friends/family 
in other countries were involved and 5 per cent that friends/family in 
Australia were involved. 
Finally, 11 per cent of respondents indicated that people who helped 
them travel (e.g. people smugglers) were involved in the decision to 
leave. Sri Lankans were more likely to report the involvement of people 
smugglers (20 per cent).
The choice of destination
The survey sought respondents’ perspectives on Australia as a destination 
country and the reasons they travelled to Australia, with questions about 
their consideration of destination countries, as well as the sources of 
information and methods of access they used when making the decision.
When asked to select the countries they considered travelling to, 
47 per  cent of respondents selected Australia, and 33 per cent selected 
the option, ‘I did not consider any particular countries’. Canada and the 
UK (6 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively) were the next most common 
responses. 
Respondents who selected Australia were then asked about the reasons 
they considered travelling to Australia over other possible countries 
(see  Table  5.5). The most common responses were that ‘Australia was 
accepting refugees’ (65 per cent) and that it ‘does not return refugees’ 
(46 per cent). The responses ‘other countries were not accepting refugees’ 
(18 per cent) and ‘other countries were returning refugees’ (17 per cent) 
ranked fourth and fifth respectively. The third ranked response was 
‘because my family would be able to follow me to Australia’ (24 per cent). 
Table 5.5 provides the full list of responses.
The survey also asked respondents about the main reasons they ended up 
travelling to Australia from their origin country (as opposed to selecting 
Australia relative to another country). The attractiveness of Australia 
appeared to lessen: ‘Australia was accepting refugees’ dropped to 33 per cent 
and ‘Australia does not return refugees’ dropped to 22 per cent, although 
they were still highly ranked. Despite similarity to the reasons given for 
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considering Australia, the results to this question indicate that there are 
different dynamics involved in this aspect of decision-making. Forty per 
cent indicated that none of the response options applied, indicating that 
the question was not sufficiently tested and essentially failed. While it 
is extremely difficult to speculate about the reasons that did apply and 
were not reflected in the survey question, it is possible that the impact 
of people assisting with travel (e.g. people smugglers) could be a reason, 
noting that respondents indicated that these people were more involved in 
the decision about where to migrate than the decision to leave the origin 
country.
Table 5.5: Respondents’ consideration of Australia as a destination 
country and reasons for travelling to Australia
Reason Why did you 
consider travelling to 
Australia over other 
countries?
What were the main 
reasons you ended 
up travelling to 
Australia?
Australia was accepting refugees 65 31
Australia does not return refugees 46 22
because my family would be able to 
follow me to Australia
24 9
other countries were not accepting 
refugees
18 8
other countries were returning refugees 17 7
There is work in Australia 13 4
because it is easier to travel to Australia 
than other countries
14 7
To be with my family 8 2
To be with [ethnicity] people 6 4
I did not have family in other countries 5 4
I did not have friends in other countries 4 3
Australia is safe 3 2
To be with friends 3 1
[Ethnicity] people are not in other 
countries
2 1
Threat to life 1 3
other 3 6
None of these 11 40
No answer 0 5
Source: IMA survey (n=454 to 554).
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These responses indicate there would be value in further research into 
Australia’s position as a destination country in the complex global 
migration context, including how Australia is perceived in comparison to 
other destination countries.
Using questions structured in the same way as those about the decision 
to leave (see the section on ‘reasons for leaving country of origin’, above) 
the survey asked about the people involved in the choice of destination, 
including the role of friends and family in origin countries, diaspora and 
agents (e.g. people smugglers).
Seventy-nine per cent responded that they were themselves involved in 
the final decision that Australia would be the final destination, while 
13 per cent responded that they were not involved. This is similar to the 
result on respondent involvement in the final decision to leave (12 per cent 
were not involved), and again Iranians were more likely to have indicated 
that they were not involved in the destination decision (19 per cent).
The involvement of friends/family in the decision again varied with respect 
to location. Twenty-nine per cent responded that friends/family in origin 
countries were involved in the final decision, while 6 per cent responded 
that friends/family in Australia were involved and 4 per cent responded 
that friends/family in other countries were involved. 
Overall, 15 per cent of respondents indicated that people who helped 
them travel (e.g. people smugglers) were involved in the decision that 
Australia would be their final destination. Iranians were more likely to 
have reported the involvement of these people (25 per cent), and Afghans 
less likely (9 per cent).
Sources of information about Australia
Respondents most commonly reported that they relied on friends and 
family in their country of origin (23 per cent) and people who helped 
them travel (e.g. people smugglers) (15 per cent) for information about 
Australia, prior to making the final decision that Australia would be their 
final destination. Only 5 per cent responded that they relied on social 
media (e.g. Facebook) for information, with 47 per cent indicating that 
they did not use social media. Similar to other results, Iranian respondents 
(24 per cent) were more likely to have reported reliance on people who 
helped them travel (e.g. people smugglers).
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In relation to information sources from Australia, 12 per cent of 
respondents reported relying on official information from the Australian 
Government, and 7 per cent on friends/family in Australia. 










Figure 5.2: Sources of information relied upon when making the final 
decision that Australia would be the destination
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Differences in decision-making processes: The decision 
to leave and choice of destination
The survey responses indicated that there were some differences in 
decision-making processes in relation to the decision to leave the country 
of origin and the choice of destination. For example, friends/family in 
origin countries were more likely to have been involved in the decision to 
leave than they were in the choice of destination, while the opposite is true 
for people who helped the respondents to travel (e.g. people smugglers). 
Table 5.6: People involved in decision-making processes
Decision to leave 
origin country (%)
Decision to go to 
Australia (%)
respondent 82 79
Friends/family in origin country 40 28
Friends/family in Australia* 5 6
Friends/family in other countries* 6 4
People who helped with travel (e.g. people 
smugglers)*
11 15
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Note: *Some respondents indicated that some circumstances did not apply (e.g. they did 
not have family/friends in Australia). The percentages are based on the total responses, 
including responses that indicated that circumstances did not apply . 
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There were also some differences in decision-making processes when 
individual and collective decision-making was examined. As shown in 
Figure 5.3, a higher proportion of respondents indicated that they made 
the decision to travel to Australia by themselves compared to the decision 







Respondent	 only	involved Respondent	 plus	others	
involved




Figure 5.3: Individual and collective decision-making: Decision to leave 
and decision to travel to Australia
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Additional research into the circumstances in which people are not 
involved in the final decision to leave would provide a better understanding 
of the role of collective decision-making on migration, and may also 
provide insights into issues of potential vulnerability involved in irregular 
migration. 
Travelling to Australia
The survey also explored respondents’ experiences of their journey to 
Australia. The questions examined connections to a range of different 
groups, such as people who had helped them travel (e.g. people 
smugglers), as well as practices they adopted en route and how safe these 
practices made respondents feel while travelling. Almost two thirds of 
respondents travelled without friends or family, and around 30 per cent 
reported having travelled with family. There was significant variation by 
citizenship, as shown in Figure 5.4, with Iranians much more likely to 
have reported having travelled with family (54 per cent) compared to 
other citizenship groups: Afghans (6 per cent); Pakistanis (11 per cent); 
Sri Lankans (19 per cent).



































Figure 5.4: Respondents’ travelling companions
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
In terms of assistance respondents received to travel to Australia, agents 
(e.g. people smugglers) previously unknown to the respondent provided 
the most help (43 per cent of respondents received help). Friends and 
family in origin countries also provided assistance, although there was 
variation by citizenship, with Pakistanis and Sri Lankans reporting greater 
assistance from this group (45 per cent and 41 per cent respectively; see 
Figure 5.5).
Assistance was also provided by agents (e.g. people smugglers) previously 
known to the respondent, although this was more common for Iranians. 
Respondents indicated that family/friends in Australia and other countries 











































Figure 5.5: Assistance respondents received to travel to Australia
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
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The average amount invested in travel to Australia was around 
USD12,600, with some marginal variation by citizenship: USD13,500 
for Afghans; USD12,200 for Iranians; USD11,000 for Pakistanis; 
USD9,200 for Sri Lankans. Travel was predominantly funded by 
respondents’ immediate families (including self-funding) (82 per cent); 
10 per cent had been funded by family/friends in their origin country, and 
2 per cent by family/friends in Australia. Eighteen per cent indicated that 
they (or their families) were still in debt, although Sri Lankans were more 
likely to report this (36 per cent).
Most respondents (91 per cent) indicated that they had travelled 
through Indonesia on their way to Australia; 55 per cent transited 
Malaysia, 23 per cent transited Thailand, 13 per cent transited Pakistan 
and 8 per cent transited the United Arab Emirates. Only 3 per cent of 
respondents indicated that they had travelled directly to Australia. When 
examined by citizenship, as shown in Figure 5.6, many Pakistanis and 
Afghans indicated that they had travelled to Australia via multiple transit 





























Figure 5.6: Number of transit countries by citizenship
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Notes: ● is the mean number of transit countries; × refers to an outlier. The box represents 
the interquartile range (the 25th to 75th percentile). The black line represents the minimum 
and maximum values .
Practices en route
Consistent with anecdotal information, the journey to Australia, for 
many respondents, involved crossing multiple borders, spending time in 
countries with no legal status and relying on strangers to progress the 
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next stage of their journey. This suggests a high degree of risk, fear and 
uncertainty for those who made the journey, as evident from the survey 
results. Fifty-four per cent of all respondents indicated that they were 
smuggled across other countries’ borders at some stage of their journey. 
When the results are examined by citizenship group, substantial differences 
emerged, with 73 per cent of Afghans and 70 per cent of Pakistanis having 
reported being smuggled. The results were much lower for Iranians 
(24 per cent) and Sri Lankans (4 per cent), noting that around half of the 
Sri Lankan respondents reported having travelled directly to Australia. 
Nineteen per cent of respondents reported having paid bribes to officials; 
however, this was much higher among Iranians (39 per cent) compared to 
other citizenship groups (10 per cent for Pakistanis and Afghans).
Many respondents (41 per cent) reported having travelled on a false 
passport  at some stage during their journey to Australia (a further 
17  per  cent were not sure if their passport was valid or false), with 
74  per  cent of those indicating that using a false passport had made 
them feel very or quite unsafe. In contrast, and not surprisingly, of those 
who had valid visas to enter transit countries (39 per cent), the majority 






































Figure 5.7: Aspects of feeling safe during journey to Australia
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
Notes: (a) used a false passport during your journey to Australia (n=357); (b) Had a visa 
to validly enter a transit country during your journey to Australia (n=399); (c) Stayed with 
[ethnicity] people during your journey to Australia (n=537); (d) Able to practice your religion 
in transit countries during your journey to Australia (n=501); (e) registered with uNHCr 
during your journey to Australia (n=257); (f) used the services of someone who helps people 
to travel during your journey to Australia (n=557).
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Some practices appeared to increase the sense of safety during the journey, 
such as contact with members of their ethnic community (59 per cent 
felt very or quite safe), or practising their religion (57 per cent felt very or 
quite safe). Just over one quarter of respondents registered with UNHCR 
during the journey to Australia. Overall this provided a sense of safety 
(63 per cent felt very or quite safe). Four per cent of those registered 
with UNHCR reported this had made them feel unsafe. A majority of 
respondents (56 per cent) indicated that they had used the services of 
someone who helps people travel (e.g. people smuggler) during their 
journey. Around half of these respondents indicated that this had made 
them feel quite or very unsafe during their journey to Australia.
Australian experiences
The survey sought the views of respondents on whether they engaged 
in specific activities after arriving in Australia, including communicating 
with family and friends in various locations, travelling back to their origin 
country to visit, and providing remittances. Forty per cent indicated 
that they did not undertake any such activities, and 9 per cent chose 
not to respond. The most prevalent activity reported was the provision 
of money to family and/or friends in their home country (35 per cent), 
with 7 per cent having indicated that they send money to people in other 
countries.
In reflecting on the journey to Australia, the vast majority of respondents 
indicated that the journey to Australia was more difficult or much more 
difficult (83 per cent) than they had expected—see Figure 5.8. Very 
few respondents (1 per cent) indicated than the journey was easier or 
much easier than expected. This accorded with respondents’ reported 
experiences en route, particularly in relation to how unsafe they felt during 
their journey when using a people smuggler(s). The implications of the 
disparity between potential migrants’ views of what the migration journey 
is likely to entail compared to the reality of the journey are potentially 
profound.
It would be useful to examine this issue in more detail, noting there was 
not significant variation between citizenship groups, the notable exception 
being Sri Lankans, 96 per cent of whom reported that the journey was 
much more difficult than expected (with another 3 per cent reporting 
it was more difficult than expected). Further analysis of survey data, 
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supplemented with qualitative research, would enhance the understanding 
of migrants’ journeys, which in turn would assist in enhancing informed 
choice of migrants and reducing vulnerability en route.





More/Much	more	difficult	 than	expected As	expected Easier/Much	easier	than	expected Don't	know
Figure 5.8: Experiences of the journey to, and life in, Australia
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
A slightly higher proportion of respondents (45 per cent) found that 
living in Australia was more difficult or much more difficult than 
expected compared to those that found it as expected, easier or much 
easier (39 per cent). There was significant variation by citizenship group. 
As shown in Figure 5.9, Sri Lankans were more likely to have reported 
life in Australia as being easier or much easier (80 per cent) compared to 

































Figure 5.9: Respondents’ perceptions of living in Australia
Source: IMA survey (n=1,008).
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The fact that most Sri Lankans found living in Australia easier than 
expected may be related to their English language ability. Eighty-
one per cent of Sri Lankan respondents stated that English was their 
primary language, compared with less than 1 per cent for Afghans, and 
5 per cent for both Iranians and Pakistanis. Figure 5.10 shows that there 
is a correlation between respondents who perceived living in Australia to 
be easier than expected and those who stated that English is one of their 
primary languages. The survey asked respondents to list their ‘primary 
language(s)’. It did not take into account actual competency levels, or 
those who spoke English but did not consider English as a primary 
language. Examination of respondents’ perceptions of life in Australia 
showed no correlation with the existence of social links to Australia, or 
















Figure 5.10: Respondents’ perceptions of living in Australia by primary 
language
Source: IMA survey (n=980).
Findings
One of the most significant findings of the IMA survey is that it clearly 
shows that IMAs are not a homogenous group. While there may well be 
some similarities in terms of some specific demographic characteristics, 
for example in relation to sex, the IMA survey results show that there are 
very substantial differences in both the demographic characteristics and 
the experiences of different groups of IMAs. This chapter has highlighted 
some of the substantial differences in patterns and processes of different 
IMA groups, mainly by citizenship—for example, Afghans and Pakistanis 
reported greater links to Australia prior to travel; Iranians and Sri Lankans 
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reported greater involvement of agents who helped them travel (e.g. people 
smugglers); Iranians tended to travel with family members, while Afghans 
predominantly travelled without family or friends.
A more nuanced understanding of the very different migration processes 
experienced by different groups of irregular migrants, including in 
relation to decision-making, has implications for policy deliberations. 
For  example, the extent and nature of collective decision-making has 
potential implications for decision-making in relation to the promotion 
and take-up of assisted voluntary return packages for those found not to be 
in need of protection. Information on return packages, for example, could 
also be usefully communicated to others involved in decision-making.
One of the notable differences between citizenship groups was the 
likelihood of having lived in a host country prior to migrating. Overall, 
a ‘hosted’ respondent was typically an Afghan born in Afghanistan, having 
lived in Pakistan or Iran for many years (with some moving between 
Afghanistan and their host country), and who was likely to have worked 
illegally and not have had any contact with UNHCR. These characteristics 
accord with research on Afghan migration survival strategies, and the 
tendency of particular groups to engage in circular migratory patterns 
through the region as a means of economic and cultural survival. Monsutti, 
for example, has argued that in relation to Hazaras, no hard and fast 
distinction can be made between refugees and economic migrants and 
that a ‘migration continuum’ exists that has developed as part of a broader 
strategy of survival (Monsutti, 2005, pp. 168–69). Further, he states that 
‘Afghans give different and usually plural reasons for their decision to 
migrate: perhaps an outbreak of fighting, a threat from a personal enemy, 
the danger of bombing or compulsory conscription; perhaps the search 
for work or opportunities to trade, the need for medical treatment, or the 
undertaking of a pilgrimage’ (2005, p. 146). 
For the ‘hosted’ respondents, it is important to acknowledge that a lack 
of contact with UNHCR is unlikely to be related to their ‘refugee-
ness’ or otherwise. The circumstances in which Afghans live in host 
countries Iran and Afghanistan and the gradual and systematic reduction 
in support and assistance to Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan over 
many years will undoubtedly have had an impact on the capacity and/
or willingness of Afghans to seek UNHCR’s assistance in host countries. 
Survey respondents, as IMAs granted protection in the second half of 2011 
and calendar year 2012, would have been likely to have travelled prior to 
2012, and so a point in time aspect needs to be taken into consideration. 
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Another key finding of the survey is that the overwhelming majority of 
irregular migrants surveyed were motivated by multiple factors. The public 
discourse about ‘economic migrants’ and ‘genuine refugees’ is limited 
and potentially unhelpful in light of the survey results, which show that 
a range of factors underpin movement to Australia, such as those related 
to protection, employment, education services, housing, health services, 
poverty, corruption, geography and family/community links. The most 
prominent factors related primarily to protection. This is unsurprising 
given that the survey population comprised people who travelled as IMAs 
and had been granted protection in Australia.
Problems facing respondents prior to their departure overwhelmingly 
related to protection issues. Non-protection problems, such as poverty, 
corruption, poor education facilities and unemployment were also 
highlighted by respondents, which is also unsurprising when broader 
human development issues facing people in some countries of origin 
are taken into account; an issue that is even more profound for those 
with marginalised status in host countries (United Nations Development 
Program [UNDP], 2013). 
In terms of reasons for leaving their country of origin and the problems 
they faced prior to departure, 85 per cent of respondents indicated that 
both protection and non-protection issues were involved. A much smaller 
9 per cent indicated that they had faced or left because of protection issues 
only. There was a very small proportion of respondents (3 per cent) who 
indicated that they did not face protection-related problems in their origin 
country and who indicated that they had left their country of origin for 
non-protection reasons only. 
This would appear to indicate that broader quality of life issues, such 
as corruption, education services, health services, and lack of economic 
opportunity, are being considered during decision-making, and are 
among the factors potential migrants (and their families and others) take 
into account when assessing and reassessing migration options. 
Reasons for leaving as well as reasons for choosing Australia included 
‘pull factors’, most particularly Australia’s perceived acceptance of refugees 
and treatment of asylum seekers. These two factors would appear to be 
part of decision-making processes as they relate to leaving and choosing 
a destination, and appeared to be more important than other ‘pull’ factors 
(e.g. Australia’s economic prosperity). It may be that the distinction 
between decision-making as it relates to ‘leaving’ and ‘destination’ masks 
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more complex realities, and that (potential) migrants and their families, 
are likely to be continually assessing and reassessing their migration 
options, and that these assessments involve a range of complex interrelated 
and perhaps conflicting factors that have to be carefully balanced within 
dynamic environments. That a high proportion of respondents indicated 
that their migration was ‘triggered’ by an event or situation resonates with 
this notion. 
It is possible that Monsutti’s analysis of Afghan migration as ‘partially 
blurring the boundary between forced migration and voluntary migration’ 
may have wider implications for other groups of people (Monsutti, 2008, 
p. 73). As the survey has shown, respondents with protection issues 
are more often than not involved in making decisions about whether 
to migrate and where to migrate, and their decision-making processes 
include as well a range of non-protection reasons. This also accords with 
Neumayer’s citing of Efionayi-Mäder et al., that ‘such a decision is likely 
to be the result of a multitude of complex and mutually nonexclusive 
factors, whose relative importance can differ across origin countries as 
well as across individuals from the same country of origin’ (Neumayer, 
2004, p. 163, citing Efionayi-Mäder et al., 2001).
The survey results also highlight the utility of conducting further research 
on decision-making of potential migrants who decide not to migrate, 
including in relation to those who may be facing protection issues. 
Adhikari’s research on the impact of a range of factors on potential 
refugees’ decision-making in Nepal highlights that individual decision-
making, even in extreme conflict situations, is based on more than just the 
threat to one’s life, and includes factors related to economic livelihoods 
and social networks (Adhikari, 2013).
Conclusions
As one of the first commissioned research projects undertaken as part of 
the Irregular Migration Research Program (see Preface and Introduction 
of this volume for information on the program), and the first quantitative 
survey of first-hand experiences of IMAs to Australia, the IMA survey 
provides an empirical evidence-base to assist in the development of 
improved understanding of decision-making of IMAs to Australia. It is 
an important addition to the small but growing evidence-base on migrant 
decision-making. 
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The IMA survey results offer insights into a range of areas in which further 
analysis and research activity would be valuable for creating a solid base of 
measurement and analysis to inform policy and program considerations. 
For example, in looking at the differences between how citizenship groups 
answer questions, future analysis of the final survey results can seek to 
identify the gaps in our current understanding of the reasons for these 
differences. This may in turn inform research activities that are tailored 
to specific citizenship groups. 
The findings on the extent to which IMAs access official information 
and media reporting demonstrate the need for more research into 
communication networks at the different stages of the journey to Australia, 
and how information campaigns can be better targeted, including through 
friends and family in origin countries, to encourage people to not travel 
to Australia irregularly. Finally, greater understanding of the experiences 
of IMAs during the transit phase of the journey to Australia could have 
a significant bearing on bilateral arrangements between destination and 
transit countries, enabling a greater level of discussion about issues such 
as voluntary and involuntary returns than perhaps is currently enjoyed. 
There is no doubt that as an evidence-base the IMA survey results will be 
useful and relevant in a number of research areas and in policy deliberations. 
Ideally, future qualitative research will supplement the survey results, 
including helping to explain some of the results, particularly as they relate 
to specific demographic groups.
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Leaving family behind: 
Understanding the irregular 
migration of unaccompanied 
asylum-seeking minors
Ignacio Correa-Velez, Mariana Nardone 
and Katharine Knoetze
Introduction
Unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors (UAMs) are a particularly 
vulnerable group that present considerable humanitarian, legal and policy 
challenges to many countries around the world. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines an unaccompanied minor 
as ‘a person who is under the age of eighteen years, unless, under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier and who is separated 
from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or 
custom has responsibility to do so’ (1997, p. 5).
Since 2006, approximately 113,000 asylum claims have been lodged 
by unaccompanied or separated children worldwide (UNHCR, 2013). 
According to the UNHCR, ‘more than 25,300 individual asylum 
applications were lodged by UASC [unaccompanied or separated 
children] in 77 countries in 2013, far more than in previous years … 
[which] constituted about 4 per cent of the total number of asylum 
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claims lodged in these 77 countries’ (2014, p. 29). The main countries 
of origin of UAMs were South Sudan, Afghanistan and Somalia. Kenya, 
Sweden, Germany, Malaysia, UK and Norway reported the highest 
number of UAM claims. ‘Available information indicates that more than 
7,100 unaccompanied or separated children were recognised in 2013 as 
refugees or granted a complementary form of protection in 44 countries 
… Roughly two thirds of all decisions taken on UASC claims during the 
year led to the granting of refugee status or another form of protection’ 
(UNHCR, 2014, p. 29). Accordingly, the recognition rate for UAMs 
seems to be higher than the overall total recognition rate, which was 
44 per cent in 2013 (UNHCR, 2014).1
Between 2008 and 2012, a total of 1,832 UAMs arrived in Australia 
as irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs) (Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, 
2012). The proportion of UAMs arriving as IMAs relative to the overall 
number of asylum seekers increased from 4 per cent in 2008 to 11 per cent 
in 2012 (Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, 2012). Despite the many 
risks faced by this vulnerable group of children, and also the challenges 
this population poses for the Australian Government’s humanitarian, 
legislative and policy frameworks (Crock & Kenny, 2012), very limited 
research has been conducted in Australia to date (Barrie & Mendes, 2011).
In 2013, the Australian Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (DIBP) commissioned a large-scale quantitative survey of 
1,008 adult IMAs who were granted protection visas between July 2011 
and December 2012. The survey has provided vital empirical evidence to 
better understand ‘why and how people decide to leave their countries of 
origin and travel to Australia, including in relation to economic, family, 
protection and other reasons’ (McAuliffe, 2013, p. 5). Importantly, the 
survey findings have highlighted the need to undertake further qualitative 
research to supplement the quantitative results, ‘particularly as they relate 
to specific demographic groups’ (McAuliffe, 2013, p. 30).
This chapter presents the findings of a qualitative study funded by 
the 2012–13 Irregular Migration Research Small Grants Programme. 
The study aimed to address the following research questions:
1. Why do UAMs leave their parents/guardians or other family members 
and engage in irregular maritime migration?
1  2013 global recognition rates are indicative as some states have not yet reported relevant data.
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2. Who makes the choice of destination country and what factors 
influence this choice?
3. How do UAMs travel between source, transit and destination 
countries?
4. What are the experiences of UAMs in transit countries?
Current knowledge of the irregular migration 
of unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors
Although there is an emerging body of literature on the irregular migration 
of asylum seekers to Australia (McAuliffe, 2013; Koser & McAuliffe, 
2013), little is known about UAMs in the Australian context. This 
section draws on what is known about three of the four main stages of the 
irregular migration process and highlights issues of particular interest for 
Australian research on UAMs: the decision to leave the country of origin, 
the choice of destination, and the transit countries.
The decision to leave
A recent quantitative survey of irregular migrant adults (mainly from 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) living in Australia on protection 
visas found that although protection-related factors were prominent, 
other factors such as employment, education services, housing, health 
services, poverty, corruption, geography and family/community links 
were also important drivers of irregular migration (McAuliffe, 2013). 
The available literature pinpoints a number of reasons for UAMs to 
seek asylum, including widespread poverty, economic hardship, political 
instability and poor educational prospects, along with trigger elements 
such as violent incidents, threats, or a parent’s death (Mounge, 2010; 
Thomas, Nafees, & Bhugra, 2004).
Most recent irregular migration frameworks focus on macro-level 
(structural reasons to move) and meso-level (role of policies; intermediaries) 
explanations, but little is known about the micro-level of individual or 
family decision-making (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013). A study of 30 UAMs 
and 70 service providers in Scotland found that ‘a community helping 
response’ commonly involving an ‘uncle’ (not necessarily a close relative 
but a familiar person) was part of the migration decision-making process 
(Hopkins & Hill, 2008). Another study of Afghan UAMs in Europe 
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showed that birth order and sex are important variables in determining 
who leaves; generally, it is the oldest son who makes the journey (Mounge, 
2010). This study also found that in some cases minors make their 
own decision to leave (especially when they are already separated from 
their families).
The choice of destination
In the global context, growing evidence indicates that the choice of 
destination country for irregular migrants is influenced, among other 
aspects, by geography, finances, available travel routes, documentation and 
chance (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013; Spinks, 2013). Some of the factors that 
may influence asylum seekers to choose Australia as a destination country 
include: economic prosperity and the stability of Australia in comparison 
with other countries in the Asia–Pacific region; Australia is a signatory 
of the UN Refugee Convention (while many of the other countries in 
the region are not); and preexisting connections of asylum seekers with 
people already in Australia (Crock & Ghezelbash, 2010).
There is evidence from Europe that ‘a global network of agents’ is critical 
in determining the destination of children (Hopkins & Hill, 2008). 
Relationships with these agents are sometimes exploitative, abusive and 
traumatic for the UAMs (Hopkins & Hill, 2008). While international 
and Australian research has reported that in many cases asylum seekers 
have their destination chosen for them by people smugglers (Spinks, 
2013), a 2009 study in Norway found that people smugglers do not have 
a significant power in questions of destination; the presence of social 
networks played a significant role, instead (Breke & Aarset, 2009). 
There is contradictory evidence about the level of knowledge irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers have about the destination country, ranging 
from very little knowledge to well-informed (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013).
Transit countries
UAMs from Afghanistan frequently move to Iran and Pakistan with their 
families or on their own to live and work some years before they travel to 
Europe (Mounge, 2010). Pakistan and Iran continue to host a significant 
number of Afghan refugees. Reasons for secondary movement from 
countries of first asylum are related to lack of legal status which represents 
numerous risks to asylum seekers including risk of refoulement, harassment 
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or arrest by police, lack of access to healthcare, education, housing and 
employment (Human Rights Watch, 2002), and lack of access to child 
protection services (Mounge, 2010).
Indonesia has traditionally been an essential transit country for UAMs 
travelling to Australia (Human Rights Watch, 2013). UAMs in Indonesia 
have no legal status, no work rights, limited access to education, 
and are  subject to detention for long periods of time (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013).
There is evidence from Australia and internationally that a large number 
of IMAs pay people smugglers for one or more parts of the migration 
journey (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013). This journey can be very costly and 
often families incur debt or sell possessions in order to pay. Where these 
options are not available, the agreement with the smuggler is to pay in 
instalments (Mounge, 2010). The length of the journey depends on the 
way the payment is made: those who pay in instalments usually have 
longer journeys than those who pay in full at the outset (Mounge, 2010).
Afghan UAMs travelling to Europe have little understanding of the 
conditions of the journey (Mounge, 2010). Smugglers tend to separate 
groups of children travelling together, preventing them from making 
friendships that could threaten their authority (Mounge, 2010). While 
some boys have regular contact with their parents or relatives, for others, 
this contact depends on the smugglers (Mounge, 2010). The boat journey 
from Indonesia to Australia is very risky, overloaded, with no safety 
regulations, and with smugglers often failing to supply enough water, 
food and fuel (Human Rights Watch, 2013).
Methods
The research was a collaborative effort between the Queensland University 
of Technology (QUT) and the Queensland Program of Assistance to 
Survivors of Torture and Trauma. Full ethics approval was granted by the 
QUT Human Research Ethics Committee. Using a qualitative approach, 
a peer-interviewer model and a snowballing technique, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 17 participants who: (i) were living in 
Brisbane on a protection visa; (ii) had arrived in Australia over the past 
five years as IMAs; (iii) had arrived in Australia as UAMs (12–17 years 
of age at time of arrival); (iv) were aged 16 years or over at the time of 
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the interview; and (v) had the capacity to provide informed consent to 
participate. Questions were informed by the objectives of the research 
and  the current literature gaps, and were developed in consultation 
with DIBP.
Significant efforts were made to interview protection visa holders from 
both sexes (although most UAMs who have arrived in Australia as 
IMAs are males) and diverse ethnic backgrounds. However, all recruited 
participants were males and all but one were either born in Afghanistan 
or born elsewhere to Afghanistan-born parents. A number of female 
protection visa holders and other potential participants from Sri Lanka, 
Iran and Iraq were approached but declined to participate. Those who 
provided reasons for declining to participate indicated their reluctance 
to talk about past traumatic experiences. As shown in the literature, 
refusals by potential participants should be seen as a positive sign, because 
they are ‘indicative of an ability to make a choice’ (Molyneux, Kamuya, 
& Marsh, 2010, p. 25). All interviews with protection visa holders were 
conducted by peer interviewers who received training in research skills 
and the ethical conduct of research. Written notes only were taken during 
these interviews.
In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight 
nongovernment service providers working with UAMs in the Greater 
Brisbane area with the aim of obtaining multiple perspectives, uncovering 
deeper meaning in the data and enhancing the validity of the research 
(Patton, 2002). All interviews with service providers were conducted, 
audio recorded and transcribed by a senior research assistant.
Interview transcripts were entered into NVivo software (QSR, v.10) and 
analysed using a thematic analysis approach (Patton, 2002). A coding 
matrix was created using the first three stages of the irregular migration 
process as a broader thematic framework (i.e. decision to leave country of 
origin, choice of destination, and transit countries). This chapter focuses 
on protection visa holders’ and service providers’ perspectives and presents 
the key themes derived within each of the three stages of the irregular 
migration process. 
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Findings
Seventeen protection visa holders who had arrived in Australia as UAMs 
were interviewed. All were males. Fifteen respondents were born in 
Afghanistan, one was born in Pakistan from an Afghan background, 
and one was born in Iran. The majority of those born in Afghanistan or 
to Afghan parents were ethnic Hazara. Their average age at the time of 
the interview was 19 years, and they had been in Australia for 2.3 years, 
on average.
In addition, eight service providers (six females and two males) from five 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working with UAMs in the 
Greater Brisbane area were interviewed. Their average time as individuals 
working with refugees and asylum seekers at the time of the interview was 
6 years. For one service provider, English was not their first language.
Stage 1: The decision to leave the country of origin
All protection visa holders stated that they had no other choice but to 
leave their country of origin. Their decision to leave as UAMs was prompted 
by discrimination (because of their ethnicity or religion), persecution, 
threat to their lives, or torture. All young people indicated that one of the 
main reasons to leave their country of origin (or the country they were 
living in) was the fear for their own life. In some cases (5 out of 17) the 
decision to leave was influenced by other family members or close friends 
being detained, missing or killed:
[O]n my way to Kabul we were stopped by Taliban and held up for few 
hours. I was so scared as they threatened us to death. Few of us managed 
to escape but some of my friends are still reported missing ever since. 
After that incident, I went straight to Kabul City and stayed in a hotel. 
I contacted my mother and explained my encounter with Taliban, my 
mother was very frightened she said I am everything that she is left with 
and she would want to protect my life by any means possible. (PV11, 19 
years old, male, Afghan-born, 1 year in Australia)2
I have left Pakistan because it is not a safe country for people who are 
from Afghanistan. And it is very unsafe for Hazara people, because Hazara 
people are Shia and they hate Hazara Shia people. Because the enemies 
2  For the purposes of this chapter, the acronym PV has been used to refer to protection visa 
holders.
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we have in Pakistan, they kill us wherever they get us. And also most of 
the time in Pakistan they make bomb blasts to kill us and also do target 
killing in different areas of Pakistan. They want us to leave Pakistan or be 
killed there, no other options. (PV05, 18 years old, male, Afghan-born, 
3 years in Australia)
Almost all service providers mentioned that there was ‘no choice’ for these 
young people but leaving their region of origin.3 They indicated that the 
main protection reasons for the UAMs to leave their countries of origin 
were: political, religious or ethnic persecution, discrimination, arrest by 
the authorities or other organisations, and/or torture:
I guess young people leave, unaccompanied minors leave their families 
either they are forced to leave. They are not given a choice. It is something 
that the parents are deciding for them and they are taking that decision 
on behalf of the family. So, war, persecution, discrimination, racism 
and violation of human rights, torture and kidnapping. My clients have 
spoken of, they have been abducted and held I guess within this like a cell 
or a place they don’t know, they don’t really have details about it, but it is 
a place where they don’t know where it is. Sometimes that’s done. They 
are covering over their head when they are taken there, so they don’t know 
where they are, and tortured in those situations. (SP01)4
A number of young people (6 out of 17) mentioned that, in addition to 
protection reasons, they left their region of origin with the aspiration of 
getting a ‘better life’ or ‘opportunities in life’. In this context, ‘better life’ 
was understood as being able to live free from persecution, feeling safe, 
and being able to access education and employment opportunities. Other 
non-protection reasons mentioned were: general insecurity/lack of safety/
conflict, a pessimistic outlook for the future, widespread violence, looking 
forward to living a peaceful/free life, and deportation from a neighbouring 
host country:
In Afghanistan there are many issues that have really made people’s life 
very hard. It is very hard for people to live a good life or you can say 
a  ‘good quality life’ in Afghanistan. Because Afghanistan is a country 
where no one can feel safe. Taliban can attack any one at any time, at 
anywhere. They are the real people who have control over the country. 
Most of the times they burn the schools. Because they do not want us, 
3  Region of origin encompasses either ‘country of birth’ or ‘neighbouring host country’.
4  For the purposes of this chapter, the acronym SP has been used to refer to service providers.
149
6 . LeAVING FAMILy beHIND
they do not want Hazara people to get education, to be healthy, to feel 
safe and live a happy life. (PV08, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 3 years 
in Australia)
I was not allowed to go to school and get education because I was an 
Afghan. So because of all these issues I had to leave Iran and travel to 
a country where I would feel safe, where there is right for human beings. 
And where I could get education. (PV09, 21 years old, male, Afghan-
born, 4 years in Australia)
In addition to protection reasons, service providers also mentioned non-
protection reasons for the children to leave, such as internal conflict, war 
or unsafety in their countries of origin, to get a ‘better life’, security, or 
to have education or employment opportunities to assist their families 
financially:
It is important to acknowledge that some of these young people have never 
lived in their country of origin. They might be born in the refugee camp, 
that isn’t the country of origin, but they wanted to be safe, they wanted 
to get a better life, they wanted security, go to school, get education, 
employment, and get better health. (SP02) 
I’ve had a few clients who didn’t know why their parents put them in 
a boat. And obviously when they come here to tell their story is ‘I don’t 
know’. It’s because they are so young and they’ve been, I am assuming for 
their own safety by their parents, they put them on a boat. (SP05)
According to the young people, the decision to leave the country of origin 
(or the host country they were living in) was either made by their parents 
(or close relatives), a joint decision between their family and themselves, 
their own decision, or a decision made together with friends. In many 
cases (14 out of 17), at least one parent or another member of the family 
was involved in the decision to leave. No participant stated that people 
smugglers influenced their decision to leave. Finding a people smuggler 
was ‘easy’ once the decision to leave was made:
My parents and brothers made the decision for me to leave Iran and I also 
did not want to stay there anymore. (PV09, 21 years old, male, Afghan-
born, 4 years in Australia)
Both my mother and I decided that it was time for me to leave the 
country and save my life. (PV11, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 1 year 
in Australia)
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My friends from school and I all five of us sat together and decided if 
we want to live a peaceful life we need to leave Afghanistan. Once this 
decision was made by us as individuals we then informed our families … 
In Kabul is quite easy to find contact numbers of people who can arrange 
your travel from Afghanistan in return for some money. I got in touch 
with a man who agreed to plan my trip from Kabul to Indonesia. (PV12, 
18 years old, male, Afghan-born, 1 year in Australia)
All service providers agreed that in most cases the family makes the 
decision for their children to leave (with no input from the children). 
In  some situations (e.g. when their parents are dead or missing), the 
decision is made by their relatives (mostly uncles or aunts), while in a few 
cases, the decision is made by the children (when orphaned, or on their 
own choice to support their families back home). Some interviewees also 
mentioned the role that the community may play in the decision-making: 
I don’t think most of them approved many of the discussions, they have 
been told to leave. And a number of them said, their parents said ‘You are 
leaving and you are going now’. (SP02)
I’ve had a few clients from Sri Lanka, they are from the same village. 
To keep the boys safe, what the village has done is to put all their money 
together to send these boys to Australia … It’s not that the families put 
their hand up and ‘My boy’, I think as a village they all decided who was 
going to go, which I don’t know how they did. (SP05)
Protection visa holders frequently stated that they were the oldest male 
child of the family:
My family consists of my mother, 3 sisters and 2 brothers. My father 
has gone missing since about 6 years ago. I am the second child but the 
eldest son in the family. (PV13, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years 
in Australia)
I made the decision that it was time for me to leave the country. I was the 
eldest son in the family and I felt very responsible towards my siblings. 
I decided to leave and make a better life for us in Australia. (PV15, 19 
years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
According to service providers, it was common for whole families to 
face protection issues (e.g. due to their ethnicity and/or religion) and 
consequently one member of the family was chosen to leave ‘and rescue 
the others’ (SP06). Almost all service providers agreed that the decision 
about which member of the family leaves is made on the basis of age 
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and sex; the oldest male child in the family leaves. In some cases, other 
factors are taken into consideration by the families in order to get the best 
outcome, such as: strength, intelligence, maturity, courage, ability to learn 
English quickly, having some level of education, or on the basis that they 
are more likely to survive and succeed in Australia. Some service providers 
mentioned that, to a lesser extent, female asylum-seeking minors also seek 
to come to Australia after experiences of kidnapping and sexual assault in 
their country of origin, or when families living in unsafe conditions have 
a single female child or constitute an all-female family (in that case the 
oldest daughter would be chosen), or when they are the only survivors 
of the family:
It is safety, certainly safety issues, for some of the families I worked for, 
at least one member of the family would survive, and so they would put 
all their finances and ensuring that member of the family got out alive. 
So the expectation on that child was so high to survive and succeed on 
behalf of the family. (SP07)
[T]here was a situation where one of the boys had a twin brother and he 
wanted to come and I said: ‘How did they choose out of you who was 
the person who was meant to come?’ and he is like: ‘Because I came first’. 
So literally is the oldest and he was bigger and he was sent. (SP01)
We do have one, who recently turned 18, she was from Iran, Iranian 
background, but we don’t have many females. And I’ve asked my clients 
‘Why do you think why girls don’t come if it’s not safe at home?’ And they 
would say ‘Because it’s not safe for them on the boat’. They see them as 
either they would be targeted upon by males, and they also see it as males 
are stronger than females, they wouldn’t be able to survive. (SP05)
Stage 2: The choice of destination
Young people and service providers were asked about the choice of 
destination country, the sources of information and the people involved 
in this choice, the presence of family or friends in Australia, and whether 
or not the choice was made prior to or after leaving their country of origin.
Ten out of 17 respondents had lived in neighbouring countries for at 
least a year (in most cases with their families) but left those countries 
because of safety concerns, discrimination, deportation or lack of rights 
and entitlements. For 6 out of 17 respondents, Australia became a choice 
after living in or being deported from neighbouring countries (Pakistan 
and/or Iran):
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Before coming to Australia I lived only in Pakistan no other countries. 
Because Pakistan and Iran are the countries where most of Hazara people 
go to when they abandon Afghanistan. But unfortunately in those 
countries too, we are targeted and killed every single day. (PV08, 19 years 
old, male, Afghan-born, 3 years in Australia)
I had already attempted living in Pakistan or Iran but failed. I only 
considered Australia after that. (PV15, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 
2 years in Australia)
Similarly, many service providers mentioned Pakistan or Iran as the most 
common neighbouring countries for people fleeing Afghanistan.
Some young people considered other destination countries such as 
USA, Canada, England, Denmark, Sweden and/or New Zealand before 
choosing Australia. Although most participants indicated they had little 
knowledge about Australia prior to leaving their countries of origin, 
they had heard that Australia was a safe, free and peaceful country that 
welcomes refugees. These general impressions were also mentioned as the 
main reasons for choosing Australia:
I also considered Denmark and Sweden, but I decided to come to Australia 
as I found this to be the easiest to arrange for logistically, with a better 
chance of success and obtaining refugee protection. (PV17, 19 years old, 
male, Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
Australia is a country where everyone wants to come to. And for people 
like us it is the country where we can live our life without being threatened 
to be killed or targeted by any religious, politician or any other group. 
(PV05, 18 years old, male, Afghan-born, 3 years in Australia)
All service providers agreed that young people have no or very little 
knowledge about Australia before leaving their region of origin. Some 
service providers stated that young people’s families might have more 
information about Australia than the young people themselves. Many 
service providers agreed that safety and opportunities to study, to work, 
for family reunification, and for sending remittances back are the main 
reasons for choosing Australia.
All service providers agreed that young people do not consider staying in 
any of the countries of transit, mainly because of the lack of safety, rights 
and entitlements in those countries:
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I don’t think Indonesia is ever the destination, because there is no work 
rights, there is no education, there is no citizenship, they are nobodies. 
(SP08)
Minors had greater involvement in the choice of destination country than 
in the decision to leave their countries of origin. For 6 out of 17, choosing 
Australia was their own decision, for five the decision was made by their 
families (with no input from the minors), while for four the decision 
was shared between minors and their families. Importantly, for 8 out of 
17 minors, the decision to choose Australia was somewhat influenced by 
friends and acquaintances. Only one young person indicated that a people 
smuggler directly influenced the decision to come to Australia:
After that day I decided that I must leave Pakistan and since I had heard 
a lot about Australia from my friends in Iran and Pakistan I decided to 
come to Australia. (PV15, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years in 
Australia)
I contacted my mother from Kabul … We discussed my options of 
survival and decided I should leave the country and go to a safe place. We 
had heard a lot from random people that Australia accepts refugees and 
many Afghans are travelling there and being accepted into the country. 
(PV11, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 1 year in Australia)
I did not have any direct contact with that person [people smuggler]. 
And he did influence the decision to go to Australia. (PV01, 19 years old, 
male, Pakistan-born, Afghan background, 3 years in Australia)
Service providers ascribed greater influence on the decision to choose 
Australia to people smugglers. One service provider also mentioned that 
the community (‘the village’ in the case of some UAMs from Sri Lanka) 
may play a role in the decision:
I think for a lot of the young people, I think it’s the people smugglers that 
choose Australia. I don’t think the family sit down and go ‘OK, where are 
you going to go?’ and sit with a map and map it out. I think the people 
smugglers are the ones that say ‘Go to Australia, you get an easy ride’. 
(SP04)
Others in the village will decide to put money in together and also bring 
them, the village puts some money together and send them on a boat to 
come to Australia for a better life. (SP05)
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None of the young people interviewed indicated they had family or 
relatives in Australia prior to arrival, and only two stated they had friends 
living already in the destination country:
I had a friend in Melbourne who arrived a couple of years before me. 
I contacted him on Facebook from Indonesia. (PV13, 19 years old, male, 
Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
It is important to note, however, that this finding may be somewhat 
different if other cohorts of young people (e.g. other countries of origin 
or ethnicities) had been interviewed.
According to service providers, whether or not UAMs have family or 
relatives in Australia varies and is frequently related to minors’ cultural/
ethnic backgrounds:
With the clients I’m working with at the moment, Hazara clients most 
of them have family members, either if it’s a distant cousin, or an aunty, 
an uncle, they know someone. I haven’t met a Hazara person that doesn’t 
know someone in Australia, either because they’ve arrived 10 years 
beforehand or they arrived just last week. They all at least know someone 
in their community here in Australia. (SP05)
All young people indicated that the decision to come to Australia was made 
before leaving their country of origin (or a neighbouring host country). 
In some instances, the decision was prompted after being deported from 
a neighbouring host country:
My auntie and her husband and myself sat together in their house in 
Kabul and explored my options. Together we reached the decision that 
I must leave Afghanistan, we knew that Pakistan is also infested with 
Taliban and therefore we decided that I should come to Australia. (PV13, 
19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
I was deported from Iran and then I really did not have anywhere to call 
home and feel safe, and also because there is also problems in Afghanistan, 
especially the conflict. So I decided to come to Australia, live my life 
under the shadow of peace and call it home. (PV06, 18 years old, male, 
Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
Service providers agreed that the decision to come to Australia is frequently 
made before leaving their countries of origin or while in a neighbouring 
host country, although in some cases the decision is made in transit 
(Indonesia). One service provider highlighted differences according 
155
6 . LeAVING FAMILy beHIND
to ethnicity; while Hazaras and Sri Lankans make the decision in their 
countries of origin, Rohingyans are more likely to decide when they are 
in Indonesia:
With Hazaras they’ve all decided in their own country, so before they 
started their travels they had Australia in their mind. With Sri Lankans, 
again I think it’s their parents who put that, because they come straight 
from Sri Lanka, they don’t have another country in the middle. I’ve had 
a few Burmese or the Rohingyan clients, who obviously went to Indonesia, 
and they were not too sure if they wanted to come to Australia or New 
Zealand, and they chose there … It’s a mixture of all, I guess. (SP05)
Stage 3: Transit countries
Regarding transit countries, respondents provided information about the 
ways in which UAMs leave their countries of origin and travel through 
transit countries, the difficulties experienced during their journey and 
how they cope with it, the assistance they receive, and how they look after 
themselves.
Almost all young people had direct or indirect contact with people 
smugglers (or their networks). Contact with people smugglers took place 
at airports, through phone calls, or through other asylum seekers. In order 
to leave their countries of origin, young people themselves, their families 
and/or friends contacted a people smuggler to arrange the journey. In a few 
cases, the arrangement with the smuggler was made for the journey from 
the region of origin to Indonesia. Once in Indonesia, it was up to the 
minor to find a smuggler to travel to Australia:
I flew from Karachi to Bangkok in Thailand. It was 14 of us that were 
travelling in the same plane from Karachi to Bangkok. At Bangkok airport 
only 3 of us managed to pass through the passport check. The other 11 
were detained at the airport and were later deported back to Pakistan. 
We were picked up by a taxi at the airport and took us to a hotel. The next 
day a taxi picked us up from the airport and drove us to the bus terminal. 
We went on a bus that drove us to Malaysia. We  spent two nights in 
a hotel in Kuala Lumpur and on the third night we were picked up by a 
taxi from our hotel. The taxi took us to the seashore … We  boarded 
a small boat and after 2 hours we reached Indonesia. We spent one night 
in a big beach house and the next day we were left on our own to find our 
own way to Australia. (PV15, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years 
in Australia)
A LoNG WAy To Go
156
Yes, I met with the people smuggler who arranged my travel from Kabul 
to Indonesia … My house mates in Jakarta arranged the contact with the 
people smugglers in Indonesia and therefore I did not see them. (PV13, 
19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
All service providers agreed that people smugglers are contacted by the 
minors or family members to arrange the journey and that payments are 
made before departure, once they arrive in Australia, and/or throughout 
the journey. Some service providers pointed out that people smugglers are 
in regular contact with UAMs during the journey (i.e. to get them out of 
jail, find accommodation, keep them hidden, getting a boat):
They are continually paying people to get them to that next point, or to 
get them out of jail, or to take them somewhere where they can go into 
hiding for a few weeks, or take them into a jungle. (SP01)
Young people used a variety of ways to travel from one place to another 
during their journey to Australia: cars, taxis, buses, motorcycles, planes, 
trains, boats. Some had to walk to cross borders or move inside transit 
countries. Many left their country of origin by plane using their valid 
passports. Subsequently, people smugglers at countries of transit provided 
them with false passports, and also SIM cards for mobile phones to keep 
in contact. In some cases, young people bought the SIM cards themselves 
to communicate with their families. Most young people were able to 
talk to their families back home by phone during the journey, although 
the frequency of these calls varied. Three young people did not have any 
contact with their families during the journey:
I flew from Kabul to Delhi in India legally with my Afghan passport and 
spent 28 days in there. I was met at the Delhi airport and was given a fake 
passport. After 28 days in India, I flew to Malaysia using my new passport 
and stayed in the airport for 5 hours as transit and then flew to Bali. I was 
lucky that I made friends with a man in Delhi who was also coming to 
Australia. In Bali we had to get Indonesian visas on our passports and 
I was scared to death at that point, I thought that I will be caught out. 
Luckily we managed to get the visas and we flew to Jakarta. (PV13, 19 
years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
I flew from Kabul to Dubai and was picked up by someone at the Dubai 
airport and was given a SIM card for my phone. I was taken to a room 
which I spent about a month in—there were other people that shared 
the room with me. I was only allowed to leave that room once per day 
to go to the bakery and purchase bread. After about a month, I received 
a  phone call and it was arranged for me to be taken to the airport. 
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I boarded the plane and reached Malaysia, I was told as soon as I reach 
Malaysia I should tear up their visa at Kuala Lumpur airport and show 
them the  Thailand  visa that was also in my passport. Therefore I was 
able to reach Thailand by plane. (PV12, 18 years old, male, Afghan-born, 
1 year in Australia)
According to service providers, Malaysia and Indonesia are the two main 
transit countries (other transit countries mentioned are United Arab 
Emirates, Thailand, and Bangladesh). Some service providers pointed out 
that in some cases minors have very limited contact with their families 
back home during the journey:
I’ve had a few clients who said that they had no contact at all when they 
came into Australia, so easily 8 months with no contact with family back 
home. I had others who had contact with them in Indonesia, and then 
that was it. It is only when they have money to be able to call back home 
that they would. Most of them were out of contact for the whole time, 
especially when they are hiding from the government in Indonesia, it’s 
very hard for them, and in some cases I had clients say the family told 
them not to contact, because they thought the telephones were all bugged, 
so why risk it? Just get to Australia and call us when you are there. (SP05)
The journey through transit countries was commonly characterised 
by danger and unpredictability and by the need for young people to 
‘maintain a degree of invisibility’ (SP08). Although the final boat voyage 
was seen by young people (10 out of 17) as the most logistically difficult 
part of the journey, respondents found ‘leaving home’ also difficult, and 
felt particularly vulnerable while hiding in the jungle, being away from 
their family, not knowing who to trust, not being able to speak the local 
language, feeling sick and unable to see a doctor, finding themselves 
hungry, thirsty and with no money, struggling to find accommodation, 
and fearful of being stopped by police and government officials. Six 
respondents mentioned that they had direct contact with government 
officials during their journey, but only one was detained while in transit:
I had a significant number of issues on the way, because I could not speak 
the language of the countries I had to go through. I did not have enough 
money to pay for the journey. I did not have any money even to get 
food and feed myself. I was always worried about being cheated by the 
smugglers, and being arrested by the government officials. And I was also 
very afraid of getting on the boat. Because I had never travelled by boat 
in my whole life before coming to Australia. (PV04, 19 years old, male, 
Afghan-born, 3 years in Australia)
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But being away from my family members and not being an adult to know 
what to do and what not to, was a hard thing for me to deal with. (PV05, 
18 years old, male, Afghan-born, 3 years in Australia)
Service providers identified a number of issues faced by UAMs in their 
journeys through transit countries, including lack of food and water and 
poor sanitary conditions during the boat voyage or while in detention, 
fear of the boat sinking, adverse weather conditions, health issues and 
no access to healthcare services, lack of adequate shelter, lack of money, 
isolation and lack of information, separation from groups of other asylum 
seekers, fear of being robbed or detained, physical abuse, and fear of 
animals while hiding in the jungle.
Assistance during the journey sometimes came from people smugglers 
and/or locals who provided phones, food, clothing, information about 
places or how to find a boat and accommodation, and often from other 
asylum seekers they met along the way (e.g. by helping each other with 
money, companionship, finding a boat, or being introduced to people 
smugglers’ assistants). However, the unpredictability of the journey 
meant that friendships were short lived. Only three participants indicated 
they already had family members or friends in Indonesia who provided 
assistance:
There were some rare occasions where the people smugglers would 
provide me with a phone to contact my family and inform them of my 
whereabouts. In Indonesia, however, I purchased a mobile phone and 
communicated with my mother regularly. (PV11, 19 years old, male, 
Afghan-born, 1 year in Australia)
But like others, I would meet new people make friends and then we 
were separated again. Because, during the journey, no one knows what 
is going to happen and when. So that is why it is very difficult to keep 
being together and stay with each other during the whole journey. (PV05, 
18 years old, male, Afghan-born, 3 years in Australia)
I had a friend who had been living in Indonesia for 2 years and were 
waiting for their refugee application to be processed. I made contacts with 
my friend … He provided me with accommodation. (PV15, 19 years old, 
male, Afghan-born, 2 years in Australia)
Support or assistance from locals, friends made along the way, extended 
family members, acquaintances and in some cases the assistance of people 
smugglers were also identified by service providers.
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In addition to receiving support or assistance from other people, young 
people looked after themselves and increased their sense of safety by using 
strategies such as remaining positive and hopeful, being careful, staying 
healthy and praying:
I tried to concentrate on the good future that I will have after all this 
journey is passed. I remained positive and knew that I have no way of 
turning back since my passport was valid only for a month. (PV14, 
19 years old, male, Iran-born, 1 year in Australia)
I was praying to God every day to look after me. I tried to follow the 
instructions of the guide person very closely at different stages of my 
journey, such as when we were crossing the Thai–Malay border. I was 
quite healthy and did not feel sick during the journey. I tried to eat well 
and take care of myself. (PV15, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 2 years 
in Australia)
Service providers also mentioned that remaining hopeful, building 
relationships, meeting locals and praying were important strategies used 
by UAMs during their journeys:
I know they talked about praying a lot, lots on the boat, and that they’ve 
been in absolute fear. A lot of them don’t know if they are going to survive 
the journey, and certainly they talked about the lack of food, being sick, 
lack of water, so I think the way they do look after themselves is through 
prayer. (SP04)
I guess their own upbringing to be that strong to be able to survive, 
something like that and I guess street smart, if that makes sense? … 
A lot of them got together in groups of young men, young boys together, 
I think that helped a few, to build that relationship to other people in the 
same situation as them. (SP05)
The data shows young people’s strong determination to reach Australia. 
Most participants indicated never considering staying in any of the 
countries en route to Australia (because they do not accept refugees or 
because of poor life conditions) or going back to their countries of origin 
during the journey because of concerns about their safety and security. 
Three participants also mentioned lack of money or validity of current 
passport as barriers to return. Only two respondents stated that they 
thought about going back when they saw the conditions of the boat or 
realised the dangers involved in the journey.
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The data also shows the strong responsibility young people feel about 
the wellbeing of their family members back home. Fourteen respondents 
stated that their families wanted to come to Australia and join them 
through sponsorship. Seven young people also mentioned that their 
families back home expected them to provide financial support. For three 
respondents, their families were expecting them to get a good education 
and succeed in life:
I really wanted to come to Australia, but on the way to Australia I had 
to go to Indonesia. And then I really liked being and living in Indonesia. 
Because Indonesia too is a war-free and peaceful country. But because 
they would not accept me stay there and would not give me any ID card 
so that is why I had no choice but to come to Australia. (PV01, 19 years 
old, male, Pakistan-born, Afghan background, 3 years in Australia)
I could sense death with every wave that hit our boat and I knew this is 
a life or death journey but I also knew that going back was not an option 
since it would equate to death. (PV11, 19 years old, male, Afghan-born, 
1 year in Australia)
I was certain that I will reach Australia. I knew that even if I am caught 
and sent back I will attempt again and again until I reach Australia … 
My family’s first and foremost request from me is to take my education 
seriously and pursue my dream of becoming someone great in life, someone 
who can make a difference. They also would like to come to Australia and 
expect me to assist with their sponsorship and if I am financially able to 
do so, provide them with some financial support. (PV12, 18 years old, 
male, Afghan-born, 1 year in Australia)
They want me to sponsor them and save their life. (PV04, 19 years old, 
male, Afghan-born, 3 years in Australia)
According to most service providers, experiences of detention in transit 
countries do not influence onward movement (either to third countries or 
returning to their regions of origin). UAMs’ strong determination to reach 
Australia was also highlighted by service providers, and this determination 
was influenced by families’ expectations for the children to find safety, to 
join their children in Australia or to receive financial support from them:
I think that it probably makes them more determined in regards to, they 
come on such a journey and I think it makes them more determined to be 
able to gain their education and to be able to get employment, so that the 
journey is worthwhile. Probably it makes them more determined. (SP04)
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Conclusion
By interviewing protection visa holders who arrived in Australia as 
UAMs, as well as service providers working with this population group, 
this study provides valuable qualitative micro-level insights on the drivers, 
determinants and decision-making processes of irregular migration among 
UAMs arriving in Australia, in particular those born in Afghanistan. 
In light of the need for a better understanding about decision-making by 
irregular migrants (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013), this study complements 
the quantitative findings reported recently by the DIBP-commissioned 
survey with adult irregular migrants living in Australia (McAuliffe, 2013).
Similar to what was found in the DIBP survey (McAuliffe, 2013), young 
people’s decisions to leave their country of origin were influenced by both 
protection and non-protection reasons (although the most prominent 
factors were primarily related to protection). This highlights the complexity 
of irregular migration and the danger of oversimplifying its root causes. 
The study has also shown that some UAMs actively participate in the 
decision-making process to leave their country of origin and in the choice 
of destination country.
Our research found that while service providers ascribed greater influence 
to people smugglers in choosing a destination country, young people did 
not attribute a major direct role to smugglers in their decision to leave 
or in their choice of destination. The DIBP’s recent survey also found 
lesser involvement of smugglers in the final decision to travel to Australia 
(i.e. only 16 per cent of respondents were influenced by people smugglers) 
(McAuliffe, 2013). Similarly, a 2009 study of asylum seekers in Norway 
(Breke & Aarset, 2009) suggested that smugglers are central in facilitating 
travel but not in determining destinations. Further research is needed to 
investigate the potential indirect influence smugglers can have on asylum 
seekers’ decision-making through other people in the community.
Among this group of protection visa holders who arrived in Australia 
as UAMs, a critical factor that influenced their choice of Australia as 
a destination country was not the presence of family or friends in Australia, 
but the information they received from friends and acquaintances in their 
region of origin. There is contradictory evidence on the level of knowledge 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers have on the destination countries 
prior to departure (Koser & McAuliffe, 2013). This group of UAMs had 
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little knowledge about Australia before leaving their region of origin, and 
their limited knowledge was related to their reasons for leaving: a safe, 
free, peaceful and welcoming place for refugees. 
Like the results of a study of unaccompanied Afghan children in Europe 
(Mounge, 2010), our research shows that many of the UAMs interviewed 
lived in a neighbouring host country (sometimes for several years) 
before they moved to Australia. In those countries, these young people 
commonly experienced discrimination, lack of rights and entitlements, 
and even persecution. In some instances, the decision to travel to Australia 
was prompted by being deported from their host countries.
As highlighted by Hopkins (2008), UAMs have a marginal position for 
multiple reasons: because they are children and asylum seekers, lacking 
the company of parents or another adult caregiver. Young people’s stories 
describe a journey marked by unpredictability, vulnerability and the 
need to ‘maintain a degree of invisibility’. Nevertheless, this research 
illustrates the resilience of the young people interviewed: they were highly 
resourceful, had a remarkable capacity to look after themselves, and 
showed a strong determination to reach Australia.
Since the aim of the research was to understand the micro-level drivers and 
determinants of irregular migration among UAMs arriving in Australia, 
the approach adopted here was qualitative. As stated by Yin (2010), 
‘the events and ideas emerging from qualitative research can represent the 
meanings given to real-life events by the people who live them, not the 
values, preconceptions, or meanings held by researchers’ (p. 8). This study 
was based on a small sample of protection visa holders (mostly males from 
Afghanistan) and service providers. Therefore, the findings here cannot 
be extrapolated to other UAMs in Australia or elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
this research, along with the previous and current studies undertaken as 
part of DIBP’s Irregular Migration Research Program, makes a significant 
contribution to addressing the evidence gaps and has the potential to 
inform policy deliberations.
In some instances, information given by service providers diverged 
from protection visa holders’ statements. Patton (2002) cautions that 
triangulation does not aim to reach consistency across data sources. Our 
study has offered multiple perspectives which proved to be successful in 
uncovering deeper meaning, providing additional and complementary 
information and enhancing the validity of the research. In order to enrich 
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our understanding of the complexity of UAMs’ irregular migration, there 
is a need to include in future research the perspectives of female UAMs, 
young people from other ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Sri Lanka, Iran, 
Iraq), UAMs living in transit countries, as well as the perspectives of the 
family members left behind. Importantly, further research is needed to 
determine how UAMs can be better protected while living in host and 
transit countries.
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Indonesia as a transit country in 
irregular migration to Australia
Graeme Hugo, George Tan and Caven Jonathan Napitupulu
One important element in the growing complexity of international 
migration is the increasing role of countries of transit. Movement 
trajectories in contemporary migrations can extend over long periods 
of time and a number of intermediate locations before reaching a final 
destination. This is especially the case for asylum seekers and for irregular 
migration. In both of these cases, transit countries are increasingly 
significant; however, the bulk of migration research is focused on the 
destination, and to a lesser extent, the origin country. 
Several Asian countries are playing increasingly significant roles as transit 
locations. This chapter focuses on one country, Indonesia, which, until the 
commencement of the Australian Government’s military-led ‘Operation 
Sovereign Borders’, in September 2013,1 functioned as a transit point 
for asylum seekers and irregular migrants seeking to land on Australia’s 
northern shores.
1  The objective of Operation Sovereign Borders was primarily to deter IMAs from seeking asylum 
on Australian territories by intercepting and turning around suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs), 
and by denying resettlement in Australia by assessing asylum claims in a third country, resettling those 
found to be refugees in a third country.
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This chapter is based largely on field studies undertaken in Indonesia 
between 2012 and 2014. The centrepiece was a survey of 119 intending 
irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs). These subjects were located in 
Indonesian detention centres or were living in Indonesian communities 
located in Medan, Tanjung, Pinang, Jakarta, Kupang and in Puncak, 
a former colonial hill station area located in the mountains to the south 
of Jakarta (Figure 7.1). A structured questionnaire was used, which asked 
questions about the IMAs’ characteristics, their experience of migration, 
their motivations and intentions relating to moving to Australia. 
In addition, a substantial number of informant interviews were conducted 
in Indonesia with people involved in the migration process or interacting 
with transiting migrants. 
Figure 7.1: Intending asylum seekers in Indonesia: Arrival location 
and place of interview of respondents to survey
Source: Image produced by the Department of Geography, Environment and Population 
at the University of Adelaide, for this study .
The respondents to the survey were identified within detention centres, 
in  accommodation provided by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), and in communities in several locations in Indonesia, 
Jakarta, Puncak and adjoining areas in West Java, Timor, northern Sumatra, 
Riau and South Sumatra. Once identified, they were approached and asked 
if they would agree to be interviewed. The agreement was difficult to get, 
given their precarious situation. The clandestine nature of irregular migration 
makes it challenging to survey this migrant group as it was not uncommon 
for research subjects to view researchers with some degree of suspicion and 
apprehension (e.g. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 
2009, p. 5). As Düvell, Triandafyllidou, and Vollmer (2008, p. 7) note, the 
fears of a smuggled migrant that s/he will be identified upon participation 
in a study can be a research obstacle, as it is usually associated with fears of 
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reprisal from smugglers and authorities, in the possible form of deportation 
or imprisonment. Accordingly, large numbers had to be approached to get 
the number of completed interviews obtained.
Transit migration in Asia
Transit migration can be seen as part of a global situation in which 
international migration has become more complex than the ‘assimilation 
narrative’ (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005) in which migration is seen as a one-
off, more or less permanent, displacement from an origin to a single 
destination and the process of adjustment to that destination. There 
are now elements of coming and going between origin and destination, 
temporary and circular migration, migration to third, fourth and more 
countries and diaspora linkages between origins and destinations. 
It is important to note the strong association of transit migration with two 
important forms of international migration in the contemporary world: 
forced migration (especially refugee and asylum seeker movement but also 
that associated with disasters); and irregular migration.
Most forced migrants are not able to move directly to a place of 
permanent resettlement due to the largely unplanned and unanticipated 
nature of the move and the sudden circumstances which precipitate the 
move. Accordingly, they often move to a temporary haven which Kunz 
(1973) describes as a ‘midway to nowhere’ situation to emphasise the 
precariousness, uncertainty and temporariness of their stay there. 
Often migrants cannot move directly to their intended final destination 
because they lack the appropriate documentation or are not able to 
meet the entry requirements of that destination. This is especially the 
case when the destination is a nation belonging to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with sophisticated 
border entry controls and highly controlled migration systems. Australia 
is such a nation, and a combination of its island geography, isolation, 
highly developed immigration bureaucracy and institutions and modern 
technologies of surveillance mean that it can control very effectively the 
number and characteristics of immigrants. 
A country of transit can be a place where irregular migrants can arrange 
their entry to their intended destination, but it is also one of the places 
where they are at risk of repatriation.
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The Indonesian context
Indonesia in many ways is a quintessential transit migration country in 
that it meets almost all the defining characteristics of a transit country. 
These include:
• Its intermediate geographical location between the Middle East, Africa 
and Asia on the one hand, and Australia on the other. It is comparable 
to Turkey and Russia, in that, for those countries, being located on the 
edges of Western Europe has meant that they have become important 
transit locations for irregular migrants from Asia and Africa and the 
Middle East intending to enter Europe.
• Its archipelago geography, comprising more than 3,000 islands. This 
presents virtually unlimited opportunities to enter Indonesia by boat 
without detection.
• Its strong historical linkages, involving centuries of population 
movement and settlement, with the main origin countries (South Asia 
and the Middle East) of many groups seeking to enter Australia and 
seek asylum.
• Its complex contemporary migration system, which not only involves 
important flows to the origins of asylum seekers and to other transit 
nations involved in their movement, but has seen the development of 
a substantial migration industry.
• A system of government in which corruption and bribery play 
a significant role, which opens up possibilities, not only for staying in 
Indonesia, but also for facilitating onward migration.
It is the world’s fourth largest country by population, and despite recent 
rapid economic growth and fertility decline, it has a substantial labour 
surplus, especially of low-skilled, poorly educated workers. Accordingly, 
there has been significant emigration with the largest group being low-
skilled temporary contract labour migrants. 
The importance of Malaysia and the Middle East is especially important 
in creating migration corridors and linkages which have played a role 
in the contemporary movement of transit migrants with an intended 
destination of Australia. Malaysia and the Middle East are the origins of 
significant numbers of immigrants to Indonesia as well as the destination 
of emigrants. The importance of these migration flows in establishing 
corridors of movement along which asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants can move needs to be stressed. The connections which have been 
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established between Indonesia and Malaysia are especially important. 
The Malaysia–Indonesia leg of the migration of IMAs intending to go to 
Australia is an important part of the migration process. 
A key issue is that undocumented migration remains substantial, especially 
to Malaysia. While this process is complex, it has a number of elements 
which impinge on the movement of irregular migrants and asylum 
seekers using Indonesia as a transit nation with the intention of moving 
to Australia (Jones, 2000). Some of the major features are as follows:
• There are strong family, community and agent networks linking 
Malaysia and Indonesia, which facilitate migration.
• A strong ‘industry’ has developed, with multiple stakeholders at 
a range of levels ranging from the local to the international.
• There are a multiplicity of sea routes and coastal embarkation and 
disembarkation points in Malaysia and Indonesia.
• There is complicity of government officials in the irregular migration 
in both countries.
• Most of the movement, especially irregular migration, involves 
maritime journeys, much of it using erstwhile fishing boats, and there 
is substantial involvement of fishermen.
Indonesia as a transit country for Intending IMAs 
to Australia
Indonesia’s function as a transit point for asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants who have Australia as an intended final destination is not new. 
Indonesia was an important transit point, along with Malaysia and other 
parts of Southeast and East Asia, for the wave of Indo Chinese boat people 
in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Lander, 1996; Missbach, 2013). 
Figure 7.2 presents results from a study by the Indonesian Directorate of 
Immigration of 40 Iraqi asylum seekers. This shows a pattern of initially 
flying to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia and then moving to Indonesia 
through multiple channels.
The survey respondents’ countries of origin are shown in Table 7.1. The 
bulk of respondents were from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. 
Among these groups, only Sri Lankans have large numbers that sail 
directly from their homeland to Australia (Jayasuriya & McAuliffe, 2013; 
Hugo & Dissanayake, 2014).
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Figure 7.2: Trajectories of movement of 40 Iraqi asylum seekers, 2008
Source: Unpublished map supplied by Directorate General of Immigration, Jakarta, 
Indonesia. reproduced with permission from Hugo and Napitupulu (2015, p. 224).




Afghanistan 65 52 .8
Sri Lanka 26 21 .1
Myanmar 15 12 .2
Iraq 7 5 .7
Sudan 4 3 .3
Iran 3 2 .4
Palestine 2 1 .6
Somalia 1 0 .8
Total 123 100 .0
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012).
Note: The transit migration survey was conducted in 2010 and 2012 by C. J. Napitupulu 
for use in this study .
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All of the asylum seekers surveyed flew initially to Malaysia as ‘tourists’, 
since  Malaysia offers visas upon arrival to nationals of more than 
60 countries, especially those with Islamic populations, in order to facilitate 
tourism (Missbach & Sinanu, 2011, p. 73). From Malaysia, they travel 
to Indonesia, which is the taking-off point for the final leg: a boat trip to 
Australia. These corridors of movement have become well established and 
a complex industry of interconnected agents has developed along the route 
to facilitate the migration from Malaysia to Indonesia. Many asylum seekers 
from Afghanistan, the most common origin, move initially to camps in 
Pakistan from where they negotiate with a people smuggler. Some asylum 
seekers travel directly to Indonesia, especially those like Iranians who could 
obtain a 30-day tourist visa on arrival. The removal of this visa has seen 
this direct flow to Indonesia dry up, and Iranians now travel via Kuala 
Lumpur.2 Some asylum seekers also move initially to Thailand, which has 
long been a hub for trafficking in the Asia region (Skrobanek, Boonpakdi 
& Janthakeero, 1997). Many of the asylum seekers arriving initially in 
Malaysia then travel to Indonesia clandestinely by boat.
There is substantial boat traffic between Indonesia and Malaysia and an 
established migration industry linking them, with more than 2 million 
Indonesians working as international labour migrants in Malaysia, many 
of them undocumented (Hugo, 2011; Jones, 2000). In many cases, the 
people smugglers, who the asylum seekers negotiate with in their home 
country, only get them as far as Malaysia or Indonesia and it is then up to 
the asylum seekers to negotiate a passage to Australia with agents based in 
Malaysia, or especially Indonesia. The borders of Malaysia and Indonesia 
present little problem to asylum seekers as they seek to make their way 
to Australia. However, there are risks of detection and detention as well 
as experiencing exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous agents, police, 
officials and other groups in Malaysia and Indonesia.
The majority of survey respondents who transited in Indonesia entered 
illegally. Excluding respondents who unintentionally arrived, a significant 
90.7 per cent (n=88) of respondents indicated that they entered illegally, 
compared with 9.3 per cent (n=9) of respondents who entered legally. 
As Table 7.2 shows, the main reason for entering Indonesia illegally 
(as indicated by 84.1 per cent of respondents) was because they were not 
able to travel legally.
2  This pattern may well change again, because in 2014 the Malaysian government removed access 
for Iranians to Visa on Arrival facilities.
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No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Formal means 
of travel were 
impossible/banned
52 85 .2 3 50 .0 11 100 .0 8 80 .0 74 84 .1
other 28 45 .9 1 16 .7 1 9 .1 2 20 .0 32 36 .4
Proper entry 
would be rejected 
at the border
24 39 .3 4 66 .7 0 0 .0 3 30 .0 31 35 .2
I didn’t want to be 
sent back to my 
country
9 14 .8 2 33 .3 1 9 .1 0 0 .0 12 13 .6
No time to get 
proper documents
8 13 .1 1 16 .7 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 9 10 .2
I lost my genuine 
documents











No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
I was following 
the arrangements 
made by my 
smuggler
14 50 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 100 .0 16 50 .0





illegal nature of my 
journey
14 50 .0 1 100 .0 1 100 .0 0 0 .0 16 50 .0
Common to enter 
illegally
- - - - - - - - - -
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=88).
Moreover, the shift towards illegality for those who began their journey 
legally usually occurred when entering or exiting Malaysia. Entering 
Indonesia illegally is also partly linked to the proportion of respondents 
who anticipated likely rejection by immigration authorities if they 
attempted to enter through formal channels (35.2 per cent). A visa 
restrictions index on the freedom of travel for citizens of each country 
(Henley & Partners, 2013) ranked Myanmar and Sri Lanka lowly on its 
index at 86 and 88 respectively (out of 93);3 Afghanistan in particular was 
3  There were only 93 rankings in the index because they included joint rankings.
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ranked lowest in the world at 93. Further, these countries are exempt from 
obtaining the 30-day visa on arrival (VOA) which would make travelling 
to Indonesia an onerous if not impossible process. The hard line taken by 
the Indonesian Government was highlighted in 2013 when Iran had their 
access to the 30-day VOA privilege removed. Up to then, Iran was the 
only major source country for asylum seekers with access to the 30-day 
VOA (Brown, 2013).
Further clarification from respondents revealed that clandestine entry was 
to avoid deportation to their home country, as they did not have to risk 
being rejected by immigration officials at the airport. The role of smugglers 
is again noted, with a small number of respondents (n=16) indicating that 
they were only following their smuggler’s instructions to enter Indonesia 
illegally; again, this seemed to be more prevalent for Afghan respondents. 
For some, that is, their illegal status continues throughout their journey, 
while others seek to enter undetected in order to avoid deportation back 
to their home countries if they were rejected at formal entry points. 
This latter appears to be quite an efficient strategy.
As shown in Figure 7.3, the majority of respondents (93.2 per cent) who 
deliberately entered Indonesia illegally did not encounter any border 
control or immigration authorities. This not only highlights the likely 
success of undocumented entry into Indonesia, but also perhaps is 
indicative of a less than efficient border control. Figure 7.4 shows the 
mode of transport used by respondents entering Indonesia. As anticipated, 
86.6  per cent of all respondents entered Indonesia on a raft or boat, 












Afghanistan Sri	 Lanka Myanmar Others Total
No
Yes
Figure 7.3: Encountering border control/immigration authorities when 
illegally entering Indonesia
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=88).

















Figure 7.4: Mode of transport used to enter Indonesia
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=119).
Sumatra plays a significant role in receiving asylum seekers: over half of 
respondents (57.7 per cent) indicated that they disembarked somewhere 
in Sumatra. Clearly, Sumatra’s location is important: it is an island situated 
in Western Indonesia, of close proximity to Malaysia, and with the Strait 
of Malacca along its north-eastern shore separating it from the Malay 
Peninsula. This corridor of movement is well established and a complex 
industry of interconnected agents has developed to facilitate migration 
along this route. In addition to asylum seekers, illegal workers constitute 
another part of the irregular migration occurring in this region, with 
200,000 to 300,000 Indonesians working in Malaysia estimated to have 
bypassed the regular migration channels in 2008 (Ford & Lyons, 2011, 
p. 109).
There are elements of corruption, with accounts of Malaysian people 
smugglers working together with the Indonesian navy to facilitate 
the return of undocumented Indonesian migrant workers (Ford & 
Lyons, 2013, pp. 216–17). Such examples contribute to the blurring 
of boundaries  between legitimate and illegal practices which have led 
to the ‘aspal’ route, a greying of the illegal nature of labour migration 
of Indonesians to Singapore and Malaysia (Ford & Lyons, 2011). In this 
context, it is easy to see how smuggling operations can flourish in the Riau 
Islands and other locations along the north-eastern shores of Sumatra and 
how they are a magnet for asylum seekers using Indonesia as a transit point.
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The role of the migration industry
It is important to acknowledge, however, that while it is possible to 
recognise some movements as being totally forced or voluntary, many 
migrations contain elements of both (Hugo, 1996). In the case of asylum 
seekers coming to Australia, for most respondents, the major reason 
impelling their migration was insecurity and fear of violence or war and 
conflict in the origin countries. But there were clearly also elements of 
choice involved in the decision-making process. Whether or not people 
move is clearly influenced by the social network of the potential movers 
and the extent to which they have family and friends in Australia. This is 
important in terms of both supply of information regarding the destination 
and assurance of support at the destination, as well as of the financing 
of the move itself. The nexus between the community in Australia and 
asylum seekers is important. Asylum seekers are in constant contact with 
their Australian contacts before and during the migration process, often 
using mobile phones.
However, it is crucial to recognise the pivotal role of the migration 
industry. Agents are a very important element in the asylum migration 
process. Very often, the agents are of the same nationality or ethnicity 
as the asylum seekers themselves. Almost all asylum seekers rely, to some 
extent, on people smugglers during at least some stage of the process, 
if not throughout the movement to Australia. 
In most cases, it seems that people smugglers do not arrange the complete 
journey from the origin country to Australia, but rather one or more 
legs of the movement. The overall picture which emerges is not of an 
integrated international structure of tightly linked elements between 
origin and international destination, but one described by Missbach and 
Sinanu (2011, p. 66) as ‘loose, temporary, acephalous networks’, and by 
Içduygu and Toktas (2002, p. 46) as ‘a loosely cast network consisting of 
hundreds of independent smaller units which cooperate along the way’. 
Government officials and police in transit countries also play a role in the 
networks. Missbach and Sinanu (2011) point out that there is a contrast 
between Malaysia and Indonesia in this respect:
Unlike in Malaysia, where asylum seekers face massive repression by 
the local police and immigration authorities even if they hold UNHCR 
documents, the Indonesian authorities normally accept these documents. 
(p. 74)
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Throughout the corridors of movement, corrupt officials are a key 
element in the people smuggling process. The dangers that many asylum 
seekers face cannot be underestimated, and the personal tragedies that so 
frequently occur not only must be an important part of the narrative of 
asylum seekers, they must also (and they do) influence policy. It does need 
to be said also, however, that these corridors of movement do contain 
networks of support and communication which facilitate and support the 
migration. 
In examining the role of the migration industry, it is crucial to recognise 
a number of its characteristics:
a. It did not arise in Indonesia in the 1990s purely to facilitate IMAs 
destined for Australia. It has a history extending over centuries.
b. The migration industry with Indonesia is very large and multilayered, 
from the involvement of international criminal organisations down 
to large cities with agents and local communities with subagents and 
sub-subagents.
c. There is a high level of complicity of government and government 
workers at all levels.
d. It is often linked to legal migration, with many agents being involved 
in both legal and illegal movement.
e. It is interlinked with family and regional networks.
f. It operates both for internal migration within Indonesia as well as for 
international movement.
g. It is extremely flexible, with workers in the industry able to diversify 
into other areas of activity if demand for their services in one area 
of migration should dry up. Accordingly, the industry can be very 
quick to respond to new opportunities and it cannot be killed off by 
destroying one avenue for undocumented migration (Munro, 2011).
h. The industry is embedded in local communities.
i. The industry has strong linkages with the fishing industry.
j. The migration industry has very strong, long historical connections 
with the Middle East and Malaysia, which have been utilised in 
facilitating the flow of intending IMAs.
k. In most cases, there is not a single agent; rather, migrants and 
intending migrants are passed through networks of agents at different 
points and often with new payments at each point.
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l. Co-ethnics play a key role, and in the case of asylum seekers they 
are often working together with Indonesian colleagues. Some of the 
co-ethnics are unsuccessful former asylum seekers. The preexisting 
Arab community in Indonesia has been the anchor around which 
these co-ethnic agents have developed.
m. It is becoming increasingly professionalised.
The chains of migration-industry connections reaching to the areas which 
intending IMAs come from or pass through is an important element in 
understanding the movement of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. 
The connection with Malaysia is of particular importance, since most 
intending IMAs initially come to Kuala Lumpur. The migration industry 
has ‘seeped into’ and penetrated state institutes in both Malaysia and 
Indonesia. 
Life in transit
There are around 10,000 asylum seekers and refugees currently 
in Indonesia registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM.4 Table 7.3 lists the ratings of respondents 
on their living conditions in Indonesia. As shown below, more respondents 
rated living conditions to be bad or very bad (a combined 60.5 per cent 
of respondents), than good or very good (about one fifth of respondents, 
21.9 per cent). 
Respondents were also asked to indicate if they had any contact with 
Indonesian locals. As Figure 7.5 illustrates, two thirds of respondents 
(67.2 per cent) did not socialise with any local Indonesians. This was 
followed by 18.5 per cent of respondents who socialised on occasion, and 
14.3 per cent who socialised on a regular basis.
4  This was as of February 2014. There have subsequently been significant changes with the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and IOM detaining, for the first time, more than 2,000 
asylum seekers and refugees. Nearly one in four detainees is a child (416 total, 216 of them 
unaccompanied). This is leading to crowding of several of the centres and some violence. The total 
number of refugees and asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR is the lowest since March 2013: 
9,547, after 2,385 have abandoned their claim for asylum.
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20 30 .8% 13 50 .0% 1 8 .3% 4 25 .0% 38 31 .9%








14 21 .5% 9 34 .6% 3 25 .0% 2 12 .5% 28 23 .5%
Verbal/psychological 
abuse
12 18 .5% 5 19 .2% 1 8 .3% 2 12 .5% 20 16 .8%
Physical abuse 12 18 .5% 2 7 .7% 3 25 .0% 2 12 .5% 19 16 .0%
Money and personal 
possessions were 
‘confiscated’
13 20 .0% 3 11 .5% 2 16 .7% 1 6 .2% 19 16 .0%
Was searched 
roughly
8 12 .3% 2 7 .7% 1 8 .3% 3 18 .8% 14 11 .8%
Imprisonment 
without charges
5 7 .7% 5 19 .2% - - - - 10 8 .4%
Asked for bribes to 
be treated well




2 3 .1% 1 3 .8% - - 1 6 .2% 4 3 .4%
Forced to engage in 
activities against will
1 1 .5% - - - - - - 1 0 .8%
Work without wages 1 1 .5% - - - - - - 1 0 .8%
I was not paid 
accordingly for work
1 1 .5% - - - - - - 1 0 .8%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=119).
By and large, the majority of asylum seekers are quite isolated from local 
Indonesians. However, the social networks of asylum seekers evolve with 
the progression of their migration. Other migrants and detainees were 
cited as major sources of information by respondents, which illustrates 
how asylum seekers establish useful social networks with other migrants 
and asylum seekers. Moreover, their travel companions from one 
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transit point to the next usually comprised of newly acquainted fellow 
asylum seekers who can be valuable sources of information, which again 
underlines how information gathering and sharing can improve in transit 










Afghanistan Sri	 Lanka Myanmar Others Total
Yes Sometimes No
Figure 7.5: Socialising with local Indonesians












Afghanistan Sri	 Lanka Myanmar Others Total
No
Yes
Figure 7.6: Have you applied for asylum in Indonesia?
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=119).
Respondents were also asked to indicate what their status was in 
Indonesia and if they intended to irregularly onward migrate to Australia. 
As Figure 7.6 shows, the majority of respondents (90.8 per cent, n=108) 
had  applied for asylum in Indonesia. Of this proportion, only three 
respondents had their applications rejected, while the remainder were 
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approved or still pending. This proportion of respondents were then 
asked to state the reasons which would motivate them to irregularly 
onward migrate despite their asylum claims being approved or awaiting 
determination. As Table 7.4 shows, the majority of respondents 
(86.7 per cent) indicated that they did not intend to irregularly onward 
migrate to Australia and were adamant that they would wait to be resettled. 
However, it is suspected that most of this group of respondents were likely 
to have impressed this on the field researcher for fear of any recourse that 
might jeopardise their asylum applications.











Don’t intend to 
escape
45 81 .8% 24 96 .0% 12 100 .0% 10 76 .9% 91 86 .7%
Long wait for status 
determination
8 14 .5% 0 0 .0% 0 0 .0% 1 7 .7% 9 8 .6%
other 6 10 .9% 0 0 .0% 0 0 .0% 2 15 .4% 8 7 .6%
Long wait for 
resettlement
3 5 .5% 1 4 .0% 0 0 .0% 1 7 .7% 5 4 .8%
Want to go to a 
specific country of 
asylum















5 83 .3% - - - - 1 50 .0% 6 75 .0%
registered so 
as to be safe 
and I wouldn’t 
be harassed by 
authorities
1 16 .7% - - - - 1 50 .0% 2 25 .0%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=105).
Nonetheless, it is worth examining the reasons that would motivate these 
respondents to further their illegal migration to Australia. As anticipated, 
a small number of respondents stated that a long wait for the determination 
of their asylum status (n=9) and/or a long wait for resettlement (n=5) 
would be a catalyst to irregularly onward migrate to Australia. Refugee 
status determination has been characterised as a period fraught with 
uncertainty, frustration and anxiety. Lengthy processing times, empty 
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promises and perceived unresponsiveness of officials were mentioned. 
Asylum seekers feel trapped in a state of limbo whereby children 
are deprived of an education and adults denied gainful employment 
(Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010a, pp. 157–59; 2010b, pp. 561, 573). 
The indefinite nature of this process has been argued as a driving force 
behind those who elect to irregularly onward migrate to Australia as they 
‘are acting out of a strongly felt need to end this limbo, even at the risk of 
death’ (Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010b, p. 561).
A small number of respondents (n=5) also indicated that they were only 
interested in a specific country of asylum, which at this stage is Australia. 
Indonesia was a desirable location to apply for asylum, as its UNHCR 
division was perceived to have faster processing times in terms of status 
determination and the resettlement of refugees. Respondents who 
indicated that they only wanted to seek refuge in Australia were motivated 
by opportunities to receive an education, train or upgrade their skills and 
find employment. Additionally, some respondents also reflected that, 
through family reunification, they would, in the future, apply for their 
family members to join them in Australia.
Under other reasons, poor conditions in detention centres were likely 
to encourage some respondents (n=6) to irregularly onward migrate to 
Australia. Conversely, a very small number (n=2) indicated that Australia 
was their primary destination and that registering with UNHCR was 
simply to obtain their attestation for safety reasons and avoid harassment 
from the Indonesian authorities.
Respondents were also asked to state their sources of financial support 
whilst in Indonesia. Given that asylum seekers and refugees do not 
have any rights to employment in Indonesia, it is unsurprising to see 
in Table 7.5 that none of the respondents had a full-time job, and only 
a small minority (n=2) had a part-time job. 
As expected, the majority (83.2 per cent) were reliant on support from 
UNHCR/IOM. Over half of respondents (55.5 per cent) also indicated 
that they had some money in hand and a small number relied on remittances 
from family and friends overseas (n=16) and from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (n=5). However, despite the lack of employment 
or income, respondents underlined the importance of sending remittances 
back to their home country, as illustrated in Figure 7.7.
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Full-time job - - - - - - - - - -
uNHCr/IoM 51 78 .5% 25 96 .2% 12 100 .0% 11 68 .8% 99 83 .2%
Money in hand 49 75 .4% 4 15 .4% 5 41 .7% 8 50 .0% 66 55 .5%
Family and 
friends abroad
11 16 .9% 3 11 .5% - - 2 12 .5% 16 13 .4%
other NGos 4 6 .2% 1 3 .8% - - - - 5 4 .2%
Part-time job - - - - 1 8 .3% 1 6 .2% 2 1 .7%


















Figure 7.7: Importance of sending remittances to family back in home 
country
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=121).
Just over half of respondents (51.2 per cent) indicated that it was very 
important for them to send remittances back to their respective home 
countries, and a further 23.1 per cent felt that it was important to do so. 
Less than one tenth (9.1 per cent) stated that it was neither important nor 
unimportant to do so. This reflects the pressure of financially supporting 
their families at home and repaying debts incurred in funding their 
migration, which fuels the likelihood of irregular onward migration 
to Australia. 
Respondents were asked what reasons would encourage them to remain 
in Indonesia, if the Indonesian Government permitted permanent 
resettlement. Table 7.6 shows one fifth of respondents (20.2 per cent) 
indicated that they were motivated to further their journey and had no 
desire to remain in Indonesia. Conversely, 40.3 per cent of respondents 
indicated that friendly Indonesian locals were a positive factor for 
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remaining in Indonesia. Although seeking protection was the underlying 
factor behind the selection of Australia as their final destination, economic 
reasons were also important in their decision-making process. As much as 
the main reasons for transiting in Indonesia were to flee from conflict and 
to live in peace, it does not necessarily mean that economic reasons were 
not relevant.











Friendly locals 22 33 .8% 15 57 .7% 6 50 .0% 5 31 .2% 48 40 .3%
It is a peaceful 
country
24 36 .9% 12 46 .2% 7 58 .3% 4 25 .0% 47 39 .5%
No particular 
reason
23 35 .4% 4 15 .4% - - 4 25 .0% 31 26 .1%
I don’t want to 
stay in Indonesia
11 16 .9% 3 11 .5% 4 33 .3% 6 37 .5% 24 20 .2%
Lack of money 
to continue my 
trip
- - 4 15 .4% 5 41 .7% - - 9 7 .6%
other 5 7 .7% - - 3 25 .0% 1 6 .2% 9 7 .6%
Low cost of 
living
2 3 .1% 4 15 .4% 1 8 .3% 1 6 .2% 8 6 .7%
Too tired to 
continue my 
journey
2 3 .1% 3 11 .5% 2 16 .7% - - 7 5 .9%
I was/am well 
adjusted
1 1 .5% 3 11 .5% 1 8 .3% - - 5 4 .2%











Marriage to a 
local
2 3 .1% 1 3 .8% 0 0 .0% 0 0 .0% 3 2 .5%
Indonesia 
allows refugees 
to live in the 
community
3 60 .0% 2 66 .7% - - 1 100 .0% 6 66 .7%
Indonesia is an 
Islamic country
2 40 .0% 1 33 .3% - - - - 3 33 .3%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=119).
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Next steps of transiting migrants
Analysing preferred destinations for resettlement sheds light on the 
decision-making process of asylum seekers and assists in understanding or 
deconstructing the labels of genuine asylum seekers or economic migrants 
attached to this particular group of migrants. Respondents who applied 
for asylum in Indonesia (n=108) were asked to state the countries which 
they would like to be resettled in, and Figure 7.8 indicates their first, 










Australia Anywhere Canada New	Zealand USA Europe	nfd India Norway France Netherlands Sweden Spain
1st	preferred	resettlement	country 2nd	preferred	resettlement	country 3rd	preferred	resettlement	country
Figure 7.8: Preferred countries of resettlement
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=108).
Note: ‘nfd’ means ‘not further defined’.
A strong desire to be resettled in Australia was displayed by three quarters 
of respondents (75.0 per cent) indicating Australia as their first choice, 
while nearly one tenth (9.3 per cent) indicated that they would be happy 
to be resettled anywhere in the world. Remaining respondents stated 
Canada (5.6 per cent), New Zealand (5.6 per cent), USA (1.9 per cent) 
and Europe. Not further defined (1.9 per cent) and India (0.9 per cent) 
were the other preferred first choices. This finding is not surprising, given 
that all of the respondents were knowingly en route to Australia and had 
committed to Australia as their final destination. It is fair to assume that 
most respondents, at this near-final stage of their migration (i.e. transit 
in Indonesia), would nominate Australia as their preferred location. 
However, if respondents were asked this question before they commenced 
their journey, or at the early stages of their migration, Australia might 
not be as prominent. Nonetheless, beyond Australia as the most preferred 
destination, the willingness to be resettled in any country (as reflected in 
their second and third choices), and the fact that only a small proportion 
of respondents had second and third choices, suggests that attempts to 
dichotomise genuine from nongenuine refugees are perhaps too simplistic. 
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Respondents reflected mixed reasons for leaving their respective home 
countries and for choosing Australia as a destination. While reasons 
relating to protection and escape from conflict and persecution can 
overlap with factors associated with employment, education or simply 
the opportunity to lead a better life, it would appear that for many 
respondents, the principal characteristic of a preferred resettlement 
country is to seek protection.
Any country that can guarantee freedom. (SL05TP1)
Any country, even Indonesia. (SL04TP1)
Canada, Australia, New Zealand. They are the same [in terms of safety, 
freedom and opportunities]. (AF03TP2)
Anywhere that I can get education and freedom. (AF10TP2)
Onward migration from Indonesia
Figure 7.9 shows that a small number of Afghan and Sri Lankan 
respondents have attempted this journey more than once. Irregular 
migration is a very costly affair, and Myanmese respondents are probably 
the least likely to be able to afford multiple attempts. Overall, however, 
it is evident that most respondents (95.9 per cent) have only attempted to 



















Figure 7.9: Number of attempts to Australia
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=121).
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When it comes to making arrangements for the journey from Indonesia 
to Australia, it is clear that smugglers have a crucial role, as Table 7.7 
shows. One third of respondents (32.8 per cent) engaged the services of 
smugglers, with 16.8 per cent of all respondents transiting in Indonesia 
engaging with a local smuggler only, 14.3 per cent engaging with their 
previous smuggler and local smuggler (i.e. same network) and a small 
number (1.7 per cent, n=2) who used a smuggler based outside of 
Indonesia along with a local smuggler.
It would seem that almost two thirds of respondents (64.7 per cent) made 
arrangements for the journey to Australia while transiting in Indonesia. 
Smugglers and individual operators based in Indonesia are significant in 
the final leg of an asylum seeker’s journey to Australia. The sample size 
does warrant caution, and while the findings are certainly not conclusive, 
they do suggest that while transnational smuggling networks can be quite 
efficient in getting asylum seekers to Indonesia, asylum seekers have to be 
resourceful in negotiating the final leg of their passage to Australia with 
smugglers based in Indonesia.













11 16 .9% 1 3 .8% - - 5 31 .2% 17 14 .3%








- - - - - - - - - -
Family/relative/
friend abroad




- - - - - - - - - -
Family/relative/
friend at home
- - - - - - - - - -
Smuggler in 
Australia




2 3 .1% - - - - - - 2 1 .7%
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17 29 .2% 1 3 .8% - - 2 12 .5% 20 16 .8%
Smuggler at 
home




- - - - - - - - - -
I don’t know - - - - - - - - - -
Haven’t 
arranged 
anything due to 
detention
33 50 .8% 24 92 .3% 12 100 .0% 8 50 .0% 77 64 .7%
Was resettled 
by uNHCr
2 3 .10% - - - - - - 2 1 .70%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=121).
Independent units, individuals, and local service providers are crucial. 
As Figure 7.10 shows, half of respondents (n=20) who managed to make 
arrangements to travel to Australia engaged the services of an Indonesian 
















Figure 7.10: Intending IMAs to Australia: Use of an Indonesian local 
to arrange passage
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=40).
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At a mean cost of USD5,364, the Indonesian–Australian leg is evidently 
the most expensive part of their journey, when considering that the mean 
cost of respondents’ overall migration to Australia is USD10,310. Asylum 
seekers usually have a ‘contract’ or an agreement of sorts with smugglers 
in case their migration to Australia was unsuccessful, as  indicated by 
the majority (70 per cent, n=28) of respondents who used a smuggler 
(see Table 7.8). 










yes 21 70 .0% 2 100 .0% 5 62 .5% 28 70 .0%









Work in Australia - - - - - - - -
Full or partial return of money 
for failed migration
1 4 .8% 0 0 .0% 2 40 .0% 3 10 .7%
Payment upon successful 
migration
3 14 .3% 0 0 .0% 0 0 .0% 3 10 .7%
Down payment and 
finalisation upon success 
8 38 .1% 2 100 .0% 1 20 .0% 11 39 .3%
Payment managed by third 
party based on outcome
11 52 .4% 0 0 .0% 0 0 .0% 11 39 .3%
Agent will attempt to resend 
the migrant between 1-3 
more times
12 57 .1% 0 0 .0% 3 60 .0% 15 53 .6%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=40).
Respondents were also asked how long they had to wait in Indonesia 
before embarking on their journey to Australia. As Table 7.9 shows, more 
than half (a combined 42.5 per cent [n=17]) of respondents, excluding 
‘I don’t know’ results, transited in Indonesia for 4 weeks or less, compared 
with a combined 30 per cent (n=12) who transited for a longer duration, 
ranging from 4 upwards towards 24 weeks. Overall, the waiting times in 
Indonesia are similar to those in previous transit countries like Malaysia 
and Thailand, with most respondents spending less than a month before 
continuing their migration to the next destination. 
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Less than 1 week 4 13 .3% - - 1 12 .5% 5 12 .5%
1 to < 2 weeks 3 10 .0% - - 2 25 .0% 5 12 .5%
2 to < 4 weeks 6 20 .0% - - 1 12 .5% 7 17 .5%
4 to < 8 weeks 3 10 .0% 1 50 .0% - - 4 10 .0%
8 to < 16 weeks 4 13 .3% - - 2 25 .0% 6 15 .0%
16 to < 24 weeks 1 3 .3% - - 1 12 .5% 2 5 .0%
I don’t know 9 30 .0% 1 50 .0% 1 12 .5% 11 27 .5%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=40).
In general, the majority of the embarkation locations stated by respondents 
in Table 7.10 tended to be around East Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands 
in South Eastern Indonesia, evidently favoured launching points due to 
their close proximity to Australia.
Table 7.10: Location from which respondents departed for Australia
Location of departure Province Frequency Per cent
I don’t know - 15 37 .5%
unspecified hours of drive from Jakarta - 5 12 .5%
Kupang east Nusa 
Tenggara
5 12 .5%
Surabaya East Java 3 7 .5%
Lombok West Nusa 
Tenggara
3 7 .5%
Jakarta Jakarta 3 7 .5%
Mataram Central Java 2 5%
unspecified hours of drive from bogor - 1 2 .5%
Sumbawa Island West Nusa 
Tenggara
1 2 .5%
Cilacap Central Java 1 2 .5%
bali bali 1 2 .5%
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=40).
Respondents were asked if they had any intentions to return to their home 
countries after resettlement in Australia. As Figure 7.11 shows, only a small 
number of respondents (10.5 per cent, n=9) intended to return to their 
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home country, compared with 41.0 per cent who did not. This indicates 
that there is a possibility that some refugees, even after resettlement in 















Figure 7.11: Intention to return to home country after resettlement
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=105).
Some 85.1 per cent of respondents (n=103) in Figure 7.12 below 
who indicated that in spite of negative experiences they have had with 
irregularly migrating, they would still have migrated even if they knew of 












Afghanistan Sri	Lanka Myanmar Others Total
No Yes I	don't	know
Figure 7.12: Would they still have migrated if they had known of the 
difficulties of irregular migration?
Source: Transit migration survey (2010, 2012) (n=121).
193
7 . INDoNeSIA AS A TrANSIT CouNTry IN IrreGuLAr MIGrATIoN To AuSTrALIA
Conclusion
The study found that the majority of respondents would enter Indonesia 
illegally, often by boat. There were a variety of reasons for this, but the main 
factor was simply their inability to travel legally. Their migration status 
might have been legal from the beginning of their journey, but shifted 
towards illegality in Thailand or Malaysia. For some, entering illegally was 
a strategy to avoid detection at official ports or channels, so as to eliminate 
the possibility of deportation to their home countries. The porous borders 
of Indonesia are further underlined, as the majority of asylum seekers who 
entered illegally were able to do so undetected. Moreover, respondents 
indicated that the Riau Islands and parts of Sumatra were their landing 
points—areas where Indonesian labour migrants are also smuggled to and 
from Malaysia and Singapore, underscoring the challenges in addressing 
the arrival of asylum seekers in Indonesia. 
Life in Indonesia as indicated by respondents is generally poor. Although 
respondents had access to services, the quality of education and housing 
was poor. The majority of respondents were also quite isolated and did 
not socialise with Indonesians. Asylum seekers might be open to settling 
in Indonesia; however, poor living conditions, indefinite processing and 
resettlement times and negative experiences can drive asylum seekers to 
onward migrate to Australia.
While smugglers play a significant role, their networks seem to be weaker 
in Indonesia. Respondents transiting through Thailand and Malaysia 
often used the same smuggling network, whereby the smuggler used to 
travel from their last transit point to Malaysia would arrange for another 
smuggler in Malaysia to assist with the migration. However, there were 
fewer respondents who used the same network of agents in Indonesia. 
This is not only indicative of weaker transnational smuggling networks in 
Indonesia, but also underlines the importance of independent smugglers 
as well as independent units or local service providers assisting with other 
aspects of the migration.
The concept of transit migration is problematic, conceptually and 
politically, but it refers to a phenomenon of increasing significance in the 
Asian region where migration is both a cause and effect of rapid economic 
growth. However, in several countries in the region, governance issues, lack 
of institutional and human capacity, excessive rent taking and transaction 
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costs dilute migration’s potential positive developmental impacts, and in 
this context, as this study has shown, irregular migration and transiting is 
likely to increase in scale and impact.
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The process of Sri Lankan 
migration to Australia focusing on 
irregular migrants seeking asylum
Graeme Hugo and Lakshman Dissanayake
Introduction
Sri Lanka is one of the contemporary world’s major emigration nations. 
The United Nations (2013) has shown that there were 1.25 million Sri 
Lankan–born persons living outside of their country of birth, equivalent 
to 5.9 per cent of the current Sri Lankan resident population. Australia 
is one of the important destination countries, with an estimated 106,280 
Sri Lankan–born residents in 2013 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2013). While Australia has only 7.9 per cent of the overseas Sri Lankan 
population, it is an important part of the Sri Lankan diaspora. Not only 
has the Sri Lankan presence in Australia been established for a long period 
(Weerasooria, 1988), but as well it comprises predominantly permanent 
settlers who have maintained important linkages with their homeland.
Sri Lankan immigrants are the 13th largest overseas-born group in 
Australia and their movement to Australia has a long history. It has 
become increasingly complex, with movement in both directions and 
increasing levels of both permanent and non-permanent migration. This 
complexity increased in 2012–13, with the sudden influx of over 6,000 
Sri Lankan irregular maritime arrivals (IMAs) seeking asylum, and with 
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the repatriation of significant numbers. This study adopts a  multisite, 
mixed-method approach to analysing this mobility within the broader 
context of all Sri Lankan migration to Australia. By collecting, analysing 
and interpreting quantitative and qualitative information from origin, 
transit and destination countries, the study seeks to understand the 
nature and drivers of the process of irregular movement from Sri Lanka 
to Australia. It investigates the characteristics of the movers and the 
decision-making processes that underlie irregular migration, selecting 
a destination and whether or not to return. It examines how individual, 
family and contextual factors influence the migration as well as the role 
of social networks and the Sri Lankan diaspora. The findings are related 
to migration theory and their implications for understanding irregular 
migration more generally and Australian IMA policy are discussed.
Methods and data
In Sri Lanka, we collected existing research and secondary data sources 
and carried out key informant interviews with the Sri Lanka Police, 
Immigration and Emigration Officials and Criminal Investigation 
Department staff, since they deal directly with the Sri Lankan irregular 
maritime migrants who are captured at the Sri Lankan border, as well 
as with those who are sent back by the Australian authorities after 
disqualifying them for asylum status. The main secondary data sources 
that the current study used for its analysis are:
• the Sri Lanka Population Census 2012 (5 per cent sample);
• data from the Department of Immigration and Emigration;
• data from the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment;
• airport statistics;
• data from the Criminal Investigation Department on IMAs;
• data from a few regional police stations; and
• data and information from various media reports.
In addition, two people smugglers, four facilitators and 17 IMAs were 
interviewed to gather information about the process of irregular migration 
to Australia.
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The Australian secondary data used here is of two types. The first is the 
quinquennial population census, which is a high quality total count of the 
population in each year that ends with a one or a six. Sri Lankans can be 
identified by their place of birth, their ancestry or the language they speak 
at home. Here, we mainly use the birthplace information. Extensive use 
is also made of data collected at the Australian borders about all persons 
arriving and departing.
Sri Lanka—A quintessential emigration 
country
Sri Lanka’s geographical position has had a significant impact on 
population movement into and out of the country over the years. At the 
latest census of 2012, the total population of Sri Lanka was estimated to 
be 20,277,597. Sri Lanka is a multiethnic country, comprising 75 per cent 
Sinhalese, 11 per cent Sri Lankan Tamils, 4 per cent Indian Tamils and 
9 per cent Moors (and less than 1 per cent of various other ethnicities 
such as Burgher and Malays). The Sinhalese population is substantially 
distributed over the southern and western parts of Sri Lanka, while 
Muslims dominate the eastern region and most Sri Lankan Tamils  live 
in the northern part of the island. A substantial proportion of Tamils 
live in the Colombo district, where the commercial capital is located. 
The post-independence era has been significantly marked by the conflict 
between Sinhalese and Tamils, and these tensions still have an enormous 
impact on political and economic development as well as migration 
patterns in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka experienced a series of sociopolitical 
disturbances over around 30 years, which reduced growth and discouraged 
investment, destroyed human and physical capital, redirected natural 
resources to non-productive uses, and caused a dramatic deterioration 
in the quality of life—not only in communities in the north and east, 
but across all communities on the entire island. Impacts of the 30-year 
war, which ended in 2009, loom large when considering contemporary 
events in Sri Lanka. This is also the case when examining the movement of 
IMAs to Australia, particularly as the majority came from the war-affected 
northern and eastern parts of the island. 
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Sri Lanka is a significant emigration nation with the United Nations 
(2013) showing that the number of Sri Lankan–born living in other 
countries increased from 0.8 to 1.3 million between 2000 and 2013, the 
equivalent of roughly 5–6 per cent of the resident population.  Figure 8.1 
shows the distribution of these migrants. Jayasuriya and McAuliffe (2013, 
pp. 6–7) explain that migration outflows of Sri Lankans can be categorised 
into five groups:




• tourists, including pilgrims to Nepal and India.
Figure 8.1: Countries of residence of the Sri Lankan diaspora, 2013
Source: united Nations (2013).
Since several of these flows are temporary or circular, not all are captured 
in United Nations’ estimates of the numbers of Sri Lankan–born persons 
resident outside of Sri Lanka. Contract labour migration of low-skilled 
workers, especially female domestic workers to the Middle East and to 
a lesser extent Southeast and East Asia, has increased, as Figure 8.2 shows.
201

































































Figure 8.2: Sri Lanka: Departures for foreign employment, 1986–2011
Source: Sri Lanka bureau of Foreign Employment .
Irregular migration has been an important element in Sri Lankan 
emigration for several decades. It is difficult to estimate the size of this 
outflow because it occurs outside of the formal migration system. There 
has also been an outflow of refugees and asylum seekers, mostly associated 
with civil conflict involving Tamils in the north and east of the country. 
India has been the main destination, but as Jayasuriya and McAuliffe 
(2013, p. 15) point out, people have also travelled within Sri Lanka, as 
well as to Australia, the UK, France, Switzerland, Canada, Germany, Japan 
and a number of other European, North American and Asian countries.
Links between Sri Lanka and its diaspora have become increasingly 
important. A major dimension of this has been the sending of remittances 
to Sri Lanka by expatriates overseas on a permanent or temporary 
basis. Remittances make up 10 per cent of the national gross domestic 
product (GDP). While the Middle East is the most important source of 
remittances, Australia is also a significant source. This reflects the fact that 
the Australian Sri Lankan community is a tightly knit one, maintaining 
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strong links with the homeland (Weerasooria, 1988). It is important to 
note that there are also high levels of internal migration within Sri Lanka. 
At the 2012 population census, almost a fifth of Sri Lankans (19 per cent, 
or 3.86 million) were living in a district other than the one in which they 
were born.
There is some evidence in Sri Lanka of a strong link between internal 
migration and international migration (Hugo, 2015; King, Skeldon, & 
Vullnetari, 2008). Internal migration, especially rural–urban movement, 
can be the first stage of a subsequent international migration (Cornelius, 
1992; del Rey Poveda, 2007, pp. 291–92; King, 1976, pp. 70–72; 
Lozano-Ascencio, Roberts, & Bean, 1999; Skeldon, 2006, pp. 22–24; 
Zabin & Hughes, 1995). Nevertheless, direct migration from rural areas 
to international destinations also occurs in international labour migration 
flows (Cornelius, 1992, pp. 162–63; Lozano-Ascencio et al., 1999, p. 140; 
Zabin & Hughes, 1995). Emigration may also be preceded by more than 
one internal move in multistep migration, perhaps starting from a small 
village, migrating to a provincial town and then on to the national capital 
before proceeding with an international move (Lozano-Ascencio et al., 
1999). This suggests that it is imperative to study both the internal as 
well as international migration dynamics in order to understand the 
environment in which IMAs make decisions to migrate to Australia.
The effects of remittances and the obvious wealth of returning migrants 
has sent a strong signal to many Sri Lankans, especially young people, 
that migration offers an avenue to income-related success. The culture 
of migration is important to factor in any strategy addressing irregular 
migration to Australia.
Sri Lankan migration to Australia
There is a long history of migration from Sri Lanka to Australia extending 
over most of the period of European settlement. Table 8.1 summarises the 
major historical waves of Sri Lankan settlement migration to Australia. 
The Sri Lankan community in Australia is currently the sixth largest in the 
Sri Lankan diaspora, but Table 8.2 shows that it is only relatively recently 
that it has assumed a significant size. 
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Table 8.1: Major historical trends in Sri Lankan migration to Australia




Up to 1870s Small-scale individual movement 
between british colonies
Sinhalese NSW, Victoria
1870s–1900 Flows of contract workers for sugar 
plantations, permanent settlers
Sinhalese North Queensland, 
NT, North Western 
Australia
1870s–1900 Small-scale individual movement 
to goldfields
Victoria, NSW
1900–50 Limited family migration Sinhalese Northern Australia
1950–80 Migration of descendants of European 
settlers, Colombo Plan students








2012–13 Asylum seekers Tamils Victoria (on 
bridging visas) and 
detention centres
Source: Authors’ own research.
Table 8.2: Growth of the Sri Lankan–born population in Australia, 1901–2011
Year Population % Growth per annum
1901 609
1911 611 0 .03
1921 637 0 .42
1933 638 0 .01
1954 1,961 5 .49
1961 3,433 8 .33
1966 5,562 10 .13
1971 9,018 10 .15
1976 14,761 10 .36
1981 17,900 3 .93
1986 23,600 5 .68
1991 40,400 11 .35
1996 46,984 3 .07
2001 53,461 2 .62
2006 62,257 3 .09
2011 86,412 6 .78
2013 106,280 3 .21
Source: Data derived from Australian censuses, 1901 to 2011 .
Note: The 1947 census population has been excluded because Sri Lanka and India were 
recorded together in that year . Growth between 2011 and 2013 is of the estimated resident 
population .
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The pattern of settlement migration since 1960 is shown in Figure 8.3 
and it indicates that in the modern era there has been considerable annual 
variation in the flow of Sri Lankan permanent migrants to Australia. 
The final peak was in recent years and coincided with the end of the Civil 
War and an unprecedented increase in Australian skilled immigration 





















































Figure 8.3: Settler arrivals from Sri Lanka to Australia, 1959–60 to 
2012–13
Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Australian 
Immigration: Consolidated Statistics, various issues; Department of Immigration and 
border Protection (DIbP), unpublished data.
Note: Settler arrivals from 2006–07 onwards are by country of birth.
One of the defining characteristics of permanent immigration to Australia 
since the mid-1990s has been the increasing focus of immigrant selection 
on skill and a reduction in family migration (Hugo, 1999). This has been 
the case in Sri Lankan immigration to Australia. Figure 8.4 shows how 
skilled migration has increasingly dominated Sri Lankan immigration in 
recent years.
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Figure 8.4: Australia: Sri Lankan–born by visa category, 2003–04 to 
2012–13
Source: DIbP, unpublished data .
Particular attention in recent years has focused on asylum seeker and 
refugee migration to Australia from Sri Lanka. Figure 8.41 shows that 
refugee migration has been a small but significant factor. In terms of 
refugee movement, Table 8.3 shows the numbers of refugees from Sri 
Lanka settled in Australia over the last decade or so, and the dominance 
of onshore settlers who arrived initially as asylum seekers.
Table 8.3: Australia: Humanitarian settlers from Sri Lanka
Year Onshore Offshore Year Onshore Offshore
2000–01 170 100 2007–08 370 210
2001–02 115 55 2008–09 400 230
2002–03 60 35 2009–10 505 200
2003–04 25 5 2010–11 355 285
2004–05 34 2011–12 410 90
2005–06 215 2012–13 320 41
2006–07 275 50
Source: DIbP, unpublished data .
1  Nonprogram migration arrivals consist mainly of New Zealand citizens arriving under the 
Trans-Tasman travel arrangement and a small group of other nonprogram arrivals (children born to 
Australian citizens overseas, residents of Cocos Islands, Norfolk Island and persons granted Australian 
citizenship overseas).
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The mid-1990s saw the introduction of a skilled temporary worker visa 
(subclass 457) (Khoo, McDonald, & Hugo, 2009), as well as student 
and working holiday maker visas. This produced a paradigmatic shift 
in Australian migration (Hugo, 1999) and has reshaped Sri Lankan 
migration to Australia. Accordingly, Figure 8.5 shows how long-term 
arrivals2 have a strikingly different pattern to the permanent migration 
flows in Figure 8.3. There has been a remarkably steep increase in the 
temporary immigrant inflow from Sri Lanka. It is clear that, to some 
extent, temporary migration is being used by some highly skilled Sri 
Lankans who hitherto would have used the permanent migration avenue 


























































































































Figure 8.5: Long-term arrivals from Sri Lanka to Australia, 1959–60 to 
2012–13
Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Australian 
Immigration: Consolidated Statistics, various issues; DIbP, unpublished data.
Jayasuriya and McAuliffe (2013, p. 9) point out that a degree from an 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  Development (OECD) 
university is highly valued in Sri Lanka, and show that Australia is the 
2  Persons entering Australia on a temporary residence visa intending to leave but only after 
spending more than one year in Australia.
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destination for the largest number of student migrants leaving Sri Lanka. 
Australia has been an important destination for students since the 
Colombo Plan in the 1960s. There has been a significant increase in the 
number of student visa holders from Sri Lanka in Australia, from 1,201 
in 2002 to 7,555 in 2009. Australia is the destination of over a third of 
Sri Lankan students going overseas, but Sri Lanka is only the 13th largest 
supplier of overseas students to Australia.
Temporary skilled migrant workers (subclass 457 visa holders) are also 
an increasingly important part of the migration flow from Sri Lanka to 
Australia. The 457 program is entirely demand driven, while the number 
of permanent immigrants is capped by government. The 457 program is 
available only to highly skilled workers. Sri Lanka is the fifth largest Asian 
source of 457 migrants to Australia. As is the case with students, many 
457s from Sri Lanka apply for, and are granted, permanent residence 
in Australia. Temporary migration, like permanent migration, from 
Sri Lanka to Australia is selective of the highly skilled.
An important dimension of change in Australian international migration 
over the last 15 years has been the increasing proportion of permanent 
settlers each year who are persons already in Australia who entered 
earlier under some form of temporary residence visa. Over a quarter 
(27.8 per  cent) of the 52,791 Sri Lankans who settled permanently in 
Australia over this period were already in Australia as a temporary resident 
before applying successfully for permanent residence. There is, therefore, 
a pattern of Sri Lankans travelling to Australia as a student or skilled 
temporary worker and, upon completion of their studies or work contract, 
taking up permanent residence. This has become a common pattern 
among students in Australia from Asia. In 2011–12, some 30,978 former 
students applied for, and obtained, permanent residence in Australia.
Moreover, it is apparent that different waves of migrants from Sri Lanka 
to Australia have been dominated by different ethnic groups. In the late 
nineteenth century it was mainly Sinhalese. In the early post–World 
War II decades it was mainly Burghers, and in the latest wave (after the 
mid-1980s) it was Tamils.
Table 8.4 shows that the Australian Tamil population is predominantly 
from Sri Lanka. and that it has doubled in the 2006–11 intercensal period. 
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Table 8.4: Persons in Australia indicating their ancestry was Tamil by 
birthplace, 2006 and 2011
Birthplace Tamil
2006 2011 % change
No. % No. %
Sri Lanka 5,158 64 .1 11,630 63 .7 125 .9
Australia 1,312 16 .3 2,811 15 .4 114 .3
Malaysia and Singapore 515 6 .4 1,014 5 .6 96 .9
India 505 6 .3 1,293 7 .1 156 .0
other 558 6 .9 1,503 8 .2 169 .4
Total 8,048 100 .0 18,251 100 .0 126 .8
























Figure 8.6: Level of post-school qualification of total Australian and 
Sri Lankan–born population, 2011
Source: Data derived from Australian censuses, 1901 to 2011 .
Policy-imposed selectivity is evident when we examine the educational 
qualifications of the Australian Sri Lankan–born population. Figure 8.6 
shows that 30.6 per cent of the Sri Lankan–born population aged 15 years 
and over in Australia did not have a post-school qualification compared 
with 52.5 per cent of the total Australian population. However, the 
difference is most dramatic for those with a University degree or higher 
qualification, since more than 30 per cent of the Sri Lankan–born are 
209
8 . THe ProCeSS oF SrI LANKAN MIGrATIoN To AuSTrALIA
at this level compared with 15 per cent of the total Australian adult 
population. For higher degrees it is 10.8 compared with 4.1 per cent. 
This points to a very high level of educational selectivity in the permanent 
migration from Sri Lanka to Australia. 
Thus far, our focus has been on the flows of Sri Lankans moving to 
Australia as well as the characteristics of the Sri Lankan population in 
Australia. It is also important to appreciate that there are reciprocal 
and circular flows between Australia and Sri Lanka. Indeed, it has been 
argued that it is more appropriate to view Asian–Australian migration 
as a complex interactive system rather than a unidirectional permanent 
relocation of populations (Hugo, 2008a, 2008b). This certainly applies to 
the migration relationship between Australia and Sri Lanka. It is important 
to establish the extent and nature of these reciprocal movements, since 
they can influence development in Sri Lanka. 
The flow from Australia to Sri Lanka, like the permanent flow in the other 
direction, is highly skilled. Revealingly, managers and professionals make 
up 65 per cent of all departures. It is clear that in the flow from Australia 
to Sri Lanka, the dominant group are those in the economically active age 
groups and their children. Hence, their potential to have a positive impact 
on development in Sri Lanka is considerable.
Permanent return migration is not the only form of movement that 
Sri Lankan expatriates in Australia have with their homeland. In fact, 
Sri Lankans overseas can keep a significant investment in their homeland 
by frequently visiting and maintaining economic links with institutions 
and individuals in Sri Lanka. Table 8.5 identifies three types of Sri Lankan–
born individuals who indicated they are moving in and out of Australia 
on a temporary (either long-term or short-term) basis. This table shows 
three categories of Sri Lankan–born persons according to their residential 
status and time periods: new settlers 1998–2006; visitors 1998–2006; 
and Australian residents who settled prior to 1998.
Table 8.5: Number of Sri Lankan–born individual persons travelling 
in and out of Australia temporarily by resident status, 1998–2006




New settlers 1998–2006 13,279 272
Visitors 1998–2006 22,355 15,814
Australian residents who settled prior to 1998 24,021 24,320
Source: DIbP, unpublished data .
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What is apparent, then, is that many Sri Lankan–born people settling 
in Australia have made several temporary moves out of Australia since 
arriving.
Refugee migration
Since the mid-1980s Sri Lanka has been a significant source of both 



































Figure 8.7: Refugees and asylum applicants from Sri Lanka, 1985–2012
Source: uNHCr Statistics.
Most have been Tamils who have been displaced as a result of the civil 
conflict. As Jayasuriya and McAuliffe (2013, p. 15) point out:
India has historically been, and continues to be, the main host country of 
Sri Lankan refugees. At the end of 2012 it hosted some 67,165 Sri Lankan 
(predominantly Tamil) refugees…. However, estimates of the number of 
Sri Lankans with pending asylum claims in Tamil Nadu vary considerably 
between organisations, from around 100,000 to 200,000.
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While India has been the main destination, Sri Lankans have also applied 
for asylum in a number of OECD and Asian countries. A recent United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study (2013, p. 28) has 
shown that in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, the main destinations 
were Germany, France, UK, Canada and Switzerland. 
Figure 8.8 demonstrates that in recent years there have been some 
significant changes, with the largest numbers now being in France, and 
Malaysia and Australia becoming increasingly significant. Table 8.6 reveals 
that France and Australia have received the largest number of asylum 
applications up to the first half of 2013, with Australia experiencing 
a sharp increase in 2012. 
Figure 8.8: Asylum claims, Sri Lankan nationals, six most important 
countries, 2006–12
Source: uNoDC (2013, p. 29).
A LoNG WAy To Go
212











Source: united Nations High Commissioner for refugees (uNHCr) population statistics, 
extracted 13 January, 2014 .
Note: uNHCr data does not include all IMAs to Australia, only those who were able to 
lodge an asylum claim following the lifting of a statutory bar .
There are more than 100,000 ethnic Tamil Sri Lankans in the southern 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu, including 68,000 in 112 government-run 
camps and 32,000 outside camps (IRIN, 2012). It is important to note 
that India, which has been the host for the majority of war refugees, shows 
a clear downward trend in the numbers of Tamil Sri Lankans because, as 
has been reported, an increasing number of refugees are returning home, 
both spontaneously and with the help of the UNHCR (Refugees return 
by ferry, 2011). 
The migration industry in Sri Lanka
Overseas migration became an industry with the opening up of the Sri 
Lankan economy during the late 1970s. Prior to that, migrating overseas 
was an individual affair and there was little third-party involvement in 
Sri Lanka. Overseas migration was mainly for higher education and 
employment. As Sri Lanka began to encourage labour migration to Middle 
Eastern countries, a ‘migration industry’ was built. It initially started with 
a few unauthorised migration agents in Colombo. It expanded to include 
both authorised and unauthorised agents not only for sending unskilled 
and semi-skilled labour migrants overseas but also for skilled migration 
to immigration-encouraging countries such as Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada. 
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The government created a Foreign Employment Unit in the Department 
of Labour in 1976 in order to find employment overseas, organise and 
monitor migration as well as maintain migration records (Korale, 1983). 
In 1980, the Foreign Employment Act No. 32 allowed private agencies 
to take care of some of the governmental functions and responsibilities 
of managing overseas labour employment but with governmental control 
(Gamburd, 2000). Figure 8.9 shows that the number of licensed agencies 










1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
No.	of	licensed	issued 10 41 27 51 30 52 64 75 47 136 183 147 109 47 70 74 99 59 49 110 66 70 88 93 50 89 75
Stock	as	at	end	of	the	year 139 124 115 182 192 220 237 273 250 322 477 464 520 385 431 445 528 538 524 581 582 607 691 626 746 708 699
Figure 8.9: Number of licensed agencies, 1985–2011
Source: Sri Lanka bureau of Foreign employment (2011).
Note: blue bars show the new licences issued each year for the newly established agencies.
A substantial institutional framework has developed in Sri Lanka to 
govern labour migration. The Sri Lankan Foreign Employment Agency 
Ltd was set up in 1996 for directing youth into foreign employment. This 
agency functions under the Ministry of External Affairs and manages the 
recruitment for employment overseas. 
Departures for foreign employment have grown between 2006 and 2011 
in almost all the districts, but the volume of departures is relatively low for 
the northern districts of Sri Lanka, as depicted in Figure 8.10. Potential 
migrants did not have the opportunity to leave the northern districts 
during the war period in order to be involved in the process of labour 
migration since almost all of the licensed agencies are located outside the 
Northern Province, and mainly in Colombo and Kurunegala districts.
Although a coherent framework for governing labour migration is in 
place in Sri Lanka, a substantial proportion of migrants prefer to take up 
informal channels to organise their migration (Eelens, 1995; Gamburd, 
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2000, 2005; Gunatilleke, 1998; Shaw, 2008; Ukwatte, 2010). Shaw 
(2008)3 observed that about one third of migrants organised their 










Figure 8.10: Departure for foreign employment by district, 2006 and 2011
Source: Sri Lanka bureau of Foreign Employment, various reports .
The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment reports that only 
75.5  per  cent of the departures in 2008 were from licensed agencies 
(Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, 2009, p. 5). Many studies 
have reported that numerous illegal recruitments continue,4 although the 
number of licensed agencies has increased (Dias & Jayasundera, 2004; 
Eelens & Speckmann, 1990).
Boat migration or IMAs is not a phenomenon that has been specifically 
developed for Australia. The smuggling of people overseas from Sri 
Lanka by boat was booming a decade ago (Brown, 2012). Although 
Australia became the preferred destination of smuggled migrants in 
2012–13, Italy has in the past been one of the major destinations. IMAs 
to Italy changed significantly in 2002 for two reasons. First, the Italian 
Parliament sanctioned a new immigration law known as the Bossi-Fini 
law that allowed for regularisation of those already living in Italy, as well 
as devising a mechanism for the processing of new immigrants with 
offices all over the country and severe border controls (Totah, 2003). 
The second was a  consequence of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
Ministerial Conference on Cooperation for the Management of Migratory 
Flows between Europe and Asia, which paved the way for the Italian 
3  Shaw’s paper is based on fieldwork conducted in 2006 in Kurunegala district, a rural agrarian 
region about 70 kilometres northeast of Colombo. A mix of quantitative and qualitative techniques 
has been employed. The primary survey instrument was a structured questionnaire, administered to 
individuals responsible for household finances in 153 remittance-receiving households in which the 
migrant had been abroad for six months or more at the time of the survey.
4  ‘Illegal recruitments’ means the recruitment of labour by nonlicensed recruiters.
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Government to establish bilateral agreements with sending countries 
to help curb illegal migratory flows by offering them special quotas for 
immigrants and readmission priorities in exchange for their cooperation. 
Most importantly, the agreement supported externalising the policing of 
the Italian border by cooperating logistically and financially with local law 
enforcement agencies to stop IMAs at the point of departure. 
International migration has increased significantly in Asia during the 
past two decades (Hugo & Young, 2008). Although there have been 
some initiatives to improve governance and cooperation in relation to 
international migration, undocumented movement remains a major 
challenge (Abella, 2008; Colford, 2013). The International Organization 
for Migration (2010) has estimated that there are 20 to 30 million 















































































































Figure 8.11: Unauthorised arrivals to Australia, 1989–90 to 2012–13
Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002, 2004, 
2005); Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Annual Report, various issues; Phillips 
and Spinks (2013).
Persons who arrive in Australia without a visa, most of whom ultimately 
apply for asylum, arrive by sea and air, and the numbers are shown 
in Figure 8.11. Sri Lankans were an important part of this upswing  in 
IMAs. In 2008 there were just over 200 IMAs from Sri Lanka, but in 2012 
there were over 6,400.
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Jayasuriya and McAuliffe (2013, p. 19) note that there has been an 
increase in the number of asylum seekers repatriated to Sri Lanka: 
between July 2012 and May 2013, 162 voluntary and 965 involuntary 
returns were undertaken. At the Sri Lanka end, data obtained from the 
Katunayake Airport shows nonvoluntary returnees by special charter 
flights in 2012–13 were 1,265 compared with 56 voluntary returnees by 
commercial flights, as depicted in Figure 8.12. All the voluntary returnees 
















Figure 8.12: Number of voluntary and nonvoluntary returnees from 
Australia, 2012–13
Source: Data obtained from various annual reports – bandaranaike Airport . retrieved from 
www .airport .lk/aasl/business_info/annual_reports .php .
In recent years, it was not only Tamils who were involved with boat 
migration, but Sinhalese as well. There were no Sinhalese IMAs in 2011 
but their number suddenly jumped to 13 per cent in 2012 (Jayasuriya & 
McAuliffe, 2013). This suggests that the reasons for boat migration are 
not related only to factors linked with ‘protection’. Table 8.7 shows that 
interdictions were on a substantial scale. Moreover, they were at a high 
level at the time of peak IMA arrivals from Sri Lanka in Australia.
Table 8.7: Sri Lankan irregular migrants detected by the Sri Lankan 
authorities, 2009–12
Item 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Total number of vessels detected 8 3 3 67 81
Total number of passengers arrested 182 10 115 3,139 3,446
Total number of facilitators arrested 35 19 12 304 370
Source: Criminal Investigation Department, Sri Lanka . Data collected by the authors .
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Most of the IMAs originated from the Northern and Eastern provinces, 
which were conflict-affected districts for more than two decades. In 2012, 
the Eastern districts of Trincomalee and Batticalo and the Northern 
district of Vavuniya dominated the irregular maritime migration, but 
a  completely different pattern of migration was observed for 2013, 













Figure 8.13: District of origin of irregular maritime migrants, 2012 and 2013
Source: Criminal Investigation Department, Sri Lanka . Data collected by the authors .
The Northern district of Jaffna has produced many irregular maritime 
migrants, while other districts both in the Northern as well as Eastern 
provinces have a smaller number of migrants. The most important feature 
of the differences between 2012 and 2013 was the substantial decline of 
irregular maritime migration in all the districts except Jaffna. 
Figure 8.14 shows that of those who attempted to depart for Australia 
by boat between January 2012 and October 2013, the majority were 
Tamil. These people were arrested while attempting to depart or before 
crossing the Sri Lankan sea border. If ‘protection factors’ are the reason for 
illegal maritime migration, as indicated by some authors (Howie, 2013; 
Kanagasabapathipillai, 2013), involvement of a large number Sinhalese 
and a significant number of Muslim migrants raises questions as to what 
the reasons are behind their migration. Many who have investigated 
‘boat migration’ suggest that an economic motive was also a  main 
reason (Waduge, 2013; Karunaratne, 2013; Kariyakarawana, 2013; 
Saravanathan, 2013).
















Figure 8.14: Number of people captured while departing to Australia 
by ethnicity, January 2012 to October 2013
Source: Criminal Investigation Department, Sri Lanka . Data collected by the authors .
It is interesting to note that all ventures in 2013 involved children, 
compared with less than half (22) of the 56 attempts in 2012. The majority 
of the latter occurred towards the end of 2012. 
Irregular maritime migrants interviewed were either unemployed or worked 
in low-paid, informal-sector occupations. They worked as fishermen, 
drivers, farmers or labourers. Most of the illegal migrants were the eldest 
child of their family, who took on the responsibility of supporting the family 
including younger siblings who are still schooling. The majority of them do 
not own any property, and others only owned their house. Therefore, the 
migrants generally come from very poor families. 
The Sri Lankan community in Australia plays a significant role in 
the migration of Sri Lankans to Australia—both documented and 
undocumented. This role involves the supply of information, both 
detailed and general, in terms of the economic and social opportunities in 
Australia. The community also helps to fund migration, and in some cases 
community members act as sponsors. 
There appears to be some mismatch between the fact that most of the 
IMAs detected either in Sri Lanka or Australia tend to have middle to low 
education and low status occupations while the Sri Lankan population in 
Australia tends to have higher levels of education and occupational status. 
The role of family in Australia and in other countries in influencing the 
decision to migrate was evident in the comments from a repatriated 
respondent. A 27-year-old Tamil man from Trincomalee explained to 
us that:
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I am still unemployed because I have studied up to GCE (O. L.) but 
was not successful. My family still supports me because my brother is in 
England and the sister live in Canada. I can communicate in English to 
some extent. I also have some relatives living in Australia. I am very much 
frustrated because only I have this low standard of living in Sri Lanka. 
For this reasons I decided to migrate to Australia by boat because one of 
my friends who went to Australia by boat suggested me that it saves time 
and money. Although the bad memories of war are over, there are many 
jobless youth so I was expecting better opportunities in Australia.
The intending IMAs that were intercepted by the Anti-Human 
Smuggling Unit of Sri Lanka’s Criminal Investigation Department 
were overwhelmingly young, and the majority came from the Northern 
and Eastern regions, so they are Tamils. They have a strong network in 
Australia because of the relatives and friends who live there and receive 
encouragement to travel to Australia by illegal means to avoid the 
immigration screening. 
The study of IMAs who have been successful in gaining protection 
(McAuliffe, 2013) showed in the case of Sri Lankans that more than 
15 per cent had relatives, more than 10 per cent had friends, friends of 
relatives or friends of friends, and a little less than 5 per cent had fellow 
ethnic members in Australia prior to their departure.
Regional disparities in development in Sri Lanka have led people to 
migrate locally or internationally looking for better income opportunities. 
The government is now making a significant attempt to develop war-torn 
Northern and Eastern districts. It is important to stress that Sri Lankan 
people have become very mobile locally as well as internationally. The 
major reason for such movement is to find better employment, whether 
locally or overseas. Moreover, illegal migration to overseas countries to 
look for employment opportunities is not a new phenomenon. Sri Lanka 
already had a network of agents able to organise this illegal movement. 
In  addition, we have seen a mass flow of refugees to India, by boat, 
during the war years. Therefore, ‘boat’ migration to overseas destinations 
involving risks is not a recent phenomenon for the low socioeconomic 
portion of the Sri Lankan community, irrespective of their ethnicity. 
Moreover, the idea that migration—especially international migration—
is the key to prosperity has become a norm in Sri Lanka.
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Conclusion
Sri Lanka has become, in many ways, a major emigrant society over recent 
decades. There are a number of elements to this. First, the country has 
a substantial diaspora. In 2013 the United Nations indicated there were 
1,245,187 Sri Lankan–born persons living in other countries, equivalent 
to 5.9 per cent of the Sri Lankan resident population. Second, remittances 
now account for 10.1 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2014). Third, a 
strong local culture of migration has developed, whereby internal and 
international migration is seen as a normal way for Sri Lankans to seek to 
improve their economic situation or respond to crisis.
Sri Lanka has initiated several livelihood development programs under 
its policy known as Mahinda Chinthanaya.5 But these programs need 
to be accelerated and better accommodate the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged communities, especially in the northern and eastern parts 
of the country, where the majority of the IMAs originated. This study has 
found that most of the IMAs are less-educated and low-skilled people from 
these areas. It is important to enhance their vocational skills according to 
the jobs demanded by the labour market in Sri Lanka without making 
a mismatch between education or skills with the available employment 
opportunities. In this regard, preparing a livelihood development plan 
specifically designed for the Northern Province—by identifying, with 
the participation of local communities, the livelihood requirements of 
individuals as well as communities—seems beneficial.
One of the few generalisations which has emerged from research on 
irregular and undocumented migration is that it often occurs because there 
are no regular or documented channels available for potential migrants, 
so that they are left with no alternative but to move irregularly. It follows 
that the most successful measures to prevent irregular migration involve 
the creation of legal channels that make irregular migration unnecessary. 
Usually, this is considered in terms of creating those channels along 
5  Mahinda Chinthanaya, which is the Sri Lankan Government’s policy agenda, strongly 
emphasises that public spending should be pro-poor, pro-growth and pro-regional. In this context, 
rural–urban imbalances in access to transport, electricity, quality drinking water, education and 
health are being attended with more resources being allocated to supplement regular programs 
through regionally focused development initiatives: Uthuru Wasanthaya, Negenahira Navodaya, 
Rajarata Navodaya, Wayamba Pubuduwa, Pubudamu Wellassa, Kandurata Udanaya, Sabaragamu 
Arunalokaya and Ran Aruna. Furthermore, public investment is expected to promote growth and 
value-creation opportunities. In addition, spending on social security will be encouraged through 
community participation.
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the same corridors of what is currently irregular migration. However, 
a somewhat different initiative is suggested here, noting that the major 
areas of origin of IMAs who have attempted to move to Australia have 
a number of key characteristics:
• Low levels of education and skill, so that few people are eligible for 
skilled migration, permanent or temporary, to OECD nations.
• No readily available channels for contract labour migration to the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, because of a lack of agents and an 
insecure situation which has prevented recruiters and other parts of 
the migration industry to operate in those parts of the country.
Accordingly, it is suggested that steps be taken by the Sri Lankan 
Government to create legal alternatives to IMA migration to Australia 
by setting up the full infrastructure to recruit, process etc. international 
labour migrants in the region for the Middle East and Southeast Asia. 
This would also involve providing training facilitators for local people, to 
fit the needs of employers in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
A major policy implication of this report is that, rather than try to prevent 
migration from the ‘hot spots’ from which IMAs have left, we seek to 
facilitate legal migration through regular channels to the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia. This builds on the considerable infrastructure and 
experience that already exists in other parts of Sri Lanka. It builds on the 
culture of migration in the area, but channels it into other more secure 
pathways to legal movement overseas.
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Applications for asylum in the 
developed world: Modelling 
asylum claims by origin and 
destination
Tim Hatton and Joseph Moloney
Introduction
Every year, hundreds of thousands of people apply for asylum, seeking 
sanctuary in the stable, safe and secure countries of the developed world. 
Most of them come from poor and middle-income countries in the grip of 
civil wars or international conflicts, where minorities are persecuted, or in 
which human rights abuses are commonplace. Those who manage to reach 
developed countries are a small minority of all who flee across national 
borders or who seek refuge elsewhere within their own country. Over 
the last 30 years, the number of asylum applications lodged in developed 
countries has soared and this has led to intense political controversy and 
what might be described as a policy backlash. Against this background, 
there has been examination of the motivations of asylum seekers and the 
effects of economic incentives and asylum policies on application rates. 
In Australia, as elsewhere, asylum policy has been widely debated. 
Yet there is little quantitative analysis that places the Australian experience 
in a comparative context. This chapter provides an econometric analysis 
of the ebb and flow of asylum applications to Australia together with 
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18 other developed countries. Besides helping to identify the common 
factors that drive the application rates, this approach allows us to assess 
how and to what degree the Australian experience differs from that of 
other countries. One of the key issues is the deterrent effects of asylum 
policies, in particular the policy differences between countries. In order 
to assess these effects, we derive a quantitative index representing diverse 
elements of asylum policy and use this in our empirical analysis. 
The approach followed here draws heavily on previous analysis by 
Hatton (2009, 2011) in terms of methodology and research design. 
It also draws on a wider literature on the determinants of international 
migration and a smaller literature that focuses specifically on modelling 
asylum applications. In the next section, we outline the trends in asylum 
applications to Australia in comparison with other developed countries. 
This is followed by a short survey of quantitative analysis of refugee 
movements and asylum applications. We then present a brief outline of 
the asylum policies in Australia and elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Our 
index of asylum policies in 19 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries is then explained, before presenting 
fixed effects regression estimates of annual data on asylum applications 
by origin and destination. We then estimate the effects of asylum policies 
and explore differences between Australia and the other 18 destinations. 
Finally, we evaluate the effects of a few key variables and conclude with 
a brief discussion. 
Comparative trends in asylum applications
The total number of asylum claims has fluctuated over the last two 
decades. Figure 9.1 shows total annual applications to what the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines as 
‘industrialized countries’. These are applications by asylum seekers who 
arrived spontaneously. They almost always applied for asylum within the 
destination country or at its border, having arrived by any mode of arrival 
(boat, air or by land). The total number of applications made in these 
countries peaked at over 850,000 in 1992; after some decline it reached 
a second peak of more than 600,000 between 2000 and 2002. Total 
applications declined to their lowest point of 300,000 in 2006 before 
rising again to 600,000 in 2013. 
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Figure 9.1: Asylum applications to 38 countries by region of asylum, 
1989–2013
Sources: 1989–2000 from uNHCr, Statistical yearbook (2001), Table C1; 2001–13 from 
uNHCr, Asylum levels and trends in industrialized countries (2005; 2009; 2013), Table 1.
Note: The eu-15 is the pre-2004 membership: Austria, belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 






































































Figure 9.2: Asylum applications to Australia and 37 industrialised 
countries (1997 = 100)
Sources: As Figure 9 .1 . 
Figure 9.1 also shows that the overwhelming majority claimed asylum 
in Europe. More than half of all applications in Europe were lodged in 
Germany (28 per cent), the UK (12 per cent) and France (11 per cent). It is 
difficult to see in Figure 9.1 how fluctuations in applications to Oceania 
compare with Europe and North America. Over the whole period the 
number of spontaneous applications (or onshore applications) in Australia 
amounted to 2 per cent of the 38-country total. Figure 9.2 displays an 
index of asylum applications to Australia, where 1997=100, comparing 
this with the total for the other 37 countries. Over much of the period, 
fluctuations in asylum applications to Australia are largely mirrored by 
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the number of applications received elsewhere. However, applications to 
Australia gradually increased after 1992, while the total for the 37 other 
countries fell. And after 2001, Australian applications fell faster to the 
middle of the decade and then increased more steeply to 2013.
Table 9.1: Asylum applications to Australia and 18 other destination 
countries (total), 2004–12
Applications to Australia, 2004–12 Applications to 18 other countries, 2004–12
Top 40 origin countries Top 40 origin countries
China 18,157 Nigeria 524 Serbia 277,554 Algeria 47,590
Afghanistan 8,046 Thailand 455 russia 222,424 India 47,056
India 6,539 P N Guinea 448 Iraq 193,980 Colombia 41,550
Sri Lanka 6,263 Libya 442 China 183,977 C. d’Ivoire 33,973
Iran 5,701 Syria 409 Afghanistan 159,695 Zimbabwe 32,247
Pakistan 4,664 Palestinian 402 Somalia 126,462 Ethiopia 31,389
Iraq 3,395 Serbia 392 Turkey 112,404 bosnia 30,415
Malaysia 2,940 Ethiopia 384 Nigeria 108,295 El Salvador 30,193
Indonesia 2,867 Colombia 376 Iran 101,003 Sudan 29,491
Fiji 2,574 Tonga 350 Sri Lanka 89,311 Azerbaijan 28,666
Egypt 2,185 Jordan 325 Pakistan 87,964 Albania 28,557
bangladesh 2,014 Mongolia 322 D .r . Congo 85,277 Cameroon 26,245
Lebanon 1,906 Kenya 305 Eritrea 84,487 Mauritania 24,314
Zimbabwe 1,745 Albania 252 Mexico 74,434 Guatemala 22,677
Nepal 1,637 russia 240 Haiti 72,917 Vietnam 22,469
Korea 1,231 El Salvador 236 Armenia 61,122 Mongolia 21,903
Philippines 894 Ghana 235 Syria 60,174 Moldova 21,776
Turkey 873 S . Africa 198 Georgia 58,898 Ukraine 20,656
Vietnam 816 Israel 174 bangladesh 53,465 Congo 20,152
Myanmar 684 Ukraine 152 Guinea 48,914 Angola 20,104
% of total 86 .3 % of total 7 .6 % of total 66 .7 % of total 17 .1
Source: uNHCr (2014). Has since been replaced online by uNHCr population statistics, 
retrieved from popstats .unhcr .org/en/asylum_seekers .
Notes: Serbia includes Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia; Sudan includes South Sudan. 
Stateless and unknown citizenships are included in total but not listed. 
Part of the difference in the trends may be due to asylum policies and 
economic performance in Australia as compared with other destinations. 
But it may also be due to differences in the origin-country composition due 
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to Australia’s unique location. To examine the origin-country composition 
of applications, we focus on 19 major destination countries, which are also 
those used for the econometric analysis presented below.1 Table 9.1 shows 
the origin-country composition of total applications from 2004 to 2012 
for Australia and for the aggregate of 18 other destination countries. Over 
this period, total applications to Australia numbered 87,000, as compared 
with 3.4 million for the other 18 destination countries. Five of the top 10 
countries of origin are the same for Australia as for the 18-country total, 
and this is likely to account for some of the similarity in the year-to-year 
movements. Not surprisingly, origin countries in the Asia–Pacific region 
are much more prominent for applications to Australia than for the other 
countries. 
Analysing refugee and asylum seeker 
movements
A number of studies have used econometric analysis to explain the 
number of refugees emanating from a wide range of origin countries, 
focusing on the origin-country causes of displacement. In a pioneering 
paper, Schmeidl (1997) analysed the stock of refugees from over 100 
countries during the 1970s. She found that the most significant variables 
were those representing armed conflict, especially genocide and politicide. 
These variables overshadowed others such as political rights, civil liberties 
and ethnic tensions. Intervening factors (those that facilitate or impede 
flight) appeared less important than has sometimes been suggested. 
Analysing changes over time in the stock of refugees, Davenport, Moore, 
and Poe (2003) and Moore and Shellman (2004) largely confirmed these 
findings. Subsequent research has elaborated on these themes. Moore and 
Shellman (2007) focus on the direction of refugee flights, finding that 
refugees move to places that are free of conflict, where incomes are higher 
and where the costs of transit are lower. Melander and Öberg (2006) 
analyse the persistence in displacements, arguing that the flows tend to 
decrease when those most able or willing to move have left. They also 
found that outflows are reduced by regime transition in the origin country 
but increased by regime collapse.
1  These are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
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A major theme emerging from these studies is that refugee flights can be 
understood as depending on the balance between the costs and benefits of 
leaving as compared with those of staying. This also helps to explain the 
distinction between cross-border flight and internal displacement. Moore 
and Shellman (2006) find that civil war, dissident terror and government 
violence increases the number of refugees relative to the number of 
internally displaced. This is also consistent with the finding that the wider 
the spread of violence, the more likely it will generate refugees (Melander 
& Öberg, 2007). A second generation of studies analyses displacement 
at the local level. Adhikari (2012) finds that migration from districts in 
Nepal depends positively on violence and opportunity but negatively on 
the solidarity of local networks. Studies of Columbia also highlight the 
individual- and community-level complexities in the choice of whether 
to leave and where to go (Engel & Ibáñez, 2007; Steele, 2009). Analysing 
individual-level data for four other Latin American countries, Alvarado 
and Massey (2010) find that emigration was less likely for those with 
higher wealth and education but more likely for those with family in 
the US. These studies serve as a reminder that (a) conditions in origin 
countries are heterogeneous and may not be well captured by country-
wide aggregates, and (b) that some variables may influence both the costs 
and the benefits of flight. 
Several studies have analysed panel data on asylum applications to countries 
in the developed world. Neumayer (2004) took as the dependent variable 
the shares for each destination of applicants from each origin country 
over the years 1982–99. This method nets out common origin-country 
effects. He found significant positive effects for the level and growth 
rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the destination, but 
a negative influence for the presence of right-wing populist governments. 
Bilateral links were also found to be highly significant, in the form either 
of the stock of migrants from the origin country, or deeper drivers such as 
colonial links, common language and distance. The only policy variable 
used was the overall recognition rate for the destination. The effect was 
positive, as expected, but small. Using a similar estimating framework, 
Thielemann (2006) analysed asylum applications to 20 destination 
countries for 1985–99. He found that a  country’s unemployment rate 
negatively influenced its share of asylum applications, while its foreign-
born population had a positive effect. He also used an index of policy, made 
up of five components, which overall had a negative effect. Examining the 
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individual components of policy, he found that the impact of refugee 
integration policies was weak compared with the effects of variables 
representing refugee status-determination procedures.2 
Using panel data for 14 destinations for the years 1981–99 and 
disaggregating applications by origin continent, Hatton (2004) found 
that relative income, destination unemployment and the cumulative stock 
of applications were important influences. A composite index of asylum 
policy toughness based on 11 components gave a significant negative 
coefficient. This implies that the tightening of policy that occurred over 
the two decades to 1999 reduced asylum claims in the EU by about 
150,000. Hatton (2009) examined the effects of policy on asylum flows 
from 56 origin countries to 19 destination countries from 1997 to 2009. 
The overall effect of the round of policy tightening between 2001 and 
2006 was to reduce annual asylum applications to these 19 countries by 
108,000, or about one third of the total decrease. 
Focusing on Australia, Hatton and Lim (2005) made an econometric 
assessment of asylum applications to Australia together with six other 
countries: New Zealand, Canada, the US, the UK, France and Germany. 
They found that the destination country’s unemployment rate had no 
significant effect. The change in Australian asylum policies in 2001 had 
a larger negative effect than was found for major policy packages in other 
countries, such as the UK in 2003 and Germany in 2002. Hatton and 
Lim argued that this was partly because the policy package itself was 
tougher both in terms of the scope of the changes and their enforcement. 
It was also partly due to the publicity that was generated, both nationally 
and internationally, by the Tampa incident. This may have produced 
a  reputation effect that was not reversed by the subsequent easing of 
policy until the change of government in 2008 (Crock & Ghezelbash, 
2010; Hatton, 2011, Ch. 9).
Other studies have focused on individual countries and on specific policies. 
Controlling for a variety of origin-country variables, Rotte, Vogler, and 
Zimmermann (1997) found that German policy reform of 1987 and the 
revision of the Basic Law in 1993 both had large negative effects (see also 
Vogler & Rotte, 2000). For Switzerland, Holzer, Schneider, and Widmer 
(2000a, 2000b) also found that policy reform in 1990 had a significant 
negative effect on applications.
2  See also Thielemann (2004) and Neumayer (2005). 
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While the studies of European countries have focused on changes in 
the criteria for asylum and the refugee status determination procedures, 
another line of enquiry examines the effects of border controls on 
irregular migration, particularly along the US border with Mexico. 
Such studies have typically found that greater effort and expenditure on 
border control had discernible but fairly modest effects on the number of 
apprehensions and by inference the number of crossings (see for example 
Hanson & Spilimbergo, 1999; Orrenius, 2006; Cornelius & Salehyan, 
2007; Bohn & Pugatch, 2013). Other studies have assessed the impact 
of visa policies. Cziaka and Hobolth (2014) found that imposing visa 
requirements reduced asylum applications from an origin to a destination 
by around half—a similar effect to that found by Neumayer (2010) for 
all migration. Overall, these studies suggest that policy effects are likely to 
differ both across countries and between types of policy. 
Asylum policy in Australia and other 
developed countries
Asylum policy in Australia is governed internationally by the 1951 
Refugee Convention and in domestic legislation by the Migration Act 
1958 and subsequent acts and amendments. Australia has long operated 
a  refugee settlement program, under which refugees are resettled from 
refugee populations in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Since 1991, the 
quota for the Humanitarian Programme has fluctuated between 12,000 
and 20,000 per annum. Spontaneous asylum seekers arriving by sea and 
by air (the onshore program) were few in number until the 1980s. The 
policy of mandatory detention for unauthorised boat arrivals (included 
in the Migration Act 1958) was increasingly enforced and extended to 
all unlawful arrivals in the Migration Reform Act 1992. From 1996–97 
onwards, onshore grants of asylum were included in the overall target, 
so that they would effectively reduce the number accepted through the 
offshore program. A surge of arrivals led to the creation in 1999 of three-
year temporary protection visas (TPVs), with much-reduced rights for 
unauthorised arrivals who qualified for protection.3 The introduction 
3  TPVs provided the right to work and to certain benefits, including Medicare, but they did 
not confer the right to re-enter Australia once having left, or the right to family reunification. TPV 
holders were eligible to apply for permanent protection after 30 months, a status that could only be 
granted if the need for protection was ongoing.
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of TPVs was followed by legislation that imposed sanctions on people 
smugglers and provided for the boarding, search and detention of ships 
suspected of carrying unauthorised asylum seekers.4
Dramatic events followed in September 2001 with the arrival off 
Christmas Island of a Norwegian freighter the MV Tampa, which had 
taken on board 433 asylum seekers when their vessel the KM Palapa 1 
had got into distress in the open seas. The Tampa was initially refused 
permission to land the asylum seekers, and there followed a week-
long standoff until an agreement was reached by which a third of the 
passengers were taken to New Zealand and the remainder to Nauru, the 
latter in exchange for financial support from the Australian Government. 
A month later, the Australian Government passed six new bills into law. 
The first two involved the excision of Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef 
and some other small islands from Australian territory for the purposes 
of establishing claims to asylum in Australia, and they provided for 
such arrivals to be processed offshore in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. 
Applicants who had spent at least seven days in a ‘safe’ country while in 
transit were denied eligibility for a permanent protection visa. Another act 
significantly narrowed the definition of a refugee used in the procedure 
for determining status.5 Further measures included harsher penalties for 
people smuggling offences and limitation of the grounds for judicial 
review of status determination decisions. 
2001 witnessed a severe tightening of asylum policy, although some of the 
elements were later relaxed, including softening of TPV policy in 2004, 
and in 2005, time limits were introduced on the processing of asylum 
claims. In 2007, offshore processing on Nauru and Manus Island was 
terminated by the incoming government. The detention regime was 
partially and gradually relaxed, and from 2009, it was used only as a last 
resort. A further step came in 2008 with the abolition of TPVs so that all 
those granted protection received permanent visas. Taken together, these 
measures represent a substantial reversal of the key elements of the 2001 
policy framework.6 
4  Summaries of policy development and timelines are provided by York (2003), Karlsen, Phillips, 
and Koleth (2010) and Phillips and Spinks (2013). 
5  In particular by restricting the interpretation of ‘persecution’ and of ‘particular social groups’ 
membership of which could give rise to a claim for protection. 
6  Asylum seekers arriving in Christmas Island or other excised places were only permitted to enter 
the status determination procedure at the discretion of the Minister and they faced restricted rights of 
review or appeal. 
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Unauthorised boat arrivals resumed in 2009 and rose steeply thereafter. 
In 2010, processing was suspended for boat arrivals from Afghanistan and 
Sri Lanka, origin countries for a majority of arrivals at Christmas Island. 
In August 2011, a plan to transfer asylum seekers to Malaysia for processing 
was rejected by the High Court. In late 2011, some of the unauthorised 
arrivals were issued with bridging visas and released into community centres. 
In response to the mounting numbers, the government appointed an Expert 
Panel on Asylum Seekers, which reported in August 2012. It recommended 
offshore processing centres on Nauru and Manus Island be reopened. The 
new government of 2013 embarked on a policy to toughen border controls 
and to ‘push back the boats’, to reintroduce TPVs along the lines of the 
1999 model, and to introduce a fast track status determination procedure. 
With this, the policy stance largely reverted to that of 2001.7 
Since the late 1990s, asylum policies in Europe and North America have 
been influenced by two developments. The first relates to the broader issue 
of the securitisation of migration, following the 9/11 attacks. The USA 
PATRIOT Act, for example, dramatically increased the number of border 
control agents. An act of May 2002 further strengthened border controls 
by establishing an integrated database system for arrivals and departures 
linked to fingerprinting and biometric monitoring. Canada also tightened 
its border security and an act of 2001 introduced reforms that included 
detention of asylum seekers without documents. 
The second development related to asylum policies in the EU, stemming 
from the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective 1999), which shifted asylum 
policies from the level of intergovernmental cooperation to that of 
community integration.8 It marked the beginning of the establishment 
by stages of a common European asylum system (CEAS). The so-called 
Dublin II Regulation embodied a new mechanism for determining the 
state responsible for an asylum claim and providing for transfers. The 
Qualification Directive established a common set of criteria to be used in 
the refugee status determination procedure, and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive covered issues such as the treatment of manifestly unfounded 
claims, rights to interviews, to legal assistance and to appeals as well as 
common rules for granting subsidiary protection. 
7  In some respects, such as offshore processing, recent policies go further than 2001. For example, 
those on Nauru and Manus Island have no right to resettlement in Australia, even if they are 
recognised as refugees (see Warbrooke, 2014). On the other hand, families with children who would 
otherwise be in detention in Australia are now released on bridging visas. 
8  Further details on policy developments in Europe are provided in Hatton (2011, Ch. 6, 2012). 
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While the first stage of the CEAS fell far short of complete harmonisation, 
it did create some convergence in policy and practice (Thielemann 
& El-Enany, 2009). The second stage of the CEAS involved deeper 
cooperation in several areas, in particular the establishment in 2003 of 
the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) fingerprint database of asylum 
applicants, and in 2005 of the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Coordination at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union (Frontex), to strengthen the EU’s external border. 
These initiatives were carried forward under the third stage of the CEAS 
from 2009, which also saw, among other things, the establishment of 
the European Asylum Support Office to support and promote further 
harmonisation and policy integration. 
Despite EU harmonisation, the trends in policy differed widely among 
individual EU countries. One reason was that most EU regulations set 
minimum standards that were, initially at least, not binding on most 
countries. This left room for a considerable tightening of policy from the 
early 2000s at the national level. The Netherlands, for example, introduced 
a range of new border controls in 1998 and an act of 2001 restricted the 
scope of subsidiary protection and limited the right to appeal. A number 
of EU countries further tightened the processing of manifestly unfounded 
claims. But not all policy changes were restrictive. For example, a number 
of countries introduced proactive integration policies, and some, such 
as Finland in 2006 and Germany in 2007, expanded eligibility for 
employment. 
A quantitative index of asylum policies
A number of attempts have been made to represent asylum policy in 
one or more quantitative indicators or in the form of a composite index 
(for  a review, see Czaika & de Haas, 2013). Here, we apply a revised 
and updated version of the policy index used previously by Hatton 
(2009, 2011). The index includes 15 indicators of asylum policy, divided 
into three groups. The first group relates to policies that limit access to the 
destination country’s asylum procedures, mainly by preventing potential 
asylum seekers from reaching the territory. The second relates to the status 
determination procedure and is intended to capture the likelihood that an 
applicant gains some form of residency status. The third relates to welfare 
conditions during and immediately after processing. 
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Access policies Processing polices Welfare policies
Visa requirements Definition of a refugee Permission to work
Border control/security Humanitarian category Access to welfare 
benefits
Trafficking regulations Manifestly unfounded 
claims
Detention policy
Carrier sanctions Expedited procedures Deportation policy
Application outside 
country
Scope for appeals Family reunification
The idea is to capture changes in a country’s laws, regulations or practice 
under each of the 15 categories. These are intended to reflect ‘major’ 
changes in policy, i.e. those that amount to significant changes in the 
conditions facing a substantial share of asylum seekers. In each of the 
15 categories, the index increases by one unit when policy becomes 
significantly tougher, i.e. less advantageous to asylum seekers. If policy 
becomes significantly more favourable towards asylum seekers, then the 
index decreases by one unit. As far as can be ascertained, the change is 
dated as the quarter that it took effect rather than when it was announced 
or when the legislation was first passed. Inevitably, the policy index 
developed here is a crude representation of policy developments in 
Australia and overseas. It takes no account of the differences in the scope 
and restrictiveness of specific Australian policies in comparison with those 
of other countries and neither does it account for differences in the way 




















Figure 9.3: Composite policy index, Australia and 18-country average
Source: Authors’ calculations, see text. 
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This 15-component quarterly index starts at zero for each component in 
the first quarter of 1997 and runs to the last quarter of 2012. Figure 9.3 
shows the composite index for Australia compared with the unweighted 
average for the 18 other countries in the dataset. In keeping with the 
qualitative account of policy, it shows the steep increase in policy 
toughness from 1999 to 2001 followed by a partial reversal in 2008–09. 
The average index for 18 countries shows a fairly steep increase between 
2000 and 2006, followed by a levelling off. However, this is an average 
of very diverse trajectories across different countries. Over the period as 
a whole there was a dramatic tightening of policy in the UK and Denmark 
and to a lesser extent Norway, Ireland, Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
By contrast, policy eased in Sweden and the Czech Republic and was 
little changed in Poland, Spain, Canada and Germany (see Hatton & 
Moloney, 2015).
Econometric analysis of asylum applications 
by origin and destination
We create an annual dataset of asylum applications from 48 origin countries 
to the 19 OECD destinations. The origin countries are those that feature 
in the top 40 of asylum applications to the 18 destination countries over 
the period 2004–12, as listed in Table 9.1 (right-hand panel). In addition, 
we include any others that appear in the top 20 origin countries for 
applications to Australia (left-hand column of Table 9.1) over the same 
period (excluding Myanmar which we are forced to drop for lack of key 
explanatory variables). The data on the number of first instance asylum 
applications from each origin to each destination are taken from the 
UNHCR’s online database. These are supplemented from the UNHCR’s 
annual report, Asylum levels and trends in industrialized countries, in order 
to extend the series back to 1997. The origin and destination countries 
included in the analysis are listed in Hatton and Moloney (2015). The 
particular origin–destination dyads that are included for analysis are those 
that involve at least 300 applications over the 16 years included in our 
analysis, 1997–2012. This avoids cases in which there are a large number 
of dyad-years where the number of applications is zero. This leaves us 
with 626 origin–destination country pairs out of a possible 48×19=912. 
We also lose some observations in cases where we are unable to obtain the 
data for the full period, notably for the years 1997–99, so that the average 
number of observations per dyad is 15.4.
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Apart from the policy index, the other explanatory variables have been 
widely used in other studies. To capture terror and human rights abuses 
in origin countries we use the political terror scale, an index ranging 
from 1 (no terror) to 5 (high terror). We also use the indexes provided by 
Freedom House, one for civil liberties and one for political rights. These 
are on a scale of 1 (complete freedom) to 7 (freedom highly restricted). 
We also include a variable to capture the wars (usually civil wars) that are 
a prominent feature of many origin countries. Here we use the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) index of battle deaths (best estimate), in 
thousands. For both origin and destination countries, we capture overall 
living standards with real GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables. 
The employment situation in destination countries is represented by the 
OECD harmonised unemployment rate. 
We include a measure of the stock of immigrants from each origin country 
living at each destination. This is the bilateral migrant stock in 2000–01, 
and it includes only adults aged 25 and over. This is aimed at capturing 
the diaspora network effect that is well known in the migration literature. 
In order to reflect previously established communities, we use observations 
from near the beginning of the period of analysis. While this captures the 
assistance and encouragement of relatives, often working though family 
reunification systems and deepening migration corridors, it also reflects 
deeper fundamentals such as colonial and historic links, and language 
and cultural affinities. Finally, we also include the distance between the 
national capitals of each origin and destination pair. The sources of all the 
variables are listed in Hatton and Moloney (2015).
Table 9.2 shows the results of regressions with fixed effects by origin 
country. The dependent variable is the log of the number of applications 
from an origin to a destination (plus one to account for zeros). The first 
column of Table 9.2 includes a dummy variable for each year but no 
destination country dummies. Not surprisingly, the diaspora effect is 
highly significant. Given that origin-country fixed effects are included, 
this reflects differences in the migrant stock across destinations. As both 
the dependent variable and the migrant stock are in logs, the coefficient 
implies that a 10 per cent increase in the stock would increase the flow 
of asylum applications by 2.7 per cent. The effect of log distance between 
country capitals is negative and significant, even in the presence of the 
migrant stock. The result is as would be expected if the cost and difficulty 
of reaching a destination increases with distance, and it may also reflect 
the existence of alternatives nearer to the origin country. Every 10 per cent 
increase in distance reduces applications by more than 5 per cent.
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Table 9.2: Asylum applications, origin and destination effects, 1997–2012 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from origin to destination)
(1) (2) (3) (4)














































Log migrant stock in 2000–01 















































Destination dummies No yes No No
year dummies yes yes yes yes
r2 within 0 .28 0 .40 0 .11 0 .12
No. of obs. 9,610 9,610 9,610 9,610
Note: ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses; significance at 5 and 10 per cent denoted by ** and 
* respectively. Constant terms and coefficients on destination dummies and year dummies 
are not reported .
The coefficients on the migrant stock and distance change very little 
when destination dummies are added in column (2). But one effect of 
this is to change the coefficient on log destination GDP from negative to 
positive, although it remains insignificant. The destination dummies are 
not shown but it is worth noting that, conditional on the other variables, 
applications to Australia are about half the average for the other 18 
countries. The third column includes origin-by-destination fixed effects, 
and so the migrant stock and distance, which take only one value for 
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each dyad, drop out. Nevertheless, there is very little change in the other 
coefficients between columns (1) and (3). Not surprisingly, a large share 
of these dyad-specific effects is captured in columns (1) and (2) by the 
migrant stock and distance, and this accounts for the lower R-squared 
in column (3). 
One of the most important origin-country effects is the political terror 
scale, where an increase of one point on the five-point scale increases asylum 
applications by about 20 per cent. Of the two Freedom House indexes, 
only that for civil liberties is significant, in contrast to some previous 
findings. An increase of one point on the scale (a deterioration in civil 
liberties) increases asylum applications by nearly 30 per cent. The lack of 
significance of political rights may reflect the fact that this can potentially 
cut in both directions: political repression may increase the incentive to 
leave but at the same time reduce the ability to do so. War deaths provide 
little additional explanatory power, which may seem surprising in light 
of large numbers fleeing from civil wars. But these effects are accounted 
for by the variables that represent human rights abuses and lack of civil 
liberties. Interestingly, the log of origin-country GDP per capita gives 
a significant negative coefficient, indicating that the richer (or  the less 
poor) the country, the lower are asylum applications even though poverty 
may also constrain the ability to migrate. The coefficient implies that 
a 10 per cent increase in origin-country GDP per capita reduces asylum 
applications by around 5 per cent.
Although the effect of destination GDP per capita is weak, the 
destination unemployment rate has a negative effect, as expected. 
As Australia avoided  the recession that began with the global financial 
crisis (GFC), this could account for the relative rise in applications from 
2008. An  increase in the unemployment rate in a destination country 
from, say, 5  to 10 per  cent would reduce asylum applications to that 
country by 12.5 per cent. Although the unemployment rate rose more 
in other countries than in Australia from 2008 to 2010, this divergence 
in unemployment rates would account for at most a 5 per cent relative 
increase in asylum applications to Australia.
It is possible that the effects of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ on the number of 
applications would be attenuated by the cost and difficulty of reaching 
a destination. One way to test this is to interact some of the key variables 
with the log of distance. For example, an eruption of human rights abuses 
could induce refugees to seek the nearest destination. Column (4) in 
Table 9.2 adds an interaction between the log of distance and the political 
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terror scale. The coefficient is not negative or significant as the hypothesis 
would suggest, although the main effect is weakened. A similar argument 
might be made for destination country effects: the more remote from the 
origin country the weaker the ‘pull’ effects would be. But although the 
interaction between distance and the unemployment rate at destination 
country is positive, as expected, it is small and insignificant. Other 
interactions, not reported here, produced similarly insignificant results. 
The effects of policy
We add to the basic model the policy indexes discussed earlier. It should be 
recalled that there is no dyadic dimension to this: for a given destination, 
our index of policy is the same towards applicants from all origin 
countries. The first column of Table 9.3 shows that the asylum policy 
index has a  strong negative effect. This is consistent with the results of 
other studies, which typically found that tougher policies have deterrent 
effects on the flow of applications that are significantly negative but often 
modest in magnitude. The coefficient implies that a one-point increase 
in the overall index reduces asylum applications by around 5 per  cent. 
Column (2) of Table 9.3 includes each of the three components of the 
index separately. Two of the three have strong negative effects. These 
are policies on access to territory and more restrictive processing of 
applications. An increase of one point on one of these indices reduces 
asylum claims by around 10 per cent. By contrast, the index for ‘welfare’, 
which is a rather heterogeneous collection of reception conditions and 
rights, seems to have no negative effect and perhaps a marginally positive 
effect. In this respect, the results are consistent those reported previously 
in Hatton (2009). 
A widely used measure of the stance of asylum policy is the recognition 
rate. The measure used here is the share of all first instance claims that 
resulted in a positive outcome, either full convention status or acceptance 
on humanitarian grounds. This is the overall rate for the destination 
country, so it is not a dyadic variable. One of the pitfalls of using the 
recognition rate is that it is an outcome variable: it depends not only on 
policy but also on the merits of the applications considered. In particular, 
tougher processing rules may deter those with weaker claims, so that the 
coefficient on the recognition rate could go either way. In order to avoid 
possible endogeneity, column (3) of Table 9.3 includes the recognition 
rate lagged one year. As this represents the refugee status determination 
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procedure, the policy index for processing is omitted. The coefficient is 
only significant at the 10 per cent level and it suggests a modest effect 
on applications—an increase of 10 percentage points in the recognition 
rate raises applications by 1.4 per cent. When the processing index is also 
included, the latter remains strongly significant, suggesting that the index 
is a better representation of policy than the recognition rate.
Table 9.3: Asylum applications and policy effects, 1997–2012 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from origin to destination)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
































































Asylum policy index overall –0 .046**
(4.03)






Policy on processing –0 .100**
(6.45)






















year dummies yes yes yes yes
r2 within 0 .12 0 .13 0 .12 0 .15
No. of obs. 9,610 9,610 9,610 5,662
Note: ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses; significance at 5 and 10 per cent denoted by ** and 
* respectively. Constant terms and coefficients on year dummies are not reported. 
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One important issue raised in the literature is the effect of visa 
requirements, as noted above. The requirement for a visitor visa can be 
used as a screening device to reduce the number of claims from those 
entering the destination country from origin countries that are likely 
to produce asylum applications. The data on visa policy is limited, 
but Hobolth provides a dataset on visa requirements from each origin 
country to each destination. Unfortunately, the dataset starts only in 
2001 (later for some destinations), and it omits Australia, Canada and 
Ireland. This reduces the number of available observations by more than 
40  per  cent. But an even greater limitation is that for 98 per cent of 
available observations, a visa is required and there are very few within-
dyad changes (only 36). The result of adding the dummy variable for visa 
required is shown in column (4) of Table 9.3, and it gives a negative but 
insignificant coefficient. The order of magnitude—a reduction of about 
20 per cent when a visa is required—is rather smaller than that obtained 
in other studies (Hatton, 2004; Czaika & Hobolth, 2013).
Of course, the policy effects in Table 9.3 are an average across all 
destination countries, where a one-point tightening in policy could mean 
different things. It is worth asking if the policy effects observed here 
adequately capture the effects of the sharp changes in Australian asylum 
policies. On one hand, the policy shifts in Australia were more dramatic 
than elsewhere, and might therefore be expected to have larger effects. 
But on the other hand, asylum seekers heading for Australia have fewer 
alternative destinations than those heading for Europe, and as a result the 
deterrent effect of policies for Australia would be weaker. 
In the first column of Table 9.4 we include two dummies for key periods 
in asylum policy, one for 2002 onwards and another for 2008 onwards. 
Not surprisingly, the 2002 dummy is large and negative. This is on top of 
the average policy effect, so the restrictive policies introduced in late 2001 
had larger effects than would have been expected based on the experience 
of other countries. The easing of policy from 2008 had the opposite 
effect, but its magnitude is not fully offsetting. It should be remembered, 
however, that our data stops in 2012, and so it does not include the surge 
of applications in 2013. It is worth noting, however, that these are large 
effects: a cut of around half in the numbers after 2001, and an increase of 
around a third from 2008. Column (2) of Table 9.4 shows that the results 
are similar when the three components of the policy index are entered 
separately, although the 2008 dummy is no longer significant. 
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Table 9.4: Asylum applications and policy effects, 1997–2012 
(Dependent variable: log asylum applications from origin to destination)
(1) (2) (3) (4)














































































































year dummies yes yes yes yes
r2 within 0 .12 0 .13 0 .13 0 .13
No. of obs. 9610 9610 9610 9610
Note: ‘z’ statistics are in parentheses; significance at 5 and 10 per cent denoted by ** and 
* respectively. Constant terms and coefficients on year dummies are not reported.
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Columns (3) and (4) investigate the issue of whether these shifts reflect 
stronger policy effects in Australia than in other destination countries. 
In column (3), the overall policy index is interacted with a dummy 
variable for Australia. The significant negative coefficient supports the 
idea that Australian policies had stronger effects than the average of other 
countries. Column (4) adds interactions for the two most important 
policy components, access and processing. Here, both interactions are 
negative, implying effects that are twice as large as the average for the other 
countries, but neither is significant, probably due to multicollinearity. 
Counterfactual analysis
It is worth briefly illustrating what the regression results imply for 
individual countries in the dataset. We first look at the effects of changes 
in terror and civil liberties on the number of applications from certain 
origin countries. The method is to predict the change in applications to 
all destination countries over a period that is accounted for by the political 
terror scale and the Freedom House index of civil liberties in a particular 
origin country. The coefficients used in the prediction are from column (2) 
of Table 9.4. The predicted percentage changes in applications from 2000 
to 2006 and from 2006 to 2012 are reported in Table 9.5. These countries 
are the top 20 origins of asylum applications to Australia (listed in the 
left-hand column of Table 9.1), with the addition of Syria and exception 
of Myanmar. However, the prediction is for the change in applications to 
all 19 destination countries, not just Australia. 
Table 9.5: Predicted change in asylum applications due to political terror 
and civil liberties (percentage)
Country 2000–06 2006–12 Country 2000–06 2006–12
China –9 .2 0 .6 Egypt 31 .2 –16 .8
Afghanistan 43 .4 10 .0 bangladesh 29 .5 –8 .1
India –7 .9 13 .2 Lebanon –24 .3 1 .2
Sri Lanka 12 .9 –17 .2 Zimbabwe 78 .2 –9 .1
Iran 12 .2 1 .0 Nepal 27 .3 –26 .6
Pakistan 12 .4 26 .2 Korea –8 .0 1 .4
Iraq –24 .8 –19 .2 Philippines 0 .2 0 .8
Malaysia –14 .4 3 .2 Turkey –43 .6 21 .0
Indonesia –39 .9 0 .6 Vietnam –18 .9 15 .5
Fiji –13 .3 2 .5 Syria –23 .9 112 .3
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on column (2) of Table 9.4. 
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Not surprisingly, the patterns are very different across origin countries. From 
2000 to 2006, the number of applications from Afghanistan is predicted to 
increase by 43.4 per cent, and those from Zimbabwe by 78.2 per cent, 
solely due to the rise in terror and the decrease in civil liberties. On the 
other hand, these two variables predict substantial decreases in applications 
from Indonesia and Turkey. Over the period 2006 to 2012, there are again 
some negative and some positive predictions, notably the dramatic increase 
in predicted applications from Syria. As the scale and timing of these events 
varies widely between origin countries, their effects on total applications 
to any given destination are to some degree offsetting, and the overall 
impact is muted. For applications to Australia from the origin countries 
in our database, the overall effects of changes in terror and civil liberties is 
to decrease asylum applications by 9.1 per cent from 2000 to 2006 and to 
increase them by 6.5 per cent from 2006 to 2012. 
The effects of asylum policies can be assessed by applying the same 
method to destination countries. The predictions in Table 9.6 are based on 
changes in policy on access and policy on the processing of asylum claims. 
For  Australia, prediction (1) is based on the two policy indexes only. 
Based on those coefficients, the tightening of policy in the early 2000s is 
predicted to have reduced asylum claims by 28.7 per cent between 2000 
and 2006, while the easing of policy at the end of the decade increased 
applications by an estimated 19.4 per cent. If, in addition, we include 
the effects of the dummy variables for 2002 onwards and 2008 onwards 
(prediction 2), the effects are greater than 50 per cent in both directions. 
Table 9.6: Predicted change in asylum applications due to policy 
on access and processing (percentage)
Country 2000–06 2006–12 Country 2000–06 2006–12
Australia (1) –28 .7 19 .4 Ireland –14 .1 1 .8
Australia (2) –53 .6 59 .6 Italy –11 .5 2 .9
Austria –27 .7 –2 .0 Netherlands –27 .1 1 .4
belgium –8 .7 0 .9 Norway –9 .1 –12 .2
Canada –13 .5 –8 .1 Poland 3 .5 –4 .9
Czech rep –5 .1 1 .8 Spain –9 .5 3 .0
Denmark –26 .5 5 .8 Sweden 33 .3 4 .0
France –16 .8 11 .2 Switzerland –9 .0 –18 .0
Germany –1 .5 0 .7 uK –43 .4 –8 .5
Hungary –6 .1 –0 .9 US –8 .5 –11 .5
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on column (2) of Table 9.4. 
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There is considerable diversity in the effects of policy in other countries. 
Table 9.6 shows that the severe tightening of policy in the UK between 
2000 and 2006 predicts a reduction in applications of 43.4 per cent, 
while the tightening in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands predict 
reductions of more than 20 per cent. By contrast, the easing of policy 
in Sweden is predicted to increase applications by a third. In 2006–12, 
applications in France are predicted to increase by 11.2 per cent, while 
declines of more than 10 per cent are predicted for Norway, Switzerland 
and the US, although the magnitude and variation in policy effects is 
less than for 2000–06. For the 18 countries excluding Australia, the 
predicted policy effect was to reduce applications overall by 11.5 per cent 
in 2000–06 and by 2.2 per cent in 2006–12.
Discussion
Consistent with our expectations, we find that terror, oppression and 
human rights abuse are the most powerful drivers of asylum applications 
from origin countries. Among the measures of origin-country political 
and social conditions, the political terror scale has a strong positive effect, 
while lack of civil liberties also has a positive effect. Origin country GDP 
per capita has a negative effect on the number of asylum claims, while 
destination country unemployment rates also have negative effects. 
Differences in unemployment trends since the recession account for only 
a small part of the relative increase in applications to Australia. Finally, 
destination country policy has a negative deterrent effect, but only through 
access and processing policies, not through welfare policies. These policies 
have significant deterrent effects, but they do not fully capture the impact 
of shifts in Australian policy after 2001 and again after 2007.
While the results obtained here are fairly robust, they come with several 
caveats. One is that we model flows as depending on conditions only in 
the origin and destination countries. This does not account for the effects 
of conditions in third countries, and particularly in transit countries. 
Although our approach sidesteps the heterogeneity across origin and 
destination country pairs, it may still be vulnerable to biases arising from 
within-pair endogeneity. Second, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in 
the circumstances that lead to asylum claims, which cannot be captured 
in aggregate-level analysis. As a result, we explain only a small proportion 
of the year-to-year variation in individual origin-to-destination streams. 
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The indicators that we use to explain migration flows are measured at the 
country level and do not capture within-country differences in the forces 
that drive asylum applications, for example between regions or ethnic 
groups. And third, for reasons outlined above, our policy index is inevitably 
a crude representation of the often subtle shifts in asylum policies.
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Assisted voluntary return and 
reintegration of migrants: 
A comparative approach
Khalid Koser and Katie Kuschminder
Sustainable voluntary return of migrants back to their origin countries 
is an important aspect of comprehensive migration management. It is 
widely recognised as the preferred mode of return and its take-up is a key 
issue in return management. It should ensure that the rights and dignity 
of the migrants involved are respected.
Both origin and destination countries support a wide range of policies 
and programs intended to facilitate sustainable voluntary return. Program 
criteria and conditions vary significantly, and it is not clear which settings 
are the most effective in enabling return, or promoting sustainable return 
and reintegration. A lack of accessible data and consensus on how to 
define and measure program effectiveness makes it more difficult to assess 
the impact of assisted voluntary return (Paasche, 2014). Program impact 
also varies across different types of migrants.
This chapter presents a summary of the findings of a comparative study 
that explored the factors influencing the decision to return, including 
the role played by return policy interventions. The study also aimed to 
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enhance understanding of the concept of sustainable return, how to 
measure it, and how to promote it. The full report of the study is available 
on the International Organization for Migration (IOM) website.1
The overall aim of this research is to inform policies and programs for 
assisting the voluntary return and reintegration of migrants, including 
irregular migrants and unsuccessful asylum seekers. Three specific 
objectives support this aim: analysis of the migrant return decision; 
development of a framework for defining and measuring sustainable 
return; and an assessment of what factors determine reintegration and 
sustainable return.
This chapter is in five main sections. The next section summarises the 
methodological approach. The following section considers the factors 
influencing the decision to return, further testing a model developed 
in an earlier study. The third main section develops a new definition 
of ‘sustainable return’, and a return and reintegration index, which 
is subsequently tested. We then consider the factors that promote 
reintegration and sustainable return. The final section summarises the 
key policy implications arising from the study, with appropriate warnings 
concerning wider applicability.
Methodology
This study included three primary sources of data collection. First, 
a comprehensive literature and policy review was conducted on assisted 
voluntary return and reintegration and sustainable return. Second, an 
analysis was conducted of data on returns from the various destination 
countries, and of IOM-assisted voluntary return data for the selected origin 
countries. Finally, primary data were collected through interviews with 
migrants and returnees in destination, transit and origin countries, as well 
as with key stakeholders wherever possible to gain further information on 
the context of assisted voluntary return. This chapter mainly draws on this 
primary data.
Research was conducted in four destination countries (Australia, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK), eight origin countries 
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan and 
1  For the full report, see Koser and Kuschminder (2015).
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Vietnam) and three transit countries (Indonesia, Greece and Turkey). 
These study countries were selected in consultation with the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection and IOM, and for various reasons, 
including their relevance in terms of priority migration flows to Australia, 
the scale of asylum and return flows, and the variety of assistance policies 
and programs. 
A semi-structured interview questionnaire was used with migrants and 
returnees. A separate questionnaire was used in the origin countries and 
destination countries, and a slightly modified version of the destination 
country questionnaire was used in the transit countries. All of the 
questionnaires followed a life-cycle approach and, wherever possible, had 
the same questions to ensure comparability. 
Recruitment of participants depended on the country context. In each 
destination country, the Department assisted the research team by seeking 
the cooperation of the appropriate government authority. Through this 
participation, the government in each destination country connected the 
research team with appropriate individuals or organisations for arranging 
and completing interviews. In each country, this worked slightly 
differently. In the origin countries, all participants were recruited by the 
IOM, and the vast majority of interviews took place at the IOM office. 
For the transit countries, as a result of each country’s unique context, 
participants were selected in different ways. In Indonesia, all participants 
were refugees or asylum seekers living in IOM-provided accommodation 
in various locations in Jakarta, and the interviews were arranged by the 
IOM. In Turkey, the majority of interviews took place at a removal centre 
in Istanbul, and the remainder at the IOM office. In Greece, the majority 
of interviews took place at the IOM office in Athens.
Understanding the decision to return
The model shown in Figure 10.1 was used in this study for the purposes 
of research design and subsequent analysis of the return decision-making 
process, and was developed in an earlier study by Black et al. (2004). 
It  conceives the individual return decision as being influenced by: 
‘structural’ conditions (conditions in the origin and destination country); 
individual conditions including individual attributes and social relations; 
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and policy interventions. The model also recognises the significance of 
information about conditions in origin and transit countries, and about 


























Figure 10.1: Factors determining the decision to return
Source: black et al. (2004), p.13.
Conditions in the country of origin
As very few respondents in any origin, transit or destination country 
identified conditions in the origin country as influential in their decision 
whether to return, the total number of responses is very small, and not 
suitable for detailed analysis. There was only one item within the broad 
category of conditions in the origin country not cited as relevant by any 
respondent at all, and that was a sense of political commitment or desire 
to help rebuild the country of origin.
Conditions in the country of destination
Across all the respondents, conditions in the destination country 
significantly outweighed any others as factors identified as influencing 
the return decision. For 80 respondents across all the countries surveyed 
(almost 30 per cent of the respondents), not having the right to work or 
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experiencing difficulty in finding employment was cited as important. 
The second most cited (by 40 respondents or 14.7 per cent) was a negative 
decision on an asylum request. Ranked sequentially after employment 
and asylum status were financial factors (35 individuals or 12.8 per cent); 
a lack of security and discrimination (14 individuals or 5.1 per cent); the 
expiry of a work or student permit (10 individuals or 3.7 per cent); a lack 
of access to social services (seven individuals or 2.6 per cent); and that the 
respondent was ‘tired of being in a detention centre’ (four individuals or 
1.5 per cent).
Given the prevailing discourse in many migrant destination countries 
that access to social services is an important magnet for asylum seekers 
and other migrants, it is interesting that no respondent interviewed in 
any destination country cited lack of access to these services as a factor 
influencing their return decision. It is not clear from the data whether this 
was not much of an issue because most respondents legally had access to 
social services, had found alternative access, or simply had not required 
these services by the time of the survey, but the conclusion stands that, 
for the vast majority, access to social services was not apparently a ‘make 
or break’ issue in considering whether or not to stay in the destination 
country.
Individual factors
Of the five categories identified in Figure 10.1 (conditions in origin 
countries, conditions in destination countries, individual factors, social 
factors and policy interventions), individual factors were the second most 
cited category influencing the return decision, by just over one third 
of respondents. Of the specific variables covered within this category, of 
most concern was that people were ‘tired of living as undocumented’, 
followed by ‘I felt I had no other choice’, ‘inability to meet migration 
aspirations’, ‘psychological problems’, and the importance of ‘dignity of 
return as a normal passenger’. 
This last variable was only cited by a total of three respondents. Yet it is 
often assumed that one of the reasons rejected asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants subscribe to organised return programs is to avoid the indignity 
(and potential subsequent reintegration challenges) of deportation.
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The data on age show no obvious trends. The majority in each age 
category in both transit and destination countries had decided to return, 
with the exception of people aged 40+ in transit countries (of whom five 
had decided to return and eight not to). Turning to data on sex, this study 
covered significantly more men than women. Of the 42 men interviewed 
in destination countries, 64 per cent had decided to return, 19 per cent 
had decided not to return, and 17 per cent were undecided. Among the 
11 women interviewed, six had decided to return, three had decided not 
to return, and two were undecided. In transit countries, overall almost 
twice as many participants had decided to return as the number who had 
decided not to return. However, more women had decided not to return 
than to return. 
No clear patterns emerged concerning marital status. In both destination 
and transit countries, more respondents, both married and unmarried, 
had decided to return rather than not to return, although the differentials 
varied quite widely (for example, in transit countries almost as many 
married people had decided not to return as the number of married 
people who had decided to return). There is also no clear pattern when it 
comes to children. In both transit and destination countries more people, 
whether or not they had children, had decided to return than those who 
had decided not to return. 
The correlations between return intentions and whether or not the 
respondent migrated alone are more interesting. The significant majority 
of those who had migrated alone to destination countries had decided 
to return, whereas a small majority of those who had migrated alone to 
transit countries had decided not to return. More of those who had not 
migrated alone to destination countries had decided not to return than 
those who had decided to return, whereas it was the opposite in transit 
countries.
Social factors
Factors broadly categorised as ‘social factors’ were cited third most often 
among all the categories of factors identified in the model in Figure 10.1. 
By far the most important was a desire to rejoin family members at home, 
cited 57 times. As a single factor, this is the second most cited across the 
entire study, following the difficulty of finding work under the ‘conditions 
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in destination country’ category. Here is a strong reminder that migration, 
and return migration, are as much social processes as they are economic 
and political processes. 
Another social factor was changes in family circumstances (cited 26 times). 
It is unclear whether this refers to changes in circumstances among family 
in the destination country or the origin country, but it seems more likely 
to be in the latter. Nostalgia about the origin country and its way of life 
was cited nine times.
Perhaps the most surprising results in this category were that problems of 
integration and the shame of return ranked at the bottom of the variables. 
Many of the challenges of integration, for example to do with legal status 
and finding a job, are covered elsewhere in the survey and data. However, 
the specific factor of ‘integration’ could have been expected to figure more 
highly here.
Another way that social factors intersect with the return decision-making 
process is where other family members are involved in making the 
decision. Only 15 per cent of the respondents in this study had made the 
decision to migrate alone. 
Reporting on their decisions after they had already returned home, 
respondents in origin countries named family members back at home 
as the most important influence in decision-making (38 per cent). 
Family members in the origin country were also most involved in the 
decision whether to return for those interviewed in destination countries 
(33 per cent) and transit countries (72 per cent). The particularly high 
response in this category for the latter group was presumably because 
so few had family members in the transit country to consult, whereas 
for those who had made it to their destination, family members there 
were also significantly involved in the decision. These findings illustrate 
the importance of policy interventions being considered not just at the 
individual migrant level, but also in the wider family context.
Finally, 13 per cent of respondents in transit and destination countries 
reported that both government authorities and the IOM were involved 
in the decision. Among respondents interviewed in destination countries, 
22 per cent reported that government authorities had been involved in the 
decision, compared with only 5 per cent referencing the IOM.
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Policy interventions
It is not clear from this study if policy interventions play an important 
role in the decision whether to return. As an entire category, this was only 
the fourth most important of the five categories considered in the survey: 
cited by only about one fifth of the respondents. Equally, the variables 
considered here overlap and probably combine to influence the return 
decision. It is also worth reiterating that aspects of the return decision 
may be beyond direct policy intervention, for example regarding certain 
individual and social characteristics. The most important specific factor 
cited, 26 times, was the possibility to benefit from voluntary return 
programs, closely followed by compliance with the law to leave voluntarily.
Information
As well as having assistance programs in place, it is equally important 
that their intended beneficiaries know about them, understand who 
they apply to, what they offer, and under what circumstances. Migrants’ 
knowledge about immigration policy in particular may often be subject 
to rumour and speculation. To begin to explore whether or not there is 
an information gap around assistance for return, respondents in origin 
and destination countries were asked what they knew about assistance 
programs and how they knew about them.
Across all four destination countries surveyed, 47 respondents had heard 
of assistance programs and only seven had not. It is somewhat surprising 
that any respondents had not come across these programs, as they were 
identified by the IOM, other return service agencies, or the government.
It is worth separately considering information dissemination in transit 
countries—a significant gap in existing research that this study can at 
least start to fill. In the transit countries, 45 respondents (75 per cent) 
knew something about return programs. Of these, 14 reported receiving 
the information from friends and family in the transit country; eight 
from the IOM; and the remainder from government authorities, a non-
governmental organisation (NGO), friends or family in a destination 
country, and friends or family in the origin country, in that order.
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Conclusions
Based on the model of return decision-making presented above, this 
section has drawn on data from respondents across the origin, transit 
and destination countries to try to understand the decision to return. 
Overall respondents ranked the five main categories of factors influencing 
the return decision as follows: by far most important were conditions in 
the country of destination, followed in order by individual factors, social 
factors, policy interventions and lastly conditions in the origin country. 
As discussed, this ranking is striking and in contrast to most other studies 
on return, in particular the positions of the final two categories.
Within these broad categories, the following specific variables were found 
to be most significant for the respondents in making their decisions: the 
difficulty of finding employment/no right to work; tired of living as an 
undocumented migrant; a desire to reunify with family at home; the 
opportunity to benefit from voluntary return programs; and job prospects 
at home.
Discerning policy implications from this analysis is challenging, not just 
because of the limitations of the methodology, but also because in reality 
the categories and variables distinguished here intersect and influence 
each other. Even though it may not be possible to highlight specific 
policy interventions, a number of wider policy implications emerge. 
First, the results suggest that neither ‘sticks’ nor ‘carrots’ alone work as 
policy interventions, and instead a judicious mix may be most effective. 
Second, there may be certain aspects of the return process that are largely 
beyond the influence of policy interventions, for example some of the 
social and cultural factors that may influence attitudes towards return and 
towards women. Finally, there is a reality check: assisted voluntary return–
related policy interventions were not considered by most participants as 
a fundamental reason for their decision, and some said they did not even 
know about return programs and other assistance programs.
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Defining and measuring sustainable return
Drawing on an extensive literature review and consolidating key elements 
of various existing definitions, this study defines ‘sustainable return’ as 
when: ‘The individual has reintegrated into the economic, social and 
cultural processes of the country of origin and feels that they are in an 
environment of safety and security upon return.’
This definition assumes that reintegration is a necessary precondition for 
meaningful sustainable return. It adopts a comprehensive perspective 
on reintegration across the dimensions of economic, sociocultural and 
political-security processes. This definition also highlights that the 
returnee must perceive they are in conditions of safety and security upon 
return (Black & Gent, 2006). 
According to this definition, sustainable return is achieved by: economic 
reintegration whereby an individual is able to sustain a livelihood and is not 
in a situation of economic vulnerability; social and cultural reintegration 
whereby the returnee is actively incorporated into the receiving society, for 
example at the local community level; and political-security reintegration 
whereby the returnee feels they have access to safety and justice upon 
return. 
Measuring sustainable return
Using the definition and building on the measures established above, 
a return and reintegration index was created, combining the three 
dimensions of economic, sociocultural and safety/security criteria. 
As return and reintegration cannot be measured by one variable, an index 
is useful because it allows all the variables of interest to be combined to 
create a single measure. 
The methodology used to develop the index follows that developed by 
Roelen and Gassman (2012)—based on work by Alkire and Santos 
(2010) and Alkire and Foster (2011)—to create a multidimensional 
child wellbeing index. The methodology consists of three simple steps 
and is replicable for the case of developing a multidimensional return 
and reintegration index. 
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The three steps were:
• First a threshold was identified for each return and reintegration 
measure detailed above to assess if each returnee was reintegrated 
according to that variable. For example, on the measure ‘employment’, 
an individual was assessed as reintegrated if they were employed. 
Individual variable reintegration rates were then determined by 
counting the number of returnees who met the threshold requirement. 
This is a basic measure—for example it cannot gauge how long the 
returnee has been employed or the conditions of employment—but it 
provides a benchmark for understanding sustainability.
• Second, return and reintegration rates were determined for each 
dimension. The dimension ‘reintegration’ rates reflect the number of 
returnees who have achieved a sufficient level of reintegration across the 
dimension variables. Each variable was given an equal weight within 
the dimension. A returnee was considered reintegrated if the weighted 
indicator for the dimension was equal to or above 0.6. This means that 
returnees had to meet a level of reintegration of at least three of the 
five variables in each dimension to be considered reintegrated. There 
are a number of assumptions in this step, regarding the weighting 
of variables and the ‘cut-off’ point for reintegration, which can be 
adjusted for further research.
• The third step was to create an overall return and reintegration index 
by aggregating the reintegration rates across the three dimensions. 
Each dimension was equally rated at one third of the total index. 
An  individual was therefore considered to be reintegrated if they 
exceed the 60 per cent threshold across all three dimensions. Once 
again these arbitrary weightings and thresholds may be adjusted as 
necessary in future.
Applying the return and reintegration index
In the economic dimension of the return and reintegration index, 
56 per cent of returns in the sample may be considered reintegrated in three 
out of five of the economic dimension indicators. Within this dimension, 
returnees were most vulnerable on the number of income sources in the 
household, as 35 per cent of returnees’ households did not have more than 
one income source. Seventy per cent of returnees were employed, and this 
does include self-employment or part-time employment. Fifty-seven per 
cent of returnees currently had no debt. Of the 43 per cent of returnees 
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who were currently in debt, 45 per cent had incurred the debt for their 
original migration. Costs of migration were cited as high as USD12,000, 
which is generally a much larger sum than return allowances offered. 
Similarly, 57 per cent of returnees currently owned land or their house. 
Finally, in terms of self-perception, 53 per cent of returnees perceived that 
they were currently struggling economically.
On the sociocultural dimension, 64 per cent of returnees were 
reintegrated. Within this dimension, returnees were most likely to 
participate in local events (79 per cent), but least likely to be a member 
in an organisation (21 per cent). Organisations in the survey included 
informal groups such as funeral or savings associations, which were quite 
common in several of the study countries, suggesting that the returnees 
had low levels of participation relative to the rest of the population. The 
majority of returnees identified themselves as having networks they could 
rely on for support (69.7  per cent) and having transnational networks 
(66.9 per cent). It is concerning that 41 per cent of returnees expressed 
that they were generally dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their life in 
the past month. 
Overall, returnees showed the highest levels of reintegration in the safety 
and security dimension, at 71 per cent. The majority of returnees reported 
feeling safe in their home (79.2 per cent) and in their community 
(69  per  cent). Further, the majority had not experienced personal 
harassment since return (78.6 per cent) and felt they could access justice 
if their rights were violated (60.8 per cent).
On the whole, 37 per cent of returnees were reintegrated based on the 
index.  There were significant variations in the degree of reintegration 
across  the eight origin countries covered by this study. Returnees to 
Vietnam and Pakistan were more likely to be reintegrated. Returnees 
to Vietnam in this study had all returned from the UK and were a particular 
migrant group: the group interviewed from Vietnam tended to be better 
off economically compared with others in their local communities. 
In Pakistan, it appears that the reintegration assistance was meaningful in 
establishing employment in that country.
Returnees to Iraq were the least likely to be reintegrated on return. 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Sri Lanka also had very low percentages of 
returnees who were reintegrated. Similarly to Iraq, Afghans reported 
low levels of reintegration in the safety and security dimension, which 
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is unsurprising given the current instability in Afghanistan. Ethiopians, 
Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans reported the lowest levels of economic 
reintegration.
Conclusions
This section has provided the basis of the analytical framework for 
measuring sustainable return through the return and reintegration index. 
The index highlights the multidimensional nature of reintegration and 
the importance of the three dimensions of economic reintegration, 
sociocultural reintegration, and safety/security. The interplay between 
these dimensions determines if an individual is reintegrated or not. It is 
evident that participants in the different origin countries had varying 
levels of reintegration, with returnees to Iraq being the least likely to be 
reintegrated and returnees to Vietnam and Pakistan the most likely to 
be reintegrated.
Promoting reintegration and 
sustainable return
This section explores the factors that influence sustainable return, drawing 
on the return and reintegration index presented above. Building from the 
literature review, the following categories of factors will be examined: 
• individual factors
• the migration cycle, including experiences prior to migration and in 
the destination country
• structural factors during return including the community of return 
and attitudes from locals
• the role of assisted voluntary return programming. 
It is important to note that these factors may overlap, and separating 
them out into categories is, to an extent, artificial. At the same time, this 
separation is helpful for analysis, and potentially also for targeting policy 
interventions to promote reintegration and sustainable return.
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Individual factors
The literature review found no systemic evidence on the impact of 
individual factors such as age, sex and education levels on reintegration 
and sustainable return. However, in one study comparing Bosnia and 
Kosovo, it was found that young men were more likely to be able to find 
employment upon return (Black et al., 2004).
Similarly, in this study’s sample there was no significant relationship either 
between age or sex and reintegration, as measured by the aggregate return 
and reintegration index. Individuals in their 30s were the most likely to 
be reintegrated, and individuals over 50 or between 17 and 29 years of 
age were the least likely to be reintegrated. Although the total numbers are 
small, it may also be noteworthy that only 24 per cent of female returnees 
were reintegrated, compared with 40 per cent of male returnees (still 
less than half ). This is in line with the conclusions of other studies that 
reintegration is a gendered process, often more difficult for women than 
men (Wong, 2013).
A noteworthy relationship was found between education and reintegration. 
Those with no primary education, or only with primary education, were 
reintegrated less than those with a secondary education who, in turn, 
were reintegrated less than those with a tertiary education. On one hand, 
those educated to a tertiary level may be expected to be more likely to 
find employment upon return. On the other hand, however, still only 
52  per  cent of those with tertiary education were reintegrated, and 
it may be that the most educated are the most likely not to find work 
commensurate with their skills and training.
Experiences prior to migration
As uncovered by the literature review, an individual’s situation prior to 
their migration can have a significant impact on their potential to be 
reintegrated upon return. In general, for example, earlier studies have 
indicated that those who are well off prior to migration (for example, 
in terms of personal security, employment and financial resources) have 
a higher likelihood of also being well off on return. 
In contrast, this study’s findings indicated no significant relationship 
between reintegration and either employment prior to migration or an 
individual’s self-perception of their standard of living prior to migration. 
For both those who were and those who were not working prior to 
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migration, around 40 per cent were reintegrated and 60 per cent were 
not. In regard to standard of living prior to migration, however, a higher 
percentage of those who were comfortable prior to migration were 
reintegrated (46 per cent), compared with those who reported struggling 
prior to migration (27.9 per cent). 
The study found instead that social and political-security experiences 
prior to migration were significant factors in determining likelihood of 
reintegration. Twenty-two per cent of participants stated that they did not 
have a sense of belonging to the community prior to migration. This group 
was found to be significantly less likely to be reintegrated, compared with 
those who did have a sense of belonging prior to migration (42 per cent). 
It is also not surprising that individuals who reported experiencing threats 
to their personal security prior to their migration were also significantly 
less likely to be reintegrated (27.1 per cent), compared with those who 
had not apparently experienced threats prior to migration (47.9 per cent). 
Also, unsurprisingly, those who had reported experiencing threats prior 
to migration were particularly less reintegrated on the safety-security 
dimension of the return and reintegration index, at 60 per cent reintegrated, 
compared with 86 per cent of those who had not cited experienced threats 
prior to migration.
Experiences in the destination country
Participants had returned from a total of 25 different countries of 
destination; the four most common countries were Norway (32), UK 
(27), Greece (25) and Belgium (14). There is a clustering effect of return 
from Greece being primarily to Pakistan and Bangladesh, and 56 per cent 
of returnees from the UK went home to Vietnam.
According to the data in this study, returnees from the UK were 
significantly more likely to be reintegrated (60.9 per cent), whereas 
returnees from Belgium were significantly less likely to be reintegrated 
(21.4 per cent). The situation of the UK, however, must be interpreted 
with caution. As indicated, all returnees in the sample in Vietnam had 
returned from the UK, and this represented a highly specific migration 
stream. When excluding Vietnam from the sample, there were 12 
remaining participants who returned from the UK. Only one of these 
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participants was reintegrated upon return. For all the other destination 
countries, around one third of returnees were reintegrated according to 
the return and reintegration index. This could not be defined as success.
The study also examined the relationship between the living situation 
in the destination country, employment, time spent in the destination 
country and reintegration. The living situation on arrival comparison 
indicates that individuals in asylum reception centres were significantly 
less likely to be reintegrated. Only 21 per cent of this group could be 
described as reintegrated, according to the index. Although the sample size 
for detention centres is very small, it is striking that those respondents who 
had spent time in asylum centres were even less likely to be reintegrated 
than those in detention centres.
The majority of returnees were not legally entitled to work while in the 
destination country; however, 41 per cent had worked informally at some 
point during their stay. On the whole, there was no clear relationship 
between working or not working in the destination country and 
reintegration. Interestingly, those who had worked informally were better 
reintegrated than those who had worked legally (47.2 per cent compared 
to 28.6 per cent).
Finally, it might be expected that reintegration would become more 
unlikely when migrants had been away for a longer period of time. 
Indeed, participants who had been abroad for over 10 years were the least 
likely to be reintegrated, although this was not statistically significant. 
There was, however, little variation in the correlation between duration 
abroad and reintegration for other time periods—ranging between 33 and 
47  per  cent for all other time periods. A recent study has argued that 
duration abroad itself is not significant in returnee reintegration; rather, 
it is the experiences abroad that matter more (Kuschminder, 2014).
Community of return
Within the broad range of conditions in the country of origin, the 
community level was an especially important factor in reintegration. 
Individuals who returned to the same community where they lived before 
they left were significantly more likely to be reintegrated, compared with 
individuals who returned to a different community than the one they left: 
44.9 per cent compared with 19.5 per cent. This has potentially important 
implications for policy, suggesting a correlation between community 
of return and reintegration, and highlighting the risks of return where 
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access to the community of origin is not yet feasible. There are at least 
two potential reasons to explain this. First, people only return to the 
same community when they do not feel their safety and security will be 
violated in that community, therefore already suggesting a higher level of 
reintegration within this dimension. Second, people return to the same 
community when they have existing networks or support services within 
that community, which would also suggest higher levels of reintegration 
in the sociocultural dimension. In addition, individuals who returned to 
an urban community were more likely to be reintegrated than those who 
returned to a rural community.
Conclusions
This section has examined the relationship between different variables 
pertaining to the circumstances and experiences of the returnees and 
their migration cycle, and reintegration as measured by the return and 
reintegration index. Several factors were assessed to have a significant 
relationship with reintegration. These included having a sense of 
belonging in the community prior to migration, the reason for migration, 
the country of destination, residing in an asylum reception centre and 
returning or not returning to the same community on return.
Policy implications
In drawing initial policy implications, a number of reservations are worth 
flagging: The first concerns the research topic itself. The decision to return, 
reintegration, and the sustainability of return all often depend on highly 
individual characteristics and experiences, many of which defy accurate 
measurement or prediction. In part, therefore, the value of this research 
has been to identify areas where policy is unlikely to make a difference. 
At the same time, however, it does allow at least for preliminary conclusions 
about where policy interventions can be effective.
A second reservation concerns the research process. While every effort 
was made to ensure a degree of trust between interviewer and respondent, 
there can be no guarantee of the accuracy of the responses provided by 
respondents. In part, this reflects the sensitive and sometimes vulnerable 
situation in which some respondents found themselves. It also reflects 
the nature of the research, which in some cases depended on participants’ 
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recall up to a year after making certain decisions and taking actions as well 
as requiring responses to hypothetical questions, from which final actions 
may diverge significantly.
A related consideration concerns access to evidence and data. Various 
aspects of return programs have been monitored and evaluated in 
several of the study countries, including by governments and relevant 
organisations. However, this information was not always easily accessible, 
and neither was it collated in a single location. In several origin countries 
the tracking of returnees is not systematic or thorough enough to answer 
important questions regarding reintegration and sustainable return. This 
has implications for the management, analysis, and publication of data 
and evidence by government authorities and international organisations.
Fourth, a key gap in this study is determining the role of assisted voluntary 
return and reintegration packages in the overall reintegration process. 
All participants in this study had received reintegration assistance, and 
therefore the study was not able to compare their experiences with those 
of other assisted voluntary returnees who did not receive reintegration 
assistance. Neither could it systematically compare the relevance or 
differential outcomes of different types of assistance packages. This has 
direct implications for program management and assisted voluntary 
return policy design, and should be explored in further research. 
A final reservation concerns the wider applicability of these findings. None 
can be considered representative of the nationality groups or countries 
surveyed, let alone of migrants or returnees more generally. The purpose 
of focusing on a semi-structured interview approach was therefore to 
identify and explore relevant issues rather than provide firm conclusions.
Bearing in mind these reservations, while also recognising the uniquely 
comprehensive and comparative nature of the study, the findings of the 
study have implications for policy in three main areas: influencing 
the decision to return, measuring sustainability, and promoting sustainable 
return and reintegration. 
Influencing the decision to return
• Conditions in their origin countries were generally not an important 
influence on the respondents’ decisions on whether to return. This 
is likely to reflect the fact that nearly half of respondents migrated 
for broadly economic reasons, and would likely differ among asylum 
seekers and refugees.
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• Conditions in destination countries may strongly influence the 
decision to return. For many respondents, an inability to work and 
insecure legal status in particular were important incentives to return, 
although rarely in isolation from other individual and social factors.
• Other key factors influencing the decision to return are largely beyond 
the scope of direct policy interventions. For example, the desire to reunite 
with family members at home, or a change of family circumstances there, 
were also important factors in the return decision. Family members were 
also often involved in the decision-making process.
• Policy interventions are not considered a major influence on the 
decision whether to return.
• Enabling policy interventions can influence the decision to return as 
much as restrictive policies. For many respondents, the opportunity to 
benefit from voluntary return programs, and the chance to wind up 
their affairs before departure, facilitated their return decision.
• More could be done to disseminate information on return programs, 
especially in transit countries. In contrast to destination countries, 
where most respondents knew about return programs and from 
multiple sources, in transit countries almost half had not even heard of 
return programs. Equally, it is important not to raise the expectations 
of migrants, many of whom may not be eligible for limited return 
assistance programs.
• There is a fine line between facilitating return and encouraging it. Any 
policy intervention in this area should be designed to allow potential 
returnees to make their own decisions, rather than encouraging them 
towards any particular option.
Measuring sustainability
• Measuring sustainability depends on how it is defined. The definition 
proposed in this study is that ‘The individual has reintegrated into 
the economic, social and cultural processes of the country of origin 
and feels that they are in an environment of safety and security upon 
return’.
• It is possible to develop an index for measuring reintegration. The index 
developed in this study distinguishes economic, sociocultural, and 
political-security dimensions, and sets reintegration thresholds across 
each to gauge individual reintegration rates. The variables and the 
thresholds can be adjusted for future studies.
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• To measure sustainability for individual returnees, it is important 
to set up an adequate sample frame at an early stage of a return 
program. It was not possible in any of the origin countries to obtain 
a representative sample of returnees from which to gain a generalised 
view of the sustainability of return for individuals.
• A system to measure reintegration and the sustainability of return could 
be put in place as part of any future voluntary assisted return program.
• Ongoing monitoring of sustainability is possible, but involves trade-
offs in terms of costs. In particular, the in-depth interviews that 
would be required to properly gauge sustainability take time, and are 
challenging from a logistical perspective.
• Remigration is not a valid proxy for measuring sustainability.
Promoting sustainable return and reintegration
• Many of the factors influencing the sustainability of return appear 
beyond the influence of direct policy intervention. These include 
premigration experiences such as level of education and social 
belonging, and individual characteristic such as sex.
• Living conditions in the destination country are significantly correlated 
with sustainable return and reintegration. This was particularly the case 
in this sample for returnees who had spent significant periods in asylum 
or detention centres, very few of whom were subsequently reintegrated.
• The ability to work in the country of destination does not clearly 
correlate with sustainable return or reintegration.
• The ability to return to the community in which respondents lived 
before migration promoted sustainable return and reintegration. This 
was particularly the case where the community was in an urban area.
• The reason for initial migration significantly correlates with 
reintegration. Individuals who migrated for political-security reasons 
were less likely to be reintegrated than those who migrated for 
economic reasons. This suggests that, although migration motivations 
are frequently mixed, the distinctions are still important when 
examining the reintegration process. 
• The factors that influence return may also impact on its sustainability 
and reintegration, but sometimes in opposing directions. In particular, 
a negative decision on asylum was a strong determinant for return, but 
also a strong indicator for a lack of reintegration after return.
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Media and migration: Comparative 
analysis of print and online 
media reporting on migrants and 
migration in selected countries
Marie McAuliffe, Warren Weeks and Khalid Koser1
By its very nature, international migration is transnational. The movement 
of people across borders necessarily relates to more than one state, and 
given the increase in scale and diversity of international migration 
over recent decades, nearly all countries in the modern era are affected 
by international migration (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014). Some 
countries, including some of those within the scope of this project, are 
affected by migration significantly, both positively and at times negatively. 
Immigration has become a first order public policy issue in many countries 
in the world.
It is unsurprising, then, that the topic of international migration is often 
included in public opinion surveys, although arguably the political 
significance of migration often outweighs its numerical significance. 
Analysis of print and online media in the UK, for example, has shown 
that the substantial political interest in this complex public policy topic 
can be put in a somewhat different perspective by examining overall 
1  The authors are grateful for research assistance from Simone Gangell and Adam Palmer in the 
preparation of this chapter.
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media coverage by themes. Content analysis undertaken as part of this 
study found that migration-related media coverage in the UK accounted 
for around 2–3 per cent of total coverage compared to, for example, 
sport (24–30 per cent), the economy (19–20 per cent), science/health 
(8–10 per cent) and climate change (1–2 per cent).
How migrants and migration are covered in the media matters for at least 
three reasons. First, although the chain of causality and the distinctions 
between causes and consequence is complex, there is a general acceptance 
that the media can influence, and be influenced by, popular opinion and 
political agendas. Thus, media coverage may be a barometer for political 
and public attitudes towards migration, and in turn shape these attitudes. 
Second, media coverage is likely to influence the perceptions of migrants 
themselves in society, for example, regarding to what extent they perceive 
migrants to be widely accepted or excluded, to be fairly represented, or to 
be scapegoated. Third, it is possible, given global access to much media, 
that media coverage may also influence the decision-making of migrants 
considering whether to move to particular destination countries.
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this research is to analyse in more 
depth how the media covers migrants and migration. More specifically, the 
purpose of this research is to compare media discourses on migrants and 
migration in selected countries by examining thematic content, contextual 
framing and the extent of polarisation of messages communicated via 
print and online media over two six-month periods.
Research questions and scope
The objective of the media and migration research project was to create 
baseline analyses of media coverage of migration and migrants in 
13 selected countries for two six-month study periods on:
• the thematic content of print and online media messages;
• the extent to which that coverage was favourable, unfavourable or 
neutral;
• the high-level contextual framing in which migration messages were 
reported.
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We analysed media messaging within two sets of print and online 
media pieces for the 13 selected countries during two six-month periods 
(1 October, 2013 to 31 March, 2014; and 1 April, 2014 to 30 September, 
2014), which are referred to as Phase I and Phase II throughout this 
chapter. The 13 countries in scope have been categorised as either ‘very 
high human development (HD)’ countries or ‘other HD’ countries.2 This 
has been done for several reasons. First, one of the key findings from Phase 
I of the project was that characterising countries as either ‘destination’ or 
‘origin’ countries for migration purposes was found to be overly simplistic 
given the range of migration issues they may face. Pakistan, for example, 
is a significant destination and origin country as well as a transit country 
and the world’s largest host country of refugees. It could be argued that at 
least one of the additional countries included in this phase (Thailand) is 
perhaps more of a transit country for irregular migration than a destination 
or origin country, further complicating a destination–origin typology. 
Second, the application of the Human Development Index (HDI) has 
been chosen because it incorporates a number of elements, including 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita at purchasing power parity 
(PPP), life expectancy and mean and expected years of schooling, so is 
more than just an economic indicator. In addition, the HDI is reasonably 
long-standing, widely accepted and UN-supported. Third, the HDI has 
been found to correlate with international migration flows (Kandemir, 
2012), and so it is arguably one of the least worst bases from which to 
develop a dichotomous categorisation to analyse media and migration 
coverage in multiple countries. That said, any and all such categorisations 
are generally applied only to ensure high-level analysis is as accessible and 
digestible as possible. Individual country reports are also provided, to 
supplement the high-level analysis.
The six ‘very high HD’ countries in scope are Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the UK. The seven ‘other HD’ 
countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri  Lanka, 
Thailand and Vietnam. Within these two types, a mix of countries was 
included, both from a geographic perspective and from a  migration 
perspective (e.g. regular/irregular migration, asylum–refugee/labour/
student migration). The three countries that were added for Phase II 
were Australia, Malaysia and Thailand, which were considered to be of 
particular interest to the Research Program.
2  These categories are based on United Nations Development Programme (2014).
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Table 11.1: Human Development Index rankings and groupings 
of selected countries in scope, 2014
Country Ranking (187 countries) HDI group
Norway 1 Very high HD
Australia 2 Very high HD
Switzerland 3 Very high HD
Netherlands 4 Very high HD
Canada 8 Very high HD
united Kingdom 14 Very high HD
Malaysia 62 High HD
Sri Lanka 73 High HD
Thailand 89 High HD
Vietnam 121 Medium HD
bangladesh 142 Medium HD
Pakistan 146 Low HD
Afghanistan 169 Low HD
Source: united Nations Development Programme (2014).
Content from both print and online sources was obtained from commercial 
media content suppliers or the publishers’ archives. Broadcast media 
content was generally outside the scope of the project, partly because of 
the prohibitive cost involved in sourcing such material retrospectively. 
The exclusion of broadcast material necessarily poses limitations on 
the analysis. This limitation is potentially more of an issue for some of 
the non-industrialised country analyses, given literacy and access issues 
within those countries. Radio broadcasting, for example, is a particularly 
important form of media in Afghanistan, with its patchy literacy, poor 
infrastructure and low incomes levels. 
Advances in journalism and digital media, however, have led to the 
converging of news organisations, where news is more commonly 
published across a multitude of media platforms (Quandt & Singer, 2009; 
Erdal, 2009). Research has also indicated that there are no significant 
differences in news coverage across the different platforms; rather, the 
main differences are between the types of news organisations and in 
particular the extent to which they use emotive language (Semetko & 
Valenburg, 2000; Keith, Schwalbe, & Silcock, 2010).
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Social media was also generally outside the scope of this project, primarily 
due to feasibility. Including broadcast and social media messages 
would have enabled a more complete comparative analysis. However, 
while broadcast media is a widely accepted form of mass media in all 
countries, and could have been included (if feasible cost-wise), including 
social media would arguably have posed methodological concerns. The 
extent of social media coverage remains highly variable (Kohut et al., 
2012; International Telecommunication Union, 2013), with substantial 
differences within and between countries. This is less so for print and 
online media coverage. As a result, comparative analysis of messaging in 
print and online media was considered the most reasonable approach. 
Further research on broadcast media would likely shed new light on 
aspects of the portrayal of migration in the media, but the initial findings 
from this study of online and print media are still relevant for both very 
high HD and less developed countries. With growing use of social media 
in some locations, this is an area that would benefit from targeted mixed 
methods research in the future. 
It is important to note the very different contexts in which media reporting 
and messaging operates, including in relation to economic, political, social 
and security-related regulatory environments. These potential differences 
can include linguistic/sociocultural tendencies towards expression, such 
that the same story is likely to be expressed using more emotive language 
in Italy than in Germany, for example. In addition, the results are likely 
to reflect differences in the proportion of opinion-based coverage versus 
traditional fact-based journalism. For example, the UK media continues 
to publish higher proportions of pieces containing opinion compared to 
media in many other countries. 
Of particular relevance to this project was the extent to which the media 
is free to report news and current affairs. Reporters Without Borders 
(Reporters Sans Frontiéres, RSF) publishes an annual World press freedom 
index that measures the level of freedom of information in 180 countries 
and ranks them accordingly. Final scores for each country range from 
0 to 180 (with 0 representing the greatest degree of press freedom of the 
countries evaluated and 180 representing the lowest) and are based on 
measurements of plurality, media independence, environment and self-
censorship, legislative framework, transparency, infrastructure and the 
level of violence against reporters during the study period.
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Table 11.2 shows the 2014 ranking for each country in scope as well as 
their corresponding ranking by RSF as either ‘good situation’, ‘satisfactory 
situation’, ‘noticeable problems’, ‘difficult situation’ or ‘very serious 
situation’.
Table 11.2: World press freedom index ratings and rankings, 2014
Country Ranking (of 180 countries) Rating
Netherlands 2 Good situation
Norway 3 Good situation
Switzerland 15 Good situation
Canada 18 Good situation
Australia 28 Good situation
united Kingdom 33 Satisfactory situation
Afghanistan 128 Difficult situation
Thailand 130 Difficult situation
bangladesh 146 Difficult situation
Malaysia 147 Difficult situation
Pakistan 158 Difficult situation
Sri Lanka 165 Very serious situation
Vietnam 174 Very serious situation
Source: reporters Without borders (2014).
Along with issues associated with press freedom, the results of the research 
need to be viewed within a range of other contexts, including economic, 
political, security and social—all of which are intrinsically linked to 
human displacement and migration. These different contexts feed into 
migration-related articles in the media.
Research method
The methodology for this project relied on a combination of qualitative 
content analysis of media articles in representative country-specific sample 
sets and quantitative modelling. The content analysis was undertaken by 
multilingual analysts working in both the original (published) language 
and English. The quantitative component involved the application of 
a sophisticated human cognitive modelling method able to deal with very 
large volumes of media articles. 
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It was important to begin with the most complete media dataset 
possible—within the cost, time and feasibility limitations—so that 
a reasonably precise, sizeable and representative sample of topic-specific 
media articles for each country could be developed. Refining the country 
samples involved a ‘top-down’ analytical approach based on iteratively 
designing, testing and fine-tuning search strings based on human analysis. 
The first stage involved multilingual analysts examining media material in 
its published language—English, Bengali, Dutch, Farsi, French, German, 
Malay, Dari, Norwegian, Thai, Urdu, Vietnamese, Sinhalese or Tamil—
before being interpreted and stored in English for further analysis. 
The methodology also relied on substantial quality assurance and data 
verification processes throughout the data collection, sorting and analysis 
phases. A detailed discussion of the methodology is contained in McAuliffe 
and Weeks (2015). 
No allowance was made for significant in-country events, such as general, 
local or regional elections, which inevitably affected the analysis. The main 
reason for this limitation was the significant methodological complication 
required to account for a multitude of in-country events that may affect 
results, such as elections, economic/financial shocks, natural disasters or 
terrorist events. In addition, the creation of time series data is assisted by 
maintaining a consistent approach across all study periods, including as 
more countries are added to the scope.
A series of country-specific datasets capturing migration-specific themes 
published in the media during the two six-month research periods was 
produced. The focal piece country datasets ranged in size from 20,000 
pieces (Australia) to 500 (Bangladesh), while the country datasets used 
for in-depth analysis ranged in size from 1,400 pieces (Switzerland and 
Canada) to 500 (Bangladesh).
It is important to note the potential for seasonal effects during the two 
six-month study periods. For example, there was a tendency in very high 
HD countries for coverage on migration-related issues overall to drop 
during the Christmas/New Year period. Likewise, the volume of reporting 
of irregular maritime migration is related to activity, which can involve 
‘sailing seasons’ in some parts of the world (McAuliffe & Mence, 2014), 
and reporting of overseas student issues can be related to seasonal student 
application, acceptance and/or departure times. To overcome some of 
the potential seasonal effects, future phases would be best undertaken on 
an annual basis.
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Analytical framework
The country-specific in-depth analysis sets were analysed to determine 
thematic content, the tone of the media messaging (favourable–
neutral–unfavourable), and how messages were contextually framed 
(humanitarian, sociocultural, economic and/or security). This analytical 
framework has been replicated from Phase I, and is discussed in detail in 
McAuliffe and Weeks (2015). By way of a summary, the three analytical 
frames employed are:
• examination of thematic content under headings that emerged from 
multiple rounds of analysis in Phase I: ‘asylum seekers and refugees’, 
‘emigration and emigrants’, ‘immigration and immigrants’, ‘irregular 
migration’, ‘migrant accommodation (including detention)’, ‘overseas 
students’, ‘overseas workers’ and ‘people smuggling and trafficking’;
• analysis of message tone as either favourable, unfavourable or neutral, 
with fact-based reporting being generally neutral and messages 
containing opinion being generally assessed as ‘favourable’ or 
unfavourable’;
• analysis of message context using a contextual-associative typology that 
comprised ‘sociocultural’, ‘economic’, ‘humanitarian’ and ‘security’ 
contexts.
Key findings are reported by variables including study period, country, 
theme, ‘favourability’, and contextual framing. This can sometimes result 
in small subsamples being analysed. To ensure the veracity of the research, 
findings based on subsamples of less than 50 messages (very high HD 
countries) and 30 messages (other HD countries) are not reported. It is 
also important to note that quantitative analysis is based on messages 
rather than articles.
Key findings
The key findings of the research presented in this paper focus primarily on 
comparative analysis across the two study periods. From the two phases 
of research, it is becoming clearer that the media discussion on migration 
in very high HD countries tends to contain more in-depth analysis 
compared to other HD countries, which was more likely to have been 
driven by specific events and so tended to be more sporadic. 
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Taking into account all print and online messages on migration 
and migrants in all countries, it is evident that there was a small but 
noticeable shift in message tone between Phases I and II toward a more 
balanced overall coverage. Favourable messages increased marginally and 
unfavourable coverage decreased. Despite the slight shift, reporting in 
Phase II was again largely assessed as being neutral. However, where it was 
not neutral, reporting was more likely to be unfavourable than favourable. 
Some themes were more likely to be reported unfavourably (e.g. ‘people 
smuggling and trafficking’ in all countries, ‘irregular migration’ in 
other HD countries and ‘immigration and immigrants’ in very high 
HD countries).
One striking finding of the research was that messaging on migration and 
migrants in print and online media was predominantly depicted through 
a ‘humanitarian’ lens. ‘Humanitarian’ framing dominated in all countries 
in scope across Phase II—a change from Phase I, which saw some very 
high HD countries experience more ‘economic’ framing. Media reporting 
tended to be framed in a border/national security context where it related 
to irregular migration or people smuggling and trafficking.
Each country had its own particular set of migration issues being discussed 
in print and online media, and it was slightly clearer from the comparisons 
between the two phases that these migration issues can be linked to 
a  range of broader discussions, including those associated with factors 
such as political cycles and processes. The changes in Switzerland and 
the UK’s reporting, for example, would appear to be related to elections/
referendums.
Key findings and comparisons—very high 
HD countries
The key findings from the analysis of the very high HD country datasets 
highlight a range of similarities and some differences across the selected 
group as well as some changes between the phases.
Consistent with Phase I findings, there was a reasonable level of 
convergence found in very high HD countries of media coverage on 
migration that does not exist to the same extent for other HD countries 
studied. This  possibly reflects similarities in terms of their migration 
circumstances and issues.
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The volume of migration-specific print and online messaging increased in 
Phase II for all countries, which appears to be due in part to the heightened 
coverage of ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ and/or ‘irregular migration’.
Taking into account all print and online messages on migration and 
migrants in the very high HD countries,3 it is evident that there was a small 
but noticeable shift in message tone between Phases I and II toward more 
balanced coverage. While neutral coverage remained the same, favourable 
messages increased marginally and unfavourable coverage decreased. 
Notwithstanding the small but positive shift, coverage of migration 
in print and online media remained more polarised than in other HD 
countries, with less neutral reporting and more unfavourable reporting.
The limited extent of favourable messaging on migration across all 
very high HD countries is one of the starker findings. Unfavourable 
coverage significantly outweighed favourable messages. Very high rates 
of unfavourable messaging were experienced consistently for coverage on 
‘people smuggling and trafficking’, followed by ‘irregular migration’.
In terms of contextual framing of all messages, there were noticeable shifts 
between the two phases, with increases in ‘humanitarian’ framing and 
reductions in ‘economic’ and ‘security’ framing. This was almost certainly 
related to the increase in coverage on ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ (both 
proportionally and numerically) during Phase II.
Thematic content in print and online media in very high 
HD countries
All media messages from the country-specific datasets were analysed 
against a number of themes. A single print or online article may contain 
more than one message, and each message may relate to more than one 
theme. Analysing the datasets in this way allows for all messages to be 
accounted for in thematic terms.
As shown in Figure 11.1, the volume of migration-specific print and online 
messaging increased in Phase II for all countries. While the increases may 
be related to seasonal effects, they are clearly due in part to the heightened 
3  Involved analysis of more than 77,000 individual messages from 7,500 articles reported between 
1 October, 2013 and 30 September, 2014 in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland 
and the UK.
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coverage of ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ and/or ‘irregular migration’, 
which increased in both actual and proportional terms in all countries 
between the two study periods. 
The increase was related to ongoing coverage of mass displacement in 
key parts of the world, such as Syria, as well as the large maritime flows 
of asylum seekers and refugees in the Mediterranean Sea and Italy’s Mare 
Nostrum operational response. Some countries, such as Switzerland, also 














Figure 11.1: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online media 
in selected very high HD countries by volume—key migration themes: 
Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=24,428), Canada (n=8,629), Netherlands (n=11,023), 
Norway (n=3,327), Switzerland (n=11,538), uK (n=17,840). Articles: Australia (n=13,256), 
Canada (n=5,640), Netherlands (n=4,337), Norway (n=1,364), Switzerland (n=4,875), 
uK (n=8,360).
When the messaging is analysed on a proportional basis, as illustrated in 
Figure 11.2, one of the first things to note is that countries experienced 
quite distinctive media coverage of migration themes. Outside of the 
theme ‘people smugglers’ (which was uniformly low in proportional 
terms, at 10 per cent or less in all countries), there was variation of themes 
proportionally in all six very high HD countries. Australia was the only 
country that experienced significant coverage of migrant accommodation, 
which was related largely to asylum seeker processing centres in Papua 
New Guinea and Nauru. Canada and the UK appeared to have a more 
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generalised media discussion, largely focused on the broad theme of 
‘immigration and immigrants’, while Norway’s media coverage in both 

















Figure 11.2: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online media in 
selected very high HD countries by proportion—key migration themes: 
Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=24,428), Canada (n=8,629), Netherlands (n=11,023), 
Norway (n=3,327), Switzerland (n=11,538), uK (n=17,840). Articles: Australia (n=13,256), 
Canada (n=5,640), Netherlands (n=4,337), Norway (n=1,364), Switzerland (n=4,875), 
uK (n=8,360).
The other striking aspect of the data is that between the two study periods, 
thematic coverage was reasonably consistent proportionally. As shown in 
Figure 11.2, this was particularly noticeable for the UK, Norway and to 
a lesser extent Canada, with all showing little variation.
Several countries experienced significantly reduced coverage of the 
theme ‘immigration and immigrants’, most notably the Netherlands 
and Switzerland. In Switzerland’s case, this related to the February 2014 
national referendum ‘against mass immigration’, reporting of which was 
included in the ‘immigration and immigrants’ theme during Phase I. A 30 
November, 2014 Swiss national referendum on limiting immigration was 
rejected, and coverage in the lead-up to the vote almost certainly occurred 
outside the Phase II study period (which ended on 30 September).
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In the uK …
‘Immigration and immigrants’ was the most prominent theme across the 12-month 
period, accounting for 45 per cent of all local focal stories . It was most prominent in 
Phase I of the study, when more than half of all coverage focused on this issue . It was 
again the dominant theme for the second study period, accounting for around half of 
all focal stories . 
The late-February, 2014 release of figures showing a rise of more than 30 per cent in net 
migration, to 212,000 over the year to September 2013, was seen in many quarters as 
evidence the government had failed to meet its pledge to bring net migration to below 
100,000. In late July, calls for tougher restrictions on migrant benefits became more 
prominent after Prime Minister David Cameron proposed new policies .
Extent of polarisation of print and online media content in very 
high HD countries
Much has been written about the polarisation, and the perceived increasing 
polarisation, of the public discourse on migration in destination countries 
(International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2011a; Koser, 2012; 
Koser, 2014). The discourse has variously been described as ‘toxic’, 
‘unbalanced’ and ‘extreme’ (IOM, 2011a; Koser, 2012).
To a significant extent, this research supports those views and findings. 
However, as was the case with Phase I, this phase has again found that 
there is considerable variation in the extent of polarisation when examined 
by specific themes. In addition, there is also variability between countries. 
More importantly, however, when all messages related to migration and 
migrants are aggregated across all very high HD countries, an interesting 
picture emerges. It is evident that there was a small but noticeable shift 
between Phases I and II for the better in terms of overall balance. Overall, 
and as can be seen from Figure 11.3, neutral coverage remained the same 
(40 per cent) while favourable coverage increased (from 14 per cent  to 
17per cent) and unfavourable coverage decreased (from 46 per cent 
to 43 per cent). It would appear that no specific events or circumstances 
drove this change—it is more likely that a combination of changes in 
overall message volume in some countries (e.g. Switzerland and the 
Netherlands), together with variations in thematic content, appears to 
have overall had a combined effect. It will be interesting to examine this 
high-level indicator in future phases, particularly as it tends to blunt the 
more event-based changes, and has the ability to provide a useful overall 
barometer on print and online media coverage of migration and migrants. 
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Figure 11.3: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration in 
print and online media in selected very high HD countries combined—
all migration themes: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Phase 1 (n=31,064), Phase II (n=46,552). Articles: Phase 1 (n=16,226), 
Phase II (n=22,189).














Figure 11.4: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration in 
print and online media in selected very high HD countries by country—
all migration themes: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=24,428), Canada (n=8,751), Netherlands (n=11,080), 
Norway (n=3,345), Switzerland (n=11,628), uK (n=18,385). Articles: Australia (n=13,256), 
Canada (n=5,738), Netherlands (n=4,364), Norway (n=1,371), Switzerland (n=4,940), 
uK (n=8,745).
Despite the shift toward slightly more balanced coverage between the 
two phases, it is clear from both Figures 11.3 and 11.4 that there is less 
favourable messaging than unfavourable messaging on migration and 
migrants in print and online media across all selected very high HD 
countries. This is one of the more striking findings, including because 
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it holds true for both study periods. In all countries for both phases, 
unfavourable messages significantly outweighed favourable messages. 
Figure 11.5 also shows that for both study periods, Australia and the UK 
had the highest proportion of unfavourable messaging of migration issues 
(ranging between 46 and 57 per cent). Australia also experienced the 
lowest favourable coverage of all countries. 
In Switzerland …
In December 2013, the media landscape was dominated by four stories: the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) initiative to cut mass immigration, conditions in the Lampedusa 
Island refugee camps, irregular immigrants arriving in the Spanish enclaves of Morocco 
and debates in the uK about migrant worker access to benefits.
The SVP initiative remained a prominent story in January, with a focus on seasonal 
workers, the economy and social welfare . There was also discussion relating to 
Swiss support for Syrian refugees. Coverage spiked in February 2014, as the SVP 
initiative against mass migration was accepted by referendum . Much of this coverage 
consisted of short bulletin-type reports .
Canada again experienced the most polarised coverage, with the lowest 
neutral coverage (27 per cent), the highest favourable coverage (28 per cent) 
and the third highest unfavourable coverage (45 per cent). Switzerland, on 
the other hand, again experienced the least polarised coverage of aggregate 
migration messaging, with the highest neutral coverage (61 per cent). 
Switzerland and Norway both experienced shifts in tone of coverage, with 
slightly higher proportions of favourable messaging and slightly lower 
proportions of unfavourable messaging between the two study periods.
Overall, the consistency between the results for the two study periods 
is notable, particularly for the proportions of favourable messaging. 
The  consistency occurred despite the changes in overall volume 
(Figure 11.1) and applied to both Switzerland and the UK, whose citizens 
went to the polls in or very near Phase I. It would be very interesting to 
examine the proportions of favourable messaging over time. In relation 
to specific themes—the most prominent being ‘immigration and 
immigrants’, ‘irregular migration’ and ‘asylum seekers and refugees’—
there was noticeable variability among the very high HD countries and 
compared with the aggregate results for all migration content.
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Figure 11.5: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration in 
print and online media in selected very high HD countries—immigration 
and immigrants theme: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=2,188), Canada (n=5,017), Netherlands (n=1,543), Norway 
(n=853), Switzerland (n=2,660), uK (n=9,720). Articles: Australia (n=996), Canada (n=2,555), 
Netherlands (n=676), Norway (n=313), Switzerland (n=980), uK (n=3,920).
The UK and the Netherlands experienced the highest proportion of 
unfavourable coverage on ‘immigration and immigrants’, as shown 
in Figure 11.6, with Canada again having had the highest proportion 
of favourable coverage, as well as the most polarised coverage. As with 
the aggregate results, all countries experienced more unfavourable than 
favourable coverage.
It is also interesting to note that despite ‘immigration and immigrants’ 
being the least polarised theme across the five countries, it was again 
the most polarised theme within the Swiss context. That said, there was 
a slightly positive shift in Switzerland in Phase II, which ended just prior to 
the November 2014 failed referendum on reducing immigration quotas. 
The Netherlands, on the other hand, witnessed a shift between the two 
phases, which appears to have been related to discussion of the potential 
links between migration and social disharmony as well as the employment 
market. In Australia, ‘immigration and immigrants’ received the highest 
proportions of favourable messaging of all themes, notwithstanding the 
drop in Phase II.
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Media on ‘irregular migration’ showed increased unfavourable messaging 
across most very high HD countries. Australia, Canada and the UK all 
had more than half of all messaging on ‘irregular migration’ as being 
unfavourable, which was in contrast to the mainland European countries. 
It is, however, important to note that Canada and Norway experienced 
very low volumes of coverage on this theme. Australia recorded no 
favourable messaging on ‘irregular migration’, noting that proportions of 
favourable messaging were very low for Phase II across all countries.
There was also noticeable variability between Phase I and II in most of 
the countries (Australia, Canada, Norway and the UK), with Switzerland 
and the Netherlands remaining fairly constant. Australia was the only 
country that experienced a discernible positive shift in coverage tone, 
becoming more positive in Phase II, which is likely to be related to the 
much-reduced volume and tempo of coverage associated with irregular 
maritime arrivals (IMAs)—no IMAs reached Australia during Phase II. 
In  contrast, Canada, Norway and the UK’s coverage contained much 
higher proportions of unfavourable coverage.
In Australia …
During the 12-month period from october 2013 to September 2014, Australia’s media 
outlets published the second largest volume of material, second only to the uK. The 
Australian public received a constant background hum of migration-related messages . 
From this ocean of material, coverage of particular events would periodically rise, attain 
prominence for a time, then recede, to be replaced by the next hot item . Messages, 
in the form of both news and opinion relating to migration events, often appeared in 
media outlets across the country—their audience footprints enlarged by syndication 
across online media networks .
In the context of Australian reporting of issues associated with IMAs, the related 
themes of ‘irregular migration’, ‘migrant accommodation’ (including detention), ‘asylum 
seekers and refugees’ and ‘people smuggling and trafficking’ together accounted for 
93 per cent of all coverage .
In contrast to ‘irregular migration’, the theme ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ 
received more favourable messaging in most countries, with positive shifts 
occurring in Switzerland, Canada and Norway (as shown in Figure 11.7). 
Interestingly, Australia experienced the lowest levels of unfavourable 
messaging on this theme, which was in stark contrast to messaging on 
‘irregular migration’.
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Figure 11.6: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration 
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries—irregular 
migration theme: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=8,210), Canada (n=181), Netherlands (n=2,566), Norway 
(n=273), Switzerland (n=2,498), uK (n=3,925). Articles: Australia (n=4,350), Canada (n=148), 
Netherlands (n=793), Norway (n=137), Switzerland (n=1,108), uK (n=1,800).














Figure 11.7: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration 
in print and online media in selected very high HD countries—asylum 
seekers and refugees theme: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=4,850), Canada (n=2,913), Netherlands (n=5,871), Norway 
(n=2,021), Switzerland (n=4,718), uK (n=2,880). Articles: Australia (n=2,860), Canada 
(n=2,637), Netherlands (n=2,516), Norway (n=785), Switzerland (n=1,808), uK (n=1,700).
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The Netherlands saw a notable increase in unfavourable messaging on 
this theme. This related largely to criticism of the government’s handling 
of asylum seeker and refugee issues, including refugee intake numbers, 
accommodation and child pardon policies.
Overall, and as was seen during Phase I, there are substantial differences 
between countries on the extent of polarisation of media messaging on 
migration and migrants. Switzerland again exhibited a more nuanced 
discussion of migration and migrants as well as a much less polarised 
discussion. Canada’s print and online media messaging was generally the 
most polarised overall; however, Australia and the UK experienced very 
high proportions of unfavourable messaging (and low or no favourable 
messaging) on specific themes. Overall, Australia experienced the most 
unbalanced overall discussion on migration and migrants in both phases. 
Framing of the media discourse in very high HD countries
As well as grouping messages into thematic sets to facilitate the quantitative 
assessment of media across the countries in this study, we also analysed 
media content according to a contextual-associative typology. This enabled 
critical examination and reporting on the overall context in which various 
propositions and/or themes were couched. 
Overall, and as shown in Figure 11.8, the research found that 
migration coverage in Phase II was more likely to have been discussed 
in a  ‘humanitarian’ context in all countries, with very high proportions 
across all countries (ranging from 57 per cent in the UK to 74 per cent 
in the Netherlands). This appears to correlate to the increase in the 
‘asylum seekers and refugees’ theme across all countries (see Figure 11.1). 
In contrast, the ‘security’ context dropped or remained the same across 
all countries, although was still noticeably larger proportionally in 
Australia compared to elsewhere (at 17 per cent). The ‘economic’ framing 
also dropped in most countries but most dramatically in the UK (from 
53 per cent to 20 per cent).
At the aggregate level, and taking into account all media messages from 
all six very high HD country datasets, the variability between countries 
apparent in Phase I was not found in Phase II. All very high HD countries 
experienced notable uniformity in the framing of all media messaging in 
Phase II, which may be related to the increase in proportional and actual 
terms of coverage of ‘asylum seekers and refugees’.

















Figure 11.8: Framing of migration messages in print and online media in 
selected very high HD countries—all migration themes, October 2013 to 
March 2014
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=23,739), Canada (n=8,397), Netherlands (n=10,895), 
Norway (n=3,249), Switzerland (n=11,313), uK (n=17,715).
In the UK and Switzerland, it does appear that migration was part of 
broader economic and political discussions during Phase I, particularly in 
the lead-up to the UK local elections (May 2014) and the Swiss referendum 
on immigration quotas (February 2014). Both countries experienced 
substantial reductions in the ‘economic’ framing of messaging in Phase II, 
and so were more in line with the other countries. 
In Norway …
The ‘asylum seeker and refugee’ theme captured the greatest share of coverage, 
accounting for 57 per cent of all the messages tracked . 
This was also the only theme for which favourable commentary outstripped the 
unfavourable – although this only happened in the latter part of the study, as negative 
issues covered in the first half faded, to be replaced by greater coverage of Norway’s 
involvement in united Nations High Commissioner for refugees (uNHCr) programs. 
While many news pieces addressed global issues such as the plight of Syrian refugees 
and those in other pockets of unrest and strife throughout the world, the Norwegian 
press often brought the discussion back to the impact this is having on the numbers 
of people seeking refuge and asylum in the eu and, by extension, Norway.
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Notwithstanding the uniformity of message-framing at the aggregate level 
with all migration messaging taken into account, there were differences 
both between countries and between phases, when specific themes were 
analysed. As shown in Figure 11.10, the framing of media messages on 
‘immigration and immigrants’ appeared to be quite different in the six 
very high HD countries. Australia and Canada were the only countries 
that had  messaging framed in a security context, although Australia’s 
messaging  was predominantly framed in a sociocultural context 
(60 per cent) and Canada’s was framed mainly in a humanitarian context 
(61 per cent). 
Economic framing was still high in Switzerland, although this had come 
down since Phase I—a reduction in economic framing of this theme was 
experienced across all six countries to a greater or lesser degree but most 
noticeably in the UK (79 to 38 per cent). While this reduction may be 
related to a postelection period of ‘normalisation’, it is interesting that the 
economic framing of this theme reduced across all countries. It may be 
that solid economic growth and a greater sense of economic stability is 
underpinning the change in these countries. It may also be possible that 
messaging related to ‘immigration and immigrants’ was affected by the 
substantial increase in the humanitarian framing of  the ‘asylum seekers 
and refugees’ theme.
In the Netherlands …
‘Asylum seekers and refugees’ was the most prominent theme during the study 
periods . There was an increase in unfavourable commentary in Phase II . This was 
driven by discussion of contentious issues, including the need for a ‘rejection quota’ 
for unsuccessful asylum seekers and limits on the extent to which asylum seekers 
should have access to health care . There was also a greater focus on asylum seeker 
processing and deportation in the second phase, which again served to increase the 
proportion of unfavourable messaging on asylum seekers and refugees. News of the 
arrival of asylum seekers from Eritrea and Syria also fed into these discussions .
Australia—which experienced a relatively small proportional coverage of 
the theme ‘immigration and immigrants’ in both phases—had a discussion 
on the topic that was more likely to have been framed in the sociocultural 
and security contexts compared with the other countries. This would 
appear to be related to the messaging in print and online media on the 
integration of Muslim migrants in Australia, a topic that appeared to be 
dominated by unfavourable messaging. 

















Figure 11.9: Framing of migration messages in print and online media in 
selected very high HD countries—immigration and immigrants theme: 
Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=2,185), Canada (n=4,738), Netherlands (n=1,488), Norway 
















Figure 11.10: Framing of migration messages in print and online media 
in selected very high HD countries—irregular migration theme: Phase I 
and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=7,908), Canada (n=166), Netherlands (n=2,548), Norway 
(n=269), Switzerland (n=2,498), uK (n=3,825).
As shown in Figure 11.10, a very different picture emerges of reporting 
of the theme ‘irregular migration’, with the framing of media messaging 
in Switzerland, Norway and the Netherlands having shifted from 
a predominantly security-related framing to a humanitarian framing, and 
bringing them more in line with the UK. The security framing of the Phase 
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I messaging appeared to have been related to discussion of border security 
within Europe and irregular maritime migration across the Mediterranean 
Sea, from North Africa in particular. It is difficult to fully account for the 
evening-out of the message contexts, which now appear to be much more 
consistent across all countries. As with other themes, Australia’s messaging 
had a slightly higher proportion framed in a security context. 
Analysis of the ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ theme shows that the messaging 
was predominantly framed in the humanitarian context, although all 
three contexts were present in all countries. Norway saw a slight shift 
in framing of the theme, with an increase in ‘economic’ framing, while 
Australia’s sociocultural framing in Phase I dropped markedly to become 
















Figure 11.11: Framing of migration messages in print and online media in 
selected very high HD countries—asylum seekers and refugees theme: 
Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Australia (n=4,679), Canada (n=2,854), Netherlands (n=5,803), Norway 
(n=1,970), Switzerland (n=4,620), uK (n=2,795).
Key findings and differences between other 
HD countries
There has been very little research on the media coverage of migration 
issues in countries that are not the very high HD migration destination 
or receiving countries. Countries that have been rated as having lower 
HD, but particularly those with low HD, have not tended to have been 
included in research on this topic. As discussed in McAuliffe and Weeks 
A LoNG WAy To Go
300
(2015), there would appear to be several reasons for this. First, it can be 
very difficult to access and collect media articles from some countries. 
Second, the need for multilingual analysts with native language skills 
and an appreciation of current social and cultural environments poses 
challenges. Third, and particularly in relation to comparative analysis, 
ensuring consistency across different country analyses can be difficult.
This project attempts to fill some of this research gap. In doing so, and 
taking into account the findings of Phase I, the seven ‘other’ HD countries 
have been grouped to facilitate comparative analysis: Afghanistan 
(low  HD), Bangladesh (medium HD), Malaysia (high HD), Pakistan 
(low HD), Sri Lanka (high HD), Thailand (high HD) and Vietnam 
(medium HD). We have moved away from categorising the countries in 
scope as ‘origin’ countries.
The key findings rely on smaller country-specific datasets compared with 
those compiled for very high HD countries. This was partly related to 
significant differences in media volumes and to difficulties with collection. 
Nevertheless, a comparative analysis produced some interesting findings:
• Consistent with Phase I findings, there remains a diversity of coverage 
by theme as well as tone and context across the seven other HD 
countries. 
• The inclusion of Malaysia and Thailand highlighted the very different 
volumes of media, with Malaysia’s volume being very high, which is 
likely to be related to infrastructure and access, but also to the nature 
of the topics covered in those countries—Malaysia and Thailand’s 
coverage tended to reflect their status as migration ‘receiving’ countries. 
• Taking into account all print and online messages on migration and 
migrants in the other HD countries,4 it is evident that there was a small 
but noticeable shift in message tone between Phases I and II, toward 
a more balanced coverage overall. While neutral coverage decreased 
slightly, favourable messages increased and unfavourable coverage 
decreased marginally. 
4  Involved analysis of more than 28,000 individual messages from 6,000 articles reported between 
1 October 2013 and 30 September 2014 in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Vietnam.
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• Overall, coverage of migration in print and online media tended to be 
less polarised in other HD countries than in very high HD countries, 
with more neutral reporting and less unfavourable reporting in origin 
countries. That said, reporting was more likely to be unfavourable 
than favourable, which is consistent with very high HD countries. 
• Most media reporting on migration in both phases was framed in a 
humanitarian context, far outstripping economic, sociocultural and 
security contexts. 
• Perhaps partly due to issues related to press freedom—as discussed 
above—the focus on migration in print and online media related 
primarily to the multitude of aspects associated with the rights and 
treatment of citizens.
• Reporting in a security context was evident in both phases in relation 
to people smuggling and, to a lesser extent, irregular migration.
Thematic content in print and online media in other 
HD countries
All media messages from the country-specific datasets were analysed 
against a number of themes. As noted in the previous section, a single 
print or online article may contain more than one message, and each 
message may relate to more than one theme. Analysing the datasets in this 
way allows for all messages to be described in thematic terms.
As shown in Figure 11.12, the volume of migration-specific print and 
online messaging was relatively similar in Phases I and II for all countries 
except Thailand and Vietnam, which experienced significant increases in 
the second phase. While the increases may be related to seasonal effects 
(as discussed above), they are clearly due in part to the heightened coverage 
of ‘irregular migration’ in Thailand and ‘overseas workers’ in Vietnam. 
As with the very high HD countries, the volume of migration-related 
print and online media messaging varied substantially between the two 
countries. Malaysia’s volume is akin to that of Canada and far exceeds all 
of the other countries in this group—a result that reflects the maturity 
and size of its media industry, as well as the focus on migration in public 
discourse.















Figure 11.12: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online media in 
selected other HD countries by volume—key migration themes: Phase I 
and II
Notes: Messages: Afghanistan (n=1,100), bangladesh (n=1,961), Malaysia (n=8,936), 
Pakistan (n=2,522), Sri Lanka (n=2,041), Thailand (n=3,964), Vietnam (n=3,945). Articles: 
Afghanistan (n=703), bangladesh (n=1,027), Malaysia (n=3,716), Pakistan (n=1,654), 
Sri Lanka (n=1,317), Thailand (n=1,870), Vietnam (n=1,725).
In terms of thematic messaging analysed proportionally, and as shown in 
Figure 11.13, there was considerable variation in the thematic content 
between the countries. It is likely that the differences between the other 
HD countries reflect the very different national discussions that occurred 
during the study periods. Further, the substantial differences, and the 
nature of some of the thematic messaging, reflect the current state of 
migration more broadly within each country. Consistent with migration 
flows from Vietnam and Bangladesh, for example, ‘overseas workers’ 
dominated the print and online media messages in both phases. Reporting 
on Phase I findings noted that the results from Sri Lanka were somewhat 
at odds with the long history of regular labour migration flows from 
Sri Lanka; however, Phase II saw this theme become more prominent in 
Sri Lanka, with a reduction in both ‘irregular migration’ and ‘emigration 
and emigrants’. 
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Figure 11.13: Thematic coverage of migration in print and online media 
in selected other HD countries by proportion—key migration themes: 
Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Afghanistan (n=1,100), bangladesh (n=1,961), Malaysia (n=8,936), 
Pakistan (n=2,522), Sri Lanka (n=2,041), Thailand (n=3,964), Vietnam (n=3,945). Articles: 
Afghanistan (n=703), bangladesh (n=1,027), Malaysia (n=3,716), Pakistan (n=1,654), 
Sri Lanka (n=1,317), Thailand (n=1,870), Vietnam (n=1,725).
It is interesting to note the dominance of the media messaging on 
‘irregular migration’ in Malaysia and Thailand, which is far greater 
proportionally than any of the other countries, including the very high 
HD countries. This appears to reflect the current migration issues facing 
those countries. In Malaysia, for example, there are estimated to be up 
to two million irregular migrants residing in the country, many working 
in the unregulated economy (McAuliffe & Mence, 2014). In Thailand, 
the very high proportional messaging on ‘irregular migration’ was related 
mainly to the Thai Government’s crackdown of illegal migrant workers 
from Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos in early 2014, which preceded its 
migrant worker registration scheme (from June 2014). The scheme was 
reported as resulting in the registration and legalisation of more than one 
million former illegal migrants. 
The amount of messaging on ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ increased in 
the majority of countries in Phase II, with slight reductions experienced 
in only Afghanistan and Thailand. Unlike coverage of this theme in very 
high HD countries, examination of the articles related to ‘asylum seekers 
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and refugees’ indicates that these tend to be on local issues rather than 
the more general material on refugee crisis situations (e.g. Syria) and 
Mediterranean Sea asylum seeker movements. For example, in Pakistan 
the focus was on Afghan refugees and repatriation, while in Sri Lanka 
the discussion revolved around Pakistani asylum seekers in Sri Lanka 
as well as on Sri Lankan asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia. 
Bangladesh, on the other hand, witnessed a discussion on this theme that 
was dominated by Rohingya-related issues. 
In Sri Lanka …
Throughout the year-long study period, the Sri Lankan print and online media showed 
substantial interest in those citizens choosing to leave Sri Lanka. It explored these 
departures from a number of different perspectives. The message theme of ‘asylum 
seekers and refugees’ often dealt not just with those entering Sri Lanka, but also with 
Sri Lankans seeking refuge outside the country. ‘emigration and emigrants’ addressed 
the matter of citizens leaving through proper channels, while ‘irregular migration’ 
messages related to both irregular arrivals into Sri Lanka, and, to some extent, news 
of citizens accused of irregularly migrating to other countries.
Extent of polarisation of print and online media 
content in other HD countries
Consistent with the findings for very high HD countries, when all messages 
related to migration and migrants are aggregated across all other HD 
countries, it is evident that there was a small but noticeable positive shift 
between Phases I and II toward more balanced coverage overall. Overall, 
and as can be seen from Figure 11.14, favourable coverage increased 
(from 11 per cent to 17 per cent), while unfavourable coverage decreased 
(from 49 per cent to 46 per cent), as did neutral coverage (39 per cent to 
36 per cent). It would appear that no specific events or circumstances drove 
this change—it is more likely that a combination of changes in overall 
message volume in some countries, together with variations in thematic 
content, appear to have overall had a combined effect. It will be interesting 
to examine this high-level indicator in future phases, particularly as 
it tends to blunt the more event-based changes, and has the ability to 
provide a useful overall barometer on print and online media coverage of 
migration and migrants. This summary result is based on analysis of over 
28,000 individual messages from more than 6,000 articles.
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Figure 11.14: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration 
in print and online media in selected other HD countries combined—
all migration themes: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Phase 1 (n=12,040), Phase II (n=16,349). Articles: Phase 1 (n=6,035), 
Phase II (n=8,010).
In Thailand …
The ‘immigration and immigrants’ theme generated the highest level of favourable 
messages, with commentary pointing to the economic benefits (legitimate) foreign 
workers bring to the country . Unfavourable messages relating to this theme appeared 
more in a sociocultural context, with reports suggesting links between immigrants and 
criminal activity . 
The ‘asylum seekers and refugee’ theme was another in which Thailand’s media was 
similar to its neighbour, Malaysia . Media in each country focused on the plight of 
rohingya refugees, while also presenting news relating to the Australian Government’s 
asylum seeker policy . Favourable messages were driven by support for the plight of 
rohingya living in Thailand, while unfavourable messages highlighted the difficulties 
faced by asylum seekers suffering with deportation or detention. 
While not overly prominent in terms of absolute message numbers, the ‘overseas 
workers’ theme attracted a reasonably high level of favourable commentary (33 per 
cent). Government support of Thai workers was a leading positive message, while 
unfavourable commentary (25 per cent) appeared largely in connection with stories 
about the hardships faced by Thai workers, internationally .
As was the case with very high HD countries, the research found 
considerable variability in the tone of the media coverage of migration 
between other HD countries. Figure 11.15 shows that higher proportions 
of unfavourable messaging were experienced in all countries except 
Malaysia and Thailand, which remained at high levels. Malaysia 
experienced the highest levels of unfavourable messaging (57 per cent) 
and the lowest levels of favourable (10 per cent), very closely echoing the 
results for Australia (49 per cent unfavourable; 13 per cent favourable). 
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Figure 11.15: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration in 
print and online media in selected other HD countries—key migration 
themes: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Afghanistan (n=1,124), bangladesh (n=2,028), Malaysia (n=11,128), 
Pakistan (n=2,656), Sri Lanka (n=2,142), Thailand (n=4,730), Vietnam (n=4,581). Articles: 
Afghanistan (n=721), bangladesh (n=1,070), Malaysia (n=4,804), Pakistan (n=1,766), Sri 
Lanka (n=1,393), Thailand (n=2,338), Vietnam (n=1,953).
The proportions of neutral media coverage between the two phases 
dropped in all countries except Malaysia, where it remained the same. 
The print and online messaging in Afghanistan and Pakistan became 
noticeably more polarised in the second phase, with both unfavourable 
and favourable messaging increasing. This was in a context of otherwise 
fairly consistent results between the two phases and across almost all 
countries. 
Not surprisingly, the two countries with the highest proportional 
and actual messaging on irregular migration (Malaysia and Thailand) 
experienced the highest proportions of unfavourable messaging and 
low levels of favourable, when all themes are taken into account. These 
results accord with the findings for Australia, which shared these key 
characteristics related to thematic messaging and the tone of the overall 
messaging. In all three countries, there would seem to be an emphasis 
on linking irregular migration to the success or otherwise of government 
policy and practice in managing immigration. 
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In Pakistan …
The ‘asylum seekers and refugees’ theme accounted a third of all messages, and was 
the most prominent issue across the entire study period. While overall unfavourable 
messages still outnumbered favourable ones, the second phase of the study saw an 
improvement in tone with the announcement of monetary aid from foreign nations, 
including the uS and Japan, and support from the uN. Pakistan was also praised for 
the magnanimity with which it receives refugees . 
unfavourable messages related to the suffering of refugees in the country’s camps and 
their inadequate accommodation. We also saw significant frustration expressed about 
the level of ongoing support needed for refugees, and, concurrently, concerns about 
potential links between terrorists and refugees, while the large economic and social 
burden placed on countries hosting refugees was also noted .
As shown in Figure 11.16, the theme ‘overseas workers’ received a 
reasonable amount of favourable media coverage in most origin countries 
during the study period, with a significant increase having occurred in 
Pakistan. Consistent with the findings for Phase I, the two countries in 
which the theme dominated (Bangladesh and Vietnam) did not have the 
highest proportions of favourable coverage, although they both increased 
in Phase II. One of the starker findings is that all countries experienced 
polarisation of messaging on this theme—lower levels or much lower 
levels of neutral reporting occurred in Phase II. 
















Figure 11.16: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration in 
print and online media in selected other HD countries—overseas workers 
theme: Phase I and II
Notes: Messages: Afghanistan (n=135), bangladesh (n=1,257), Malaysia (n=8), Pakistan 
(n=390), Sri Lanka (n=585), Thailand (n=158), Vietnam (n=2,785). Articles: Afghanistan 
(n=89), bangladesh (n=589), Malaysia (n=8), Pakistan (n=276), Sri Lanka (n=314), Thailand 
(n=74), Vietnam (n=1,074).
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In bangladesh …
Print and online media was highly focused on the ‘overseas workers’ theme, typically 
addressing the hardships confronting these people . over half of all messages reported 
during the one-year study period were on this theme . The prominence of stories and 
messages on the plight of overseas workers aligned with the often-reported link 
between the health of the bangladeshi economy and the remittances flowing from its 
foreign workers .
A long way back in terms of its prominence was the second-most reported theme of 
‘asylum seekers and refugees’ (15 per cent). The standout issue discussed here was 
rohingya refugees in bangladesh and Myanmar, which became more prominent in 
Phase II .
In contrast to the tone of the media messaging on ‘overseas workers’, the 
coverage of ‘irregular migration’ was once again extremely unfavourable, 
although there were some changes evident in Pakistan and Vietnam. As was 
found in Phase I, the tone of the coverage of this theme was the second 
most unfavourable of all of the thematic coverage across all very high 
HD and other HD country datasets—second only to ‘people smuggling 
and trafficking’, which received extremely unfavourable commentary in 
all countries.
















Figure 11.17: Favourable–neutral–unfavourable coverage of migration in 
print and online media in selected other HD countries—irregular migration 
theme: Phases I and II
Notes: Messages: Afghanistan (n=126), bangladesh (n=205), Malaysia (n=6,516), Pakistan 
(n=298), Sri Lanka (n=338), Thailand (n=2,234), Vietnam (n=225). Articles: Afghanistan 
(n=83), bangladesh (n=129), Malaysia (n=2,544), Pakistan (n=220), Sri Lanka (n=227), 
Thailand (n=992), Vietnam (n=126).
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Interestingly, the tone of the messaging on irregular migration in other 
HD countries tended to be much more unfavourable (35 per cent to 
75 per cent) compared with very high HD countries. This reflected the 
focus on the dangers to potential irregular migrants, deportations of 
irregular migrants back to the other HD country as well as commentary 
on the dangers posed by irregular migrants from elsewhere. It should be 
noted, however, that the volume of messaging on ‘irregular migration’ was 
reasonably low, with only Malaysia and Thailand experiencing substantial 
volumes (see Figure 11.12).
In Vietnam …
Print and online media on migration issues in Vietnam was similar in many respects 
to that of other countries ranked lower on the HDI . It had a strong focus on the 
opportunities and challenges faced by citizens working in foreign countries, and the 
valuable contribution these workers make to the Vietnamese economy through the 
flow of remittances. Discussion surrounding inbound migration in the Vietnamese 
press was limited and was largely driven by specific events. 
This event-driven media surrounding inbound migration produced something of shift 
when comparing the two phases in this study period. In the first phase of the study, 
press articles relating to ‘overseas workers’ made up the lion’s share of coverage (68 
per cent), while coverage relevant to ‘immigration and immigrants’ was insignificant. 
In the second phase, tensions caused by the development of a Chinese oil rig in 
Vietnamese waters led to anti-China protests that targeted industrial zones housing 
large numbers of Chinese workers. The subsequent media interest in these events 
saw the ‘immigration and immigrants’ theme jump to a 15 per cent share of coverage 
across the April–September 2014 period .
Framing of the media discourse in other HD countries
The first striking result of the research is the dominance of the 
‘humanitarian’ framing in all other HD countries across both phases. 
Messaging on migration and migrants in print and online media coverage 
is being predominantly depicted through a ‘humanitarian’ lens. Other 
framing is present and in some countries not insubstantial—24 per cent 
‘security’ in Malaysia, 25 per cent ‘economic’ in Bangladesh—but all 
countries’ messaging is predominantly framed in a ‘humanitarian’ context, 
regardless of the differences in substance and complexity of national 
migration issues.
The second key finding is the noticeable degree of uniformity between the 
two phases. All countries experienced similar results in the two phases, 
with moderate changes largely being limited to increases in ‘humanitarian’ 
framing in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (with  concomitant 
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decreases largely in ‘sociocultural’ framing). While it is difficult to 
anticipate the results of future phases, it would be useful to have this trend 
finding confirmed (or otherwise) through further research.
In Malaysia …
The Malaysian press was most focused on the inflow of immigrants, with the most 
prominent area of discussion being ‘irregular migration’. This theme accounted for 
53 per cent of the messages studied across the 12-month study period, and its 
significance in the study set points to the high importance of this issue to the Malaysian 
nation. Very large numbers of people enter the country to work each year, and the 
management of this human flow was shown through the media to be a daunting task 
for policymakers and administrators alike . 
With two thirds of ‘irregular migration’ messages being critical of people entering 
Malaysia through unlawful channels, and half of all messages unsupportive of legal 
‘immigration and immigrants’, it’s no surprise that the most prominent themes were 
















Figure 11.18: Framing of migration messages in print and online media in 
selected other HD countries—all migration themes: Phases I and II
Messages: Afghanistan (n=1,018), bangladesh (n=1,995), Malaysia (n=11,128), Pakistan 
(n=2,612), Sri Lanka (n=1,603), Thailand (n=4,730), Vietnam (n=4,497).
The two countries that experienced the highest proportions of ‘security’ 
framing (Malaysia and Thailand) have arguably the highest numbers 
of irregular labour migrants who are not asylum seekers or refugees in 
their communities (International Federation for Human Rights [FIDH] 
& Suara Rakyat Malaysia [Suaram], 2008; IOM, 2011b). While 
acknowledging that this is difficult to state categorically, given the lack of 
hard data on migrant flows and stocks, the little we do know seems to be 
consistent with the overall results. 
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Consistent with Phase I, the discussion of ‘overseas workers’ was more 
likely to have been framed in an economic context compared with 
the overall migration discussion, with an exception being Thailand. 
In Thailand, there was not much coverage of this theme either in volume 
or proportional terms, but the little that was reported was framed in 

















Figure 11.19: Framing of migration messages in print and online media in 
selected other HD countries—overseas workers theme: Phases I and II
Messages: Afghanistan (n=138), bangladesh (n=1,255), Malaysia (n=8), Pakistan (n=424), 
Sri Lanka (n=414), Thailand (n=158), Vietnam (n=2,718).
In other HD countries, as was the case in very high HD countries, 
discussion on ‘irregular migration’ saw a greater proportion of messages 
framed in a security context, with little or no economic framing. While 
there was uniformity across the two phases for most countries, Vietnam 
was an exception: security framing jumped from 23 per cent in Phase 
I to 96 per cent in Phase II. There appear to be two main reasons for 
this. First, the volume of messaging in Vietnam in both phases was small. 
Second, the coverage was mainly associated with event-driven reporting 
of Chinese irregular labour migrants and security-related incidents 
(including shootings) and threats. 

















Figure 11.20: Framing of migration messages in print and online media in 
selected other HD countries—irregular migration theme: Phases I and II
Messages: Afghanistan (n=112), bangladesh (n=201), Malaysia (n=6,516), Pakistan 
(n=284), Sri Lanka (n=243), Thailand (n=2,234), Vietnam (n=226).
Implications for policymakers
The media is often accused of generalising—usually negatively—
about migrants and migration, for example by scaling up individual 
misdemeanours to entire populations, or failing to tell good news as well 
as bad news stories. One of the implications of the preceding analysis is 
that those who criticise the media in this way are in turn generalising. It 
is clear that media coverage of migrants and migration is dynamic and 
quite sophisticated, and varies significantly between countries as well as 
within countries over time. This noted, a number of initial implications 
for policymakers can be suggested from this research. 
First, and given the significance of media coverage on migrants and 
migration noted in the Introduction, it is important to promote a fair 
and reasonable portrayal of migrants in the media, and as this analysis has 
illustrated this is often still not the case. At a national level, promoting 
and protecting the freedom of the press is paramount. At the corporate 
level, there are implications, for example concerning safeguarding editorial 
independence from commercial interests. At the level of individual media 
outlets, providing internship or employment opportunities for journalists 
with a migrant background has been suggested as one way to increase 
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a better understanding and more objective coverage of this and indeed 
other cross-cultural issues. There are powerful reasons to support these 
sorts of policies beyond just potential migration outcomes.
A second policy area that can be informed by this and subsequent analysis 
is the design and dissemination of information on migration policies 
and programs to settled migrants as much as to potential migrants. It is 
likely that media content and comment has more influence on migrant 
decisions than many official sources of information, for example because 
the former may be more trusted and more easily accessible. Understanding 
how the media shapes its coverage of migration, as this analysis has begun 
to, has important implications for trying to predict and perhaps direct its 
influence.
In this regard, one of the key contributions made by the research is the 
application of a consistent methodology to a selected number of countries 
to develop a measurable set of indices, which can be monitored over time. 
This can be appealing for policymakers, as it offers the opportunity to 
compare media discourses about migration in other countries, including 
other HD countries. Detecting changes and shifts over time, in a solid and 
measurable manner, enables policymakers to consider a range of options, 
including for communications activities, with the benefit of evidence. 
Conclusions
The purpose of this research has been to compare migration discourses 
in selected countries by examining thematic content, contextual framing, 
and the extent of polarisation of messages communicated via print 
and online media over two six-month periods. It is the second phase 
of a research collaboration between the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection and Cubit Media Research, designed to inform 
migration policymakers and practitioners by drawing on expertise built 
up in the private sector on large-scale quantitative media analytics.
This project involved large-scale quantitative research that relied on 
a  combination of multilingual human analyses and a human cognitive 
modelling software system. This developed a unique evidence-base, albeit 
covering two finite periods and with certain limitations. The research 
has highlighted, with a reasonable level of confidence, the nature of the 
migration discussions occurring within the media in the selected countries, 
as well as the relative ‘space’ devoted to different migration topics.
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Overall, the evidence this research provides adds to the existing body 
of work on migration and the media. However, it could be argued that 
a more pressing longer-term benefit will only be realised through analyses 
of trends stemming from additional research phases. Discerning changes 
over time has the potential to uncover trends that are likely to have 
implications for policymakers and migration practitioners internationally.
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Victoria Mence and Alex Parrinder
Policy deliberations on environmentally related migration1 have 
encountered a number of substantial challenges. The potential scale of 
environmentally related migration across borders both currently and in 
the future is unknown. Further research is required on the relationship 
between environmental factors and international migration to better 
understand what lies ahead and the implications this might have for 
Australia’s policies to manage both regular and irregular migration. 
Challenges at the international, regional and national levels for 
policymakers involve understanding environmental impacts on human 
movement and the possible increase in the volume of international 
migration, including irregular migration, that may follow. In addition, 
the potential for environmental and climate change displacement to 
impact on states’ viability (or parts thereof ) and the ability of migrants 
to return is very difficult to quantify. From an Australian perspective, there 
is a perception that many of the challenges relate to the issues faced by 
Pacific Island nations, although there are implications for environmentally 
related movement in the broader Asia–Pacific region.
1  In this chapter the term ‘environmentally related migration’ is used to refer to the range of issues 
relevant to the relationship between the environment, climate change and migration. 
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It is widely recognised that there have been significant problems 
relating to  historical research on environmentally related migration 
including because of the contentious and politicised context in which 
the knowledge base has developed. One effect of this schism is a dearth 
of empirical research and robust evidence on key concerns and a lack 
of clarity around international and national normative frameworks 
regarding environmentally related migration. The difficulties involved in 
conceptualising and defining the complexities of environmentally related 
migration are central to the challenge of increasing the knowledge base 
and engaging in effective policy deliberations and the formulation of 
policy responses.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background on the key issues 
relating to environmentally related migration, including the debate on 
connections between migration and environmental stress; the development 
of global, regional and national-level policy responses (including policy 
considerations relevant to Australia); and priorities for further research. 
The second section below summarises the literature on this topic. The 
third section briefly discusses some of the key challenges for policymakers. 
The fourth section summarises potential future policy responses, noting 
examples of relevant measures that have been implemented in Australia 
and internationally. 
While highlighting the challenges for policymakers that arise from 
the contested body of empirical research on environmentally related 
migration, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to draw conclusions on 
the evidence on the migration impacts of environmental factors.
Literature overview
One of the most striking features of the literature on the environment–
migration nexus is that the issues have ignited intense interest and 
controversy across a range of academic disciplines. There is also keen 
interest among the public and the media, which is often characterised by 
heated debate. This is not surprising given that issues around migration, 
such as asylum seekers, refugees, forced migrants and irregular migration 
are all highly contested, as are the issues of environmental degradation 
and climate change. 
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Another feature of the literature is the enormous volume of information 
available from a diverse research community. In addition to numerous 
academic papers, there is an abundant array of reports and papers by 
governments, international agencies and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) (Gemenne, 2011). 
Current thinking and research on the environment–migration nexus 
is to a large extent a product of the historical controversies that have 
characterised the development of research over the past two decades. Dun 
and Gemenne provide a useful analysis of the disciplinary divide within 
academia that has shaped the contested nature of much of the research. 
Prior to the focus on the interconnections between the environment and 
migration, the fields of study relating to migration and the environment 
evolved within very different branches of learning. Research on the 
environment was located in the natural sciences, and migration within 
the domain of the humanities and social sciences. ‘Just as most classical 
theories on migration tend[ed] to ignore the environment as a driver 
of migration, most theories on environmental governance ignore[d] 
migration flows’ (Dun & Gemenne, 2008). Both areas of research are 
relatively new and both have evolved in the context of growing economic, 
political and social tensions.
The polemic nature of the debate has its origins in the response to initial 
research by environmental scholars in the 1980s that linked environmental 
stress and migration in the context of a limited understanding of refugee 
and migration epistemological frameworks. From these beginnings, 
research and theories on environmentally related migration evolved 
within two distinctive clusters of disciplinary approaches. One group 
included authors who based their research approaches primarily from 
an environmental, disaster or conflict disciplinary perspective. The other 
group included scholars primarily from refugee and migration disciplinary 
backgrounds who challenged the definitional and theoretical assumptions 
that underpinned this research. 
Until recently much of the literature relating to the environment–
migration nexus concentrated on a number of controversial themes that 
surfaced in the 1980s. The most prominent included:
• the way migrants, thought to be migrating in response to environmental 
pressures, were described and defined;
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• the strength of the evidence used to support estimates of existing 
examples of environmentally related migration, and the speculative 
nature of the predictions made about future migration flows;
• whether a direct link can be made between environmental factors and 
migration or more complex causalities apply.
Definitions, terminology and typologies
One of the most important and determinative debates in the literature 
has been about definitions and terminology. As Castles noted, poorly 
conceived definitions have implications beyond the research community 
as ‘definitions are crucial in guiding policies of governments and 
international agencies’ (Castles, 2002, p. 9). 
‘Environmental refugee’ was a term commonly used in the context of 
environmentally related migration research and, in spite of some serious 
problems identified relating to its use, the term is still widely used. 
‘Environmental refugee’ as a term first gained currency in the 1980s. 
A number of mainly environmental researchers and commentators 
maintained that a significant proportion of the forced migrant population 
were migrating because of environmental factors. Further, it was suggested 
that this category of forced migrants was a hidden problem and involved 
people who needed protection and should be referred to as ‘environmental 
refugees’ (El-Hinnawi, 1985; Jacobson, 1988). 
Without further definition, linking concepts relating to the ‘environment’ 
and ‘refugees’ to describe a particular group of forced migrants was 
regarded by many scholars as conceptually misleading and legally 
meaningless (Kibreab, 1997; McGregor, 1993). As Zetter and others 
noted, the concept of ‘refugee’ has a clear legal meaning and historical 
weight anchored in the Refugee Convention, which remains confined to 
the criteria outlined in its original formulation (Castles, 2002; Suhrke, 
1992; Zetter, 2007). 
Attempting to expand the definition to define a particular category 
of  forced  migrant, a concept that in itself is still evolving, risked 
undermining refugee protection by inflating the numbers and thus 
providing states with further reasons to step away from asylum obligations 
(Black, 2001; Dun & Gemenne, 2008; Kibreab, 1997). Further, the 
term ‘environmental refugee’ also invoked some inherent assumptions 
about environmentally related migration, including the idea that the 
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environment was the principal factor driving forced migration, and that 
the migration was cross-border, neither of which had been verified or 
supported by sound empirical evidence (Castles, 2002; Findlay & Geddes, 
2011; Kibreab, 1997; McGregor, 1993). 
The challenge of identifying meaningful definitions and categorisations 
for migrants, especially those in crisis, was central to discussions at the 
recent 2013 United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development. The term ‘migrants in crisis’ was used in an attempt to 
‘straddle traditional categories and distinctions’. The aim was to capture 
the complexity of mixed migration populations that can include workers, 
as well as asylum seekers and refugees, migrating because of political, 
conflict related crises and/or natural disasters (Koser, 2013).
Estimates and predictions
The use of the term ‘environmental refugee’ in the context of forced 
migration received widespread attention and prompted further research 
in the 1990s that made some ominous predictions about future 
environmentally related migration flows. These predictions have had an 
ongoing influence in the discussion. 
One of the most prominent and prolific writers on this theme was Myers 
(Morrissey, 2012). In 1993, while acknowledging that some of the analysis 
was ‘speculative’ and ‘essentially exploratory’, Myers claimed that, based on 
the most conservative calculations of what he called ‘this refugee problem’, 
the movement of people ‘would …be of an altogether unprecedented 
scale’ with an estimated 150 million environmental refugees by 2050 
(Myers, 2001; Myers, 1997; Myers & Kent, 1995; Myers, 1993, p. 752). 
In subsequent papers this figure rose to 200 million, a figure Myers was 
still predicting in 2005 (Myers, 2005). Some advocacy publications went 
much further with one predicting up to one billion people displaced by 
the end of the 21st century (Christian Aid, 2007). In 1993, a report by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated 
that ‘it is entirely possible that the impact of environmental degradation 
and resource depletion on population movement may be even more 
important than these authors suggest’ (UNHCR, 1993, p. 5). The 
predictions were widely accepted and were central to a body of literature 
that used the predictions to highlight the risks and the dangers of not 
acting on climate change. 
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Early critical responses to the scale of migration predicted were highly 
sceptical of the way the figures had been calculated. Critics argued that 
the figures did not take account of the role of personal agency in decisions 
to migrate, the ability of populations to adapt to changing conditions, nor 
the range of other political, economic and social factors at play (Lonergan, 
1998; McGregor, 1993; Surhke, 1992). 
A number of authors have suggested that there has been little appetite for 
reassessing the validity of the high estimates and predictions because the 
sheer scale of the migration predicted has successfully raised the profile 
of climate change and its potential consequences (Black, 2001; Castles, 
2011; Crisp, 1999; Morrissey, 2009). The uncritical use of Myers’ figures 
by international organisations, advocate groups and the media has also 
reinforced and influenced political and public discourse on the issues 
(Morrissey, 2009). However, in 2008, UNHCR warned that inflated 
figures were not helpful, rather they ‘evoked fantasies of uncontrollable 
waves of migration that risk stoking xenophobic reactions’ (A question 
of climate refugees, 2011, para. 7).
Estimates are important, but need to be based on more robust and 
rigorous empirical evidence. Further, research needs to be location 
and context specific and to take account of the multiple responses going 
on (Leighton, 2011). ‘Mapping and monitoring potential environmental 
“hotspots” and changing regional conditions, and tracking migration 
trends, offer a  more fruitful and evidence-based route for policy 
development’ (Boano, Zetter, & Morris, 2008).
Mono-causality versus multiple causality
Until recently, one of the most contentious disagreements in the 
literature related to the assumption that there were direct links between 
environmental factors and international migration flows. In the view of 
some critics, predictions were often based on a simple process of subtracting 
current populations living in problem areas to calculate migration flows 
(Black, 2001). 
Those critical of attempts to draw direct correlations have long argued 
that the causes of migration are highly complex, involving a range of 
political, economic and social factors that may influence responses to 
environmental stress. The strength of family, social, cultural and ethnic 
networks, the effectiveness of state responses to disasters and the level 
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of poverty and wealth all appeared to influence coping strategies and 
migration decisions. Further, all of these variables are likely to vary over 
time and space (Black, 2001; Castles, 2011). 
An additional level of complexity lies in the complicated variations 
involved in   environmentally related migration, including: internal 
versus cross-border; short- or long-distance; temporary or permanent; 
rapid- or slow-onset events, that is, forced migration as a result of an 
environmental catastrophe or migrants who move voluntarily in the 
context of environmental stress and those who leave as opposed to those 
who stay (Bates, 2002; Hugo, 1996; Suhrke, 1993). 
There has been a growing consensus in recent literature on the 
environment–migration nexus that multiple causality is a crucial 
consideration. There is a sense in more recent literature that some of the 
controversies that have characterised the debate are abating. ‘Although 
the debate still goes on, the disciplinary divide is gradually being 
overcome: environmental scientists tend to be more cautious while 
migration specialists do recognise the role of the natural environment 
in migration dynamics. On the whole, most scholars now dismiss the 
apocalyptic predictions that used to influence debates’ (Piguet, 2011, 
p. 4). Further, there is recognition in more recent literature by migration 
theorists that environmentally related migration is an issue that demands 
greater attention. 
It is significant that reference is made many times in recent literature 
to how much is yet unknown about the interconnections between 
environmental factors and migration by both migration and environment 
researchers (Brown, 2008; Castles, 2011; Kniveton, Schmidt-Verkerk, 
Smith, & Black, 2008; Koser, 1996; Martin, 2010). This is especially true 
in relation to ‘the circumstances in which international migration may 
result from climate change’ (Martin, 2010). 
It is evident that a more considered approach is starting to inform the 
discourse at a national and international governance level, as reflected in 
the more recent global discussions on related issues. There is also a growing 
recognition that an interdisciplinary approach, based on robust empirical 
research, is essential to support practical and realistic policy development 
by governments in particular. An important challenge ahead is to better 
negotiate the narrative in the public arena. Publications by academics 
containing apocalyptic themes, especially in relation to security issues, 
continue to have influence.
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Challenges for policymakers
There is broad agreement that most environmentally related migration is 
expected to be internal (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 
2013; McAdam, 2012; Martin, 2010; Newland, 2011). Nonetheless, 
discussions of the implications of environmentally related migration for 
Australia often focus on the possibility of international migration from 
Pacific Island nations, and the challenges Australia may face in addressing 
such flows through its current policy settings. If significant international 
migration flows do eventuate, Martin (2010, p. 3) has argued that 
‘the immigration policies of most destination countries are not conducive 
to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants, unless they enter 
through already existing admission categories’. Martin has summarised 
common parameters of immigration programs, highlighting that labour 
migration is usually based on the needs of the receiving country and that 
family migration is usually restricted to immediate relatives, as well as 
noting that admissions are sometimes based on point systems. Martin 
(2010) has also noted that humanitarian admissions are generally limited 
to people who fit the Refugee Convention definition, and that those 
admitted under resettlement programs are screened overseas.
In addition to migration policy, the complexities of environmentally 
related migration invoke a range of other policy fields, including 
international development, humanitarian assistance, the environment 
and climate change. Government agencies in these areas have particular 
responsibilities in relation to different stages of environmentally related 
migration: contributing to global climate change mitigation; supporting 
adaptation and resilience of affected communities to environmental 
events; contributing to humanitarian and disaster relief efforts; managing 
the movement of people across international borders; and supporting 
return, resettlement and reintegration following events (Martin, 2010). 
These responsibilities overlap, leading some commentators to argue that 
existing policy fields can be relied upon to address the challenges of 
environmentally related migration (Piguet, Pécoud, & de Guchteneire, 
2011). Warner (2010), however, has argued that institutional and policy 
‘silos’ limit the effectiveness of existing responses, which underscores the 
need for strong communication and coordination between policymakers 
in relevant fields if more effective responses are to be developed (Appave, 
2012; Boano et al., 2008; Warner, 2010). 
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Approaches to adaptation (which is usually considered a matter of 
international development policy) and migration have been discussed 
in the literature in this context. It has been suggested that not only can 
adaptation function as a way to reduce migration, but that migration can 
also function as an adaptation strategy that may significantly increase the 
resilience of communities to environmental and climate change impacts 
(Hugo, 2010; Newland, 2011; Transatlantic Study Team on Climate-
Induced Migration, 2010). It is also worth noting the increasing role of 
diasporas in enabling a range of adaptation strategies, including beyond the 
provision of remittances. Such connections demonstrate the potential for 
effective coordination between policymakers in relevant fields. In arguing 
that mobilisation of resources for adaptation may be contentious, White 
(2011) has suggested that a key challenge lies in balancing the use of 
reliable research to help mobilise support for adaptation and development 
strategies without igniting security fears. 
Conceptualisation and definition
Definitions are important for policy development, as they allow rights and 
obligations to be identified. As Dun and Gemenne (2008) have argued, 
‘[w]ithout a precise definition, practitioners and policymakers are not 
easily able to establish plans and make targeted progress’ (p. 10). Many 
commentators have considered the challenge of defining environmentally-
related migration to be complicated by ‘the lack of good information and 
analysis about the circumstances in which international migration may 
result from climate change’ (Martin, 2010, p. 2). 
In the absence of a clear definition, McAdam (2012) has neatly 
summarised a range of considerations that responses to environmentally 
related migration will depend on: ‘(a) whether such movement is perceived 
as voluntary or involuntary; (b) the nature of the trigger (a rapid-onset 
disaster versus a slow-onset process); (c) whether international borders are 
crossed; (d) the extent to which there are political incentives to characterise 
something as linked to climate change or not; and (e) whether movement 
is driven or aggravated by human factors, such as discrimination’ (p. 17).
A number of commentators have argued that effective policy responses 
need to recognise the multiple causality of migrant decision-making 
processes and take into account the social, economic, cultural and political 
factors involved (Black, 2001; Castles, 2011; Hugo, 2010; Zetter, 2010). 
Findlay and Geddes (2011) have emphasised the need for policymakers to 
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appreciate the existing local context and to understand that ‘those affected 
by environmental change are not simply passive populations onto which 
externally defined practices need to be imposed to protect them from 
“risk”’ (p. 153). They have suggested the value of a policy approach that 
involves local populations as ‘purposive actors’ in addressing the challenges 
posed by the environment–migration nexus (Findlay & Geddes, 2011). 
These considerations apply in cases where migration is perceived as 
voluntary as well as cases where it is perceived as forced, which Hugo 
(2010) has described as extremes along a continuum where, in reality, 
different levels of force operate in different circumstances. The nature 
of an environmental event—whether it is regarded as a rapid-onset 
(e.g.  tsunami, flooding) or slow-onset (e.g. desertification, ‘sinking 
islands’) process—and its impact in the particular circumstances also have 
implications for policy responses.
It has been suggested that ‘climate change impacts’ should be distinguished 
from other environmental factors. Climate change processes have been 
argued to be connected to broader issues of human vulnerability that 
affect populations (e.g. rapid-onset environmental disasters, conflict), 
acting as a ‘threat multiplier’ that increases the likelihood of migration 
(Collinson, 2010; Kirsh-Wood, Korrebord, & Linde, 2008). Conversely, 
others have suggested that vulnerability can be aggravated in a very 
different way (e.g.  reduced livelihoods, increased poverty), and that 
climate change processes thus act to reduce people’s ability to migrate 
(Geddes & Somerville, 2013). Nevertheless, Zetter has argued that ‘the 
interrelatedness of climate change, general changes in environmental 
conditions and socioeconomic factors which underpin decisions 
to migrate’ makes it difficult to develop policy responses in relation to 
migration that is related specifically to climate change (Zetter, 2010).
Noting the disparate array of scenarios in which environmentally related 
migration may occur, McAdam (2011) has argued that ‘it is not yet clear 
whether a universally applicable definition of those displaced by climate 
change is necessary or desirable’ (p. 4). 
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Future policy: What is possible?
A range of policy responses to environmentally related migration have 
been proposed at both the international and national levels. At the 
international level, policy responses (proposed and/or current) include 
frameworks based on refugee protection, complementary protection, a new 
international instrument, protection of internally displaced people, and 
regionally based responses. Unsurprisingly, none of these has successfully 
overcome the fundamental difficulty of conceptualising environmentally-
related migration in order to address the range of circumstances in which 
it might occur.
Notwithstanding the challenges that exist in the international arena, 
a number of countries have implemented domestic laws and policies 
regarding environmentally related migration. These measures also have 
limited applicability, and none would appear to effectively address 
migration induced by slow-onset processes. A summary of the national-
level responses is provided below.
Refugee framework
Proposals to expand the Refugee Convention to protect people who 
move across borders due to environmental and climate change factors 
have been discussed extensively at the international level. The Office of 
UNHCR does not support revision of the Refugee Convention, and has 
argued that ‘refugee’ is a  legal term with a settled meaning centred on 
persecution. People whose movement is related to environmental factors 
would not normally qualify as refugees, although some could fall within 
UNHCR’s mandate (e.g. where conflict is involved, where governments 
persecute those affected by withholding assistance, or where statelessness 
is a concern). According to UNHCR, the terms ‘environmental refugee’ 
and ‘climate refugee’ have no basis in international law and their use could 
confuse environmental factors with persecution, potentially undermining 
refugee protection standards (UNHCR, 2009).
Other critiques of this approach have noted that refugee protection applies 
only to people who have already crossed international borders, while most 
environmentally related migration is expected to be internal. The term 
‘refugee’ has also been seen to imply forced movement (Zetter,  2010), 
which may apply in particular circumstances of rapid-onset environmental 
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disasters, but becomes much less clear in cases where people are considered 
to be migrating voluntarily in anticipation of slow-onset environmental 
or climate change impacts (Hugo, 2010).
Complementary protection framework
It has been suggested that nonrefoulement obligations under international 
human rights law might provide another avenue for protecting those 
affected by environmental and climate change factors (McAdam, 2012; 
European Commission [EC], 2013). This is envisaged primarily under 
the right to life (where relevant issues may be standard of living, means 
of subsistence, survival and protection of life, which could be affected 
by environmental factors) and the prohibition against torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (where return 
to socioeconomic deprivation, including that caused by humanitarian 
disasters, could constitute inhuman and degrading treatment) (United 
Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 1966). However, it is unclear in 
practice whether such claims can be relied upon: the harm faced must 
be found to be sufficiently severe and ‘imminent’. As with refugee 
protection, this may imply forced movement, while migration in 
anticipation of slow-onset environmental or climate change impacts is 
more likely to be regarded as voluntary. Complementary protection has 
therefore been argued to be inadequate for addressing the complexities 
of environmentally related migration (McAdam, 2012).
New international instrument
A number of models for a new international instrument have also been 
proposed, including a stand-alone convention, a protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and regional agreements under an international framework agreement 
(Biermann & Boas, 2010; Docherty & Giannini, 2009; Hodgkinson, 
Burton, Anderson, & Young, 2010). These proposals have significant 
variations in approach and detail (Appave, 2012), reflecting the difficulties 
involved in conceptualising environmentally related migration. There 
has been no common agreement among the proposals on how to define 
the individuals (and groups) their instruments seek to protect, including 
in relation to use of the term ‘refugee’. Nor has there been a common 
approach to the applicability of the proposed instruments in relation 
to forced and/or voluntary movement, internal and/or cross-border 
movement, and rapid-onset and/or slow-onset environmental events 
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(including how the interaction between environmental events and climate 
change is understood and whether climate change factors should be the 
specific focus).
Kälin and Schrepfer (2012) have argued that, in the present context, 
negotiating such an instrument is likely to be difficult because of the 
‘largely incompatible interests of potential countries of origin and countries 
of destination’ (p. 70). Further, if not appropriately targeted, McAdam 
and Saul (2010) have suggested that a new instrument could actually 
‘encourage general migration, abusive claims and people smuggling’. 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
People displaced internally have been argued to be better protected by 
international norms (including human rights) than those who move 
internationally, as exemplified by governments having widely adopted the 
nonbinding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Appave, 2012; 
Koser, 2011; Leighton, 2010). It has been argued that policymakers could 
usefully apply the Guiding Principles to situations of environmentally-
related migration across borders. The Guiding Principles include in their 
scope ‘persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to 
flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as 
a result of or in order to avoid the effects of … natural or human-made 
disasters’ (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1998). 
However, the requirement that people are forced or obliged to move 
creates a lack of clarity once more about whether slow-onset processes 
are covered (Zetter, 2010), particularly as economic motivations for 
movement, which can be related to the impacts of climate change on 
livelihood and economic opportunities, were deliberately excluded from 
the text (Koser, 2011). Further, as the Guiding Principles are nonbinding, 
if they are not implemented effectively in national laws and policies they 
may not provide any actual guarantees to displaced people (Koser, 2011). 
Regional responses
In view of the range of scenarios in which environmentally related 
migration may occur, McAdam (2011) has argued that localised or regional 
approaches may provide better responses than generic international 
normative frameworks. Regional discussions may provide an avenue for 
policymakers to consider the different contexts in which environmentally-
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related migration may pose challenges and opportunities. For example, 
the specific nature of the threat posed to low-lying Pacific Island nations 
by rising sea levels and the priorities of affected populations have been 
prominent features of Pacific regional discussions for a number of years. 
Importantly, the Pacific Islands Forum developed and endorsed the 
Niue Declaration on Climate Change in 2008 (Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, 2008). On a more practical level, affected states in the Pacific 
are taking action on possible scenarios ranging from internal displacement 
to nonviability. For example, a recent decision by Kiribati to purchase an 
island in Fiji, while officially described as a response to food security, has 
been interpreted by some commentators in terms of environmentally-
related migration.
Also in a regional context, McAdam (2012) has discussed the potential 
utility of existing regional instruments, such as the Organization of African 
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees in Latin America. Both 
define refugees more broadly than the Refugee Convention, and include 
people who have moved because of events that have disturbed public 
order. McAdam (2012) has argued that under both instruments it is likely 
that attributing movement to ‘climate change’ would be difficult, and 
that protection seems to be limited to people who have already moved in 
response to an actual threat, therefore limiting coverage of people moving 
in anticipation of future environmental impacts.
While the European Union (EU) is a supranational body, with a different 
character from other regional bodies, it is relevant here to note the EU 
Temporary Protection Directive, which establishes temporary protection 
in cases of ‘mass influx’ of displaced persons. The Directive does not 
mention environmental factors explicitly, but the open definition of ‘mass 
influx’ is argued to provide flexibility (EC, 2013). However, invoking 
the Directive would require agreement by a majority of EU member 
states and it is considered unlikely that it would cover environmental 
migrants travelling as a result of slow-onset processes (Koser, 2012). 
Nonetheless, acknowledging that environmentally related migration may 
pose increasing challenges in the future, the EC has published a working 
document, Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration, 
which provides an overview of the EU perspective on the complexities 
involved in addressing the issues, and outlines the need for increased 
knowledge, dialogue and cooperation in order to build policy (EC, 2013).
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National-level policy settings
Several countries have developed domestic laws and policies on 
environmentally related migration, although this has been limited and 
the implementation of such policies is, in some cases, untested. 
Complementary forms of protection for people unable to return to their 
country of origin are provided for in Sweden’s Aliens Act (‘because of 
an environmental disaster’)2 and Finland’s Aliens Act (‘as a result of an 
environmental catastrophe’).3 Finland’s Act also provides for temporary 
protection where ‘there has been a massive displacement of people 
… as a result of an armed conflict, some other violent situation or an 
environmental disaster’.4 As none of these provisions has yet been tested, 
their operation is unclear. 
In the US, legislation allows for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to be 
granted to people who are ‘temporarily unable to return to their home 
country because of … an environmental disaster’ (Martin, 2010, p. 3). 
TPS only applies to people already in the US at the time of a disaster 
(not to those fleeing an event), and the designation of nationals to whom 
it applies is discretionary (Koser, 2012; Martin, 2010).
A summary of national-level policy responses is in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1: Overview: National-level policies relevant to environmentally 
related migration
Country Response Comments
Finland Aliens Act provides for 
complementary protection 
for people unable to return 
to their country of origin ‘as 
a result of an environmental 
catastrophe’.1 
Aliens Act provides for 
temporary protection where 
‘there has been a massive 
displacement of people … as 
a result of an armed conflict, 
some other violent situation or 
an environmental disaster’.2
As these provisions have not yet 
been tested, their operation is 
unclear .
2  Aliens Act (2005:716) [Sweden], Chapter 4, Section 2.
3  Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 458/2009 included) [Finland], Section 88a(1).
4  Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 458/2009 included) [Finland], Section 109.
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Country Response Comments
Sweden Aliens Act provides for 
complementary protection for 
people unable to return to their 
country of origin ‘because of 
an environmental disaster’.3
As this provision has not yet been 
tested, its operation is unclear .
US Legislation allows for 
Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) to be granted to people 
who are ‘temporarily unable 
to return to their home 
country because of … an 
environmental disaster’.4
TPS only applies to people already 
in the US at the time of a disaster 
(not to those fleeing an event).
The designation of nationals to 
whom TPS applies is discretionary .5
Australia Seasonal Worker Program 
(SWP) introduced in 2012 
allows Australian businesses 
to recruit workers from Pacific 
states .
The SWP is designed to meet 
Australian workforce needs and 
contribute to poverty reduction and 
economic development in Pacific 
countries . It is not designed to 
address climate change adaptation .
New Zealand Pacific Access Category (PAC) 
allows a number of Pacific 
Islanders to immigrate to New 
Zealand each year .
The PAC is based on employment—




Temporary Protection Directive 
establishes temporary 
protection in cases of ‘mass 
influx’ of displaced persons.
The Directive does not mention 
environmental factors explicitly, but 
the open definition of ‘mass influx’ is 
argued to provide flexibility.7 
Invoking the Directive would require 
agreement by a majority of EU 
member states .
It has been considered unlikely that 
the Directive would cover migrants 
travelling as a result of slow-onset 
environmental processes .8
Source: (1) Finland, Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 458/2009 included), Section 
88a; (2) Finland, Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 458/2009 included), Section 109; 
(3) Sweden, Aliens Act (2005:716), Chapter 4, Section 2; (4) Quoted in Martin (2010), p. 3; 
(5) Koser (2012), p. 10; (6) Martin (2010), p. 3; (7) eC (2013), p. 19; (8) Koser (2012), p. 10.
In the Australian context, there have been a number of instances in 
which migration-related operational responses have been put into 
effect following sudden-onset environmental disasters (e.g. the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami), similar to the US’s TPS policy approach. While 
Australia’s responses have not been formalised via legislation, a similar 
approach is able to be applied, allowing people in Australia to remain 
following natural disasters on a case-by-case basis.
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In Australia, an attempt to directly address the issue of ‘climate refugees’ 
came in the form of the Migration (Climate Refugees) Amendment Bill, 
introduced by the Greens in 2007. The Bill sought to amend the Migration 
Act to include a ‘climate change refugee’ visa class for ‘a person who has 
been displaced as a result of a climate change induced environmental 
disaster’.5 This approach raised the difficulties involved in identifying 
an environmental event as being induced by climate change, which the 
Bill proposed to make the subject of a determination by the Minister 
for Immigration. Questions were also raised about the implications for 
both Australia’s security and humanitarian priorities, particularly whether 
the new visa category would attract migrants from around the world 
(which could include irregular migrants), and whether it would impact 
on Australia’s humanitarian resettlement quota (Koser, 2012). The Bill 
did not proceed to a vote and lapsed. 
Utilising existing policies
Some commentators on environmentally related migration have argued 
that ‘there are actually a number of existing policy fields that can be relied 
upon to address the challenges it raises, including development strategy, 
humanitarian affairs, post-disaster interventions, or immigration and 
admission policies’ (Piguet et al., 2011, p. 24). Each of these policy fields 
covers particular issues relevant to different stages of environmentally-
related migration, but in light of the complexities that characterise the 
phenomenon, Warner (2010) has argued that institutional and policy 
‘silos’ limit the effectiveness of existing responses. Warner has cited existing 
governance gaps in the protection of environmental migrants who are 
unable to return after rapid-onset disasters, and those whose movement is 
related to slow-onset processes.
To address these gaps, many commentators have highlighted the need 
for a stronger evidence-base, policy dialogue and collaboration between 
institutions and practitioners in different policy fields in order to 
understand environmental and climate change impacts on livelihoods and 
migration (Boano et al., 2008; Findlay & Geddes, 2011; Warner, 2010). 
5  Australia, Migration (Climate Refugees) Amendment Bill 2007 (Cth), Schedule 1, Clause 2(2).
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Due to their key relevance in this context, approaches to adaptation 
and migration have regularly been discussed in these arguments. 
Notwithstanding White’s arguments about the potentially contentious 
nature of adaptation (White, 2011), commentators have suggested that 
not only can adaptation function as a way to reduce migration, but 
that migration can also function as an adaptation strategy that may 
significantly increase the resilience of communities to anticipated climate 
change impacts. 
Discussion of migration and adaptation has often turned to the impact 
of sea-level rise on Pacific Island nations, as a part of the world in which 
‘long-term migration might be the only response for some communities 
vulnerable to climate change’ (Elliott, 2010, p. 184). 
Australia’s humanitarian aid and development programs include 
a significant focus on the Pacific, including a number of projects aimed 
at building the resilience of communities and reducing disaster risk. 
However, its humanitarian action does not specifically address cross-
border displacement due to natural disasters. From the migration policy 
side, migration from some Pacific Islands to Australia is long term 
and well established. In this context, Australia introduced a Seasonal 
Worker Program in 2012, which allows Australian businesses to recruit 
workers from Pacific states to both meet Australian workforce needs in 
particular sectors and to contribute to poverty reduction and economic 
development in Pacific countries. This program is not designed to address 
climate change adaptation, and has not been implemented in such terms. 
Similarly, New Zealand has introduced a Pacific Access Category which 
allows a number of Pacific Islanders to immigrate to New Zealand each 
year based on employment, not on climate change adaptation (Martin, 
2010). These examples illustrate the potential utility of existing policies 
that could be adjusted to accommodate emerging priorities, and could 
be expanded, for example, in response to different issues, and possibly 
involve utilising migration as an adaptation strategy.
Finally, it is important to note that arguments for the utilisation of existing 
policies to address environmental and climate change migration should not 
be taken as rejecting the development of new normative legal and policy 
instruments outright. Rather, drawing on the conceptual challenges that 
the environment–migration nexus presents for the development of these 
instruments, it is argued that an absence of consensus on the desirability 
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of such new standards does not imply that nothing can be done (Piguet et 
al., 2011; McAdam, 2010). How sustainable such existing policy settings 
are, in relation to future migration, is a key question.
Conclusions
A fundamental challenge for policymakers and decision-makers attempting 
to respond to environmentally related migration is the difficulty involved 
in conceptualising and defining the links between environmental and 
climate change factors and international migration, including irregular 
migration. Further, the lack of reliable empirical research and analysis 
on the issues means there is a weak evidence-base to underscore effective 
policy development or implementation. 
Building the research base to determine the role of environmental factors 
among the range of other drivers that contribute to decision-making 
processes involved in regular and irregular migration across borders is 
complicated. Effective policy responses need to take into account the 
nature of particular environmental events or climate impacts, as well as 
the local social, political and economic contexts in which they occur. 
Some authors have proposed that a range of existing national policies can 
be utilised to address the challenges raised by environmental migration. 
Given the multilayered nature of environmentally related migration, 
cooperation and coordination between different policy areas has been 
widely recommended to ensure that overlapping issues are captured. 
A number of approaches to managing environmentally related migration 
have been put forward at both the international and national levels. 
However, all of these approaches have struggled to comprehensively 
address the multifaceted nature of the issues involved. One of the greatest 
challenges ahead will be to understand the nature of environmentally-
related migration in order to develop policy responses that will effectively 
address potential future movement across borders. 
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Khalid Koser and Marie McAuliffe
The purpose of this volume—like the research program from which 
it emerges—has been to address a gap in evidence of, and knowledge 
about, irregular migration, in order to inform policymaking, specifically 
in Australia. This concluding chapter assesses the extent to which this 
purpose has been achieved, and highlights remaining evidence, research, 
and policy gaps.
Addressing a gap in evidence and knowledge
On the whole, research on irregular migration has tended to focus on 
specific case studies or themes, and usually from a particular disciplinary 
approach. In contrast, this volume has tried to present a global and 
multidimensional perspective on irregular migration. Specific case studies 
of Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, both significant countries of origin for 
maritime asylum seekers to Australia in recent years, combine with wider 
studies on the causes of irregular migration globally. A chapter on Indonesia 
provides a more systematic understanding of migrant decision-making in 
transit. Several chapters adopt a global and comparative perspective on 
issues such as trends in asylum seeking. The entire migration ‘cycle’ is 
covered, from the decision to leave, through experiences in transit and 
applying for asylum in destination countries, to return. The chapters 
combine qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods, and are written by 
scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds including public health, 
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psychology, politics, geography, sociology and demography. The topics 
covered range from environmental drivers for migration, through media 
coverage of irregular migration, to unaccompanied minors.
Through this diversity, at the same time, a number of key unifying 
themes emerge. First, the chapters demonstrate how defining irregular 
migration is far from straightforward. The category covers a wider range 
of experiences than is often assumed. It includes both people who enter 
transit and destination countries with authorisation, and those who enter 
without authorisation. Asylum seekers, economic migrants, and transit 
migrants may all also be irregular migrants. Irregularity is not a fixed 
experience—regular migrants may become irregular, irregular migrants 
may be regularised. The contributions remind us that the concept includes 
people moving for different and sometimes mixed motivations, and with 
a wide diversity of profiles. There are often convergences in the manner 
that regular and irregular migrants move, whether arising from similar 
decision-making processes, to moving through similar networks and 
channels. A lack of data and research simply compounds such definitional 
challenges.
A second related theme is the multifaceted nature of irregular migration. 
As illustrated here, it involves different routes, modes of transportation, 
and geographies, even between the same origin and destination country. 
Motivations may vary between migrants, and even for the same migrant 
over time. Governments, international organisations, the private sector 
and non-state actors, some legal and others not, all have a stake in the 
causes and consequences of, as well as potential responses to, irregular 
migration. Irregular migration intersects with both state security and 
human security, and challenges existing legal, normative and institutional 
frameworks. It should not be a surprise that there is no easy policy solution 
to this multifaceted challenge.
Third, the chapters demonstrate the importance of context. The decision to 
migrate is rarely made in isolation from wider family contexts, in particular 
for unaccompanied minors. Irregular migration often takes place alongside 
other forms of regular migration. Understanding what drives irregular 
migration requires understanding the influence of global trends such as 
disparities in development, democracy and demography, the global jobs 
crisis, and revolutions in communications and transportation. Similarly, 
effective policymaking in response to irregular migration necessitates 
trade-offs with other public policy concerns such as security and economic 
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growth. Even analysis of media coverage of irregular migration, usually 
assumed to be one-dimensional and negative, demonstrates how in fact 
coverage varies in response to wider contextual features such as recession 
and compassion in response to particular humanitarian disasters.
The contributions also point to remaining evidence and research gaps. 
More research is required on decision-making by (irregular) migrants, 
both before they leave home and when they are in transit. Experiences 
in transit as a whole remain understudied, despite clear indications that 
the number of migrants in transit worldwide is increasing. There is clearly 
more research required on media reporting on irregular migration, too. 
None of this research is easy, and the research represented here has on the 
one hand often adopted innovative methods in order to overcome some 
of the challenges; but on the other hand, it leaves the reader in no doubt 
of their shortcomings and the methodological challenges confronted. 
Equally, the contributions here reinforce why further research must be 
undertaken, in order to inform policy.
Informing policymaking
Policymaking obviously is shaped by influences other than just evidence 
and knowledge, and in certain circumstances may take place in spite 
of, rather than as a result of, the current body of research. Equally, 
well-informed policy may be ineffective; it may even result in negative 
unintended consequences because of changes in, for example, geopolitics 
or technology. Bridging the research–policy divide to develop effective 
and sustainable policy remains a perennial challenge in migration as in 
many other fields of public policy. 
Such observations notwithstanding, at the very least it can be proposed 
that together the contributions to this volume have implications for 
policy, and more widely than in Australia alone. 
One is apparent simply in restating the main messages that have emerged: 
irregular migration is complex, multifaceted, and deeply contextualised. 
It would be naïve to suggest that policy can ever be granular or dynamic 
enough to respond fully to this reality, but there are still implications here 
for how policy can be better planned, implemented and evaluated. 
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It should have become clear that irregular migration is a dynamic subset 
of migration, which is itself a dynamic subset of mobility. Understanding 
the interlinkages between irregular migration and wider global processes 
demonstrated by the contributions to this volume leads to the realisation 
that it cannot be managed in isolation from these processes. The chapters 
on Afghanistan and Sri Lanka in this volume imply, for example, that 
migration agencies may not always even be the best equipped to implement 
policies that seek to influence immigration; for example, in situations 
where the focus is on the root causes of migration such as climate change, 
conflict, relative deprivation or violent extremism. The chapters on transit 
migration suggest that, when it comes to evaluating the impacts of policy, 
the extent to which the rights of irregular migrants are being respected 
is just as relevant as reducing numbers. Similarly, the chapter on assisted 
voluntary return makes clear that the scale of return migration should not 
necessarily be a proxy for the sustainability of return.
There are good reasons why many states still attempt to manage migration 
(and in particular irregular migration) on a largely unilateral basis, given 
its intersection with sovereign issues of economic growth, citizenship, 
identity and security. But a second implication for policy that emerges 
from this volume is a recognition of the limits of bilateral or unilateral 
responses to multilateral challenges. It has been suggested here that policy 
interventions in origin and transit countries may be just as important 
as those in destination countries in reducing irregular migration (as well 
as respecting the right of migrants). As has been explained, irregular 
migration is in any case driven by global forces that necessitate at least 
regional and often global approaches. The implication of the chapter on 
environmental migration is that while adapting national laws and policies 
may be the most expedient response, ultimately it may be time to revisit 
the international protection regime.
This observation on the importance of a multilateral approach may 
also be extended to emphasising the importance of a multistakeholder 
approach, as illustrated here. Individual migrants rarely make the decision 
to move alone; thus, reaching families and communities is important 
for information campaigns. There is a range of intermediaries involved 
in migrant smuggling and human trafficking; thus, targeting just one 
operative will rarely disrupt the business. The media can influence public 
perceptions of migration and of the extent to which governments are 
able to manage borders and migration. Sustainable return depends on 
reintegration within local communities. Although not adequately reflected 
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in the contributions to this volume, there is growing recognition of the 
pivotal role the private sector could play in contributing to more effective 
migration management.
A third implication arising from the various contributions is to guard 
against policy responses that view irregular migration exclusively as 
a security challenge. As has been acknowledged here and by several 
contributors, irregular migration can certainly pose challenges to state 
security by, for example, undermining the exercise of state sovereignty 
and disrupting managed migration programs and asylum systems. But as 
has also been made clear, development interventions, good governance 
in origin and transit countries, and promoting respect for rights may be 
just as effective as border management and restriction in undermining 
irregular migration. The risk of ‘securitising’ irregular migration is that 
it legitimises extraordinary responses, which themselves may often 
be counterproductive. Fitting environmental migration into existing 
frameworks for regular migration will be an important priority for 
the future.
That the contributions here have policy relevance should not be surprising 
as they emerge from papers commissioned by a research program with close 
links to policy and operational areas across government. Importantly, the 
findings in these papers were able to be combined with other knowledge 
and evidence, such as analysis of administrative data and classified 
material, to directly inform policy and operational deliberations. At the 
same time, some more conceptual implications also emerge, albeit not 
usually explicitly. For example, the sharp distinctions between traditional 
migration categories of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ or ‘economic’ and 
‘political’ have been shown to be empirically blurred. Legal, normative 
and institutional arrangements are largely still based on these traditional 
categories, and need to adapt to new realities.
Beyond Australia
As stated, this volume arises from a research program explicitly established 
to inform Australian policy. To an extent, this has determined the papers 
commissioned by the program and by extension the chapters in this 
volume. Thus, they have focused on cases and themes of direct relevance 
to Australian policymaking on irregular migration. But that is not to say 
that these cases and themes are not also relevant elsewhere. There has, 
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for example, been a significant increase in the number of Afghan asylum 
seekers in Europe during the last year; it is well known that Europe has 
faced a surge in maritime arrivals; and significant policy focus in Europe is 
on transit migration and decision-making in Greece and Turkey. Likewise, 
the events of May 2015, involving thousands of irregular migrants 
stranded in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, pointed to significant 
policy challenges facing South East Asia. The key messages and policy 
implications elucidated above also clearly apply to irregular migration, 
and policy responses, beyond Australia alone.
In at least three ways the genesis of this volume also has lessons beyond 
Australia. First, it is laudable both that the report of the Expert Panel 
identified a need for research as a priority (among only 22) for Australian 
policy, and the government responded by investing in the Irregular 
Migration Research Program. As this volume has amply demonstrated, 
there is a real dearth of evidence on and understanding of irregular 
migration patterns and processes, particularly in the Australian context, 
and further research is required. Some of the priorities have been identified 
here, and the Australian and other governments should continue to 
support research efforts.
Second, it is striking that the research program included international 
experts both as advisers and contributors. This approach risked 
international opprobrium at a time when Australia’s asylum policies were 
quite controversial. But it also demonstrated a willingness to learn from 
the experiences of other countries and regions that have been confronted 
by far larger numbers of irregular migrants than Australia. The fact that 
international experts were willing to engage is a timely reminder in the face 
of Europe’s migration crisis that proximity does not define responsibility. 
It also highlights the global nature of irregular migration, which is 
underscored by the increasing global mobility of irregular migrants—the 
rescue of migrants from Myanmar off the coast of Turkey in early 2016 is 
a case in point, and such examples are becoming less rare.
Third, the research program explicitly provided an opportunity for 
‘horizon-scanning’ and ‘blue-sky thinking’. The inclusion of chapters 
towards the end of this volume on media representations of irregular 
migration and the future challenges of environmental migration are 
illustrative. All too often migration policymaking is short-term and 
reactive. This is particularly problematic when recognising that, on the 
whole, migration presents challenges in the short term, and only realises 
dividends in the longer term.
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It would be remiss not to conclude a section entitled ‘Beyond Australia’, 
and a volume focusing on ‘irregular migration’, without finally reflecting 
on the migration crisis in Europe, against which backdrop this volume 
will be published. The potential relevance of this volume certainly should 
not be overestimated—it has largely focused on a different set of challenges 
than those currently confronted in Europe and of course in a different 
context. But some of the research will be relevant to European policymakers, 
such as the work concerning decision-making by migrants in transit. The 
three key messages distilled here—complexity, multidimensionality and 
context—also resonate in Europe today. And the lessons posted here for 
policy, in particular the importance of guarding against viewing migration 
as a security issue unless justified, should also guide decisions currently 
being made by European politicians and policymakers.

